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The ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state was built by British colonialism in West 
Africa’s Niger basin.  Its supra-national status derives from its multi-national 
composition.  It attracts the attention of scholars who want to account for its continuing 
poor political performance.  Our inquiry into the roots of its continuing poor political 
performance was conducted from the perspectives of Harry Eckstein’s congruence theory 
and the derivative framework from it that we called the E-G scheme.
We found a high degree of social, economic, and political heterogeneity amongst 
the diverse nationalities that were compelled to constitute it.  In the three nationalities—
the Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa-Fulani—that we sampled, that heterogeneity is evident in 
their governmental and non-governmental authority patterns.  We found that the British 
formulated and implemented state building policies that preferentially favored the Hausa-
Fulani but not the Igbo, the Yoruba, and others.  We found that the British were 
impressed by the inherent autocratic traits of the Hausa-Fulani, but not the obviously 
democratic traits of the indigenous Igbo, and Yoruba authority patterns.   Thus, while 
there emerged tremendous resemblances between the authority patterns of the ‘Nigerian’ 
supra-national state and those of the Hausa-Fulani, there emerged deep-seated disparity 
between them and indigenous Igbo, and Yoruba authority patterns.  We established that 
the resultant state of affairs created and promotes commensurate bases of legitimacy for 
the authority of the supra-national state only in core Hausa-Fulani society but not in Igbo 
and Yoruba societies.  During colonial rule high political performance in the ‘Nigerian’ 
supra-national state was region-specific.  In spite of the resemblances shared by the 
authority patterns of the supra-national state and indigenous Hausa-Fulani authority
patterns, their common incongruence and inconsonance with the indigenous authority 
patterns of the Igbo, Yoruba, and others constitute sufficient ground for the continuing 
poor political performance in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state.  
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THEORETICAL PROBLEM AND FRAMEWORK
Europe’s external intervention in Africa in the late nineteenth century is a 
building enterprise.  But it wasn’t until the end of colonialism in the post-World War II 
period that the polities or products of that intervention in Africa and elsewhere in the 
colonized world emerged and were recognized as “new and sovereign independent 
states” (Huntington 1965: 415-6).  In an era that was characterized by the strategic rivalry 
of the Cold War between the US and the former Soviet Union, the course of political 
development in the ‘new states’ attracted considerable attention from American social 
scientist beginning from the 1950s (Gendzier 1985).  The concern of most policy makers 
in the US was to prevent the ‘new states’ from becoming the allies of their ideological 
rival, the Soviet Union (Huntington 1965, Apter and Andrain 1968, Chirot 1981).  Many 
in the US foreign policy establishment and academe at the time believed that given the 
European-type institutional structures bequeathed to the ‘new states’ by the various 
European powers that colonized them, they could be swayed to modernize in the image 
of North American and West European societies.  They were convinced that it was the 
best path to development in the ‘new states’.  We also know that states in most North 
American and West European societies experience what Eckstein (1969 and 1971) and 
Gurr and McClelland (1971) characterized as high governmental or political 
performance.  The aforementioned scholars outlined five dimensions: legitimacy, 
durability, civil order, permeation and decisional efficacy as the indicators of 
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governmental or political performance in any given polity or political unit.1  When 
expectations of high performance proved false in many of the ‘new states’, the question 
of why it did began to occupy the attention of the US foreign policy establishment and 
many Euro-American scholars.
Theoretical Issues
The Rationale for Focusing on Political Violence
Ever since those immediate post-World War II years that were marked by the 
ideological rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union, the multi-dimensional issue of 
political performance in the ‘new states’ has received the consistent attention of many 
scholars across the various social science disciplines and even history.  It is mostly 
because political performance in the ‘new states’ has persistently remained low, and the 
fact that as a sociological phenomenon it continues to elicit extensive consequences in 
their societies that we are equally focusing on it as the problem of interest in the present
study. Many studies of political performance in ‘new states’ have often emphasized the 
absence of civil disorder and not the other four dimensions in their assessment of political 
performance in the ‘new states’.  The hypothetical explanation for that could be found in 
the notoriety, which is associated with the violent activities that characterize the absence 
of civil order in society.  
Political performance in polities is a function of the five crucial dimensions—
legitimacy, durability, permeation, decisional efficacy, and civil disorder (Eckstein 1971, 
Gurr and McClelland 1971).  But most studies—including this one—of political 
1 The concepts of governmental performance, political performance and political 
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performance in polities often focus on the presence or absence of civil disorder to make 
the determination of poor or high political performance.  The reason might derive 
probably from the notoriety, which is associated with the violence, and destruction that 
comes with civil disorder whenever it occurs in societies.  Violence has been the staple of 
“the history of organized political life” (Gurr 1970: 3) in Europe.  The history of the 
modern world is no exception on this either. Gurr underscored this when he observed that 
political violence often destroys men and property, and is “corrosive of political 
institutions” (Gurr 1970: 10).2  Events in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state reaffirm 
Gurr’s observation in some canny ways.  Table 1.1 below shows that since October 1, 
1960, when colonial rule yielded way to indigenous rule, the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national 
state has experienced eleven different governments at the center.  Seven of those 
governments were un-elected.  They were installed and controlled by soldiers, while the 
remaining four were elected and controlled by civilians (see Table 1.1 below).
Jedrzej G. Frynas (1988) characterized those elected civilian governments as 
unstable.  Frynas’ characterization derives from his reason that they were all overthrown 
by soldiers in coups d’etat.   Frynas’ characterization can also apply to the various 
military regimes that took power in the supra-national state.  Two of those military 
regimes were themselves wracked by coup attempts, while three others were themselves 
deposed in successful army-led coups.  One military regime replaced itself with an 
appointed military successor.  The other was succeeded by another military successor 
regime after the sudden death of the army strongman.
instability are used synonymously throughout the study.
2 See Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (1970), NJ: Princeton University Press.
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Table 1.1: Governments in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state, 1960-1999
Duration Head of State Government Ethnic origin How rule ended
1960-66 Balewa Civilian Hausa/North Coup/assassination
1966 Ironsi Military Igbo/South Coup/assassination
1966-75 Gowon Military Angi/North Coup
1975-76 Mohammed Military Hausa/North Coup attempt/assa.
1976-79 Obasanjo Military Yoruba /South Elections
1979-83 Shagari Civilian Fulani/North Coup
1984-85 Buhari Military Fulani/North Coup
1985-93 Babangida Military North Stepped down
1993-94 Shonekan Appointed Yoruba/South Coup
1994-98 Abacha Military Kanuri/North Sudden death
1998-99 Abubakar Military Hausa/North Sham election
Source: Frynas, Jedrzej George. 1998. “Political Instability and Business: Focus on Shell 
in Nigeria”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 19. Number 3. Pp. 457-478.
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Figure 1.1: Matrix table showing some of the details of five of the violent incidents of 
political instability in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state in 1966, 1967, 1976, 1985, and 
1990 respectively.  Sources: Luckham (1971b), Miners (1971).  West Africa magazine of 
January 22, August 6, 13, and 27, October 8, November 26, 1966, February 23, March 
22, 1976, January 6, and 13, February 3, and March 3, 1986.  Newswatch magazine of 
May 7, August 6, and August 13, 1990.   African Concord of May 14, 1990. 
3 This includes 39 commissioned military officers and 171 other ranks all but 12 of whom 
were Igbo.
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The drama and destructiveness associated with political violence underscores why 
it is most visible of the five indices of political violence.  Figure 1.1 above which presents 
some the details of five of the coups, attempted coups and coup plots in the ‘Nigerian’
supra-national state is further proof of that.  Ninety-one military officers, other ranks, and 
civilians were executed in three of those events.  A pogrom, displacement of huge 
number of persons, and a thirty-month long war which is documented as one of the “most 
deadly conflicts” (Gurr 1970: 3) in modern history are some of the aftermaths of those 
events.  Political violence is more visible than the other four dimensions of political 
performance.  Put differently, focusing on political violence in the study of political 
performance is akin to using the most visible factor to prove the presence of the other less 
visible ones.
Definitions of the Problem and Their Theoretical Perspectives
The variations in the “theoretical categorization” (Morrison and Stevenson 1971: 
348) of failed state development measured by political instability makes it pertinent for 
us to showcase some of its definitions furnished in various theoretical contexts in some 
existing studies.  North American social scientists who accounted for the failure of the 
‘new states’ to fulfill the aforementioned expectation framed their account of that failure 
variously in terms of political instability.  Morrison and Stevenson (1971: 347) have 
defined political instability as “a condition in political systems in which the 
institutionalized patterns of authority break down, and the expected compliance to 
political authorities is replaced by political violence”.  Samuel P. Huntington on the other 
hand designates the same phenomenon as “political decay” (Huntington 1965: 392).
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There were some social scientists including Feit (1968), and Luckham (1971b) 
who perceived the dramatic unraveling of central governments in the ‘new states’  through 
military take-over and civil unrest as a breakdown in institutional transfer.  Still, many 
others like Nordlinger (1970), LaPalombara (1968), Pennock (1966), Almond (1965), and
Decalo (1973) concurred with Huntington (1965, 1968) to characterize political 
instability in the ‘new states’ as a function of ‘low political institutionalization’.  The 
range of events shown in studies by Eckstein (1965), Rummel (1963, 1966), Tanter 
(1966), Bwy (1968), Feierabend and Feierabend (1966), Morrison and Stevenson (1971) 
as indicators of political instability have included riots, civil wars, coups d’etat, plots, 
assassinations, etc.  In the same token, the theoretical categorization of political 
instability has been varied (Morrison and Stevenson 1971: 348).  For our purposes we 
have adopted the conceptionalizations of the indicators of political instability that 
Morrison and Stevenson (1971) collated from different sources and with some 
modifications and additions as our benchmark—see Table 1.2 below.
Most of the scholars who studied political instability in the ‘new states’ in the 
1960s tended to raise and re-echo similar themes that centered particularly on the tenets 
of the modernization theory in their analyses and arguments (Huntington 1965, 1968, 
Apter and Andrain 1968, Decalo 1973).  They argued that the traditional basis of political
authority in the societies of the ‘new states’ as well as the inadequate living standards of 
their populace are factors that inhibit the development of both modern political 
institutions and their associated democratic trappings in them.  All those, they argue 
further, engender the prevalence of authoritarian political leadership, which in turn 
unleash instability in the body politic of the ‘new states’ (Emerson 1955, Staley 1954). 
8
Table 1.2: Similarities in the definitions of incidents that indicate political instability.  
Source: Morrison and Stevenson (1971: 350-3), with some modifications and additions.  
























duration in two or 
more distinct 
geographical areas.
Riots: Any violent 
demonstration or 
clash of more than 
100 citizens 
involving the use 
of physical force.
Micro-riots: An organized 
or unorganized public 
display of protest on the 
part of 10,000 or fewer 
people with accompanying 
violence.
Macro-riots: Organized or 
unorganized public 
display of protest on the 
part of more than 10,000 
people with accompanying 
violence; however the 
violence is limited to 100 
or fewer injuries.
Severe macro-violence: 
Distinguished by a large 
amount of violence—more 
than 10,000 persons in 
participation.
Riots: Events involving 
relatively spontaneous, 
short-lived but violent 
activity, in which the 
generalized aims of the 
insurgents or the objects 




declarations of emergency 
by the national 
government in response to 
real or presumed threats to 
the public order.  Such 
declarations include the 
imposition of martial law, 





of at least 100 
people for the 
primary purpose 







An organized or 
unorganized non-
violent public display 
of protest on the part of 
10,000 people or fewer.
Macro-demonstrations: 
An organized or 
unorganized non-
violent public display 
of protest on the part of 





violent activity, in 
which the aim of 
participants is to protest 
some specific action on 
the part of domestic 
political authorities.  
When demonstrations 
are counteracted by 
violence on the part of 




Any strike of 1,000 
or more industrial 
or service workers 
that involves more 
than one employer 






collective cessation of 
work on the part of 10,000 
or fewer members of the 
labor force or other 
employees, students, or 
professional workers.
General Strikes: 
Collective cessation of 
work lasting for a week or 
less, and involving labor 
force or other employees, 
students or professional 
workers.
Macro-strikes: Collective 
cessation of work lasting 
longer than a week and 
involving more than 
10,000 members of the 
labor force, or other 
students or professional 
workers.
Strikes: Events involving 
organized disruptions of 
the economy by groups 
who refuse to work at 
their regular employment 
in order to bring pressure 
to bear on political or 
economic authorities.  A 
strike event is identified in 
terms of the organizational 
unity of the strikers, not 
the economic or 
geographical 
differentiation of work 
locations: e.g., a strike of 
mine workers which 
begins at one mine on 
Monday and another mine 
on Wednesday is counted 





terrorism from the 
more undisciplined 
and discontinuous 














motivated murder or 
attempted murder of a 
political figure by a group 
or individual not acting 
under the auspices of 
government. 
Terrorism and sabotage: 
Organized violent activity 
on the part of small groups 
of citizens, which is 
directed toward 




organized and planned 
activity on the part of 
small but cohesive groups 
in which the aim of the 
activity is to damage, 
injure, or eliminate 
government property or 
personnel.  These 
activities include bomb 









Violence or the 
threat of it by one 
or more parts of 
the power elite 
against other parts.
Mutiny: Violence 
on the established 
order by groups, 
which are part of 
its own 
instruments of 
force, such as 
police, etc.
Plots: Equivocal, 
rather because they 
are opposed while 
in an early 
conspiratorial 
stage (and thus are 
not violent), or 
because the alleged 
plot may be only a 
pretext by which 
the government 







through the use of 
the formal 
administrative




illegal or forced 
change in the top 
governmental elite, 
any attempt at such 










jailing or execution 
of political 
opposition within 
the ranks of the 
regime or the 
opposition.
Coups d’etat: An illegal or 
forced change in the top 
office holders, whether 
successful or not.  
Characterized by the 
limited number of persons 
involved, usually the in-
group elite and the 
challenging, out-group 
elite, and the geographical 
location in which it 
occurs, usually the capital 
city.
Coup d’etat: An event in 
which the existing 
political regime is 
suddenly and illegally 
displaced by the action of 
relatively small, elite 
groups without any overt 




Plots: Events in which an 
announcement or 
admission is made by the 
political elite that a plot to 
overthrow the government 
has been discovered.
Mutiny: A declaration by 
part or all of a national 
security force to the 
decisions of political 
authorities or senior 
officers.  The aim of a 







military or police 
establishment.  
The intention of 
the authors is 
always to use their 
action to call 
attention to some 
personal or group 
grievances.  It 
could involve or 
not involve the 
loss of lives or 
destruction of 
property.  It is not 
aimed at the 
removal of the 





of a government, 
which is followed 
by a total 
reorganization of 





of members of a
nationality through 
mob actions aimed 
at eliminating 
them.  In most 
situations the 
victims reside 
away from their 
own homeland in 




civil and guerrilla 
warfare, which 
have not been 
separately counted 
because of the 
frequent 
inadequacy of the 
source.  
Characterized by a 
high degree 















indication of the 
existence of 
extended violence, 
such as a 
prolonged civil 
war, through a 
double asterisk 
attached to the 
particular nation in 




systematic use of 
intimidation and 
harassment by 
assassination and / 
or sabotage by 






wars because the 
violence was not 









carried on by 
independent bands 
of citizens, or 
irregular forces, 
and aimed at the 
overthrow of the 
present regime.
Guerrilla warfare: Armed 
activity by mobile and 
scattered irregular forces 
aimed at the overthrow of 
the government.  This 
event usually takes the 
form of sporadic attacks 
on villages and outposts 
and is characterized by the 
irregular tactics employed.
Civil war: All out war 
between two or more 
organized major segments 
of the population.  Each 
segment has its own 
government and the entire 
nation becomes involved.
Revolts: An armed attempt 
on the part of a group to 
form an independent 
government.  The gravity 
of the event is less than 
that of a civil war, 
involving less of the 
population and similar 
geographical area.
Civil War: An event in 
which an identifiable 
communal group attempts 
by secession to form a 
new polity based on 
boundaries of ethnic 
community, or by take-
over to monopolize 
political power for the 
communal group within 
existing political system.
Rebellion: An event in 
which an identifiable 
communal group seeks to 
gain increased autonomy 
from the national political 
authority or attacks 
supporters or agents of the 
national government 
without aiming to secede 
from or monopolize the 
existing polity.
Irredentism: An event in 
which an identifiable 
communal group seeks to 
change its political 
allegiance from the 
government of the 
territorial unit, in which 
the authorities share the 
communal identification 
of the irredentist group 
concerned.
Ethnic violence: An event 
of short duration in which 
members of two 
identifiable communal 
groups are antagonists in 
violence not designed to 
secure independence, 
autonomy, or political 
realignment for the groups 
concerned.
Revolt: An event in which 
co-ordinated attacks 
against government 
property and personnel are 
carried out by groups who 
are more readily identified 
by membership in a mss 
political movement than 
by elite or communal 
status, and whose aim is to 
overthrow the existing 
government.
Armed resistance: 
An organized and 
armed defensive 
effort by members 
of a polity in 
response to 
unprovoked armed 
attack by a foreign 
or indigenous 
polity.
Armed revolt: An 
armed uprising 
directed against an 




Successful effort to 
detach from a 
supra-national 
state imposed by 
an external power 






attempt to secede. 
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Major government 
crises: Any rapidly 
developing 
situation that 
threatens to bring 
the downfall of the 
present regime—
excluding 
situations of revolt 
aimed at such 
overthrow.
Number of people 




violence of an 
inter-group nature, 
thus excluding 
deaths by murder 
and execution.
Exile: Politically 
motivated, voluntary or 
involuntary exit from the 
country.
Arrests of significant 
persons: Government 
seizure or detainment of a 
significant individual for 
political reasons.  
Imprisonment and jailing 
are included in this 
variable.
Martial Law: Suspension 
of the constitution and its 
replacement by military 
rule.  The guarantees of 
individual and group 
rights are discarded and 
arbitrary decrees are 
supreme.
Number killed: The 
number of persons killed 
in instability events of all 
kinds. In cases of 
conflicting reports the 
highest figure given is 
taken.  The variable is also 
given in the form log10 
(X+1), where X is the raw 
score.
Arrests: The number of 
persons arrested for 
political offences, whether 
specifically tied to 
instability events or not.
Emerson (1955) identified some specific factors, the absence of which, he argues 
promotes political instability in the ‘new states’.  Such factors include, the “lack of 
experience in government and administrative functions, the relative thinness of a modern 
westernized elite and its dissociation from the traditional masses, the consequent lack of 
development of institutions of local government, and the continuation of traditional 
patterns”, in the ‘new states’ (Eisenstadt1961: 11-12).  Political instability in the ‘new 
states’ was also explained as the product of the tension inherent in their transition from 
traditional to modern societies (Scaliapino 1951).  Scaliapino who called attention to the 
prevalent tense international political and economic environment caused by the 
ideological rivalry between the US and the former Soviet Union believed that it was a 
factor that promoted political instability in the ‘new states’.   
Leonard Binder, et al (1971) believed that the ‘new states’ experience political 
instability largely because they are unlike the developed states of Western Europe and 
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North America, which could mobilize “more effort and resources … for coping with the 
inherent tensions in the development syndrome” (in Pye 1971: viii).  Binder, et al 
articulate ‘development syndrome’ as “a continuous interaction among the processes of 
structural differentiation, the imperatives of equality, and the integrative, responsive, and 
adaptive capacity of a political system” (Coleman 1971: 74).  Huntington (1965 and 
1968), who got involved in the debate from the outset, argues that, “in large part, 
[political instability in the ‘new states’ is] “the product of rapid social change and the 
rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of 
political institutions” (Huntington 1968: 4).  
But one is not hard-pressed to concur with Eisentadt’s disagreement with the 
arguments and conclusions of the authors of the studies cited above.  He substantiates his 
disagreements by arguing that their arguments and conclusions “are often based on 
implicit assumptions as to the relative importance of some social conditions which may 
influence the stability and development of the new institutions” (Eisentadt 1961: 11) in 
the ‘new states’.
Eisentadt’s disagreement is based on the following couple of points.  He argues 
that the aforementioned scholars:  
(1.) fail to systematize their assumptions, and 
(2.) that they focus their works “on the extent to which political institutions, [in the “new 
states”] especially on the formal level, deviate from the Western political pattern” 
(Eisenstadt 1961: 12).  Eisentadt’s points of departure from those he criticized, is indeed 
cause for worry.  He seemed to have been merely interested in: (a) capturing “the internal 
dynamics of social and political systems” (Eisentadt 1961: 12) in the ‘new states’, and (b) 
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to discern “the ways in which [their] societies accommodate themselves—successfully or 
unsuccessfully—to various aspects of modern political institutions, and evolve relatively 
new forms of political organization” (Eisentadt 1961: 12).  
The Choice of the Niger Basin as a Case for a
Longitudinal Comparative Historical Study
Earlier attempts to explain political instability in the ‘new states’ and its 
sociological consequences in their economic, political, and even social development have 
been associated with certain pitfalls.  The most glaring of such pitfalls has been the 
tendency to lump the ‘new states’ together.  This is usually done without regard to their 
diverse geopolitical and historical attributes.  The assumptions that the ‘new states’ are all 
former colonies, and that unlike established states in Western Europe and North America 
most of them are economically underdeveloped, tend to be the main factors that 
determine why they are categorized together.  When we view these assumptions in the 
context of two points, made separately by Rustow (1957) and Eisentadt (1961) the 
alternative recommendation that attempts to categorize must proceed with caution 
becomes necessary and realistic.  (a) In a language that captured Rustow’s argument on 
the matter in all of its essence, Eisentadt points out that “many of the underdeveloped 
societies did not have official colonial status” (Eisentadt 1961: 13).  (b) Furthermore, 
they both posit that the ‘new states’ are neither racially nor geopolitically, talk less of 
being culturally homogeneous.  
But for our purposes and based on the above observations, we believe that the 
need to infuse extra care in any attempt to aggregate the ‘new states’ in social research 
becomes more glaring when we realize that the former colonies amongst them were not 
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all colonized by the same European states.  We therefore caution that more meaningful 
studies of political development in the ‘new states’ should accommodate their diverse 
colonial experiences.  Accommodating their different colonial history in any study must 
start from the outset when a researcher makes his choice of what to include or exclude as 
cases.
In addition to the reasons espoused above, our choice of a case in this derives 
from other reasons that are related on the one hand to the African continent in general, 
and specifically to the Niger basin and its inhabitants on the other.  I outline some of the 
reasons that relate to Africa in general, first.  
Despite Africa’s socio-cultural diversity, its peoples and their societies share 
considerably on a range of similarities in their contacts with Europeans and in the latter’s 
pattern of intervention in their internal politics beginning in the second half of the 
nineteenth century.  For instance, before colonial conquest, almost all inhabitants of West 
Africa’s coasts participated actively in trade and commerce with traders from different 
European countries over an extensive period of time (Dike 1956a, Igbafe 1970).  Colonial 
conquest and rule assumed the same pattern in Africa in the sense that they involved a 
range of different European states.  All over Africa each European colonizing state was 
confronted by the continent’s socio-cultural and political heterogeneity.  In every 
situation the challenges that confronted each colonizing state did not just impact on the 
course of its conquest of the inhabitants of the area, but equally influenced the character 
and dynamics of colonial rule itself.  The reason for that was the formulation and 
implementation of colonial policies that were largely influenced by those challenges.  In 
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all, the of aforementioned similarities make Africa a suitable location to choose a case 
from for a study like the present one.
We believe that the Niger basin is one of Africa’s several microcosms.  It 
encompasses the continent’s rich socio-cultural diversity, which that can often become a 
suitable benchmark for sociological inquiry.  The argument for the value of the choice of 
the Niger basin, was succinctly underscored by Coleman when he asserts that it 
encapsulates “groups that … reflect the widest range of political organizations of any 
territory on the continent” (Coleman 1958: 4).  The supra-national state which resulted 
from Britain’s external intervention in the Niger basin is endowed with peculiarities that 
distinguish it from other polities, which resulted from similar circumstances.  Those 
peculiarities which border on the variables that derive from the diversity of its inhabitants 
make the Niger basin a more extreme case of diversity, which in turn makes it quite 
deserving of serious social research attention.  By studying this more extreme case it 
becomes easier to discern patterns and develop hypotheses and theoretical generalizations 
that can be applied to other cases.
Some studies on political development in the Niger basin tend to make “a broad 
distinction … between the “primary resistance”” (Coleman 1958: 4) of the respective 
African nationalities4 that inhabit it “on the one hand, and, (sic) on the other hand, the 
4 Coleman’s conceptualization of a nationality, which follows is one that we buy into in 
the study: “A people distinguished from other peoples by one or more common cultural 
traits (a common language, a shared historical tradition, a common mythology as to 
origin, or similar customs).  A nationality is the largest traditional African group above a 
tribe which can be distinguished from other groups by one or more objective criteria 
(normally language).  Present or recent political unity is not necessarily characteristic of a 
nationality, although such unity no doubt prevailed in the original core group (tribe) from 
which many of the ‘Nigerian’ nationalities have developed historically.  
“The concept of “nationality”, …is considered essential for any working 
classificatory scheme for ‘Nigerian’ social and political groupings…. [w]hereas several 
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movement to create new political nationalities (that is, Nigeria, Western Region, Eastern 
Region, Northern Region) as self-governing units in the modern world” (Coleman 1958: 
4) due to and since colonial conquest.  But the tendency to ignore the former in favor of 
the latter confuses the analysis and findings in a study like Coleman’s.  Coleman asserts 
wrongly though, that nationalism in the Niger basin did not commence until the time 
when “the movement to create new political nationalities” began (Coleman 1958: 4), i.e. 
after the supra-national state was built by the British.  His decision to ignore the “primary 
resistance” of [Nigeria’s] traditional … groups” (Coleman 1958: 4) against colonial 
conquest and to focus instead on their “movement to create new political nationalities” 
(Coleman 1958: 4) in his study of nationalism in the area was informed by that judgment.  
The need to avoid the confusion introduced into Coleman’s research by the deliberate 
resolve to ignore the pre-colonial and part of colonial history of the inhabitants of the 
area underscores the relevance of our present efforts.  
Coleman’s and other studies similar to it may be criticized on several counts.  
Coleman conducted his study in the immediate years following the end of World War II 
when anti-colonial resistance amongst most of the distinct nationalities that constitute the 
‘Nigerian’ supra-national state assumed new dimensions.  Put differently, World War II 
and its associated events actually helped to engender additional impetus to existing anti-
colonial resistance amongst the nationalities that inhabit the region in question.  While 
such an impetus may have quickened the demise of British colonial rule in the region, it 
nationalities are both potential and incipient nations (for example the Hausa, the Yoruba, 
the  Igbo), others are too small or awkwardly situated to become nations.  In sum, the 
concept of nationality is simply a convenient intermediate category introduced to refer to 
a people larger in population than a tribe, which is not yet and may never be a nation, but 
offers the strongest cultural basis for nationhood at the highest level and on the largest 
scale of all traditional African groupings” (Coleman 1958: 423).
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did not however, originate anti-colonial resistance in those nationalities in the first place.  
Also, the eventual demise of de facto colonial rule in the Niger basin did not entail the 
end of their negative perception of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state and its authority.  
In fact, it was mostly because the governmental and non-governmental authority patterns 
and influence relations of the supra-national state remained intact after the end of colonial 
rule that the nationalities continued to perceive its authority negatively.
What is generally perceived by scholars as political instability in the ‘Nigerian’
supra-national state today is actually the continuation of the symptoms that manifest from 
several independent variables that stem from the different political history, geography, 
and cultures of the nationalities as well as Britain’s state building activities amongst 
them.  The endemic poor political performance of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state is 
the problem of focus in the current study.  The aim is to seek the roots of that problem by 
including the nationalities that constitute the supra-national state as vital components of 
the discourse.  The principal underlying objective for so-doing is to furnish more 
sufficient explanations for the persistence of poor political performance in the latter.  The 
truth in the assertion that the nationalities that constitute the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national 
state must be factored into any inquiry that would furnish meaningful explanations for 
persistent poor political performance in the latter is made more self-evident by the fact 
that several of those nationalities had evolved into viable African states and polities prior 
to British penetration and colonial rule (Dike 1953).  There were well-established polities 
in Yorubaland, Igboland, in the Niger delta, and other parts of the lower Niger basin.  In 
the upper Niger basin too, there were viable indigenous states and polities in Hausaland, 
Tivland, etc.  All of these tend to contradict Margery Perham’s (1951) claim that the 
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history of the region and its inhabitants actually commenced with British intervention and 
military conquest.5
Theoretical Questions and Hypotheses
The following questions and hypotheses guide the study.  What stalled state 
building amongst the distinct and diverse nationalities that constitute the ‘Nigerian’
supra-national state?  Did incomplete state building among them deter the development 
of viable and durable modern political institutions in the larger “society” that may have 
emerged in the region as a result of the creation of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state?  
Did Britain’s intervention and state building activities in the region impact negatively on 
the emergence of a viable trans-national civil society in the resultant supra-national state?  
If yes, how?  Were there indigenous states and polities, as well as parallels to Britain’s 
external state building activities in the area that may have in their own right impacted the 
course of social and political development in the region amongst the nationalities that 
inhabit it?  What is the relationship between such indigenous states, polities, and parallel 
state building activities and the state of politics among the nationalities in the ensuing 
post-colonial period?  
In order to make the study, which spans three distinct periods—pre-colonial (prior 
to and up until 1884); colonial (1884-1960); and post-colonial (1960-1990)—in the 
history of this part of West Africa meaningful, we have been consistent in designating it 
5 M. J. Herskovits debunked the likes of Perham’s claims in his The Myth of the Negro 
Past (1941) with unflappable facts that prove resilience of African cultures in spite of 
colonial intervention.  So does Joseph H. Greenberg (1949).  According L. S. B. Leakey’s 
(1953 and 1954) and J. C. Carothers (1954) the resilient culture of the Kikuyu played a 
tremendous role the Mau-Mau resistence movement that they waged against British 
occuppation of Kenya.  In Must We Loose Africa (1954) Colin Legum suggested that the 
institutions, cultures of the Baganda played an important role in their anti-colonial 
resistance against the British in East Africa.
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as the Niger basin.  It is for the same reason that we refer to its inhabitants as distinct 
nationalities (Coleman 1958), while we refer to the administrative polity that they were 
carved into through Britain’s colonial intervention as the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state.  
It is by so doing that we avoid the trap of seeming to assume that all nationalities in the 
Niger basin subscribe to the existence of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state as a 
legitimate polity worthy of their political support.  Much of the argument in the study 
revolves around the contrary hypothetical contention that most of the constituent 
nationalities of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state perceive its authority negatively.  Most 
of the existing studies on political instability in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state have 
tended to either ignore or avoid making these critical distinctions altogether.  
The failure of the supra-national state to elicit positive perception of its authority 
from most of its constituent nationalities has tended to flow from three factors:
(i) Selected characteristics of social and political organization evolved by the 
constituent nationalities.  (These characteristics are in terms of type and 
scope).
(ii) The degree of heterogeneity in kinship and authority patterns in the 
constituent indigenous African states and polities in the Niger basin.
(iii) The various state building policies and preferential alliances that were 
formulated by the British, especially their support of autocratic authority 
patterns in Hausaland.
These three factors and their direct association with political instability amongst the 
nationalities in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state are represented diagrammatically in 
Figure 1.2 as well as in the four distinct hypotheses that follow.
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The degree of Differences in
Selected Characteristics 
Evolved in the Component Polities
+
Heterogeneity in                                                          +             Political Instability
Kinship and Authority                                                in the Supra-national            
Patterns of the Component State
Polities                                                                        +
Lack of Congruence and 
Consonance Between and amongst
The Authority Patterns of the
Supra-national State and those of 
The Different Nationalities due to
Preferential State Building
Policies 
Figure 1.2: Factors that contribute to political instability in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national 
state. The arrows and plus symbols indicate causation and association respectively
Hypothesis # 1: Given a high degree of social, economic and political 
heterogeneity among diverse societies in the Niger basin that were then compelled to 
constitute the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state by the British, the chances that political 
instability will prevail in the supra-national state during and after colonial rule is 
exceedingly high.
Differences in the categories of political and socio-economic organization 
amongst distinct nationalities in a geographical space are likely to produce a situation in 
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the pre-colonial period in which some of the nationalities could adopt warfare and 
military conquest as state building devices and utilize them to extend their own “political 
arrangement” or polity (Gurr and McCleland 1971: 11) into others.  This becomes 
particularly pronounced if one or more of those nationalities followed an expansionist 
policy, as did the Fulani in the upper Niger basin.  Warfare and military conquest as state 
building devices could constitute recipes for political instability in a polity, which is 
composed of politically distinct nationalities.  The problematic situation that could result 
in such a situation can in fact be exacerbated if, the social and kinship patterns defined 
for instance by marriage are not co-terminus with the political boundaries of the various 
nationalities as has been the case in the Niger basin.  Again, these establish a precursor 
for separatist movements in the supra-national state during and after de facto colonialism.  
Separatism here refers to determined desires by some of the constituent nationalities in a 
supra-national state to assert their political independence from the central authority.6
For our purposes in the study, political development is indicated by some 
attributes of not just only a state, but a political system that have been created in any 
given “social space” (Eckstein 1969: 287).  These attributes include the presence of a tax 
system, standing army, and civil bureaucracy, which are typically associated with the 
state in its strict Weberian conceptionalization.  Evidence of political development may 
also include parallels of those three attributes.  There is no doubt that there were parallels 
of those three attributes of “government-like entities” (Eckstein 1998: 529-30) in pre-
colonial African societies.  There can be no doubt too that pre-colonial Africa’s 
“government-like entities” met the needs of their inhabitants for territorial defense, civil 
6 In the Niger basin we are referring specifically to the nationalities that unlike the Hausa-
Fulani lost out due to the way Britain’s state building policies favored the Fulani 
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administration, etc.7 Socio-economic development represents the creation of an exchange 
system, written records and some form of schooling.  Schooling can be defined in the 
broader context of socialization to include the various methods and practices through 
which the young were prepared and integrated into the society in pre-colonial Africa 
(Raum 1938 and 1940, Fafunwa 1974).  
Our broad definition of these attributes here is underscored by Eckstein’s (1998) 
assertion on the need for that in contemporary social research.  When it then comes to the 
issues of social, economic, and political development, the absence of exact indicators or 
attributes in any of the nationalities of the Niger basin is not indicative that the former 
were unable to develop parallel structures that performed parallel functions in their 
societies.  We can take direct taxation and a standing army as typical examples.  Their 
absence among the Igbo does not in any way imply that “government-like entities” 
(Eckstein 1998: 529) in pre-colonial Igbo societies were unable to raise revenue for 
specific projects when the need arose for them, or waged wars to defend their society and 
citizens.  Latham (1971), Hopkins (1966), Hiskett (1966, 1967), Sundstrom (1965), 
Newbury (1961), and Jones (1958) have all shown in their work “that virtually all of pre-
colonial West Africa had economies sufficiently developed to require the use of 
circulating mediums of exchange and units of account” (Lovejoy 1974: 563). 
aristocracy classes.
7 Eckstein advocates a comparative politics that studies “macro-politics, or politics at the 
system level”, “all political systems, past, present, and future …. For greater historical 
depth … greater social depth … through the study of power, pressure, and authority in all 
aspects of society” (Eckstein 1998: 505).
7 The set of dimensions are outlined and reviewed in a logical manner in the review of 
related literature.
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Hypothesis # 2: (i) Given the high heterogeneity in the governmental authority 
patterns of the constituent nationalities in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state the 
possibility that political instability will ensue in the latter during and after colonial rule 
will be quite high. (ii) The greater the heterogeneity in the non-governmental authority 
patterns of the constituent nationalities in the supra-national state the greater the 
political instability that will ensue in the supra-national state during and after colonial 
rule.
The greater the number of diverse political entities brought together in an 
involuntary manner by a colonial power to form a supra-national state, which is held 
together by the threat or use of actual military force, the more difficult it will be for them 
to evolve much needed resemblance in their kinship and authority patterns.  Furthermore, 
all other things being equal the absence of such resemblance would translate to the supra-
national state that they constitute.8
There is an inherent rationale in this two-tiered second hypothesis.  If the 
constituent nationalities have developed their own respective authority patterns, their 
combination in a supra-national state is likely to produce latent internal conflicts that 
would manifest themselves almost immediately and exacerbate as soon as the colonial era 
and its coercive trappings ended.  This second hypothesis affirms that what is involved 
that could make a difference between the nationalities is not just the issues of their 
different systems of social, economic and political organization.  Also involved are the 
processes of social, economic and political evolution and transformation in their 
societies, which may have equally impacted the creation of different institutional patterns 
8 Details of some of the ideas mentioned in relation to Hypothesis #2 are elaborated more 
clearly in Hypothesis #3.
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that serve various needs for the polities in them. The more institutionalized all these are, 
the more difficult it would be for a colonial power to create a unified supra-national state 
that has legitimacy in the eyes of its constituent nationalities.
Hypothesis # 3: The greater the disparity between the authority patterns in the 
supra-national state and the authority patterns in its various constituent parts 
(nationalities), the greater the political instability that will prevail in some of the 
constituent nationalities during and after colonial rule.
This third hypothesis is closely inspired by the first two out of the eight 
hypotheses formulated by Eckstein (1969) in a ‘theoretical framework’ that relates 
“authority patterns to the performance of governments” (Eckstein 1969: 283).  For want 
of a better name we can call them Eckstein’s ‘congruence-consonance’ hypotheses, 
which state as follows: (a) ‘High performance by a government requires congruence 
between its authority patterns and the authority patterns of other social units in the 
society. (b) ‘High performance requires consonance among the elements of the authority 
patterns of a social unit’ (Eckstein 1969: 283, 300).  Governmental or political 
performance is “ a set of dimensions on which a high rank appears necessary if any 
government [read polity] is to be regarded as successful regardless of its concrete 
purposes (or even in the sense of its ability to achieve any substantive goals whatever)” 
(Eckstein 1969: 287).9  Inherent in those nationalities is the notion that political 
instability in the supra-national state is more likely to be region-specific.  The occurrence 
of indicators of political instability will be more frequent and more pronounced in those 
9 The set of dimensions are outlined and reviewed in a logical manner in the review of 
related literature.
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nationalities that have authority patterns that are incongruent and inconsonant with those 
of the supra-national state and vise versa.
When we deductively apply Eckstein’s hypothetical framework to our case, we 
see evidence of a disconnection between the authority patterns of the Igbo, the Yoruba, 
and the other nationalities, but not the Fulani, and those of the supra-national state.  The 
logical inference from that disconnection is that the nationalities will continue to resist 
the authority of the supra-national state.  The institutional conflict between the 
constituent nationalities and the supra-national state is compounded if the indigenous 
authority patterns in some of the former are based on normatively democratic, or even 
autocratic systems on the one hand, while the authority patterns of the latter based on 
some form of bureaucratic norms, do not accommodate their peculiarities, and vice versa.  
Indeed, we have here an explanation of why political instability prevailed and still 
prevails in colonial and post-colonial Africa respectively.  The political instability and its 
associated uncertainties that ensue in many African post-colonial states are magnified 
especially in those cases where the authority patterns of all the diverse constituent 
nationalities were not accommodated in the course of state building and in the practice of 
authority during and after colonial rule.  If at this stage in the discourse we are asked to 
resolve the puzzle of why the relative political stability in a post-colonial African state 
like Botswana has not obtained in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state, we can only 
attempt to answer that puzzle by way of speculation.  Part of the answer lies in 
Botswana’s near-homogenous composition which contrasts with ‘Nigeria’s’ overt 
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heterogeneous make-up.10  The indigenous ‘segmental units’ of society evolved in each 
nationality where political socialization takes place are hardly if at all, proximate to 
government in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state.  That speculation may be stretched a 
little further to imply that the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state is yet to evolve a civil 
society with all the attendant ‘segmental units’ that are most proximate to its government, 
amongst all of its constituent nationalities.
Hypothesis # 4: The more an intervening power imposes a supra-national 
state via preferential policies and alliances towards one of several existing nationalities 
that are socially and politically diverse, vis-à-vis the others, the greater the political 
instability that will prevail in the resultant supra-national state during and after colonial 
rule.
This fourth hypothesis captured diagrammatically in Figure 1.3 is informed by the 
following arguments.  Most colonial powers that built supra-national states in regions of 
the world whose inhabitants are distinctively diverse in their social, economic, and 
political systems often choose to ally themselves preferentially with the nationality or 
nationalities whose governmental and non-governmental authority patterns are perceived 
to be more amenable to colonial rule. The greater the tendency for such alliances between 
the state building colonial power and nationalities that it selected and favored, the greater 
the resentment of the disfavored nationalities, and by extension, the less the legitimacy of 
the authority of the resultant supra-national state in the perception of the disfavored.  
What ensues under this situation is a pattern of political conflict involving the threat or 
use of force by the managers of the supra-national state in the exercise of political 
10 Pre-colonial indigenous state formations in the territory that became ‘Botswana’
produced centralized but democratic monarchies none of which served as a bridgehead 
28
authority (Zolberg 1968).  When colonial rule ends, the negative perception of the 
authority of the supra-national state by the disfavored nationalities is bound to 
exacerbate.  That will happen especially when the indigenous ally or allies of the colonial 
power are in fact using repression to prevent the disintegration of the supra-national state.
Incongruence B/w Incongruence B/w the Relative Cong-
Imposed Autocratic Alien Imposed Autocratic Alien ruence B/w
Authority Patterns of the Authority Patterns of the the Imposed 
Supra-national State and Supra-national State and Autocratic 
Yoruba Traditional the Igbo Traditional Alien Authority
Authority Patterns Authority Patterns Patterns of the
(Constitutional/ (Decentralized/Democratic Supra-national








Very High Chance of Resistance of Resistance
      Political Instability Relatively High 
Political Stability      
Figure 1.3: The mixed legacies of clashing authority patterns and authority patterns that 
found relatively common grounds between and amongst one another.
for the autocratic authority patterns of the state built by European colonialism. 
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Some of the Existing Literature on Political Instability in Post-
Colonial States Reviewed in their Theoretical Perspectives
On Theories about the Problem of Political Instability in Post-Colonial States
Studies on political development in the ‘new states’  by Huntington (1965 and 
1968), Shils (1966), Almond, et al (1960), Rudebeck, Tornquist and Rojas (1998), 
O’Donnel and Schimeter (1986), Falola and Ihonvbere (1985), Callaghy (1984), Clapham 
(1985), Anderson (1986, 1987), Migdal (1988), and Chazan (1993) have been conducted 
from different theoretical perspectives.  These studies range from those that were 
conducted by modernization scholars to others that were situated within different strains 
of liberal, neo-liberal, and radical perspectives.  Scholars who situated their works within 
the modernization perspective have tended to stress socio-economic factors “and the rise 
of stronger middle class” (Rudebeck, Tornquist, and Rojas 1998: 3) in their explanation 
of political stability and democratic development in “new” societies.  
On the one hand, Huntington (1965, 1968) stressed the importance of modern 
political institutional structures guaranteeing political stability in society.  On the other 
hand, he also insists that ‘political decay’ entails political instability in society.  
Huntington’s argument then is that “political order depends in large part on the 
relationship between the development of political institutions and the mobilization of new 
social forces into politics” (Huntington 1968: vii).  When Huntington applies his 
argument to what he calls the “developing societies” of the Third World, his position is 
that the prevalence of political instability in them stems from “rapid social change and the 
rapid mobilization of new groups into politics, coupled with the slow development of 
political institutions” (Huntington 1968: 4).  He believes that the absence of broad 
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participation of citizens in politics helps to predispose society in the ‘new states’ to 
political instability.
Aristide Zolberg (1966, 1968) is one Euro-American Africanist11 whose “Africa-
oriented” perspective on the problem of political instability in post-colonial situations is 
deserving of review.  He asserts that the “more or less disparate societies, each with a
distinct political system, and with widely different inter-social relationships” (Zolberg 
1968: 71) that constitute Africa’s colonially created states all survived to a significant 
extent everywhere … [with their] sets of values, norms and structures” (Zolberg 1968: 
71) to exist side by side in the same “territorial containers” (Zolberg 1968: 71) with the 
values, norms, and institutional structures of the colonial and post-colonial states.  
Contemporary African societies are therefore ‘syncretic’ arrangements of “two sets of 
values, norms, and structures, the “new” and the “residual” with the latter itself usually 
subdivided into distinct sub-sets” (Zolberg 1968: 71).  Zoberg then agues that it is 
therefore the “syncretic character of contemporary African s ocieties [that] tends to be 
reflected in every sphere of social activity, including the political” (Zolberg 1968: 71). 
Scholars such as O’Donnel and Schimitter (1986), O’Donnel (1978), Falola and 
Ihonvbere (1985), Badru (1998) who write from the radical perspective have also 
theorized on the subject.  These radical scholars emphasize the role of classes, the 
dynamics of their incessant struggle, and center-periphery issues in their own 
explanations.  Arguing about the Niger basin and its inhabitants, Falola and Ihonvbere 
contend that political instability in the unitary supra-national state that it was carved into 
11 Because of their sometimes over zealous diagnosis and prescriptions on African issues 
renowned novelist of Igbo extraction Chinua Achebe characterized some of the Euro-
American Africanists as non-owners of the corpse who out-mourn the owners at the wake 
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stems from the inability of its ‘bourgeoisie’ to take control over other classes in the 
struggle “to create a viable hegemony in the social formation” (Falola and Ihonvbere 
1985: 234).  
When applied to the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state, both Marxist and 
modernization accounts of political instability are found wanting especially on the ground 
that they tend to ignore the necessity to address the historical roots and sociological 
importance of the ensuing tense relationship between the unitary supra-national state and 
the nationalities that were compelled to constitute it even though they had no say in its 
construction.  Questions about why, how, and when that tense relationship evolved and 
even survived colonialism and persists in the post-colonial era need be posed and 
addressed. Their failure to address these questions partly explains why Falola and 
Ihonvbere (1985), and Badru (1998) all dismissed the nationalities that constitute the 
‘Nigerian’ supra-national state as anachronistic (relics of the past) whose continued 
existence hinder the rise of a viable bourgeois hegemony in the country’s “social 
formation” (Falola and Ihonvbere 1985: 234).  Even after he extensively established that 
the history of party politics in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state, is one in which 
nationality associations and not political parties always select the candidates, “determine 
whether an elected official is performing well or not; and [resolve and mediate] inter-
party and intra-party conflicts”, Oghosa E. Osaghae (2003: 54) still argues that the 
resilience of the nationalities is a mere function of the failure of the supra-national state 
“to respond satisfactorily” (Osaghae 2003: 57) to their economic demands.
(see Morning Yet On Creation Day: Essays. Garden City, NY: Anchor Press, 1975, 
1976).
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Neo-institutionalist accounts of political instability in Africa in general raise some 
of the central issues involved in the discourse.  Thomas M. Callaghy (1984: 32) for 
instance, links political instability in post-colonial Africa to “the absence of central state 
authority and the resulting search for it”.  However, he leaves one to guess what could be 
responsible for the absence of those two factors, i.e. “central state authority and the 
resulting search for it”.  In their respective studies conducted from the neo-institutionalist 
perspective too, Christopher Clapham (1985), Lisa Anderson (1986, 1987), and Joel S. 
Migdal (1988) all believe that the weakness of Africa’s states, and their “precarious 
links” (Chazan 1993: 68) to the diverse groups that constitute the larger society, are 
factors that contribute to political instability in post-colonial African states.  Naomi 
Chazan (1993) adds that the problem derives from the competition for legitimacy and 
dominance between Africa’s weak states and the diverse components of the larger 
society.  
Some studies on political instability in contemporary African states do not 
adequately address the role of Europe’s external involvement (conquest of African 
peoples) in state building in Africa, which produced legacies that aid and abet political 
instability.  Hence, in the case of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state, blame for the 
persistence of political instability in its body politic is often levied on a flawed federal 
structure (Kirk-Green 1971), and a contradictory constitutional arrangement that was 
incapable of withstanding political strains (Whitaker 1981).  Richard Sklar (1965) and B. 
J. Dudley (1966) attribute the problem to an imbalance in education and economic 
development.  Larry Diamond (1988: 16) attributes it to “tribalism and regionalism…and 
the process of class formation” in the supra-national state.  
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In each of the cases mentioned above, political instability is defined strictly as the 
absence of a stable central government in the supra-national state during the post-colonial 
era leaving readers with the assumption that the supra-national state enjoyed political 
stability during colonial rule.  That definition of political instability is indeed the 
justification given for the studies reviewed above and others similar to them which regard 
the supra-national state as a given. 
We can argue that the literature reviewed so far stresses only ‘traditional 
variables’, i.e. ‘traits of governmental structure’, ‘the social environment of governments’ 
or ‘complex multivariate combinations of the two’ (Eckstein 1969: 277) as the 
determinants of political stability or the absence of same in a polity.  As we have argued 
earlier, this tendency to designate the “non-political aspects of [the] social environment 
… of polities as independent variables” (Eckstein 1969: 277) in studies that attempt to 
attempt political instability has hardly fulfilled that quest adequately.  
Eckstein’s (1969) theoretical framework, which he derived from his congruence 
theory, is a tool that clears the path for a departure from this norm in this type of social 
research.  By “locating the determinants of governmental stability precisely in those 
aspects of nongovernmental institutions that could be considered their specifically 
“political” traits: their internal authority relations” (Eckstein 1969: 277), the framework 
fills a void in the study of political instability by serving as a better tool for conducting 
such studies.  Eckstein’s framework is capable of illuminating the quest to explain 
political instability in polities of all kind (Eckstein 1969).  The reason for that is because 
of how it could be applied to research situations to ensure that “the crucial x-variable 
would be one [that involves] both government and society simultaneously, not each 
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separately” (Eckstein 1969: 277). Hence his argument that “[t]he stability of 
democracies, and perhaps other polities, might be held to depend on the degree of 
resemblance between social and governmental authority patterns” (Eckstein 1969: 277).  
This is one out of the several possible roles that “resemblance between social and 
governmental authority patterns” can “serve as a potential mediating and higher-order 
variable” (Eckstein 1969: 277) in the study of political stability or governmental 
performance in polities.  
Eckstein’s framework is partly validated by the deliberate manner in which it is 
steeped in sound psychological as well as sociological tenets.  He posits for instance that 
“men are able effectively to perform political roles if their previously learned norms and 
behavior substantially prepare them for such roles, and if the norms and practices 
demanded by their concurrent social roles do not create strains or painful ambivalences 
and contradictions with their political ones” (Eckstein 1969: 278).
The derivative hypotheses in the framework are such that they relate12 “authority 
patterns to the performance (a crucial ‘y-variable’) of” (Eckstein 1969: 283) polities, and 
posit that “congruence among authority patterns and consonance within them” (Eckstein 
1969: 283) are the two principal ‘x-variables’.  Hence the following hypothetical 
postulations: “High performance by a government requires congruence between its 
authority patterns and the authority patterns of other social units in the society, [and h]igh 
performance requires consonance among the elements of the authority pattern of a social 
unit” (Eckstein 1969: 283, 300).  The consequence of lack of congruence between and 
lack of consonance among those vital patterns in any social unit will be very low 
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government performance.  These assertions are captured graphically in the index shown
in Figure 1.4 below.
Figure 1.4: The index of congruence and consonance between and amongst 
authority patterns in social units.  Note: The ideas that are encapsulated in this 
index were derived from Eckstein (1969).
There is sufficient justification for drawing from Eckstein’s (1969) framework 
and the congruence theory that it was derived from to illustrate and illuminate our 
12 The second set of derivative hypothetical propositions in Eckstein’s framework, which 
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analysis in the study.  That justification is made especially glaring when we assert that the 
persistence of the Niger basin nationalities in their distinctiveness is proof that their 
governmental and non-governmental authority patterns and the indigenous norms that 
guide the practice of authority in them still endure.  In other words, colonialism’s “new 
set of values, norms, and structures, which constituted an incipient national center, did 
not necessarily grow at the expense” (Zolberg 1968: 71) of their indigenous parallels in 
the nationalities.  
There is no doubt that indigenous authority patterns in the nationalities are quite 
different from those that were imposed on them under the aegis of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-
national state.  In subsequent chapters in this study, we will explain how the lack of 
congruence and consonance between indigenous governmental and non-governmental 
authority patterns and the authority patterns of the supra-national state tend to breed 
political instability amongst the nationalities.13
There is indeed a considerable measure of built-in originality in the research 
design. Where previous studies on political instability in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national 
state tended to neglect or took the perception of the supra-national state by the 
nationalities for granted we designed this study to accommodate the contrary assumption.  
This is because the perception of the authority of a polity by its members is a pointer on 
their acknowledgement of or refusal to acknowledge its legitimacy to exercise that 
authority and vice versa to direct their affairs.  Since legitimacy is a “crucial dimension of 
political performance” (Gurr and McClelland 1971: 5), the legitimacy of the supra-
one another” (Eckstein 1969: 283), is not quite relevant for us in this study.
13 Pre-colonial situations that engendered the clash of indigenous authority and kinship 
patterns will not be ignored in the analysis.
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national state and polities created under it in the Niger basin are crucial objects in the 
analysis.
Gurr and McClelland define polity as “the basic political arrangements by which 
national political communities govern their affairs” (Gurr and McClelland 1971: 11).14
Legitimacy is defined by these immediate authors as “the extent that a polity is regarded 
by its members as worthy of support” (Gurr and McClelland 1971: 30).15
The emphasis placed on legitimacy in the study design is not accidental.  In 
congruence theory, legitimacy is one of a set of five “crucial dimensions of political 
performance, dimensions on which polities must perform well to some degree if they are 
to attain any special goals (other then their own dissolution)” (Gurr and McClelland 
1971: 5).16 As “the extent that a polity is regarded by its members as worthy of support” 
(Eckstein 1971: 50), legitimacy is so crucial that “a polity performs well to the extent that 
it is so regarded” (Eckstein 1971: 50) by its members.  
Since the nationalities were constituted into a supra-national state without their 
consent by an external power, it is therefore logical for us to include the other four 
dimensions of political performance, i.e. durability, civil order, permeation and decisional 
efficacy in our analysis.  Ever since the Niger basin was carved into a supra-national state 
14 Their definition of polity aptly suits our purposes in the study.  However, in colonial 
situations where nationalities are not allowed to participate in the governance of their 
affairs, this definition could be reframed to imply that polity is the political arrangements 
by which the affairs of political communities are administered.  Ever since the imposition 
of de facto colonialism in the Niger basin there have been several such arrangements, but 
none of which has stood the test of time.
15 Earlier on, David Apter (1965: 236) had loosely defined legitimacy as “rightness of a 
political pattern”.                      
16 Eckstein (1971) articulated them in the following order: durability, civil order, 
legitimacy, and decisional efficacy (see Eckstein, Harry. 1971. The Evaluation of 
Political Performance: Problems and Dimensions, and Gurr, Ted Robert and Muriel 
McClelland. 1971. Political Performance: A Twelve-Nation Study.
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none of the several polities under which its inhabitants have been administered has stood 
the test of time.  Thus we cannot take the durability of the supra-national state and the 
other polities that are associated with it for granted.  Durability or “the persistence of a 
polity over time” (Eckstein 1971: 21) is a political performance dimension that plays a 
crucial role in the success or failure of any polity.  In fact, “[t]he longer it persists [in a 
polity], the higher its [, i.e. the polity’s] performance” (Eckstein 1971: 21).  
Civil order or “the absence of unregulated collective resorts to violence or acts in 
which violence is overtly threatened or for other reasons very likely to achieve private or 
public objectives” (Eckstein 1971: 32) has not prevailed in the supra-national state during 
and after their de facto colonization either.  Elaborating further on the pivotal importance 
of the prevalence of civil order in polities before they can survive and “attain any special 
goals (other then their own dissolution)” (Gurr and McClelland 1971: 5), Eckstein (1971: 
32) affirms, while Gurr and McClelland (1971) concur from their study that “[p]olities 
perform well to the extent that such actual or latent violence does not occur”.
Social units like the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state and its associated polities that 
lack legitimacy in the eyes of their constituent nationalities, that can neither sustain their 
own durability nor civil order in the ‘social space’ that they occupy cannot be expected to 
permeate that ‘social space’ in any meaningful way.  Eckstein conceptualized permeation 
as “the ability of a polity to derive resources from, and carry out its directives in, the 
various segments of its social space” (Eckstein 1969: 287). 
 In a similar vein, the incidence of unsuccessful polities by which the nationalities 
have been administered sequel to the creation of supra-national state is a good reason to 
infer the absence of decisional efficacy in each of those polities and in the ‘Nigerian’
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supra-national state under whose aegis they emerged.  Eckstein (1971: 65) defines 
decisional efficacy as “the extent to which polities make and carry out prompt and 
relevant decisions in response to political challenges”.  The pivotal role of decisional 
efficacy in the performance of governments and polities is further underscored by Gurr 
and McClelland (1971: 6) who concluded from their study that “[l]evels of [decisional] 
efficacy,” as well as levels of two other ‘dimensions of political performance’, i.e. 
“legitimacy, and civil order all appear to have an interacting time-dependent relationship 
with a polity’s longevity” (Gurr and McClelland 1971: 6).  In the study we are 
associating longevity with political performance or stability in a social unit or polity. 
Existing accounts of pre-colonial and colonial events in the region indicate that 
there may be more to the political instability that prevails in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national 
state than have been accounted for in existing studies.  Political instability amongst the 
nationalities in the region and in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state itself cannot therefore 
be restricted to the post-colonial history of the supra-national state.  The validity of that 
assertion is especially underscored by the fact that we argue the absence of all five crucial 
political performance dimensions including civil order in the supra-national state ever 
since it was imposed.  The assertion that even civil order has consistently eluded the 
supra-national state is further supported by the range of indicators of political 
instability—riots, insurrections, assassinations, military coups and coup attempts, 
secession attempts, and a thirty-month civil war—that have occurred therein since it was 
created.17  Justifications in the media and academe for all successful military coups that 
17 The extensive documentation of indicators of political instability is presented in Tables 
6.1-4 in chapter six.
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terminated the ‘basic political arrangements’ in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state claim 
that they saved the latter from disintegration.  
If it requires military coups d’etat to save the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state from 
disintegration, then the extent to which its constituting nationalities regard its authority as 
legitimate is either non-existent or significantly low.  Since we are talking about the 
performance, indeed, the stability of a political system (an imposed supra-national state) 
in an environment inhabited by distinct and diverse nationalities, the need to probe back 
into the history of state building in the Niger basin cannot be over-emphasized.  The 
essential idea concerning its performance (stability) depends most fundamentally on 
whether its authority patterns are congruent and consonant with (fits or resembles) the 
authority patterns of its constituent social units—(the distinct and diverse nationalities 
that inhabit its social space (Eckstein 1969).18
To what then can we attribute the inability of ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state and 
the several polities instituted in its social space under its aegis to elicit legitimacy from, 
and achieve civil order amongst the distinct nationalities that constitute that social space?  
Why have the supra-national state and the various polities failed to attain durability and 
decisional efficacy in that same social space?  To what degree if at all did they permeate 
“the various segments of their social space” (Eckstein 1969: 287)?  In the event that they 





This is a theory-driven longitudinal comparative case study of the 
‘Nigerian’ supra-national state and the distinct nationalities that constitute it.  It seeks 
answers to the question, ‘what is going on?’ within and between indigenous polities and 
an imposed polity in the Niger basin over distinct periods in history.  It was carefully 
designed to satisfy the tenets of three genres in social research, i.e. case study, 
longitudinal, and comparative (Dixon, Bouma, and Atkinson 1987b, Bouma 1996).  The 
duration of coverage extends over a century and half, i.e. 1884-1990, covering three 
distinct periods—pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial.  Within these three periods the 
focus is on the social, economic19 and political development of the nationalities that 
inhabit that region, and the issue of political stability in the supra-national state they were 
carved into by the British.  The study is comparative across three of the constituent 
nationalities, but obviously still focuses on political instability.
Selection of the Nationalities for Describing the Constituent 
Parts of the ‘Nigerian’ Supra-national State
The major methodological issues are: (1) selection of which nationalities in the 
Niger basin to study; (2) selection of which aspects of the nationalities for measuring 
18 These ideas are further developed in the methodology.
19 We are cognizant of the tangential relevance of the assertion that “levels and rates of 
economic development (among other conditions) might affect political stability only, or 
chiefly, through their effects on the degree of resemblance among authority patterns; and 
a high level of economic development might correlate well (but imperfectly) with 
democracy’s stability because it is (imperfectly) promoted by or itself promotes, certain 
authority patterns in social life” (Eckstein 1969: 278) on some of the premises of this 
study.
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heterogeneity of political and economic development; (3) selection of which dimensions 
of their socio-political components for describing authority patterns.  Finally, there is also 
a discussion of the various sources used to measure the variables. 
The Niger basin is inhabited by several distinct nationalities.  Ideally, my desire 
was to include all of the nationalities that inhabit it as cases in the study.  But the 
constraint of time and resources would not permit that.  Even if time and resources were 
not constraining factors the absence of an agreement on the actual number of nationalities 
is another big obstacle to any attempt to include every one of them in a study like this 
one.  We are then left with the option of selecting a representative number of them.  In 
order to establish a sound basis to make a representative selection of nationalities to 
include, it is necessary to review existing views on their number.
The issue of the exact number of nationalities in the region is indeed, 
controversial.  Some analysts who used linguistic criterion20 arrived at numbers such as 
394 (Hoffman 1974, Otite 1990), 550 and 619 (Wente-Lukas 1985; Otite 1990 in Nnoli 
1995).  Coleman insists that “there are approximately 248 distinct language groups” 
(Coleman 1958: 15) in the region.  The 1952 census report which also utilized language 
as a criterion cites that there are 52 of them (Afigbo 1989: 14).  In many studies the 
number 250 is often cited (Nnoli 1995).  Some authors have come up with the numbers 
60 (Awolowo 1968), 374 (Nnoli 1995), and 143 (Odetola 1978), while some 
anthropologists have to cited the numbers 161 (Gandonu 1978), and 62 (Murdock 1975) 
20 The more serious shortcomings of utilizing language as a criterion for identifying 
nationalities in the region include the fact that a nationality can “speak a cluster of 
languages” (Nnoli 1995: 26), while languages are known to have dialects that are often 
confused as distinct.  Others culturally absorbed some nationalities in the upper Niger 
basin through the Islamic religion.  This is to the point that they now speak the Hausa 
language, the official lingua franca of Islam.
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as the correct count.  Figure 2.1 below is our own ‘reasonable’ count derived from 
Nduntuei Ita’s Bibliography of Nigeria (1971).
Although there is lack of consensus on the number of nationalities in the region, 
no one has in a single study been able to inventory and include even half of what is 
known.  Each researcher adopts either some creative or convenient criteria to arrive at a 
representative sample of nationalities to meet the purposes of his or her own study.  The 
most convenient criterion known to be popular among researchers has been population 
size.  Hence the three more populous nationalities, i.e. the Yoruba in southwest lower 
Niger, the Igbo in the southeast, and the Hausa-Fulani in the upper portion, are selected in 
almost every study on the region.  People who have selected these three more populous 
nationalities for their research have argued that their population imbue political 
significance on them while the less populous ones which are labeled “tiny and politically 
insignificant” (Diamond 1988: 21) are left out on account of their comparatively smaller 
population.21
But the history of the region and its inhabitants is cause for us to argue otherwise.  
Existing literature on the history of the region does not support the view that political 
significance of the nationalities is a function of just their respective population size.  
There are pointers to substantiate that too.  The pre-colonial trading city-states of Nembe-
Brass,Akassa, Bonny, Opobo, and Calabar that later played prominent roles in the trade 
with Europeans were all founded by the less populous nationalities of the Niger delta, i.e. 
the Ijaw (Ibeno); the Efik, the Kalabari, and the Itsekiri (Anene 1966, Alagoa 1970, 
1971).  Moreover, ever since the region was carved into a supra-national state early in the 
nineteenth century both the more populous and the less populous nationalities have 
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consistently registered their disaffection against it.  The less populous nationalities have 
done so without regard to their population size.
In the context of this study all such contentious resistance (there have been 
several in the colonial and post-colonial periods) from both the more populous and less 
populous nationalities22 alike constitute valid indicators of political instability in the 
‘Nigerian’ supra-national state.  The significance of the less populous nationalities in the 
course of social, economic and political development in the supra-national state was 
further underscored by the appointment of a Commission by the British in 1957 at about 
the eve of their departure to inquire into their fears and means to allay them (see London: 
HMSO 1958).23  However, we have been constrained by time and resources to still select 
the usual big three: the Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa-Fulani.
21 The less populous nationalities are often called “minorities”.
22 There have been “a series of political disturbances covering nearly four decades” 
(Tamuno 1970: 576) among the Tiv (a minority nationality in the Middle Belt portion of 
the North).  In 1929 and 1939 there were serious political disturbances that brought 
colonial government activities among the Tiv to halt, and caused the colonial government 
to take extra-ordinary measures (Buhannan 1958, Tamuno 1970).  Apart from the 
disturbances of 1929 and 1939, there were also two others in 1945 and 1948 all of which 
“were put down by [the colonial] government police and military force, [and in which] 
many Tiv people lost their lives and property” (Tamuno 1970: 576).  In fact, Tiv 
resistance against British colonial rule predates 1929.  Tivland experienced widespread 
political riots again in 1960 and 1964 which caused the post-colonial government to draft 
its specially-formed and trained Mobile Police and troops to the area (Dent 1966, 
Luckham 1971, Diamond 1988).  Again, both disturbances claimed significant number of 
lives and property destruction.  There was a secession bid by the Ijaw in 1966 (HRW 
1999).  Since 1990 the rulers of the supra-national state have been faced with unrests 
from the Ogoni, another minority nationality in the Niger delta (Saro-Wiwa 1992, 1995, 
HRW 1999).
23 That Commission whose report was entitled: Nigeria: Report of the Commission 
Appointed to Enquire into the Fears of Minorities and the Means of Allaying Them, 
(Cmnd 505 (London: HMSO, 1958) is a fall out of the Constitutional Conference of 1957 
which preceded the exit of the British as the rulers of the supra-national state.
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Nationalities in the Upper Niger
Afu, Angas, Ankwe (Boghorom, Borrom, Burmawa),Bwol, Chip 
Dimuk, Goram (Gworam), Gurka (Gerkawa, Gurkawa), Kunnum, 
Kwolla, Lardang, Larr, Mikiet, Miriam (Merniang, Mirriam) Montol 
(Montoil) Ron (Baram, Baron, Boram) Schalla (Scha) Sura, Yergum 
(Yergam), Arago (Alago), Bachama (Bashama, Bashamma), Mbula 
(Bula, Bulla), Bassa (Basa), Bassa Kaduna (Basa Kaduna), Bata 
(Batta), Bolki Bulai, Gudu (Gudo) Holma, Kofa (Kofo), Malabu, 
Njei (Jenge, Kobochi, Njai, Nzangi, Zani), Zumu (Jimo), Birom 
(Berom, Burum, Burumawa, Kibbo, Kibyen), Aike, Aten (Ganawuri, 
Ganawarri, Jal, Ngell, Njell), Ayu (Ayob, Ayub), Pyem (Fem, Fyem, 
Paiema, Pem, Pyemawa), Ninzam (Sanga, Sangawa) Numana, 
Nungu (Lungu) Sigidawa (Segiddawa), Bolewa (Bole, Borlawa, 
Fika) Auyukawa (Ayokawa), Bede (Bedde), Beri-Beri (Beriberi) 
Keri-keri (Karekare, Kerekere), Ngamo (Gamawa), Shirawa 
Teshenewa), Borgawa (Bargu, Borgu, Burgu) Bariba (Barba, Barba), 
Busa (Boussa, Bussa, Bussawa), Kyengawa (Kengawa, Kiengawa, 
Kyenga, Shangawa, Tienga, Tiengawa), Buduma (Boudouma, 
Jedina, Yedina), Bura (Burra) Gabin, Hona, Pabir (Babir, Babira, 
Babur Baburr), Butawa (Mbotuwa, Mbutawa, Kudawa, Ningawa 
(Ningi), Chamba (Chamba, Dschamba, Tsamba), Daka, Donka, 
Kungana, Lekon (Laego, Leco) Mumbake, Suntai, Takum, Tsugu, 
Wom, Chawai (Atsam), Irigwe (Aregwa, Irrigwe, Rigwe), Kwoll, 
Bangawa, Fakawa, Kalewa, Lilawa, Fulani, Gbari (Goale, Gwali, 
Gwari, Gwarri) Gade, Gwandera, Kinkera, Koro (Korro), Cheke, 
Fali, Hausa (Haoussa), Daurawa, Gobirawa, Kanawa, Katsenawa, 
Kebbawa, Maguzawa, Zamfarawa, Zazzagawa, Higi (Hiji, Hill 
Margi), Baza (Bazza), Idoma, Agala (Agalawa), Agatu, Igumale, 
Iyala (Ingkum, Yala), Nkim, Nkum, Ogwaka, Okpoto (Akpoto, 
Opoto) Oturkpo, Igala (Agatara, Igara, Igula), Ibaji, Igbira (Egbiri, 
Igbirra, Kotogori), Kwotto (Panda, Wushishi), Jerewa, Afusara 
(Fizere, Hill Jarawa) Anaguta (Naguta), Badawa, Bamberawa 
(Bamboro) Bankalawa, Barawa (Mbarawa) Buji (Bujawa), Chara 
(Fachara, Nfachara, Pakara, Teira), Chokobo, Das (Dass), Guswa 
(Gusum, Ibau) Janji (Ijanyi), Jarawa (Jar) Jengre, Jere, Limorro, 
Rabinawa (Narabuna, Ribina), Rukuba, Sangawa, Taurawa, Jerra 
(Jara, Jera), Hina, Kanakuru (Dera) Maga, Nimalto, Terra (Kemaltu, 
Terawa), Junkun (Jukon, Kororofawa), Bashar, Dampar Garaga, Jibu 
(Dschubu, Jibawa, Jubawa, Jubu), Kam, Kona, Kadara (Adara), 
Kajuru (Ajure), Katurmi (Ada), Kagoro (Agolok), Kaleri, Mada, 
Mama, Numana, Nungu (Lungu), Kambari (Kambali, Kamberi), 
Abadi, Achifawa (Achipawa, Atshefawa, Atsifawa), Agadi, 
Ashingini, Dukawa, Kimba, Mawuchi, Kanuri (Kanoury), Bede 
(Bedde), Gamergu, Jetko, Kanembu (Hamedji), Kotoko, Lerewa, 
Maguemi (Magomi), Magumi, Mandara (Ndara, Wandla, Wandara), 
Manga (Magawa), Mobber (Mober) Nguzzur, Tubu, Katab, Ataka 
(Attaka), Ikulu (Ikolu), Jaba (Ham), Kachichere (Aticheri), 
Kafanchan, Kagoma, Kaje (Baju, Kache, Kaji), Kamantan, Kaninkon 
(Tum), Kaura, Kentu (Kyato, Kyeto), Morwa (Asolio, Moroa), 
Yeskwa, Kofyar (Kofia), Kulu, Wurkum (Urku, Wurkuru), 
Kurama, Azura, Binawa (Bogama), Dungi, Gurre 
(Gurri), Kahugu (Kahagu), Kaibi, Kibalo (Kiballo),
 Kiniku (Kimiku, Kinuka), Kitimi (Kittimi) Kono, Piti (Abisi, Bisi, 
Pitti), Ribam, Rishua (Rishiwa), Rumaiya, Ruruma, Srubu, 
Mambibila (Tobi), Gelebda (Gelevda), Hitkalanchi (Hidkala), 
Kamkam, Magu, Margi (Marghi),
Nationalities in the Upper Niger (continued)
Chibak (Chibbuk, Chibuk, Cibak, Kibaku) Kilba, Sukur (Sugar), 
Womdeo, Mumuye, Gengle, Gola (Gomla, Gori), Kugama, 
Kumba, Teme, Waka, Yakoko, Yendang (Yendan), Yundam, 
Zinna, Ndoro, Ngezim (Ngezzim), Nupe, Basange (Bassange, 
Nge), Dibo (Ganagana, Zitako), Kakanda (Akanda, Yapa), Kupa 
(Gupa), Reshe (Barashe, Gungawa, Tsureshe), Bakarawa, 
Larawa (Laro, Laruwa), Lopawa (Lupawa), Sorkowa (Sorke, 
Sorko), Yaurawa (Rasawa, Yauri, Yawuri), Shuwa Arabs 
(Choua, Larabawa, Shiwa, Shoa), So, Tigong (Tigon, Tigum, 
Tikong, Tugong, Tugun, Tukum), Ashiaku (Atsiku), Nama, Tiv 
(Mitshi, Munshi, Tivi), Tula, Awok, Billiri, Dadia, Jen, Kamu 
(Kamo), Logunda (Nunguda), Tangele, Waja, Bai, Boi, Gweri, 
Koma (Komawa), Lima, Marki, Verre (Vere, Were), Togi Tuki), 
Vomni, Zango, Warjawa (Warji), Afawa (Faawa, Paawa), 
Ajawa, Denewa, Diryawa, Gamsawa, Gerewa, Germawa 
(Gerumawa), Gezewa, Jimbinawa, Kirifawa, Lipkawa, Miyawa, 
Sirawa, Wudufawa, Yungur (Bina, Yunguri), Banga, Ga-Anda, 
Handa, Lala, Libo, Mboi (Mboyi).
Nationalities in the Lower Niger
Bini, Etsako, Ineme, Ishan (Esa, Esam, Isa), Urhobo (Osobo, 
Sobo, Usobo), Isoko, Ivbiosakon, Kukuruku, Akweya, Egede,
Etulo (Turu, Turumawa, Utur, Yachi (Iyace, Iyashi), Ekoi, 
Abayong (Abaiyonga) Abine (Abani), Adun (Aran), Agoi, 
Akaju (Ahaju), Anyan (Anjang, Bascho), Asiga (Essigu), Atam, 
Banyang (Bnajang, Konguam, Manyang), Bete, Boki (Nki), 
Effium, Ejagham, Ekparabong, Ekumuru, (Ikumuru), Ekuri, 
Enna, Etung, Keaka, Korop (Korawp), Mnta, Mbe (Mbube), 
Mbembe, Nde (Ndei), Nkokolle, Obang, Ododop (Erorup), 
Ogoja, Okoiyang, Okpoto-Mteze (Opkoto-Mezi), Olulumaw, 
Orri, Oshopong (Eshupum), Ufia (Utoblo, Utobono), Uge,  
Ukelle, Utonkon, Yakoro (Yakori), Yakurr (Yako), Ibibio, 
Abuan, Anang, Andoni, Efiat, Efik (Ebrutu, Eburutu Iboku), 
Efut, Eket, Enyong, Ibeno, Kwa, Oron, Igbo, Ijaw (Ijo), Ogoni, 
Kalabari, Itsekiri (Awerri, Ishekiri, Itshekiri, Iwerri, Jakri, Jekri, 
Oere, Ouaire, Ouere, Oware, Warri), Yoruba. 
Table 2.1 Inventory of nationalities in the Niger Basin Region.  Source: Adapted from 
Ita, Nduntuei O. (1971). Bibliography of Nigeria: A Survey of Anthropological and 
Linguistic Writings from the Earliest Times to 1966. London: Frank Cass
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Selection of the Independent Variables
The first question is how do we measure the social and political development of 
the three constituent nationalities that we have chosen?  The following list of criteria 
would appear to be fairly comprehensive in that regard:
1. population size 
2. presence or absence of a standing army
3. use of war and conquest as state building strategies
4. use of written records
5. degree of centralization in the political system
6. system of socialization, and
7. kinship patterns.
These cover most aspects of pre-industrial societies.  Many of these dimensions are 
briefly described in Figure 2.1 below, and in Appendix I.  Furthermore, the economic 
development and kinship patterns are connected to the geographic location and ecology
of these three nationalities as discussed in the beginning of chapter three.
Figure 2.1 equally provides an inventory of these three nationalities that we 
selected according to their geographical region, authority patterns, and type of pre-
colonial polity, etc.  Effort was made to ensure that the selection accommodates the range 
of indigenous polities in the region, i.e. centralized v/s decentralized, trade-based v/s 
conquest based, as well as the plurality of authority patterns in the nationalities that 
inhabit the region etc. The differences in traditional polities and societies in the selected 
nationalities are thought of in terms of the Weberian ideal-types.  Figure 2.1 shows the 
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Figure 2.1: Inventory of the political characteristics of the three nationalities.
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Yoruba and the Hausa-Fulani.  Furthermore, the five categorizations of the Igbo and the 
specific types of polities that are associated with the groups in each category are all 
shown in Figure 2.1.  The disparities in the type of polities between the northern, western 
and northeastern Igbo groups who evolved constitutional monarchies and the southern 
and eastern groups that evolved village-based democracies are not hard and fast.  Among 
the Igbo who are trade-based cultivators, authority is democratically structured and 
practiced.  The centralization of the structures of authority amongst some Igbo groups 
does not entail the employment of coercion in its practice.
The categorization of the Yoruba into three groups is evidence of the absence of 
an over-arching political organization in Yorubaland.  The fact that there were fairly large 
political organizations in Yorubaland is not indicative of the fact that their centralized 
political system was undemocratic.  Among the Hausa-Fulani, polity and authority were 
evolved into huge monoliths of authoritarianism.  It will be shown that all the afore-
mentioned differences and unique features have some measure of impacts on the story 
that we tell in this study.
To measure the congruence and consonance of the authority patterns within a 
nationality and the heterogeneity in the authority patterns across the three constituent 
nationalities that we chose, we adopted and applied a methodological construct or scheme 
that was developed by Eckstein and Gurr (1975) and based on Eckstein’s congruence 
theory.  The authors recommended their scheme/construct for studies that focus on the 
governmental and non-governmental authority patterns in social units and their impact on 
political performance.  For our purposes in the study, we designated the construct as the 
Eckstein-Gurr scheme or E-G scheme.  
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The independent or x-variables are conceptualized to correspond with the four 
hypotheses.  The first set of x-variables comprises the differential patterns of political, 
social, and economic development in the three selected nationalities.  The other set of x-
variables comprises their governmental and non-governmental authority patterns.  The 
third x-variable comprises the authority patterns of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state.  
The fourth x-variable comprises the four state building policies and the preferential 
alliances that evolved between the British and the leadership in some of the nationalities.
The dependent variable is political instability measured in terms of such 
indicators as riots, strikes, uprisings, secession attempts, civil war, coups d’etat, coup
attempts, assassinations, etc. in the supra-national state during and after colonial rule.
The four hypotheses that we presented and discussed earlier are meant to address 
and dispel any possible concern about vagueness in the study.  The E-G scheme, which is 
summarized in detail in the next section in the current chapter, constitutes the set of tools 
for the inquiry.  The scheme will aid our task of assessing the governmental and non-
governmental authority patterns in each of the three nationalities as well as in the supra-
national state itself. 
For the sake of clarity, there is the need at this point for us to define what we 
mean by ‘governmental and non-governmental’ authority patterns.  We have elected to 
do that particularly for the additional reason that they are prominent features of our 
discourse.24  We have deduced from Eckstein (1969: 294) that ‘governmental’ authority 
patterns apply specifically to the authority structures and relations of governments or 
“government-like entities” (Eckstein 1998: 529-294) in social units or societies.  
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Furthermore, we have been able to discern from some of his work that he frequently 
employed the concept of ‘non-governmental’ authority patterns when he referred to the 
authority structures and relations of “other segmental units of society” (Eckstein 1969: 
294).  In that regard therefore, all the various agencies that perform roles in the realms of 
socialization, defense, social control, etc. in society will qualify as segmental units.  In 
most if not all cases these are those units that are most proximate to government in 
society.  They would include the family, the lineage, kindred, agencies of socialization, 
social control, defense, etc.
Tools for Inquiry into Authority Patterns: A Summary of the E-G Scheme
Before we can embark on an in-depth examination of political development in 
pre-colonial Igboland, Yorubaland, and Hausaland, to portray their respective authority 
patterns and supporting influence relations, as well as those of the imposed ‘Nigerian’
supra-national state, it is pertinent for us to lay out the tools that we will need.  
Developed by Eckstein and Gurr (1975) such tools are outlined below.  These concepts 
“apply to authority patterns in any and all social units, regardless of variations that do not 
directly involve authority relations (such as size, complexity, or functions) and regardless 
of whether the units exhibit great or little overall asymmetry between subordinates” 
(Eckkstein 1975: 41).
The concepts are products of deliberate ‘reasoning’, i.e. they do not constitute “an 
arbitrary list” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 41).  They are embodied in a ‘scheme’ that 
facilitates the examination of specific “aspects of patterns of authority” (Eckstein and 
24 Eckstein (1969) used ‘governmental and non-governmental’ synonymously with 
‘political and social’ in his discourse on authority patterns.  We will emulate him to do 
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Gurr 1975: 41).  The six ‘aspects of patterns of authority’ whose examination is 
facilitated in the E-G scheme of concepts or tools are as follows: (a) ‘influence relations 
among super-ordinates and subordinates’, (b) ‘inequalities among them’, i.e. super-
ordinates and subordinates, (c) certain “static” aspects of structures of super-ordination 
(their conformation, or “anatomy”), (d) ‘certain’ “dynamic” aspects of such structures 
(their processes, or “physiology”), (e) ‘the manner in which members of social units are 
recruited into super-ordinated positions’, (f) ‘and the bases of legitimacy perceptions’ 
(Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 41).
Our analysis of the authority patterns among the Igbo, Yoruba, Hausa-Fulani, and 
the imposed bureaucratic authority patterns of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state will 
benefit from a detailed examination of the first and sixth aspects of ‘patterns of 
authority’, i.e. the ‘influence relations among super-ordinates and subordinates’ and ‘the 
bases of legitimacy perceptions’ by subordinates in any given social unit.  The 
examination of the ‘bases of legitimacy perceptions’ is bound to be inferential primarily 
because of the unique way in which Eckstein and Gurr derived and articulated them from 
their articulation of the former.  The concepts or tools that are embodied in the E-G 
scheme are bound to enhance our discussion in its entirety.  What follows immediately 
below is the succinct but comprehensive summary of each of the two aspects of ‘patterns 
of authority’ that we outlined above.  This summary is strictly derived from the way that 
Eckstein and Gurr articulated them in their scheme.  
By definition “an authority pattern is a set of asymmetric relations among 
hierarchically ordered members of a social unit that involves the direction of the unit” 
(Eckstein 1973: 1153).  By extension the mention of a ‘social unit’ in this definition calls 
the same in the study. 
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the following three complimentary issues about the definition to mind.  (i) The ‘social 
unit’ itself depicts a group of “individuals that may be regarded as collective individuals” 
(Eckstein 1973: 1153) who exist as members and “are perceived as ranked in levels of 
superiority and inferiority” (Eckstein 1973: 1153) as a result of their ‘hierarchically 
ordered’ positions.  (ii) There is bound to be ‘direction’ in any social unit.  (iii) “The 
direction of a social unit involves the definition of its goals, the regulation of conduct of 
its members, and the allocation and coordination of roles within it” (Eckstein 1973: 
1154).
Influence Relations Among Superordinates and Subordinates 
The E-G scheme posits that authority relations involve ‘super-ordinate’ actors or 
Super-actors and their ‘subordinate’ counterparts or sub-actors.  In any given social unit 
the association of individuals who belong to these two categories of actors co-note 
“direction”, i.e. “people who direct and are directed, and their interactions” (Eckstein and 
Gurr 1975: 53).  The interactions that take place between the Super-actors and the sub-
actors have certain components or ‘dimensions’ to them.  The aggregate totals of those 
aspects or ‘dimensions’ of the interactions that take place between these two categories of 
actors in any social unit is four.  All the four components “involve flows of “influence” 
among [the individuals in the two categories, as well as]: attempts to affect behavior and 
actual effects of the attempts” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 53) in the social unit.  Those four 
“dimensions of influence [are:] Directiveness, Participation, Responsiveness, and 
Compliance” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 53).
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Directiveness
This dimension or aspect of influence relations among Super and sub-actors in 
any social unit “refers to the extent to which activities in a social unit are subject to 
directives, rather than being left to the free discretion of members” (Eckstein and Gurr 
1975: 53).  It is defined “as the extent to which supers attempt to influence the behavior 
of members of a social unit by means of directives” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 53).  
Eckstein and Gurr conceived Directiveness as a continuum that has two polar extremes to 
it with the following depicted values, Regimented (+) and Permissive (0), and of course a 
middle point (see Figure 2.2 below).
General Dimension Coverage Latitude Supervision Sanction Threshold
Regimented (+) Comprehensive Specific Close Severe
=     +     +     +
Permissive (0) Restricted General Loose Lenient
Figure 2.2: Diagrammatic representation of the Eckstein-Gurr Directiveness dimension 
Source: Eckstein and Gurr (1975: 54).
Directiveness does not deal with the issue of the ‘success’ of directives or their 
absence in a social unit at all.  As we can see from the diagrammatic representation 
above, at the top-most extreme of its continuum Directiveness entails a situation in which 
whatever that takes place in a social unit is “dealt with, in every detail, by rigidly 
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enforced directives” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 54).  Conversely, the lowest extreme 
depicts a complete absence of authority pattern (which may not obtain in any social unit 
in a real world situation).  It is therefore due to the reason that such a situation is 
untenable in reality that Eckstein and Gurr posit that whenever social units tend towards 
this lowest extreme on the Directiveness dimensions, it is better to categorize those units 
as ‘permissive’.  The reason for that being that “all benefit of doubt is given in them to 
“free” behavior and wide choices of behavior are … allowed” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 
54) in them.  Directiveness consists of four components, which Eckstein and Gurr depict 
in a configuration that portray  “ a certain logical order” because “of their probable 
behavior consequences” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 54-55).  The four components are: 
(i) Coverage, which is defined as (‘the degree to which items of behavior are dealt 
with by supers’ orders).  It can be either comprehensive (when it is at the top-most 
extreme’), restricted (when it is at the tail extreme) or even anywhere in-between.
(ii) Latitude (‘the number of ways in which members or sub-actors of social units can 
behave according to prevalent norms’).  Again, this component of Directiveness
equally entails a specific extreme in which there are ‘specific’ stipulations or the 
general pole that leaves “room for the discretion to subs” (Eckstein and Gurr 
1975: 55)
(iii) Supervision (‘the extent to which supervision is used to detect failures to 
comply’).  It can be close or loose.  As far as supervision is concerned, “[i]n many 
cases, … the very existence of directives, and any remote possibility of being 
found in noncompliance, will have a constraining influence—more, of course, if 
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one is greatly attached to the unit and its superordinates than if one is not” 
(Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 55).
The reverse of supervision “always opens possibilities, always reduces the probability 
that noncompliance will be costly, and sometimes denotes that an order is merely 
nominal” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 55), and of course 
(iv) Sanction threshold, which configures in a continuum that comprises of the 
‘severe’ and the ‘lenient’.
Given that the “level of Directiveness is judged by effects on behavior, not just treated as 
supers’ wishful intents”, (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 55) Directiveness is a dimension of 
authority patterns that helps us to “deal with the threshold at which sanctions are used 
and their severity when invoked” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 55).
While Eckstein and Gurr caution that all the four components of Directiveness
can (depending on the purpose) be treated separately in their own rights, they also added 
that they all possess a clear ‘dimensional’ configuration.  Their respective effects on the 
response of sub-actors to Directiveness are invariably clear and succinct.  By saying that 
Eckstein and Gurr mean that while in the real world situation “coverage narrows choice; 
latitude narrows it more, supervision still more, and sanction threshold and severity more 
again” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 55).
Participation
Eckstein and Gurr conceived Participation as a dimension of authority relations 
in social units specifically to depict ‘direction’ as well as to detach it from ‘causality’ and 
the “notion of ‘control’” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 55).  They explained that their 
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conception of Participation was informed by the rationale that interactions between 
Super-actors and sub-actors in any social unit do not simply amount to one -way street 
relationships in which all individuals who are sub-actors are mere passive actors who 
simply receive and follow directions.  In most if not all real world social units there are 
bound to be some sub-actors who may be passive followers of directions, and there may 
also be some who may “generally attempt to influence the directive activities of supers” 
(Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 60).  Such sub-actors who qualify as non-passive members of 
their social unit ‘attempt to wield such influence’ on the Super-actors through ‘acts of 
participation’.
Hence, “dimension of authority patterns like Participation refers to overall 
characteristics and measures of such acts in social units” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 60). 
Eckstein and Gurr outline the following crucial pointers on Participation.  It is a 
continuous dimension, i.e. “social units exhibit more or less of it, and distinctions 
regarding it can potentially be made as discriminating as seems useful” (Eckstein and 
Gurr 1975: 61) in any given case in point.  Our knowledge of Participation in any social 
unit will enable us to discern the “degree of asymmetry between subs and supers” 
(Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 6) therein.  It does have a high extreme (that ‘lies at or near 
infinity’), and a low extreme that portrays zero (0) or the absence of participating sub-
actors.  
Thus, while it is possible that there can be zero (0) participation from the sub-
actors in a social unit, it is also true that there can be much more participation therein.  
Such increased participation will be “in terms of numbers of subs who participate, 
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numbers of acts of participation, intensity of the acts, or extensiveness of matters one 
seeks to influence” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 62).
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Figure 2.3: Diagrammatic representation of the Eckstein-Gurr Participation dimension
Source: Eckstein and Gurr (1975: 61).
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The close examination of all the four components of Participation that follows 
reveals that all of them are not “clearly dimensional” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 62).  The 
existence of:
(a) Channels of participation in a social unit are bound to impact positively on 
participation therein.  If those channels are open the more the likelihood of 
improved participation in that social unit.  In the same vein, closed channels are 
bound to deter and impede participation in a social unit.  However, “although 
open channels encourage and facilitate participation in social units, it is equally 
evident that equal opportunity does not imply equal use” (Eckstein and Gurr 
1975: 62).
(b) It may call for a number of specific measures for us to ascertain whether or 
not channels are ‘open’ or ‘closed’ in any social unit as the case might be.  
“Channels”, argue Eckstein and Gurr,
may be “formally” open (i.e. provided, or at least not proscribed) 
by explicit formal rules like those in constitutions or by-laws.
Even if not proscribed, however they may be “normatively” 
disapproved in the unit (especially by supers), in which case the 
significance of what the formal rules provide is bound to be
reduced; similarly, normative approval will open channels 
more than the mere lack of formal proscription, or it may counter-
weigh proscriptions ” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 62).
Then come two crucial questions of “practical import: Does “the use of proscribed 
channels, or failure to use open ones” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 62) attract sanctions to 
sub-actors in the unit?  How feasible to them is the use of seemingly open channels?  For 
sub-actors the openness of channels of participation in a social unit might be more 
apparent than real.  It is clear from Figure 2:3 that ‘formal rules’, ‘prevalent norms’, the 
‘likelihood of sanctions, and the ‘feasibility of the use of channels’ in a social unit can in 
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their respective rights impact participation.  But when rolled together, they also have a lot 
to reveal about the degree to “which participatory activities by subs are facilitated or 
impeded, which is certainly “dimensional”” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 63).  If there are 
impediments to channels of participation in the social unit, participatory activities therein 
will attract costs to participant sub-actors.  One can guess from the foregoing that those 
costs (both in fact and in degrees) are functions of the nature and extent of the 
impediments that exist in the channels of participation in the said social unit.
The other related issue on this is that, irrespective of the extent to which Super-
actors in the social unit try to impede channels of participation there will always be room 
for some creative subs-actors to wield certain acts of participation.  Although such acts of 
participation from those creative sub-actors may not be to the liking of the Super-actors, 
they are still bound to influence their directive activities all the same with very high 
chances of triggering instability of some sorts in the social unit.  While channels can be 
either ‘highly facilitated’ or ‘highly impeded’ the four aspects of the dimension of 
Participation are there to aid us in the task of gauging the degree to which participation 
has been facilitated or impeded in the social unit. 
(c) The frequency and intensity of the use of the channels of participation in a 
social unit by sub-actors can and are often associated with one another.  
However, knowing that the ‘frequency’ of use of channels can “be isolated 
and sporadic, or … frequent and continuous” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 63) 
would not entail that one is unaware of its intensity.  Thus, even if we were to 
know everything about the ‘frequency of use’ of the channels of Participation
it would not tell us the cost that sub-actors are prepared to bear for 
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participation.  Cost of participation is indeed a function of the value that sub-
actors place on their acts of participation in their social unit.  The logic of it all 
is that the higher the value that sub-actors place on their acts of participation, 
the higher cost that they will be prepared to shoulder and the higher the 
pressure that they will exert on the Super-actors in the social unit.
(d)  Acts of participation by sub-actors in a social unit do not constitute a 
homogenous whole.  Indeed they vary, and can come in the following modes: 
(i) ‘group actions’ (which connote that participatory sub-actors may either join 
existing groups or construct completely brand new groups all for the purpose of 
influencing the directives of their super-ordinate colleagues  
(ii) ‘direct personal actions’ (through which sub-actors resort to the use of such 
repertoires as ‘personal representations or letters’
(iii) ‘indirect personal actions’ (through which sub-actors route their acts of 
participation through a third party or medium—letters to the editor for instance), 
and
(iv) ‘impersonal actions’ (which are “activities in which the participating sub-actor 
remains anonymous, his actions simply adding a numerical increment to a more 
general activity—voting or depositing unsigned criticisms in the suggestion box” 
(Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 64).
There are two crucial issues that are worthy of note here concerning these four 
modes of acts of participation by sub-actors in a social unit.  Both issues relate to 
the “intensity of participation” or its “underlying dimension” (Eckstein and Gurr 
1975: 64) in any social unit.  We are told that:
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(a) “Group actions mark by far the greatest demands on participants, impersonal 
actions by far the least, and between them, direct personal actions are more 
strenuous than direct ones” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 64).
(b) It is safe to “assume that intense participants not only use the more demanding 
modes of participation (which are also likely to make supers feel “pressured”) 
but a variety of modes, participating if these include the more strenuous ones” 
(Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 64).
Responsiveness
It wouldn’t be wrong to presume that the dimension of Responsiveness is the 
logical consequence of Participation.  In fact, that was exactly how Eckstein and Gurr 
articulated it.  Hence their assertion that “participant subs seek to influence the way 
supers direct social units; responsive supers are disposed to be influenced by them and 
seek out “inputs” from them” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 67).  Knowledge of Participation
in any given social unit can indeed pave the ground for a logical understanding of 
Responsiveness therein.  
One can discern from Figure 2.4 below that there are two extremes to this third 
dimension of authority pattern.   Eckstein and Gurr call the first and second extremes of 
Responsiveness ‘autocracy’ and ‘alterocracy’ respectively.  In any social unit where 
Responsiveness is at the ‘autocracy’ extreme participation is not only un-tolerated, it is 
even inhibited by the Super-actors who tend to “define their own problems and issues, 
keep their own counsel, issue whatever directives they please, implementing them as they 
see fit, and ignore or block off “feedback” except for information required to sanction 
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noncompliance” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 67).  The opposite is the case at the 
‘alterocracy’ extreme, i.e. ‘alterocrates’ “act in all cases according to what they perceive 
to be the “public opinion” of social units, counting their own preferences no greater than 
others” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 67).  
Figure 2.4: Diagrammatic representation of the Eckstein-Gurr Responsiveness dimension
Source: Eckstein and Gurr (1975: 68).
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Another crucial difference between the Super-actors who are associated with 
these two extremes of the Responsiveness dimension is that “autocrats perceive social 
units as collective extensions of themselves, and alterocrates see themselves as personal 
extensions of social units"”(Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 67).  Absolute alterocracy may not 
obtain in logic and reality for the reason that it would entail “no effective asymmetry 
between supers and subs, hence no authority—only a vacuous “superiority” without 
“control”” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 67) as well as a situation in which the preferences of 
both subs and supers coincide in all and every issue(s) in every and at all times.  
On the other hand while autocracy in the absolute sense is not devoid of authority, 
its absolutism is not watertight since absolute autocrats are known to operate with the 
assistance of lieutenants.  In real world situations however, the one factor that has the 
potential to cloud up the desire of any researcher who desires to plot a Responsiveness 
dimension devoid of differentiation “is the divisibility of the process of direction into 
phases [such as the] definition of problems and issues, deliberation, and resolution” 
(Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 69).  But in other for a researcher to accomplish such a plot he 
must adjust his concern and focus on just ‘policy-making’ in the social unit he is 
stydying.  If the concern “shifts to direction…, we would of course add implementation, 
sanctioning, and the reception and processing of feedback from subs” (Eckstein and Gurr 
1975: 69) to the other phases that were outlined above.  When the different phases of the 
Responsiveness dimension are arrayed as shown in Figure 2.4, “Responsiveness can be 
high at some phases and low at others” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 69).
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Compliance
If all things were to be equal the logical flip side of “the directive super is the 
complaint sub” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 71).  But then nobody should assume that every 
subordinate actor in a unit will simply go out of his or her way to comply with whatever 
directives that emanate from their super-ordinates without factoring in the cost of doing 
that and the cost of the benefits that will accrue as a result of his or her compliance.
There are a number of factors that can engender compliance by a sub-actor on 
directives from the Super-actors in his social unit.  The first factor could be the 
disposition to compliance.  A sub-actor who is generally disposed to complying with 
directives can just do so at any given time for just that reason.  That would be especially 
so if after pondering on his options he concludes that it is more advantageous for him to 
comply as opposed to not complying.  The logical assumption in such a case is that he 
will ponder his options in view of several conditions with or without factoring 
“supervision and sanctions, … the probable costs of noncompliance” (Eckstein and Gurr 
1975: 71) into that process of pondering, etc.  The second factor is that a sub-actor could 
be convinced in his mind sequel to all deliberate calculations that a directive does not 
merit compliance but can at the same time be compelled to comply because of the dire 
consequences of noncompliance.  Thirdly, “considerations of diffuse “legitimacy” may” 
(Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 71) also elicit compliance to a directive from a sub-actor in a 
social unit.   Eckstein and Gurr remind us that some scholars (Rogowski and Wasserpring 
1971, and Rogowski 1974 in (Eckstein and Gurr 1975) have basically reduced 
‘compliance and noncompliance’ in social units “to cost-benefit ratios” (Eckstein and 
Gurr 1975: 72).  Irrespective of whatever ratio that guides compliance and 
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noncompliance in a social unit, Eckstein and Gurr believe that there are three peculiar 
“values” that definitely determine compliance or noncompliance in a social unit.   They 
are (a) ‘the specific value of the act’ of compliance or noncompliance, (b) ‘the more 
diffuse value of supporting or thwarting a general superordinate setup in the social unit’, 
and (c) the value of compliance or noncompliance in themselves’ (Eckstein and Gurr 
1975: 72).
Compliance                 
dispositions                                    
      (+)  Submissiveness
(0) Indifference   
   (-)  Insubordination           
Figure 2.5: Diagrammatic representation of the Eckstein-Gurr Compliance dimension
Source: Eckstein and Gurr (1975: 73).  Note: This is not all there is to Eckstein and 
Gurr’s diagrammatic representation of this dimension.  The other aspect that deals with 
the ‘determinants of compliance behavior’ is deliberately left.
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The configuration of the Compliance dimension (Figure 2.5) indicates that the 
disposition of sub-actors in the social unit to comply with directives from Super-actors 
come in “true opposites” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 72).  There is the topmost positive end 
in the configuration that boasts of the value of (+1).  That positive end can be identified 
as the point of ‘submissiveness’.  The point of ‘submissiveness’ is where compliance is 
the ‘overriding value’; the lowest point of negative end (-1) can be identified as the point 
of ‘insubordination’.  The overriding value at the point of ‘insubordination’ (negative 
end) is the opposite of what it is at the point of submissiveness.  In the configuration both 
of these points are separated by a point in the middle (0) which is called the point of 
‘indifference’ where “calculations of immediate specific costs and benefits have full 
play” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 72).  There are calibrated points of ‘allegiance’ between 
the points of ‘submissiveness’ and ‘indifference’.  In this realm of the Compliance
dimension, i.e. at the mid point of ‘indifference’, factors like the ‘overriding value’ to 
comply favorable ‘perceptions of legitimacy’ converge to deter sub-actors “from 
calculating the costs and benefits of compliance with specific directives in the first place, 
or favorably affect such calculations” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 72).  But that’s not all 
there is to the configuration.  One finds that a little before the middle of the upper notch 
of the configuration of the Compliance dimension depicts a situation in which 
compliance to directives in a social unit is driven by the extent to which the overriding 
value to submit is trumped by the perception of legitimacy.  Beyond that notch, 
compliance is guided by a sub-actor’s cost-benefit calculations.
Below the mid point of (‘indifference’), what we have is the ‘true opposite’ of all 
that we have seen, i.e. calibrated measures of ‘potential’ ‘opposition’.  There are some 
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additional aspects to the Compliance dimension, which are evident in the configuration, 
which we will not treat in detail here for the reason that they do not hold much relevance 
for our present discussion.
The Bases of Legitimacy Perceptions in Social Units
In their formulation and conceptualization of their scheme or tool for social 
inquiry into patterns of authority in a social unit Eckstein and Gurr did not overlook the 
crucial place of the ‘bases of legitimacy’ in “the ‘performance’ of patterns of authority” 
(Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 197) in social units.  Both authors defined ‘bases of legitimacy 
perceptions’ as: “values which govern perceptions that authority patterns are rightly 
constituted and therefore worthy of support—worthy, that is, of actions that tend to keep 
the patterns in existence and functioning effectively” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 198).
Naturally, Weber’s state-centered conception of legitimacy (Collins 1986) is the 
point of departure for Eckstein and Gurr as they proceeded to outline their own clearer 
and unambiguous set of analytic concepts to depict the bases of legitimacy.  In the 
context of Weber’s state-centered conception, authority conceived in the context of the 
state, is analogous to domination, i.e. the capacity of some to exert their will on the rest 
who are in the majority, and make them to obey (Bendix 1962).  Also, in the Weberian 
conception, “beliefs in the legitimacy of a system of domination are not merely 
philosophical matters” (Bendix 1962: 294).  Indeed, they coalesce into a dynamic 
“feeling that arises from assessing the prestige of the state at any given moment” (Collins 
1986: 155).   Weber furnished us with three bases of legitimacy, each of which is “related 
to a corresponding type of “apparatus”—that have been used to justify the power of 
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command” (Bendix 1962: 294).  The three bases of legitimacy that he furnished us with, 
which have often been described as a typology are: legal-rational legitimacy, which he 
associated with legal-rational authority; charismatic legitimacy (associated with the 
personal character of supers), and traditional legitimacy, which is associated with 
traditional authority.
Taken accordingly, the exercise of legal-rational authority derives its legitimacy 
in any society where it issues from a set of impersonal code of laws whose application is 
judiciously impartial.  All persons in such societies are deemed equal before the 
established code of laws.  The only factors that elevate the individuals who are charged 
with the administration of that code to the status of “superiors” are the offices that their 
fellow members elected them to occupy (Bendix 1962).  Such offices survive the tenure 
of the individuals who are elected to occupy them.  
The legitimacy of wielders of charismatic authority is based on the presumed 
personal charismatic attributes of such leaders.  While they are imbued with 
“extraordinary qualities” (Bendix 1962: 295) by their followers, which is why they obey 
them also, the “disciple-officials” who serve under them are equally appointed for “their 
own charisma and personal devotion” (Bendix 1962: 295) to the leader.  
Authority whose exercise is based on traditional legitimacy functions on the 
accepted belief that its existence is timeless and that it is part and parcel of the social unit 
and its members.  The “commands of leaders who fall under this typology are legitimate 
in the sense that they are in accord with custom, but they also possess the prerogative of 
free personal decisions” (Bendix 1962: 295).
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Eckstein and Gurr consider Weber’s typologies useful particularly for the reason 
that “they seem to exhaust all possibilities”, are “mutually exclusive”, and have “wide 
applicability” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 202).  However, they argue that “as an analytic 
scheme for characterizing bases of legitimation [i.e.] as an analytic scheme of qualitative 
elements” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 203-4), Weber’s typologies “are defective on one of 
two grounds” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 204).  First, they do not account for the crucial 
element of “force” as well as “many other Bases of Legitimacy” (Eckstein and Gurr 
1975: 204).  Second, even if one accepts that they are ‘comprehensive’ in scope, their 
comprehensiveness merely “identifies bases of legitimacy only at a level of generality 
where important information is lost” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 204).  They cite examples 
with legal-rational legitimacy and charismatic legitimacy.  They argue that there can be 
an endless list of what can constitute legal-rational and charismatic bases for legitimacy 
respectively.  As for traditional legitimacy, they argue that in spite of being the one 
typology whose comprehensiveness is somewhat close-ended, the list of what it 
encompasses which can serve, as the bases of legitimacy in any situation where it 
prevails can still be quite extensive.  One can therefore conclude that the Weberian 
typologies are fraught with serious shortcomings which can get in the way of any attempt 
to adopt them as analytic tools for “characterizing the bases of legitimacy” (Eckstein and 
Gurr 1975: 204) in social units.  Based on all these, their verdict on the Weberian 
typologies is that they may serve as a good point of departure in the quest to outline more 
robust analytic concepts for the manner of inquiry that we are saddled with in this 
dissertation.
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They recommended that their “analytic scheme for characterizing authority 
patterns [can also] be converted for use in describing the bases of legitimacy perceptions” 
(Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 204).  That explains the deliberate manner with which they 
formulated and examined all their dimensions of authority patterns in ‘three modes’, i.e. 
“the forms, practices, and norms of authority” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 205).  The 
position of these two authors therefore is that each of the four dimensions of influence in 
the relations between Super-actors and sub-actors that we have examined so far and 
acknowledged as “central to any authority pattern” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 53) in any 
social unit are “bound to have practical and normative aspects, …” (Eckstein and Gurr 
1975: 205) to them in the study of political or governmental performance in social units.  
The hub of the Eckstein-Gurr articulation of the Bases of legitimacy linked to the 
‘forms’, ‘practices’ and ‘norms’ of authority
 is that the normative aspects of the dimensions are all, in the nature 
of norms, potential sources of perceptions of legitimacy.  The norms 
concern conditions deemed desirable.  If correspondence of practices
(or perhaps forms) to norms is perceived, positive perceptions of 
legitimacy should occur; if not, the perception should be negative
((Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 205). 
In a nutshell therefore, the ‘Bases of legitimacy’ in social units could be furnished by 
‘balances of norms’ and ‘salient norms’ (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 204-221). 
Drawing from the logic of their own argument steeped in examples, Eckstein and 
Gurr have recommended the following three of their dimensions of authority patterns as 
possible bases of legitimacy.  In some quite reasonable ways too, they were able to 
associate all three with aspects of Weber’s typologies of legitimacy.
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Personal Legitimacy: Recruitment as a Salient Dimension
This is the dimension of authority patterns that touches the occupants of 
“superordinated positions” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 211) in a social unit directly.  The 
issue of who the superordinates in a social unit are is understood most if not all of its 
members.  Members of social units can easily factor their perceptions of who their 
leaders are into their over all assessment of the authority they wield.  ‘Personal 
legitimacy’ of superordinates is of pivotal importance in how members of a social unit 
evaluate their authority patterns.  Indeed, “a personal characteristic, competence, was the 
one factor other than position as such frequently mentioned as a basis of authority” 
(Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 213).
Eckstein and Gurr emphasized that since the processes through which 
superordinates are recruited are visible to members, Recruitment is bound to “play 
important roles in perceptions of legitimacy” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 150).  They 
designate Recruitment as a dimension which is “salient for norms of legitimacy” 
(Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 213).  Also, they designate it as “a dimension that both closely 
relates to the persons of superordinates and renders accessible the less mutable aspects of 
the personal characteristics of authorities” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 213).  When subs see 
that what actually prevails in the processes of elevating individuals to positions of 
authority correspond to the dictates of the prevalent norms in their social unit, then there 
will be no doubt that they will view the exercise of authority by those individuals as 
being legitimate.  Eckstein and Gurr’s designation of the Recruitment dimension as a 
valid base for legitimacy is further underscored by their assessment that it tends to 
encompass aspects of Weber’s legal-rational and traditional types of legitimacy.
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‘Substantive Legitimacy: The Salience of Directiveness’
What emanates from the wielders of authority in a social unit as directives have a 
lot to do with how they are perceived by those who they direct.  Irrespective of what their 
notion of the person who issues the directives is, the members of social units tend to have 
a clear notion of what they consider to be fair or foul.  The implication of that is that “it is 
hard to believe that their sense of justice or injustice (hence legitimacy) will be wholly 
based on perceptions of the persons of supers or processes of direction” (Eckstein and 
Gurr 1975: 216) in their social unit.  It is therefore because of the nature of what they 
both encompass that Directiveness and Responsiveness tend to have immediate impact on 
the perceptions that subs have about their supers who are the sources of directives in their 
social units.
This is why Eckstein and Gurr propounded that it is because of the way in which 
the affairs of people can be impacted by enforced directives that Directiveness in social 
units determines their evaluation of authority in society.  When we recall that the extent 
to which the views of members of a social are taken into account by the wielders of 
authority when they formulate directives impacts their evaluation of authority we can also 
say a similar thing about Responsiveness.  In other words, because Directiveness and 
Responsiveness “possess high immediacy and consequentiality” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 
217) they both constitute valid bases for legitimacy too.
‘Procedural Legitimacy: The Salience of Participation’
Participation is the other dimension of authority pattern whose salience can 
impact the evaluation of authority by members of a social unit.  People can get a sense of 
74
belonging in their social unit through Participation.  In societies where the norm of 
participation is prevalent, attempts by authority to direct otherwise are bound to make 
members to perceive authority as illegitimate.  Participation “has manifest immediacy for 
people and is likely to be perceived as consequential” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 220).
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Determinants of compliance behavior: 
(a) General legitimacy perceptions—
can dispose people to comply (b) 
Specific cost calculations
(i)General illegitimacy perceptions (ii) 
specific cost calculations—can dispose 
people to defy
Creative acts of participation such as 
revolts, riots, resistance, etc.
Figure 2.6: Tabular representation of the E-G scheme showing the four dimensions of 
influence relations, the components and their applicable indices.
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relate to influence relations.  It shows the four dimensions, the values of their respective 
continuum, the aspects/components of each value in the continuum for each one, and of 
course, the indices or indicators that characterize each dimension.  Figure 2.7 is the 
presentation of the five possible measures or metrics (Very High, High, Low, Very Low, 
and Absent) that can be used to assess the degree to which the values of the four 
dimensions are evident in the authority patterns of the three nationalities, and those of the 
‘Nigerian’ supra-national state.






Very High, High, Low, Very Low, or Absent
Very High, High, Low, Very Low, or Absent
Very High, High, Low, Very Low, or Absent
Participation 1. Participant (+)
2. Non-participant (0)
Very High, High, Low, Very Low, or Absent






Very High, High, Low, Very Low, or Absent
Very High, High, Low, Very Low, or Absent








Very High, High, Low, Very Low, or Absent
Very High, High, Low, Very Low, or Absent
Very High, High, Low, Very Low, or Absent
Very High, High, Low, Very Low, or Absent
Very High, High, Low, Very Low, or Absent
Figure 2.7: Measure-scale representation of the E-G scheme
So far, we have been able to establish the grounds to embark on the task of 
discussing authority patterns among the Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa-Fulani and in the next 
chapter, in the imposed ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state.
76
Data and Their Sources
The historical nature of the study dictates that it should be based on data from 
secondary sources.  We were able to identify several documents and records that fit that 
definition on all aspects of the lives of the distinct nationalities in the Niger basin and 
their contacts with Europeans were identified.  Such secondary documents and records 
were sorted into the three categories of 25
(1.) studies on the nationalities,
(2.) studies on the colonial period.
(3.) studies on political instability.
Studies on the Nationalities
We developed a chart to enable us sort the available data on the three 
nationalities—see Appendix 1.  There were monographs, early anthropological and 
original historical records of all kinds that were produced and gathered on and about the 
indigenous nationalities.  Such secondary sources include the Human Relations Area 
Files (HRAF)26, and the London International African Institute’s Ethnographic Survey of 
Africa series, edited by Daryll Forde.  The HRAF, which was developed by Yale 
University in the early 1970s, is an assortment of “historic and ethnographic” (Bates 
1983: 22) materials by different authors and sources on a “sample of thirty-six African 
25 Only a selection of these sources is listed in this chapter.  The bibliography is arranged 
in a deliberate manner aimed at presenting the sources of data in the three categories. 
26 See Murdock, George Peter. 1975. Outline of World Cultures, Human Relations Area 
Files, Inc.  The HRAF opened up some important sources of data on the nationalities.  
Every annotated entry on each of the nationalities led us to the complete work from 
which it was culled.
77
societies” (Bates 1983: 22) and more.  It is an assortment of materials by different authors 
and sources on various groups and peoples of the world.  
The Ethnographic Survey of Africa series is a colonial undertaking which include 
monographs on almost all the nationalities that inhabit the region.  Some examples as 
shown in Figure 2.8 include: Peoples of the Plateau Area of Northern Nigeria and 
Peoples of the Middle Niger Region of Northern Nigeria, both by Harold D. Gunn, The 
Tiv of Central Nigeria by Laura and Paul Bohannan, Notes on the Tribes of Northern 
Nigeria by O. Temple, The Ibo and Ibibio Speaking Peoples of Southeastern Nigeria by 
Forde and Jones, C. K. Meek’s Law and Authority in a ‘Nigerian’ Tribe, M. M. Green’s 
Ibo Village Affairs, Samuel Johnson’s The History of the Yorubas, G. T. Basden’s Niger 
Ibos, S. F. Nadel’s A Black Byzantium, Northcote W. Thomas’ six volume 
Anthropological Report on the Ibo-Speaking Peoples of Nigeria.  Included in this 
category are books and monographs in the Ibadan History series and early trail blazing 
articles in The Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, and The Journal of Modern 
African History, etc).  
Early anthropological monographs furnished vital data on marriage27; economy, 
and politics; three indices that we utilized to assess integration within and between 
nationalities on the socio-cultural, economic and political levels respectively during the 
pre-colonial period.
27 Edward Ward’s Marriage Among the Yoruba, 1937, Washington, DC: The Catholic 
University of America. (The Catholic University of America Anthropological Series, No. 
4) stands out here.
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Sources on the Colonial Period
Documents in this category include British Parliamentary Papers, Foreign Office, 
and Colonial Office records and documents—British Parliamentary Papers (Colonies 
Africa 63, Papers Relating to Africa 1802-99, Colonies Africa # 50, 64, Reports and 
Papers From the Foreign Office Confidential Print Series G (Africa, 1848-1914) Vol. 21 
The Niger and Oil Rivers 1860-98).  They all yielded extensive data on different aspects 
of British activities in the areas over time.  I identified and gathered original records and 
accounts of the various ‘treaties’ that various British agents made indigenous leaders in 
the areas to sign, the various punitive expeditions and campaigns that British-led forces 
conducted against inhabitants of the areas.  I identified and gathered relevant records of 
marshal and administrative enforcement by the British in the areas at the onset of and 
during the period of colonialism. They include, Correspondence Relating to Campaigns 
in Arochukwu, Bini, Sokoto, Hadeija and the Munshi Country, Colonial Reports 1900-
157, War Office Records, Lugard’s Political Memoranda, Amalgamation Report, etc.).  
Statistical records of all kinds, including census data on the areas were gathered or 
identified.
Studies on Political Instability
Sources here include works by Samuel P. Huntington, Gabriel Almond, James, 
Coleman and the others who pioneered studies on political development in the ‘new 
states’ in the immediate post World War II years.  Most of the works by these pioneer 
scholars are steeped in modernization theory.  The works of scholars who reacted to 
studies by these pioneers and resorted to situate their own studies within the realm of 
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“bringing the state back in” (Skocpol 1982) were good sources of data.  They include 
Larry Diamond’s Class, Ethnicity and Democracy in Nigeria, Toyin Falola and Julius 
Ihonvbere’s The Rise and Fall of Nigeria’s Second Republic, etc.  Works that fall under 
this category of sources cover the entire range of theoretical perspectives.  Figure 2.4 
below is a snapshot of some of the important sources of secondary data on the three 
nationalities and British colonialism.
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Ten of our most important sources of secondary data
Igbo Yoruba Hausa-Fulani British Colonialism
1. The HRAF.
2. The Ibo and 
Ibibio-Speaking 
Peoples of South-
Eastern Nigeria by 
Daryll Forde and G. 
I. Jones (1950).
3. Ibo Village Affairs
by M. M. Green 
(1950).
4. Studies in Ibo 
Political Systems by 
Ikenna Nzimiro 
(1972).
4. “Ibo Oracles and 
Intergroup Relations” 
by Simon Ottenberg 
(1958).
5. The Igbo of 
Southeast Nigeria by 
Victor C. Uchendu 
(1965).
6. “The Igbo 
Response to British 
Imperialism” by F. 
K. Ekechi (1974).
7. Law and Authority 
in a ‘Nigerian’ Tribe
by C. K. Meek 
(1937).
8. The Igbo People 
and Europeans by 
Elizabeth Isichei 
(1973).
9. The six-volume 
Anthropological 
Report on the Ibo-
Speaking Peoples of 
Nigeria by Northcote 
W. Thomas (1914).
10. “The Growth of 
Trade Among the 
Igbo Before 1800” by 
David Northrup 
(1972).
1. Yoruba Warfare in 
the Nineteenth 
Century by J. F. A. 
Ajayi and Robert 
Smith (1971).
2. The Origin of the 





Nigeria by Daryll 
Forde (1951).




5. “The Yoruba 
Lineage” by P. C. 
Lloyd (1955).
6. “Sacred Kingship 
and Government 
Among the 
Yoruba” by P. C. 
Lloyd (1960a).
7. “Kinship and 
Lineage Among 
the Yoruba” by 
William B. 
Schwab (1955).
8. The Peoples of 
Southern Nigeria
by P. A. Talbot 
(1926).
9. Revolution and 
Power Politics in 
Yorubaland, 1840-
1893 by Stephen 
A. Akintoye 
(1966).
10. “Political Change 
      and Adaptation in 
     Yorubaland in the 
     Nineteenth Century” 
     by G. O. Oguntomisin
(1981).
1. “Islam and Clan 
Organization 
Among the Hausa” 
by Joseph H. 
Greenberg (1947).








4. Affairs of West 
Africa by Edmund 
D. Morel (1968).
5. “Aspects of 
Emirship in Kano” 
by John N. Paden 
(1970).
6. Government in 
Zazzau, 1800-1950
by M. G. Smith 
(1960).





the Hausa” by M. 
G. Smith (1964).
8. Native Races and 
their Rulers by 








Nigeria” by P. K. 
Tibenderana 
(1989).
10. “Islam and Social 
Stratification in 
Northern Nigeria” 
by E. R. Yeld 
(1960).
1. The Warrant 







3. “Portrait of a 
Colonizer” by 




5. “Lugard and 
Indirect Rule” 










1960 by Ian F.  
Nicolson 
        (1969).








by Anthony I. 
Nwabughu-
ogu (1981).










Figure 2.8: Ten of our most important sources of secondary data.
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CHAPTER III:
THE PERIOD BEFORE 1884: THE NIGER BASIN AND ITS INHABITANTS 
BEFORE COLONIAL CONQUEST
Understanding the problems that often emanate from the task of building a 
politically unstable supra-national state from distinct as well as diverse nationalities 
requires that one must appreciate the disparate nature of those constituent nationalities.  
The pertinence for embarking on such an undertaking is especially necessary in situations 
where the task of state building was accomplished by external intervention, and without 
the consent of those distinct nationalities.
In the case of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state, some of the disparities that exist 
between distinct nationalities can be traced to the geographical differences in their 
environment.  For instance, geography played a role in the racial make-up of the 
inhabitants (Buchanan, Pugh, and Brown 1955: 80)—see Map 3.1.  There may also be 
some disparities that can be traced to striking differences in the kinds of state, systems of 
governance, and the nature of social, economic and political authority patterns evolved by 
each one of them prior to British conquest.  The nationalities that made their home in the 
Niger basin inhabit it in almost a neat non-co-terminus pattern—see Maps 3.2, 3. 3, and 
3.4 respectively below.  Through nature’s own act of territorial demarcation, the Niger 
basin is apportioned into distinctive geographic regions (Coleman 1958).  
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Map3.1: To illustrate the role that the geography of the Niger basin played in the racial 
make-up of its inhabitants.  “Note the role of the rain forest and the broken terrain of the 
Middle Belt as refuges for the forest Negro and Negrito groups respectively” (Buchanan, 
Pugh, and Brown 1955: 80).
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Map 3.2: Showing the Igbo and some of the other nationalities that inhabit southeast 
lower Niger basin. Source: Coleman (1958: 29).
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Map 3.3: Showing the Yoruba and the nationalities that inhabit southwest lower Niger 
basin.  Source: Coleman (1958: 26).
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Map 3.4: Showing the upper Niger basin and the nationalities that inhabit it.  Source: 
Coleman (1958: 19)
It was indeed those distinctive regions that facilitated the socio-political 
demarcation of the Niger basin in a way that qualifies its inhabitants to be rightly referred 
to as regional people (Coleman 1958).  Each of the nationalities lays claims to its own 
historical territory or homeland.  Each homeland has its own specific geographical 
boundaries that separate members of the inhabiting nationality and demarcate their 
territory from their neighbors’ territory or homeland.  In the Niger basin geography was 
responsible for providing the ‘boundaries of nationality’ that John Stuart Mill (1962) later 
espoused as a necessary condition for stable and democratic governance in polities.28
28 Mills argued that “the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with 
those of nationalities” or fellow-feelings (in Marx 1998:4, and Katznelson 1996: 119).  
Mill’s argument was affirmed by even the political development in an immigrant society 
like the United State where settlers in the southern colonies evolved their own kinship 
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But pre-colonial state building and Europe’s colonial intervention produced the 
trans-regionalism that disrupted some of the natural ‘boundaries of nationality’ in the 
Niger basin—see Map 3.5.29   The Fulani jihad (a pre-colonial state building event that 
began in Hausaland in 1803) was responsible for incorporating parts of northern 
Yorubaland as an administrative polity into the Caliphate Empire in 1874.  Similarly, 
Europe’s colonial intervention (an external state building event in the late nineteenth 
century) arbitrarily carved up some of the homelands into artificial polities that are better 
described as amalgams of several distinct peoples.  Parts of Yorubaland and Hausaland 
were partitioned into components of French possessions in the lower and upper Niger 
respectively.  The British combined some Igbo groups and parts of Ijoland into an 
administrative polity within the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state that they called the 
Western Region with the rest of Yorubaland.  The rest of Ijoland and the other smaller 
nationalities that inhabit southeast lower Niger all got placed into the Eastern Region 
with the rest of the more populous Igbo.30
networked and unique culture that was based on the ecology of their agricultural 
environment and dependency on slave labor for its exploitation.  The politics of the US 
has continuously been defined by the uniqueness between the agricultural South and the 
industrial North. 
29 The exception was in the open savanna parts of the upper Niger basin where kinship 
and cultural ties developed between two erstwhile distinct nationalities, the Hausa and the 
Fulani.  The kinship and cultural integration that evolved between the Hausa and the 
Fulani was partly because of the open savanna grassland that did not constitute a natural 
barrier to the movement and fission of peoples.
30 The Regions and the other artificial administrative polities carved out of the inhabitants 
of the Niger basin since they were forced into the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state lacked 
political durability.
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Map3. 5: Showing the trans-regionalism that resulted from European intervention in the 
Niger basin.  Source: Coleman (1958: 17)
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The Centrality of Geography and Ecology: Geography, Ecology, Homelands, and 
Peoples31
The geography of the Niger basin is central to both the history and political 
development of its diverse peoples.  The lower Niger basin includes the Niger delta and 
the areas that are located to its east and west.  The lower Niger basin consists of four 
distinct tropical vegetations that qualify as ecological zones.  The mangrove swamps 
constitute the ecological zone through which the River Niger drains into the Atlantic 
Ocean.  The evergreen and thick rainforest land is the ecological zone which began from 
where the mangrove swamps terminate upland in the Niger basin.  The evergreen and 
thick rain-forest ecological zone is followed by the deciduous forest region that thins 
down and becomes mostly grassland, which then joins up smoothly with the fourth 
ecological zone of mostly savanna vegetation.  As Figure 3.1 shows, geography and 
ecology (Anene 1966) largely define the inhabitants of the Niger basin.  Hailey’s (1957) 
observation that geography impacts the history of most large world regions is therefore 
true about the Niger delta and its inhabitants.  From Table 3.1 below, it is evident that 
each of the four distinct ecological zones in this large portion of the West African sub-
region is associated with distinct political systems too.32
We have evidentiary proof to associate the four ecological zones with the 
evolution of specific political systems.  We shall soon establish that in those situations 
31 See Coleman, James S. 1958. Nigeria: Background to Nationalism. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, p.11-35.
32 Some Euro-American scholars including W. Arthur Lewis (1965:24) and Jeffrey Herbst 
(2000: 12) have observed that in contrast to Europe contemporary African states 
encompass more diverse ecological zones.  Their observation ignored the need to 
mention that such a contrast resulted from Europe’s arbitrary intervention in state 
building in Africa.
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where different nationalities inhabit the same ecological zone, the ecological 
circumstances that prevail in each of the zones yielded uncanny similarities in the 
political systems that the nationalities that inhabit them evolved.  Hence, the inhabitants 
of the mangrove swamps evolved small city-states at the mouth of the various rivers 
through which the Niger empties into the Atlantic, while those that inhabit the thick ever-
green rain forest zone fashioned out small village democracies for themsellves.  It will 
amount to stretching the facts for us to suggest here that this is the exact social world 
replica of convergent evolution observed in evolutionary biology amongst certain animal 
species.  However, the situation that we discerned from the socio-political systems 
evolved by the inhabitants of the mangrove swamps and the thick rain forest zones 
indicate that there are still some striking similarities between the social world in this part 
of the Niger basin and the world of evolutionary biology.  The parallels that are evident 
in the political systmes of the different inhabitants of each zone can be accounted for by 
their adaptation to the uniform pecularities of their habitat.  The variations (random) in 
their respective socio-political system highlight their distinctiveness.
In the economic realm the inhabitants of the mangrove swamps made their living 
as fishermen and watermen, while those of the thick rain forest became mostly cultivators 
and agrarians.  But rather than exist in isolation or become preoccupied with the quest to 
surmount the natural barriers in their environment and prey on one another through 
warfare, they evolved an efficient inter-group system of trade and commerce through 
which they disposed of their produce and acquired whatever they needed that they 
couldn’t produce from their neighbors.  The economic cooperation which developed 
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Figure 3.1: The interactive impact of ecological factors in the Niger basin and their 
outcome on the social, economic and political organization of the Igbo, Yoruba and 
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located at river  
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Bini, Yoruba Deciduous rain forest Large-scale political 
organizations
Hausa-Fulani Savanna grassland Large-scale political 
organizations
Table 3.1: Ecology and scale of political organization in the Niger basin
between the various nationalities in the mangrove swamps and the rain forest zones gave 
rise to the extensive inter-group system of long distant trade in southeast Niger basin.  
This is not the first time that geography and ecology have been stressed on as 
central factors in Africa’s history.  Geography and the ecological factors that are often 
associated with it have been highlighted as being central to the political development of 
Africa and its peoples.  Jeffrey Herbst argued that Africa’s ‘inhospitable territories’ and 
its inhabitation by sparse population densities have been age-old obstacles to state 
builders and their desires to project authority in all ramifications (Herbst 2000: 11).  
Robert Bates (1983) made the broad assertion that high population density was a positive 
predictor of political centralization in Africa.33  John Iliffe (1995: 70) blamed under 
33 My profound knowledge of the Igbo which he specifically pointed at in his work 
indicates that his lack of adequate knowledge of their anthropological history takes a bite 
off the validity of his assertion as far as they are concerned.  His attempts to depict the 
Aro Igbo as having “centralized systems” (Bates 1983: 24) of social, economic, and 
political organization which enabled their pivotal role in the development of trade in the 
lower Niger basin during the Euro-American trans-Atlantic slave trade (1650-1850) is not
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population in the savannah belt of the West African sub-region as the principal culprit 
that impacted state formation in negative ways.  Robert F. Stevenson (1968) cited cases 
all over tropical Africa (including the Igbo) to argue that there is a high correlation 
between state formation and high population density amongst African peoples.
The Mangrove Swamps Ecological Zone
The inhabitants of the lower Niger basin’s mangrove swamps exploited their 
ecology and environment to develop their economic and political institutions in some 
remarkable ways (Anene 1966).   The inhabitants of the mangrove swamps include the 
Ijo34, the Kalabari, the Efik, the Ibeno (Ubani),35 the Ogoni, and the Itsekiri nationalities, 
who, thanks to their environment, are great fishermen and traders (Anene 1966).  Talbot 
(1926: 317) underscored the importance of fishing and trading as the two mainstays of 
the economies of the inhabitants of the Niger delta, which played a significant role as 
well in their socio-political development. 
Long before the middle of the fifteenth century when the first Europeans36 made 
contact with the inhabitants of the Niger coast, the mangrove swamps was the material 
base that provided the latter with the resources that they utilized to develop a successful 
long distance trade with all of their upland neighbors--the Ibibi, Igbo, et al (Ukwu 1967: 
655, Alagoa 1971: 269).  The inhabitants of the Niger delta’s mangrove swamps utilized 
supported by facts.  Like the other Igbo groups, the Aro Igbo “themselves lacked a strong 
hierarchical organization and strong centralization of power” (Ottenberg 1958: 312).  
Northrup (1978) asserts the same in Trade Without Rulers: Pre-Colonial Economic
Development in South-Eastern Nigeria. 
34 Ijaw is the anglicized spelling of this name.  I’ll restrict myself to spelling it as Ijo in 
the rest of the study.
35 The Igbo call them Ndi Ubani, meaning the Ubani people.
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the wealth that accrued from that internal long distance trade to found their various city-
states literally at the various mouths out of which the Niger empties into the Atlantic 
(Alagoa 1970, 1971, Anene 1966).  It is evident that each of those city-states evolved its 
own political structures and institutions that served the economic, social and political 
needs of its founding nationality (Anene 1966: 9).  Marxian economic determinism is 
very much in play here.  The overall transformation of these city-states depended strictly 
on the internal long distance trade that flourished in the lower Niger basin prior to about 
1472 when the first European traders who ventured near the coasts got involved in it 
(Dusgate 1985: 15).  Thus, trade and commerce had both been developed and were 
already flourishing in the lower Niger before the advent of Europeans (Latham 1971, 
Hopkins 1966, Hiskett 1966 and 1967, Sundstrom (1974), Newbury 1961: 40-2, 57-9, 
and Jones 1958).  In deed, “ virtually all of pre-colonial West Africa had economies 
sufficiently developed to require the use of circulating mediums of exchange and units of 
account” (Lovejoy 1974: 563). 
Furthermore, Dike (1956a), Jones (1963), Ukwu (1965 and 1967), Alagoa (1970, 
1971), and Northrup (1972) argued that trade with Europeans in the lower Niger began 
long after the evolution of extensive internal long distance trade.  It is therefore true that 
trade with Europeans merely furnished additional material base that the fishing and 
trading nationalities of the Niger tapped into to enhance economic growth in their city-
states and further transform their existing socio-political systems (Dike 1956a, Jones 
1963, Alagoa 1970, 1971).
36 Precisely, the Portuguese were the first Europeans who made the first contacts and 
traded with the inhabitants of this part of the Niger basin.
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The Efik for example, evolved city-states that were essentially republics, which 
functioned under the overall legislative, executive and judicial authority of the Ekpe
(Egbo) society (Waddell 1970, Anene 1966).  In contrast to the Efik, the political system 
that the Ibeno people founded and based the administration of their own city-states on 
was monarchical.  Each Ibeno city-state was structured according to the ‘House-system’.  
Several Houses made a city-state.  A House head (chief) and his subordinate chiefs 
governed each House (Anene 1970).  A House was comprised of a loose hierarchy of 
families of freemen and their slaves.  The hierarchy of the Houses is loose in the sense 
that slaves could ascend to the headship of Houses.  In the Ibeno tradition, the king of 
each city-state, of which Bonny emerged as the most prominent one, was the chief of 
state as well as the spiritual and temporal head of his society (Anene 1966).  
There was also an advisory council that was composed of all the House heads and 
the priests.  But the authority of the King in Bonny extended to all issues of national 
affairs touching on the economy (trade and markets) and foreign affairs (wars and the 
conduct of wars) (Anene 1966: 10).  He founded and directed markets and trade, and 
relied on the support and advice of the advisory council in the discharge of his 
responsibilities and duties as the leader of his society.  His position and authority served 
as the balance in Bonny’s monarchical political system (Anene 1966).   
The Thick Ever-Green Rain Forest Ecological Zone
A little distance upland still in the lower Niger basin, north of Efikland, and 
around the Cross river are other smaller nationalities including the Ekoi, the Yakoro, the 
Akunakuna, the Iyala, the Uwet, the Uyanga, etc., who also evolved their respective 
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political systems and their attendant unique institutions, through their dynamic interaction 
with their own environment.  The location of the nationalities and their homelands is 
shown in Map 3.1.
The political systems and the structures that the coastal nationalities evolved and 
ran their city-states with were quite straight-forward when compared with their more 
populous upland neighbors—the Igbo37 , the Ogoja and the Ibibi (Ibibio)38—as well as 
the aforementioned numerically smaller nationalities who also inhabit the immediate 
upland areas away from the delta.  That straight-forwardness seemed to have played a 
role in the ease with which the British seemed to have understood the political systems in 
the city-states.  On the contrary, the British found the complex Igbo, Ibibi, and Ogoja 
political systems and institutional structures confusing (Anene 1970).  In fact, Anene 
(1970) further asserted that the British misunderstood the Igbo and Ibibi political systems 
and institutional structures.  Over the years some historians (Dike 1956a, Anene 1966) of 
Anglo-West African relations had separately concluded that the standard British practice 
in the Niger basin—exemplified by the views of Ormsby-Gore in 1926—was to label the 
political system in the Niger basin that they could not understand as disorganized, 
anarchic, and devoid of leaders (Ormsby-Gore 1926 in Anene 1966).
Here too, in the thick and ever-green rain forest zone, the environment that the 
hinterland nationalities inhabit, together with its forests ecology played central roles in 
the evolution of their respective political economies each of which is unique and 
seemingly intricate to outsiders.  This is particularly true about the Igbo who inhabit the 
37 Igbo is the authentic name of this nationality.  The anglicized version is Ibo.  Unless 
where there is a direct quote from someone else, we shall stick to the former in this 
dissertation.
38 Ibibio is the anglicized version of Ibibi by which their Igbo neighbors know them.
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thick rainforest environment of the lower Niger basin.  While the thick rainforest 
environment of the Igbo homeland supported their predominantly agricultural economy 
and even constituted a natural barrier that protected them from large-scale internal 
invasion, it was also a hindrance to smooth movement and interaction of people.  More 
than anything else, that kind of environment impacted the course and outcome of political 
development in Igboland.  It may have been on account of that environment that the Igbo 
had no need for and never evolved large scale political organizations (Anene 1966).  
Instead of large centralized political systems, the Igbo evolved small village-based 
democracies (Anene 1966, Isichei 1973 and 1983).  
Perhaps it was for some of the same reasons that have to do with the geography of 
their respective homelands that the Igbo and almost all the other nationalities (the Ogoja, 
the Ibibi, the Yako, et al) that inhabit the same thick rainforest ecological zone in the 
lower Niger basin evolved economies that were based on agriculture and long distance 
trade.  Those same reasons may have accounted for why they never tended towards large 
political organizations with centralized authority patterns (Anene 1966, Isichei 1973).  
There is certainly a relationship between the three factors of population, 
migration, and ecology in the social, economic, and political evolution and 
transformation of societies and polities in the Niger basin.  That assertion is underscored 
by the prominent role played by all three factors in the development of markets amongst 
the nationalities, which in turn aided the transformation of their indigenous economies 
respectively (Newbury 1977).  Among the Igbo for instance, “the year is ecological rather 
than chronological” (Ukwu 1967: 648).  Tied to agriculture, the Igbo year “is the period 
from one yam harvest to the next, from mid-dry season to mid-dry season and lasts 
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between twelve and thirteen moons” (Ukwu 1967: 648).39  On this, the Igbo are not the 
exception in an environment where economic mainstays— agriculture, fishing, etc; are 
all driven by the ecological cycle.40
Population
Migration Location of markets
 (Economy)
Ecological zones       
Figure 3.2: The relationship between population, migration, and ecological zones and 
their determination of the distribution of markets in the Niger basin
39 In Igboland, “the moon”, (the unit of time that approximates the Caesar calendar 
month), “is related directly to the lunar cycle, being the period between the beginning of 
the first quarter and the end of the last.  Operationally, the duration is rather imprecise 
since it depends on the ability to spot the new moon; sometimes, as between debtor and 
creditor, luminescence can be subjective!” (Ukwu 1967: 648).  Note, that I pointed this 
out to illustrate that amongst the Igbo, the ecological cycle is factored into the mundane 
economic understanding of credit and trust between creditor and debtor.
40 The Oka Igbo who are reputed to have founded one of the two well-organized trade 
systems in pre-colonial Igboland hinged its logistics on the ecological cycle:  “In the 
eight or nine agricultural month, shortly after the new yam festival, the travelers whose 
turn it was would leave…. but … were not obliged to return until the seventh month of 
the next year, about five Izus (20 days) from the new yam festival” (Ukwu 1967: 651).  
Their comprehensive understanding of the ecological cycle of the Igbo homeland and its 
surroundings enabled them to integrate agriculture “with their specialist activities” 
(Ukwu 1967: 650) as physicians, diviners, smiths and priests. 
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While it is not valid to assert that indigenous society in pre-colonial Igboland was 
warless, it is valid to argue that among Nd’Igbo warfare and conquest were hardly 
exploited for state building purposes.  More often than not, during the pre-colonial period 
in order to prevent protracted conflicts between different independent political units from 
degenerating into high intensity warfare, communities resorted to migrating to another 
territory across a river, stream or other natural barriers that offered them protection away 
from hostile neighbors (Isichei 1973).  Perhaps it was because of the importance of 
kinship patterns to the Igbo and the crucial roles that they play in all facets of life in their 
society that conquest never became a devise for polity growth and expansion.  The usual 
practice was to push hostile neighbors farther off the territory (Jones 1961).  Even in 
those rare cases of conquest of some Igbo units by a neighboring nationality it is evident 
that the conquering groups were largely unsuccessful in their efforts to absorb the Igbo.  
A typical case in point exists in northern Igboland where the semi-savanna grassland 
environment exposed one or two Nsukka Igbo units to military conquest by the 
neighboring Igala, a nationality that evolved a centralized monarchical system of rule.  
Available evidence indicates that the Igala were only able to establish a religious-based 
social control over the Igbo communities that they conquered (Shelton 1971).  Polity 
formation in pre-colonial Igboland was essentially a function of the interplay of factors 
such as migration, religion, kinship, the economy, which were impacted in turn by the 
environment. 
The geography of Igboland impacted the nature and character of Igbo social, 
economic, and political worlds.  It constrained the evolution of their social, economic and 
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political organizations (Jones 1961).41  An environment like theirs could not have 
permitted the conquest and control of an optimum population of people that could 
provide an idle ruling class with sufficient surplus production.  All of these explain why 
the Igbo and their neighbors were able to evolve their uniquely decentralized political 
systems, each of which thrived on non-autocratic authority patterns.  A group that does 
not organize its economy according to production relations that allow a category of 
society to live off the surplus created by subordinate members of society would not 
evolve an autocratic political culture.  Indeed, the political culture of pre-colonial Igbo 
society did not permit the normative reliance on force to achieve order and stability in the 
society.  Put differently, discernable congruence in Igbo political culture promoted 
stability in pre-colonial Igbo society (Olisa 1971: 17-18).
The Deciduous Rain Forest Ecological Zone
Like the southeast, southwest lower Niger basin contains some other nationalities 
too.  The nationalities in the southwest constitute the Edo (Bini) Commonwealth.  They 
include the Bini, the Itsekiri-Urhobo peoples who established monarchical political 
systems, and were dominated by the Oba (King) of Bini who presided over the ancient 
and legendary kingdom of Bini (Anene 1966).  In the southwest too is the Yoruba who 
evolved and lived under several notable monarchical states (Smith 1969).  The ancient 
kingdom of Oyo was one of the Yoruba states.  Reputed to have been founded early in 
the fifteenth century, the founding and growth of the Yoruba kingdom of Oyo was fueled 
41 See Jones, G. I. 1961. “Ecology and Social Structure Among the North Eastern Ibo.” 
Africa, Pp. 117 -134.
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to a good measure by the economic prosperity that was generated by the forward-
backward linkages from the north-south caravan trade (Morten-Williams 1971).  
In the Oyo political system, the aristocracy owned and maintained implements of 
war of which the war-horses were the most notable.  The need of the aristocracy in the 
Old Oyo Empire to buy and keep war-horses required them to participate in warfare, 
which was a veritable instrument for state building and state transformation.  The 
ownership of the means of war making and participation in war making by members of 
the aristocracy in Old Oyo Empire enabled them to become a check on the chiefs of state.  
That in itself was partly responsible for the inability of chiefs of state in Old Oyo to 
convert the centralized but democratic system of rule that existed in the Old Oyo Empire 
and the rest of Yorubaland into an autocracy.  The good measure of economic wealth that 
the control of hinterland-coastal trade in the waning years of the eighteenth century put 
into the hands of the chiefs of state could not event alter the status quo in Old Oyo 
(Morten-Williams 1971: 97).  The efforts that they made to achieve that sparked off a 
power situation between them and the aristocracy that produced a constitutional crisis 
(Gbadamosi 1978) that among other things led to the disintegration of the kingdom and 
the conquest of Ilorin in northern Yorubaland in 1874 by the Fulani jihadists.  The 
evolution and transformation of indigenous states in pre-colonial Yorubaland entail 
significant sociological implications in our story. 
The Semi-Arid Savanna Grassland Ecological Zone
The Hausa, the Fulani, the Kanuri, the Nupe, the Gwari and others inhabit the 
upper Niger basin, which is mostly semi-arid grassland.  Through conquest, marriage and 
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other cultural intermingling that took place in that part of West Africa over the years, the 
Hausa and the Fulani were able to fuse into one socio-cultural group, which is referred to 
as the Hausa-Fulani.  Prior to that intermingling, the Hausa had founded their own city 
states most of which were later over-ran by the Fulani in their jihad of 1804 (Anene 
1970).  Because of the open savanna grassland which lacked natural barriers of protection 
for people, society and its inhabitants in Hausaland were vulnerable to ambitious state 
building groups and their leaders who turned themselves into rulers.  In every case, 
through military conquest the ruling groups and their leaders were able to gradually 
institute and evolve predatory rule over the general population of people.  These 
processes of transformation were accomplished over the course of a significant period of 
time before the Fulani jihad.
The semi-arid savanna grassland environment of the upper Niger basin impacted 
the nature and character of rule particularly in Hausaland where rulers adopted the policy 
of erecting territorial walls of defense around cities and towns.  That policy which 
protected them and their subject populations from their rivals enabled them to establish 
social, economic and political control over people who resided in those walled cities and 
towns.42  Nomadic cattle herders took advantage of the protection that those walled cities 
and towns offered them and their herds.  Once they were inside those walled towns and 
cities they became ready sources of revenue and military manpower for rulers (Smith 
1964).  Rulers who made their courts inside those walled cities and towns could afford to 
42 Among the Igbo walls as architectural devices were not built for the control of people.  
They established privacy and personal property—compound walls were built around 
homesteads to secure privacy and personal property.  The Yoruba in addition utilizing 
walls to secure private property built walls and ditches around their towns for defense.  
Ajayi and Smith (1971: 23-8) did not for one mention that walls were built in Yorubaland 
to control people.
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control the population of cattle herders and cultivators who sought protection in them.  
They could also afford to institute and preside over autocratic and despotic systems of 
rule as was the case in Hausaland before and after the Fulani jihad.  Also, the open 
savanna grassland did only encourage extensive migration of peoples into Hausaland.  
That was one principal way through which kinship network in the area tended to extend 
beyond one nationality—the Fulani fussing with the Hausa for instance.  All of these 
factors had their profound impact on pre-colonial state building in the area.  The jihad
which played a prominent role in the political development of pre-colonial Hausaland 
may not have materialized in the absence of extensive migration and intermingling of 
peoples in the open savanna region of the upper Niger basin. 
It was because of ecological reasons that the tsetse43 fly-free savanna grassland 
parts of the upper Niger basin that include Hausaland constitute “a horse-breeding as well 
as a horse-using area” (Law 1975: 1).  Plentiful supply led to the ready deployment of the 
horse as a war machine by state builders in Hausaland to aid and abet the evolution of a
system of rule, which depended on the control of people from whom surplus value was 
expropriated to sustain autocratic rulers.  Conversely, because of ecological reasons too, 
the lower Niger, parts of which are inhabited by the Igbo, the Yoruba, and other
nationalities is not particularly conducive for horse-breeding.  Hence, its use for any 
purposes at all by the inhabitants of the lower Niger was predicated on the unreliability of 
its survival as well as on the fact that it was an imported item of trade (Law 1975: 4).  But 
in Yorubaland—the only part of the lower Niger in which the horse was used as a war 
machine—it is strongly associated with extensive expansion of political boundaries in the 
43 The tsetse (genus: Glossina) is a multi-specie insect that infects man and animals with 
the Trypanosoma (sleeping sickness) disease in parts of tropical Africa (Ford 1971).
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legendary Old Oyo Empire (Law 1975).44  Among the Igbo its role as a war machine 
effectively disappears all together.  The horse is so exotic in Igboland that it is a luxury 
item, strictly utilized as either a status symbol or as a ceremonial trophy (Ukwu 1967: 
652, Afigbo 1973: 81-2).45
The summary of our fore-going discussion which we must subsequently develop 
in greater detail in the rest of the chapter is that the geography and ecology of the Niger 
basin are vital aspects of the story that we are about to tell about the Igbo, Yoruba, 
Hausa-Fulani, and the others who inhabit it.  There is a logical relationship between the 
upper Niger basin’s open savanna, its lack of natural barriers and the extensive migration 
patterns that they encouraged, and the diffused kinship networks that stemmed from the 
latter.  The open savanna was a factor that enabled the introduction of Islam in the upper 
Niger.  Unlike the indigenous religion that was practiced in pre-jihad Hausaland, after the 
jihad, Islam was utilized to achieve the hierarchical definition of society.  That definition
which bordered on stratification and segregation categorized Hausa society along the 
lines of rulers and their subjects, the haves and the have-nots, males and females, cleric 
and lay people, etc, was decisive in the evolution of a non-egalitarian social order that 
part of the upper Niger basin. 
The rain and deciduous forest ecological zones that the Igbo and Yoruba inhabit 
played their own logical roles that starkly contrast with the one played by the savanna in 
the lives of its inhabitants.  There were natural barriers which deterred migration and the 
fission of peoples and helped to prevent the extension of kinship networks between 
44 According to Law, the association of horses “with immigrant conquerors is 
questionable, and they have nothing to do with the origins of states in Yorubaland” (Law 
1975: 2).
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nationalities.  In the presence of natural barriers, the control of people was hardly feasible 
even in Yorubaland where war was a state building device which facilitated the evolution 
of large-scale political organizations.  In the absence of control in society and of its 
members by leaders, religion and economy evolved and developed along egalitarian 
lines.  All these factors became the bases for institutionalized democratic patterns of 
authority in both Igboland Yorubaland.
The theory of internal migration, wars and schisms in the grassland areas of the 
upper Niger basin and their role in state formation in the areas is strongly espoused by 
Isichei (1973, 1983).  Isichei (1973) argues that the erstwhile notion of external 
involvement in state formation amongst the indigenous nationalities that inhabit the areas 
is no longer popular among area scholars.  Abdullahi Smith (1970) who made a similar 
argument earlier before Isichei pointed out that culture, politics, as well as economics are 
the products of the environment of groups that evolved them.  
There is no gain over-emphasizing that the distinct attributes of the inhabitants of 
the Niger basin are not simply in terms of their non-co-terminus homelands .  Their 
distinctiveness extends to the social, economic and political patterns that they evolved 
over the course of their respective histories.  Indeed, it is those peculiar patterns that 
actually distinguish their respective political, social, and economic systems from one 
another.
45 Fisher (1972 and 1973) argues that in West Africa the horse is used as a luxury item 
more than it is used as a war-machine.
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Measuring Congruence-Consonance of Authority Patterns: 
Applying the E-G Scheme
We have seen from the foregoing that prior to the onset of the 1800s, also known 
as the remarkable century that made a tremendous difference in Euro-African interaction 
(Dike 1956a, Anene 1966) the distinct nationalities that inhabit the Niger basin had all 
built their respective indigenous states.  Each of them had also evolved its own system of 
rule.  For reasons that have already been established, we have elected to concentrate our 
attention in the present study on three of the nationalities, i.e. the Igbo, Yoruba, and the 
Hausa-Fulani.
Political systems and their supporting institutional structures are products of the 
socio-geographical environment in which they were evolved (Smith 1970).  We 
acknowledge that subsumed within every political system are some ‘social and political 
authority’ patterns that are often unique to that political system, which are crucial for the 
success or failure of the political system in question (Eckstein 1969).  
We agree that the success or failure of political systems is a function of the extent 
to which their vital and driving elements i.e. social and political authority patterns 
resemble each other (Eckstein 1969).  Our aims in the present study will be adequately 
served if we execute an in-depth analysis of the ‘influence relations’ and the bases of 
legitimacy perceptions of the governmental and non-governmental authority patterns 
(Eckstein 1969) of the indigenous Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa-Fulani political systems.  The 
task of achieving our aims in the study can best be accomplished under the rubric of the 
E-G scheme. 
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We can draw from the E-G scheme to assert in general terms that Directiveness, 
Participation, Responsiveness, and Compliance in pre-colonial indigenous societies in 
the Niger basin involved the outcome of efforts by leaders and members alike, who 
impacted the behavior of one another.  We have shown in Figure 2.6 that the 
Directiveness dimension can include laws, customs, traditions, and agencies of social 
control, etc., which are used to direct the affairs of society and its members by leaders 
who exercise authority.  The same reconstruction shows that the dimension of 
Participation encapsulates the various acts that emanate from the rest of the members of 
the population who do not occupy leadership positions in society.  They direct those acts 
at their leaders with the intention of influencing how they direct the affairs of their 
society. 
Responsiveness depicts the reaction of the leaders to the acts of participation from 
the subordinate members of these indigenous societies.  Figure 2.7 shows that the 
dimension of Responsiveness can be characterized by representative institutions of 
governance, normative provisions for over-ruling the leadership, dismissing and 
replacing them, etc. by ordinary members of society.   We are not saying that the 
responsiveness of leaders in some of these nationalities rested solely on their willingness 
to seek inputs and encourage participation from members of their society.  We are saying 
that their responsiveness depended on the extent to which the directives that derived from 
their authority are influenced by the participation of subordinate members in the affairs of 
their societies.  The Compliance dimension depicts extent to which the subordinate 
members of a social unit have been successfully influenced by the directives from the 
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leadership.  Compliance is indicated and contraindicated by the absence or presence of 
creative acts of participation including revolts, resistance, etc.  
The Igbo or Nd’Igbo46
Igboland which is home to Nd’Igbo extends from the Cross River in the southeast 
of the Niger basin up until the southwest across the Niger River proper (Isichei 1973).  
Nd’Igbo inhabit the thick evergreen rain forest portion of the Niger basin’s four 
ecological zones.  Like the other inhabitants of the Niger basin their homeland has a lot to
do with who the Igbo are.  The geography and ecology of the Igbo homeland impacted 
the evolution of their village-based democratic system of government. 
One can say that Igbo political system is resoundingly democratic because of its 
characteristic feature of direct democracy.  When Michael Mann observed that the superb 
democratic qualities of the political institutions of the indigenous peoples of America 
rested to a good measure on “forms of political participation that were more direct than 
representative” (Mann 1999: 26) he might as well have been referring to Nd’Igbo.  The 
correctness of Mann’s assertion is evident in Figure 3. 3 in which we show that the first 
three tiers of authority patterns in pre-colonial Igbo society are based on direct 
democracy.
Although Nd’Igbo constitute one of the three most populous nationalities that 
inhabit the region of the Niger basin which the British carved into the ‘Nigerian’ supra-
46 Ndi is the concept term for “People” in the Igbo language.  Literally therefore, Nd’Igbo 
means Igbo People.
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national state, like the other nationalities, their exact population is still undetermined.47
To the outsider, Nd’Igbo and their pre-colonial world amounted to a patchwork of 
confusion and anarchy, totally lacking of authority and control (Dike 1956a).  But like 
social units elsewhere, pre-colonial indigenous Igbo societies were comprised of leaders 
or super-actors, and the rest of members of the society or subordinate actors.  These two 
categories of people were involved in asymmetrical authority relations as members of the 
same social unit.  between those who occupy leadership positions and the rest of 
members of society is basically the interaction of super-ordinate and subordinate actors in 
the dynamic process of directing the affairs of their societies.48  It is the interactions that 
take place between those who occupy authority positions and the rest of the members of 
pre-colonial Igbo societies that configure into the dimensions of Directiveness, 
Participation, Responsiveness, and Compliance.  
Indigenous Religion and the Practice of Authority in Igboland
Indigenous religion played a central role in the organization and direction of the 
social, economic and political affairs of Nd’Igbo in their pre-colonial society.  But that 
assertion does not in any way imply that the Igbo system of governance is theocratic.  
Political affairs in indigenous Igbo societies are directed in manners that conformed to 
certain earthly democratic proclivities of their members.  In the context of the E-G 
47 The Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani are the other two populous nationalities.  The 
politicization of the outcome of the 1952/53 census exercise by the British established a 
legacy that made it impossible to determine the authentic census population for each 
nationality in the supra-national state ever since.
48 In theoretical terms, our conception of direction in the dissertation is Gramscian in its 
etymology.  It connotes “the ideological capacity to win consent” (Perry Anderson, 
“Editorial,” New Left Review, 17, Sept.-Oct. 2002: 5-30) from society and its members at 
large.  
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Ama-Ala or Village Group Assembly
Composition: Lineage and Village                        
Heads, Titled Citizens, Senior                       Representative Democracy                    
Members of Secret Societies
Other Distinguished Elders
The Ama or Village Assembly
Composition: All Adult Males, but
the core is the Ama-Ala at Village
level (i.e. Lineage Heads, Title Men,
etc.)
                                                                                                                                     Direct Democracy
            The Nzuko Umunna or Sub-Lineage 
    Assembly Composition: All Adult 
            Males and on occasion also the Women
The Ezi, composed of the Onu-
Usekwu and presided by the
Onye-nwe ezi
Figure 3.3: The Typical Igbo authority patterns.  Source: Afigbo (1973) with 
modifications.
in pre-colonial indigenous Igbo society, the dynamic socio-political interplay evident in 
those proclivities can be associated with all aspects of the Participation dimension.  They 
include their penchant for embracing the normatively existing channels of Participation
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in their political system and utilizing them voluminously, i.e. with frequency and 
intensity, through a variety of modes.  Their indigenous religion, which gave effect to the 
norms that guided the practice of authority in all aspects of their social, economic and 
political organization, is deeply rooted in their history and natural environment.  
Indigenous Igbo religion mirrors the other aspects of Igbo life (Thomas 1914).  Its 
“eclecticism…was comparable to the fluidity of [Igbo] political institutions and 
settlement patterns” (Isichei 1970: 216).  It is neither centralized in structure nor 
hierarchical in mode.  Although there are priests and priestesses, every adult was 
sufficiently qualified to and officiated in the religion.  Hence, everyone was sufficiently 
knowledgeable about the consequences that resulted from the violation of the norms that 
guided the existence of communities and their members.  The eclecticism and 
adaptability of traditional religion ensured “concrete and measurable benefits” (Isichei 
1970: 215) for the Igbo.  It was usual for individuals or communities to try a cult or 
divinity and discard it for another if it was found wanting (Jones 1963, Isichei 1970, 
Achebe 2000).  The centrality of religion may have partly accounted for why subordinate 
members of society in Igboland were not afraid of availing themselves of the facilitated 
channels of Participation, while leaders were obligated to be responsive to the former in 
the course of discharging their duties. 
There were institutionalized religious and non-religious agencies and 
organizations that were normatively accepted sources of the Directiveness dimension in 
pre-colonial Igbo societies.  Those agencies and organizations included oracle and 
professional organizations, which functioned in ways that directed the various 
independent Igbo political units towards social and economic integration (Ottenberg 
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1958).  Such agencies and their organizations existed and functioned in clearly practical 
ways.  
Meek (1937) noted that the Igbo are not the only people whose religion plays a 
central role in their affairs at both the micro and macro levels.  In the context of Igbo 
society, “religion and law are so closely interwoven that many of the most powerful legal 
sanctions are derived directly from the gods (sic)” (Meek 1937: 20).  But as we 
mentioned earlier, to say that does not in any way imply that the prevalent system of rule 
in pre-colonial Igboland was theocratic.  It is not just in the realm of the law that one 
observes this close relationship between Igbo religion and system of jurisprudence.  Any 
meaningful discussion of pre-colonial Igbo ‘political forms’ cannot isolate indigenous 
Igbo religion (Isichei 1969:121).  Those agencies and organizations that “functioned to 
provide a degree of integration” (Ottenberg 1958: 295) for the various independent Igbo 
groups did so mostly on the auspices of religion; and at three different levels, which 
Ottenberg (1958) identified as: 
(i) the level of the relationship that existed between ‘independent Igbo units’ that 
inhabit an immediate geographical area, 
(ii) the level of “long-range contacts of professional specialists” (Ottenberg 1958: 
295) such as physicians, diviners, smiths of all types, rainmakers, etc. and 
(iii) the level of oracles and their organizations.
In pre-colonial Igboland, independent political units that inhabit the same area 
often developed practical links with one another.  For instance, there were some 
relationships that originated “out of the ties of individuals to one another and out of 
relationships between social groupings in neighboring units” (Ottenberg 1958: 297).  
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There were instances when some units which either claimed the same ancestral origin or 
a similar pattern of migration at the time when they settled their respective districts 
resolved to initiate an alliance for trade or even for defense between them.  Such alliance 
often survived in perpetuity.  
In other instances when there were no substantive formal alliances between 
independent political units, their members were still co-existed peacefully in ways that 
permitted them to interact economically as well as socially (Ottenberg 1958: 297).  In the 
event of an outbreak of hostility between two units, another unit often stepped in to 
restore peace between them (Meek 1937).  
There were interactions that produced the evolution of viable trade and commerce 
between various Igbo units that were although politically autonomous but could not by 
any stretch of the imagination be said to have been economically self-sufficient.  
Professional religious specialists such as rainmakers, physicians, diviners, etc. visited 
villages away from their own to attend to their clients, who felt free in turn to visit them 
(Green 1947).
All over Igboland, there were some of the aforementioned religious “professional 
specialists without the extensive backing of formal social organizations” (Ottenberg 
1958: 298) who fall into this second category of agents that promoted links between 
independent units for the reason that they traveled far beyond their immediate units to 
attend to their clientele and engagements.  The kinds of links that they fostered between 
units were primarily at the level of their individual clients who they either traveled to 
visit or received from long distances to attend to.  Such “professional men were free to 
travel long distances and to follow their occupations, not because of their power or the 
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authority of their own independent unit or the social groupings within it, but because the 
goods [and services] that they traded were much desired or because of their associations 
with the supernatural world” (Ottenberg 1958: 299).49
The oracles constituted the third category of agencies and organizations that 
functioned to link independent political units in Igboland in the pre-colonial period.  
“There were perhaps half a dozen oracles of significance” (Ottenberg 1958: 299) which 
arose among the Igbo to help people to fulfil “traditional functions” (Afigbo 1971b: 17) 
such as “telling the future or holding discussions with one’s departed relations or for 
dealing with psychological problems associated with barrenness, sudden and premature 
death, … disposing finally with unrepentant criminals” (Afigbo 1971b: 17) and other 
social misfits in the various Igbo communities.  The more prominent of these oracles are 
the Ibiniukpabi of Aro-Chukwu, the Agbala of Oka (Awka), the Igwe-ka-Ala of 
Umunneoha, and the Amadioha of Ozuzu (Talbot 1932).  The other two minor oracles 
were at Ogwu (Awgu) (Meek 1937) and Ogbunko (Obunko) (Basden 1938).
These oracles instituted by different Igbo communities earned the respect of all 
sections of Nd’Igbo because of their association with the pantheon of Gods whom 
Nd’Igbo worship (Meek 1937).  In deed, the oracles constitute “an institution which 
transcended the particularism of individual groups” (Isichei 1969: 127) that established 
them.  Customs and tradition are components of laws in Igbo society.  For all intents and 
purpose therefore, in Igbo society Directiveness is closely interwoven with religion.  
Together, this association and inter-relationship encouraged responsiveness from the 
49 This provides the most factual context for the appreciation of why the trading Aro Igbo 
were able to travel all over Igboland and win the acceptance of their various host 
communities to establish their several settlements.
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elders and other occupants of authority positions and exacted compliance from members 
of the larger society.  Isichei succinctly puts it thus: “Suffice it to say that the life of an 
Ibo village was permeated by the supernatural; supernatural sanctions were the most 
potent guardians of social order” (Isichei 1969: 129).
Over the course of time these oracles and their organizations became largely 
associated with trade and commercial activities in Igboland as well.  Their association 
with the growth of trade in Igboland is to such a high degree that a meaningful discussion 
of their linkage functions among the Igbo can be better accomplished in the context of the 
economic development of Nd’Igbo.  But the economy of space and time cannot permit a 
detailed discussion of the role of the oracles in the development of particularly the 
European slave trade in Igboland.
In sum all Igbo “units remained a relatively balanced grouping of independent 
political structures, which never developed, into a large formal organization. …” 
(Ottenberg 1958: 296), but which, partly because of the role of the religious and non-
religious agencies and organizations, continued to reap positive performance from their 
respective institutions at the social, economic, and political spheres.
Traditional religion furnished the Igbo with the concept of chi, a crucial element 
of their social organization.  The personal chi of an individual represents “a refraction of 
the universal force, a personification of his allotted role in the universal motion towards 
the ultimate goal” (Nwoga 1971: 119).  Sociologically, it enables the individual Igbo to 
engage, embrace and accommodate change and innovation in his or her personal capacity 
without loosing the traits that determine his Igbo identity.  An individual’s fortunes are 
determined by his chi, “and mischance is due to his absence or oversight” (Isichei 1969: 
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125).  The belief is that the individual takes the initiative while his or her chi acquiesces 
(Chukwukere 1971: 113), hence the wise saying: ‘onye kwe, chi ya ekwe’—when an 
individual affirms, his personal chi reaffirms.  This concept underscores the legendary 
proclivity of the Igbo to respond “rapidly to outside stimuli” (Isichei 1969: 130) or 
“receptivity to change” (Ottenberg 1962). 
The Authority Patterns of Nd’Igbo
Like the rest of the other nationalities that inhabit the Niger basin, their exclusive 
habitation and continued occupation of their homeland, a common language (with slight 
differences), and remarkable similarities in most of their socio-political institutions 
Nd’Igbo are, and have always been regarded as a people (Forde and Jones 1950).  
However, there are some variations that exist in Igbo “culture and social groupings” 
(Ottenberg 1958: 295).  Forde and Jones (1950) may have utilized those variations to 
categorize Nd’Igbo into five broad divisions: Northern or Onitsha Igbo, Southern or 
Owere Igbo, Western Igbo, Eastern or Cross River Igbo, North-Eastern Igbo.
Again the variations that constitute the basis of this broad categorization have a 
lot to do with the response of the Igbo to the specific ecological situations in the part of 
the Igboland inhabited by each group. In every specific instance, as was pointed out by 
Jones in the case of the Northeastern Igbo, the ecology impacted the two mainstays of the 
Igbo economy—agriculture and trade.  The ecology impacted the “patterns of territorial 
expansion and supporting mythological charters, residential and land tenure systems and, 
following on this, the distinctive features occurring among [each group] with respect to 
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marriage and kinship relations to political organization and its supporting institutions” 
(Jones 1961: 118). 
Despite their categorization into five broad groups, we still can neither afford to 
discuss the prevalent political system in each of the five nor can we afford to discuss the 
one in each of the constituent units in them.  In view of the constraints of both time and 
space therefore, the form of our discussion is as follows.  The “general pattern of political 
process which is shared by all Igbo” (Uchendu 1965: 39) groups is first discussed.  That 
discussion will sufficiently include details that portray the authority patterns of the 
Eastern or Cross River Igbo whose decentralized village-based democratic political 
system is closely similar to those of the Southern (Owere) Igbo, and the Northern Igbo. 
We must caution ahead of time that apart from the Eastern or Cross River Igbo who have 
a matrilineal lineage system50, the rest of the Igbo groups all have a patrilineal lineage 
system.  The matrilineal lineage system of the Eastern or Cross River Igbo rendered their 
marriage and kinship systems as well as their “rules of inheritance and succession” 
(Nsugbe 1974: vi) slightly different from what obtain among the rest of Igbo groups.  
Also, “the forms of their men’s associations and cults” (Nsugbe 1974: vi) tend to differ 
slightly.  The ‘pattern of political process’ that obtains among the Northern and 
Northeastern Igbo is the second part of the discussion.  The discussion of their 
monarchical political system is aimed at (a) highlighting the variation in culture that 
exists among the Igbo further, and (b) using same to underscore our earlier argument that 
such variations do not constitute grounds for defining Nd’Igbo as different peoples.  
50 Out of all the groups in the Eastern or Cross River Igbo main division only those Aro 
Igbo who migrated in what must have been a village group to and settle permanently 
among the Afikpo Igbo constitute an exception.  They still maintained their patrilineal 
lineage system.
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The Levels of Authority in Igboland 
One can safely posit that social, economic and political authority in indigenous 
Igbo society configured into four distinct levels.  The primary level of authority resided 
in the Ezi or compound, which is composed of households or Onu-usekwu.  Superceding 
the Ezi is the Umunna or sub-lineage, which is in turn superceded by the Ama or Village.  
Following the Ama in that order is the Ama-Ala or Village Group where authority 
terminates.
The Ezi
The ezi is best defined as the primary segmental unit most proximate to 
government in Igbo society.  It is the cradle of and reinforcement node for the 
socialization of every Igbo.  The ezi is made up of a number of onu-usekwu which are 
“economically independent households each with a man or a woman as the head 
householder” (Uchendu 1965: 40).  This trait of economic independence renders the onu-
usekwu the basic segmental unit of economic sustenance for individual Igbo in his 
society.  Managerial authority in each household revolves around its head who is 
expected to hold his household together.  He is the source of most of the directives in his 
household.  If his children are grown he often consults them on issues of vital importance 
in the household.  He ensures that the women of the household—his wives and the wives 
of his sons—do not lack equitable access to plots of land on which they raise the 
subsistence food crops such as coco-yam, beans, cassava, maize, vegetables, etc. that they 
grow by the side to supplement the nutritional needs of their children.  His economic role 
centers on the cultivation of yams, the principal crop among the Igbo.  Because yam 
118
cultivation is a labor-intensive undertaking, the household is the primary source of labor 
for its head.  When his sons come of age it is often his responsibility to start them off as 
yam cultivators by providing them with their initial seed yams.  He is more of a manager 
and strives to be a good role model to his children and grandchildren.  His personality 
determines the style of management that he adopts to ensure the success of his household 
as an economic unit.  
The Opara or first son of the head of the household takes precedence over the rest 
of his siblings regardless of the number of wives that their father has.  His overall 
preeminent status corresponds to that of the Ada or first daughter of his father.  Usually, 
unless the most senior wife in the household was childless or could not have children in 
time, the Opara and the Ada share the same mother.51  While the Ada would marry and 
relocate to her husband’s household (without severing the ties in her household of birth) 
the Opara (Okpara) assumes the position of his father at his death.  He inherits his obi or 
reception hall, which is the premier edifice in the household in which the male head of 
household lives and receives his visitors, his Ofo (which symbolizes the substantive 
legitimacy of the authority he wields as the head of household), etc.
The most senior male who is called Onye- nwe ezi exercises authority in the ezi.  
Every household head and his or her members recognize the authority of the Onye- nwe-
ezi, who they usually consult prior to taking decision on any major political issue 
(Uchendu 1965).  In view of the inherent asymmetry in the relationship between the 
Onye-nwe-ezi and the members of the ezi he is the rightful leader in the compound.  He is 
51 These birth positions earn individual automatic membership in the Association of Ndi 
Opara and the Association of Umu Ada respectively at both the village and village-group 
levels.  Both Associations are segmental social units that are quite proximate government 
and the practice of authority in Igboland.
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the conduit through which the Directiveness in the ezi  flows.  This is on the grounds of 
his age, extensive wisdom and knowledge of the custom and tradition of the ezi and the 
community at large.  He does not decree directives.  They stem from custom and tradition 
which the other adult members of the ezi are also conversant with.  The authority that he 
exercises to direct the affairs of the ezi is not self-sustained, i.e. it derives from the 
ancestors (Uchendu 1965).  His failure to exercise it fairly will attract the wrath of the 
ancestors and deities against him as well as the disdain of the members.   If a member 
violates a custom and it is brought to his notice, he is expected to interpret the degree of 
the violation and prescribe the requisite ablution in a non-prejudicial manner.  His 
responsiveness derives from steadfast adherence to the custom and tradition. His position 
encapsulates both political and religious responsibilities.  
Apart from the authority of the Onye-nwe-ezi to arbitrate disputes that arise 
between members of the ezi he is in charge of the external affairs of the ezi as well.  He is 
both its spokesman and representative in those situations that do not require the presence 
and direct participation of its adult members.  Because governance in the ezi takes the 
form of direct democracy (Afigbo 1973), involving the participation of all the adults, the 
process and phases of direction involve the Onye- nwe-ezi and members.  
We could take the issue of problem recognition, which in itself is one of the 
several phases of the ‘process of direction’ under the E-G scheme as a point to illustrate 
the Onye-nwe-ezi’s responsiveness and the participation of members of the ezi in the 
direct democracy that prevails in the ezi.  Although his position, age, wisdom, etc. make 
it imperative on him to recognize problems that may arise in the ezi, every adult member 
can equally call his attention to problems through complaints.  A similar assertion can be 
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made about the other phases in the ‘process of direction’ that are identified in the E-G 
scheme to include “the definition of issues … deliberation, resolution …, 
implementation, sanctioning” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 69).  In the context of the E-G 
scheme therefore, the Onye- nwe-ezi is neither an alterocrat nor an autocrat, his 
responsiveness varies in terms of low and high at each of these phases.   
Borrowing directly from the E-G scheme, the ‘bases of legitimacy perception’ of 
the Onye-nwe-ezi’s authority rests solidly on the normatively prescribed qualifications 
that earned him his pre-eminent position of authority in the compound.  Those 
qualifications include his age, and his ascribed position as the Opara.    These 
qualifications are recognized and acknowledge by the members of the ezi through their 
respect for him shown through their compliance to his directives.  The same applies to the 
outsiders with whom he inter-faces in the course of his external representation of 
members of the ezi.    
The Onye nwe-ezi’s ‘personal legitimacy’ is a function of the recognition and 
acknowledgement by individual members of the ezi of the two criteria (the office and 
recruitment process) that qualify him to exercise authority.  There’s indeed no doubt 
about his position of authority and how he attained it.  Since members of the ezi have a 
clear notion of the customs and traditions, they are equally knowledgeable about what 
may constitute fair or foul in his attempts to regulate their behavior and their affairs.  
Their expectation therefore would be that he would be even-handed in his direction of 
their affairs.  If their perception of him in that regard is positive, it translates to 
‘substantive legitimacy’ of his authority in the compound.  If he does not stifle their 
participation—as he is expected not to—in the direction of their affairs it definitely earns 
121
his authority the prerequisite ‘procedural legitimacy’ in their perception.  It is partly 
because of these that occupants of the position of Onye-nwe-ezi in pre-colonial 
indigenous Igbo society strived to be upright in their exercise of the authority derived 
from the ancestors to direct the affairs of their compound.  An Onye- nwe-ezi who 
preferred to do otherwise ran the risk of exposing the ‘bases of legitimacy’ of his 
authority in his compound to ridicule and the negative perception of its members who 
would be encouraged to become indifferent and insubordinate to his directives.
The Umunna
The Umunna is the next level of stop in our examination of the authority patterns 
in pre-colonial indigenous Igbo society.  Each Umunna is a lineage of kinsmen, their 
wives and children who reside in their own territorial portion of the village.  Usually, 
members of an Umunna share the same descent from one male ancestor and his several 
wives.  Each Umunna is usually composed of several ezi (compounds).  The Umunna is 
headed by the Opara-Umunna who is usually the Onye-nwe-ezi from the most senior ezi
in the Umunna.  Since all the ezi that constitute an Umunna descended from one male 
ancestor, it is the ezi that was founded by the Opara of the ancestor of the Umunna that 
assumes the leadership position in the Umunna.  But if after several generations the 
seniority pattern in the Umunna can no longer be effectively traced again, premier 
authority in the Umunna will reside in the most senior male.  As it is the case in the ezi, 
the Ofo Umunna—(the symbol of legitimate authority) normatively acknowledged by the 
Igbo to exclusively emanate from the ancestors (Forde and Jones 1950) must be in the 
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custody of the occupant of the office of Opara-Umunna.  In Igbo society, the role of the 
Ofo, is salient to every Igbo (Uchendu 1965).  
The Ofo that the occupant of the position of Opara-Umunna wields on behalf of 
members of his Umunna is a symbol of both his authority as the head as well as his 
function as the priest who performs various rituals on their behalf (Uchendu 1965).  
According to Isichei, the Opara-Umunna who is revered by all “had both religious and 
social authority. … He represents all the power and authority of their dead male 
ancestors.  He offers sacrifices on behalf of the family, decides quarrels, allots land, and 
so on” (Isichei 1968: 127-8).  This position imbues very limited political authority and 
power on its occupants in pre-colonial indigenous Igbo society.  Although he presides 
over the nzuko (assembly) of his lineage, which is often summoned into session to 
resolve disputes that arise between members, the Opara-Umunna does not formulate 
directives for the Umunna.  His influence on directives derives from his opinions on 
questions of custom and tradition.  His opinion is usually sought by the assembly before a 
decision is handed down on issues that involve the violation of custom or traditions that 
came before Umunna (Uchendu 1965).  He is not expected to and does not interfere in 
the affairs of any of the ezi (compound) that constitute the Umunna.  Whenever it was 
determined that a serious taboo in the land has been violated by a member of the Umunna
the Opara-Umunna is expected to ensure that the necessary sacrifices are offered to the 
ancestors and the deities to restore harmony in the Umunna and the community between 
the living and the ancestors from whom all authority emanate.  Igbo lineage affiliation is 
traced through the Umunna.  The Umunna provides a crucial platform for the objective 
deliberation and handling issues before they reach the village assembly.  It is highly 
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unusual for an individual who lacks the support of his umunna to attain a position of trust 
and responsibility in the village.  Hence, in their figurative speech pattern the Igbo liken 
the umunna to the thorny palm fruit bunch that can only be lifted off the ground by 
someone with the aid of a pad. 
To prevent the rise of a dynasty and the disruption of existing practice of authority 
in the Umunna the son of the Opara-Umunna does not succeed him.  He is rather 
succeeded by his brother if at his death the one happens to be the most senior male in the 
ezi.  The prime position of the ezi that descended from the Opara of the first ancestor or 
founder of any Umunna is ever lasting.  In the event that it does not produce the most 
senior male in the Umunna at any one time, authority in the Umunna must pass on to the 
most senior male from another ezi in the Umunna  without trumping the privileges of the 
prime ezi.  Age alone does not bequeath authority on anyone. Authority comes with age 
and character (Uchendu 1965).  Government at this level is based essentially on direct 
democracy (Afigbo 1973) which helps to confer the right of participation on every 
responsible adult member in the formulation of directives in the Umunna.  As it is at all 
levels of governmental authority patterns in pre-colonial Igbo society, in his leadership 
capacity the Opara-Umunna lacks the legitimacy to flout any of the four dimensions of 
influence relations on grounds of his authority position.  If a holder of the office goes 
against the grains of the expectations of members of his lineage the preference was often 
to first call his attention to the fact through a dignified approach.  Another elder or even 
someone close to him was often sent to bring his shortcomings to his attention.  It was 
only in the event that he refuses to acknowledge those shortcomings that he looses the 
respect and loyalty of the Umunna.  Committing such a taboo would definitely result to 
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the negative perception of the legitimacy of the authority of an Onye- nwe-ezi by members 
of the ezi.  Such loss of legitimacy and prestige is akin to indirect removal from authority. 
The Ama
A group of Umunna that descended from the same ancestor usually constitutes an 
Ama or village, which is autonomous and ‘sovereign’ in the conduct of its affairs 
(Uchendu 1965: 39).  Governmentally, Afigbo (1973) likens the Ama to a village 
republic.  Because of their shared common ancestry, marriage is highly forbidden 
between members of the Village.  Politics at the village level is practiced in a direct 
democratic manner involving the participation of all adult males who convene as the 
Ama-Ala or Oha-na-Eze52  in some areas, i.e. General Assembly to attend to the business 
the village when summoned to do so (Uchendu 1965).  The Ama-Ala convenes in the 
Mbara or the Central Village Square which is usually the village market place and ritual 
center where the shrines of the Gods that the village jointly worships are located (Forde 
and Jones 1950).  The Village governmental processes, practices, power and authority are 
normatively invested in the Ama-Ala (Afigbo 1973).    
The Ama-Ala is an ad hoc institution.  Together with the oracles worshipped by 
the village, and the various age grades, it constitutes the village Government (Uchendu 
1965).53  Although ad hoc, the Ama-Ala is still one of the major ‘channels’ of 
Participation for members of the village.  When it is viewed in the light of the E-G 
52 This is the enlarged Assembly of the entire community and its distinguished and titled 
citizens.
53 The oracles are represented in the Village Government by the priests and priestesses 
who minister to them.
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scheme, the Ama-Ala is a channel of Participation, which is both open and ‘facilitated’ 
for all adult members of the village, who make voluminous use of it.  
Because villagers discharge their acts of participation as individuals as well as on 
the auspices of their respective Umunna whenever the Ama-Ala convenes, the members 
of each Umunna sat among themselves in their section of the Mbara or the Central 
Village Square, which is in the direction to their own quarter in the village.  That way,
they could consult among themselves in the course of debates.  The village leadership is 
composed of those who hold the Ofo (who in most cases are the elders who are also the 
heads of their respective lineage), men and women of wealth and prestige who have taken 
titles and “have risen spontaneously in the village and have developed their power and 
influence gradually” (Uchendu 1965: 41) over the course of time.  Individuals who 
feature prominently at this level of authority in the village are often those who acquired 
titles of Nze, Ozo , Ezeji, etc. by virtue of which they become members of title societies or 
associations.  They must have sufficiently distinguished themselves to become members 
of the Okonko, and other secret societies (Jones 1962).  Villagers acquire those coveted 
titles and membership of the titles associations through their wealth.  It is through 
membership of the title associations that an individual “acquired a special status as 
ogaranya (as opposed to plain ogbenye) and was entitled to enjoy more weight and 
authority in the councils of his people than if he were a poor man (ogbenye)” (Afigbo 
1973: 15).  We must be mindful of the processes as well as the criteria that qualify 
individual members of the village for leadership positions in the village.  It is because 
those processes and criteria are normatively stipulated and visibly recognized by all that 
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they play into the legitimization of the authority of leaders of the village, particularly at 
the personal level.
However, irrespective of wealth and status no one is denied the chance to ‘say his 
own mouth’54 on any matter that is before the Ama-Ala.  Nd’Igbo are able to reconcile the 
claim to uniqueness by entities with the quest for integration.  That reconciliation is made 
both at the individual and the community levels through the agency of the “popular 
assembly that is small enough for everybody who wishes to be present to do so and to 
“speak his mouth”, as they like to phrase it” (Achebe 2000: 15).  The norm of ‘speaking 
one’s mouth’ on issues that come before the Popular Assembly of the village underscores 
the crucial importance of the ‘intensity, frequency and unrestricted’ nature of 
participation pre-colonial indigenous Igbo society.  It is not only that all the prevalent 
‘channels’ of Participation available in a typical Igbo society are ‘open’ and ‘facilitated’, 
it is also true that their ‘openness’ and facilitation are ‘formally’ provided for, 
‘normatively tolerated’, and ‘unsanctioned’ for all members of society.  Like the 
proverbial chicken in Igbo lore who absented herself from the village Assembly on a 
certain day when it was convened to examine the crisis that was produced by the 
adoption of animal sacrifices by human beings, with the implicit commitment to her 
neighbors that she would abide by whatever decision that was reached in her absence, 
and ended up being designated the candidate who could be sacrificed at will by human 
beings by the unanimous consent of those who were present, any villager who absents 
him or herself from the Ama-Ala runs the risk of exposing himself to the risks becoming 
the victim of a decision in which he chose not to ‘say his or her mouth’.   Taking oneself 
54 See Home and Exile, (Achebe 2000: 14-15) for an illustrative story about this unique 
Igbo phraseology.
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off one of the important normatively-approved channels of Participation exposes one to a 
range of risks.  
The range of issues that might be subject of directives includes disputes between 
individuals from the same ezi or Umunna that were not settled to the satisfaction of one 
of the parties, or between individuals from different Umunna.  Issues of specific 
legislative importance touching on the knitty-gritty aspects of life in the community are 
equally tabled before the Ama-Ala.  Once an issue has been thoroughly debated by the 
Ama-Ala the heads of the various Umunna or their designee would usually retire into a 
conclave or izuzu55 in which all the views that have been expressed by those present are 
reconciled and framed into a reasonable and impartial decision which is then tabled 
before the Assembly for acceptance by general acclamation or rejected by shouts of 
derision (Uchendu 1965: 40).  In situations when the izuzu returns with an unpopular 
decision, the decision of the Ama-Ala will trump it to prevail.  If it is a legislative cause 
the decision is then sealed as the iwu or law of the Village by the Ofo holders who would 
raise their Ofo four times and strike it on the ground all at the same each time (Uchendu 
1965)56.  Leaders are responsively mandated to abide by the ultimate position of the Ama-
Ala on all issues that comes before it.  In the practice of authority in pre-colonial 
Igboland the community would never allow anyone, including the leadership to utilize an 
exigent platform like the izuzu to monopolize the dimension of Directiveness or exercise 
55 The izuzu is temporarily constituted each time by the leaders of the Village from 
individuals who they request each Umunna to recommend for the purpose.  Every izuzu
must dissolve upon the completion of the assignment it was constituted for.
56 Certain numbers are symbolic in Igbo numerology.  The even number four (ano) is 
symbolic for the Igbo for the reason that it denotes the first days—Eke, Orie (Oye) Afo, 
and Nkwo—in the Igbo market week.  Four denotes a full circle.
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veto power over the Popular Assembly.  That is actually the symbolism that underlay the 
prompt rejection of an unpopular decision whenever one is returned by the izuzu.
It is clear that the Ama-Ala, a popular ‘channel’ of Participation for every 
responsible adult member of Igbo society, plays a central role in the formulation of 
directives in pre-colonial Igbo communities.  The directives that emanate from debates 
that take place in the Ama-Ala on issues that come before it at all times cannot actually be 
located at the top polar extreme of the Directiveness continuum.  The reason for that is 
that regimentation is not a feature of the practice of authority in Igbo society.  The 
situation approaches what is characterized in the E-G scheme as ‘minimal Directiveness’, 
which is “a tendency to issue directives only insofar as the existence of the unit clearly 
requires it” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 54).  Eckstein and Gurr further delineate this 
situation as one in which there is “a generally specifiable level, in the manner of 
‘functional requisites’ or … a level that varies with specific external pressures on social 
units and their internal purposes” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 54).  
The above characterizations of directives that result from decisions reached by the 
Ama-Ala would become clearer if we examine them further in the context of some of the 
component parts into which Directiveness is dissected in the E-G scheme.  We already 
know that the Ama-Ala is a popular channel of participation for all villagers, which 
functions on the principle of direct democracy.  When we recall the assertion made by the 
formulators of the E-G scheme that in fundamental terms, “direction requires the 
existence of orders (commands, imperatives, rules, statutes, etc.) emanating from 
superordinates” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 54), it may not be unreasonable for us to infer 
that the Ama-Ala does not necessarily regiment its directives. Hence, the ‘coverage’ of 
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directives that emanated from decisions reached by this popular Assembly of direct 
democracy was neither ‘comprehensive’ nor ‘restricted’.  At the same time, we can infer 
that while the ‘latitude’ of its directives could have been ‘specific’, their ‘supervision’ 
wasn’t ‘close’ since the absence of professional law enforcement in pre-colonial 
indigenous Igbo societies was pervasive.  In the same vein we can infer that the absence 
of an institutionalized penal system in Igbo villages implied that the ‘sanction threshold’ 
of most directives reached by the Ama-Ala was hardly severe.  However, the advent of 
the trans-Atlantic slave trade introduced a degree of severity in the ‘sanction threshold’ of 
Directiveness in Igbo society especially for violators of serious taboos who were 
promptly sold off into slavery.57  Some of the oracles, Ibiniukpabi of Arochukwu and 
Agbala of Oka in particular, played a crucial role in that regard.  People who were found 
guilty of grievous crimes that went before these Pan Igbo oracular originations were often 
sold off directly into slavery (Basden 1938, Afigbo 1971a, Ottenberg 1958).
The responsiveness of leaders of the village is usually commensurate with the 
intense participation of the generality of villagers in the governance of their village.  In 
the absence of regimentation in the practice of authority both Directiveness and
Compliance are driven by the degree to which the overriding value to submit is trumped 
by the perception of legitimacy.  The generality of the people are inclined to adhere to the 
normative prescriptions that guide influence relations in their community.  But on those 
rare occasions when the community is genuinely convinced that the leadership is intent 
57 Often times it was customary for Ama-Ala to call the attention of an Umunna to a 
serious infraction of one of its own.  It was usually the responsibility of the Umunna to 
take the big decision to sell a culprit off into slavery.   See Harris, J. S. (1942: 40-40). 
“Some Aspects of Slavery in Southeastern Nigeria”.  The Journal of Negro History, Vol. 
27, Number 1.
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on fostering an unpopular agenda at the expense of the community the former often 
responded to latter’s attempts to influence their behavior with ‘indifference’. 
The Village-Group
A group of villages that usually share some measure of affinity but intermarry 
compose a democratic government of the Village-Group in which each one irrespective 
of size is equal.  The Village-Group is “generally the largest political unit” (Afigbo 1973: 
17) in the Igbo political system.  
The villages that comprise a Village-Group are ranked according to the seniority 
of their founders who are the children of one ancestor.  “The most senior in rank is 
believed to have grown out of the descendants of the first son of the founder while the 
most junior is said to have descended from his last son” (Afigbo 1973: 17).    The Ama-
Ala is also charged with the Government of the village-group.  But unlike the Ama-Ala at 
the village level, this one functions as a representative Assembly.  Every Village is 
represented in the Ama-Ala by its Ndi Isi Ofo (Ofo Custodians).  However, supreme 
authority still lies in the Ama-Ala.  Directiveness reached by the Ama-Ala is “enforced 
within each Village by the age-grades and secrete societies of each village” (Afigbo 
1973: 20).  Age organizations are vital components of the authority patterns in the 
Village-Group.  In the absence of professional law enforcement agencies it is the age 
grades that are assigned the responsibility of enforcing compliance to directives passed 
by the Ama-Ala.  But their enforcement responsibilities do not transcend village 
boundaries.  The constituting members of the Village-Group guide their respective 
sovereignty quite jealously.  Any member village, which feels that its interests are not 
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sufficiently protected in any decision taken by the Ama-Ala, would usually opt to ignore 
its enforcement.  It was in situations like that that the restorative role of the oracles is 
brought in to take preemptive measures to avert schisms that could degenerate to high 
intensity warfare if they were unaddressed (Isichei 1973).  Verdicts handed down by 
oracle are binding on all parties.  The verdicts that emanate from the oracles hardly vary 
from popular expectations in the community for the reason that their agents always go out 
of their way to clandestinely gather all existing information on the dispute from the 
disputing communities as well as their neighbors (Meek 1937).  
In every Igbo political unit, the age organization “is a universal broad division of 
the male and of the female population into three categories or grades of Elders, Men 
(Women) and Boys (Girls)” (Jones 1962: 194).  The variation and complexity attached to 
this institution of authority vary from one political unit and community to another.  The 
Elders are usually the ones who are in-charge of government in the unit.  The Elders or 
Ndichie do not exercise their leadership authority in Igbo society in isolation from the 
Ancestors.  The Elders are the acknowledged link between the living members of their 
community and the Ancestors, who are still considered to be part of the community.   
Their link with the Ancestors is a source of legitimacy for their leadership authority in the 
community.  
Influence relations in Igbo society are exercised in ways that promote “the process 
of regulating normal life among” (Afigbo 1973: 20) a people who see themselves as 
having a lot that bonds them together from the individual up to the various group levels.  
Individuals and even distant units whose members lack any obvious lineage links were 
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known to go as far as creating one through the covenant of Igbandu (Ukwu 1967).58
Participation in the affairs of every Igbo unit is the normative right of “all who were old 
enough to talk sense” (Afigbo 1973: 20).  Apart from the asymmetry evident in the 
authority pattern, the authority relations function according to the belief that all members 
of the social unit “who are worthy are basically equal, differences in wealth 
notwithstanding” (Afigbo 1973: 21).  
Illustrating for Clarity
We would use Chinua Achebe’s novel, Things Fall Apart (1958), in which he 
captured life in all of its essence in pre-colonial Igboland at the turn of the nineteenth 
century to illustrate our analysis on the Igbo and their practice of authority further for 
clarity.59  Okonkwo, the self- made protagonist in Things Fall Apart, was haunted by his 
father, Nnoka’s lack of personal industry which rendered him an economic failure who 
was incapable of fending for his only wife and children while he lived.  Although 
Nnoka’s was an economic failure in his household, he retained his natural rights to 
participate in the ezi, Umunna, and village-group during his lifetime.  In contrast to his 
father who was a remarkable and permissive and lazy household head and manager, 
Okonkwo became a no-nonsense manager who regimented all aspects of his household 
with ‘specific directives’ and ‘close supervision’ on the conviction that it was the only 
58 Igbandu is a ritual whereby the parties involved have blood drawn from them mixed 
together and tasted by everyone of them.  It established a ritual kinship between them, a 
guarantee that they can never inflict harm on one another or members.
59 We concur with Eckstein and Gurr on their justification for extracting valid research 
data from novels when they argue that: “The main methodological assumption underlying 
the exercise [of extracting research data from novels] was that since novelists tend to be 
gifted observers who generalize personal experience, the careful reading of fiction can 
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way to raise a successful household.  His autocratic traits often got him into trouble with 
the customs and traditions of the land.  His peers in the novel who did not have to deal 
with the psychological burden of a father who was a failure on account of his laziness and 
lack of industry managed their own household differently.  
The following points relevant to our discourse of indigenous Igbo authority 
patterns are made clear in Achebe’s “realistic [portrayal] of the day by day and hour by 
hour issues of social living” (Killam 1969: 14) in pre-colonial Igboland.  Household 
management style could entail either low Directiveness or high regimentation.  Either 
way it would not transcend the customs and traditions of the community.  The deities 
worshipped by the clan often sanctioned individuals like Okonkwo who tended towards 
high regimentation in the direction of their households for their excesses.  When an 
individual’s autocratic traits tended towards what the E-G scheme deems as “peremptory 
and violent” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 57) as was often the case with Okonkwo, someone 
close by often called him to order.  Extreme Directiveness including the administration of 
corporal punishment on children prevailed in the Igbo household, but it tended to decline 
as children grew and matured.  The same was true of a household head like Okonkwo as 
he translated from his role as a super to that of a sub in the ezi, umunna, etc.  Flogging 
and imprisonment of adults both of which are two possible hallmarks of regimented 
Directiveness were unheard of in pre-colonial Igbo society (Jones 1965: 94, Ekechi 
1971).  The essence of that is captured in the Igbo proverb—Onye maara ihe achoghi 
otutu okwu (A wise person does not require specific directives).  What is described in the 
E-G scheme as the “aura of violent retribution” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 57) which 
serve as a reasonable substitute for field studies when such activities cannot be carried 
out” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 56).
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obtained in some adult-children relationships ceased as soon as children attained 
adulthood.  In spite of his personal industry, economic success, and high standing in his 
society, Okonkwo’s autocratic traits neither spilt over nor were they embraced in the ezi, 
umunna, village or the village-group.  When he advocated armed struggle to drive the 
British out he was over-ruled by the deliberative Assembly of his village-group.  As one 
other Igbo proverb goes, ‘Otu onye adighi abu nnam oha’ (An individual does not dictate 
to the community).  
If we subject the Igbo authority patterns to the E-G measure scale their ranking on 
the four dimensions of influence relations will be akin to the configuration in Figure 3.4
below.

































Figure 3.4: The ranking matrix of the Igbo authority patterns on the E-G scheme 
measure-scale
Direct democracy is one of the critical elements in the practice of authority amongst the 
Igbo.  Apart from encouraging the participation of all and sundry in the direction of the 
affairs of the community, direct democracy equally makes it possible for the community 
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to ensure that individuals who are entrusted with authority positions are responsive in the 
discharge of their duties.  Direct participation makes it possible for villagers to veto 
unpopular decisions taken on their behalf by their representatives in the Ama-Ala at the 
village-group.  
The E-G scheme provides us with a sound measure to gauge the intricate fit in the 
over all authority patterns of the Igbo on the one hand as well as their harmonious co-
existence with their world.  The ancillary ‘bases of legitimacy perceptions’ tend to 
succinctly fit into those patterns too.  Religion, which is the anchor on which all the four 
dimensions of influence relations are hinged is also a vital legitimating agent for 
authority in Igbo society.  Indigenous Igbo religion provides the glue that binds most if 
not all the components of life in Igbo society in a manner that checks and punishes any 
attempt by anyone to abuse or ignore authority.  It is equally the anchor for the Igbo 
personality through which society regenerates itself.  The results are that those who are 
entrusted with the authority to play a prominent role in the processes of directing society 
are normatively discouraged from directing society towards the path of autocracy and 
despotism in social, economic and political life.  At the same time change and 
innovations are allowed into society through the personal industry of individual who are 
driven to achieve and accomplish by their belief and trust in their personal chi.
Exceptions: Centralized Authority in Four Specific Igbo Polities:
Oguta, Onitsha, Abo, and Osomari
From the generalist point of view there is ample evidence to warrant the location 
of the authority patterns of Nd’Igbo within the typical scenario that we discussed in the 
preceding section in the current chapter.  However, there are still some specific aspects of 
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the authority patterns found among the Northern and Northeastern Igbo groups which 
deviate somewhat from the general patterns.  Such deviations include the presence of 
institutionalized monarchies involving a considerable degree of such trappings of royalty 
as court keeping, distinct forms of regalia and associated ceremonies of royalty (Afigbo 
1973).  Afigbo (1973) has argued that those Igbo groups who operate monarchical 
political systems may have borrowed them from their non-Igbo neighbors.  His assertion 
is largely underscored by the fact that all the various Igbo communities who practice the 
monarchical political systems live close to non-Igbo nationalities that evolved centralized 
monarchies.  In fact, a careful scrutiny of the authority patterns in various Northern and 
Northeastern Igbo societies where monarchical political systems prevail would reveal that 
their kings are no more than premier members of the enlarged Popular Assembly (Ama-
Ala ) of their Village-Groups (Afigbo 1973).  
Ikenna Nzimiro (1972) identified some of the differences in the authority patterns 
of Northern and Northeastern Igbo communities that underscore the assertions made 
above by Afigbo.  Nzimiro believes that it is not just the monarchical system of rule that 
the various Northern or Onitsha and Northeastern Igbo groups adopted from their 
Yoruba, Bini, and Igala neighbors.  He argues that Northern and Northeastern Igbo 
communities seem to have emulated the residential patterns that are associated with their 
non-Igbo neighbors as well.  For instance, Nzimiro supports his argument with the 
finding that unlike the rest of Nd’Igbo who live in obodo or ikporo (village), Northern 
and Northeastern Igbo groups live in differentiated and compact towns like the Yoruba, 
and the Bini.  These compact residential towns are made of quarters called ebo that are in 
turn made up of wards called ogbe (Nzimiro 1972: 21).  Nzimiro further asserts that “an 
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ogbe divides into compounds (nkpu uno) which contain the members of an extended 
family or minima lineage” (Nzimiro 1972: 21).  Our discussion in this section centers on 
four different Northern and Northeastern Igbo polities, i.e. Oguta, Abo, Onitsha and 
Osomari that share some characteristic similarities as well as subtle differences in their 
respective political systems. 
Their chiefs of state are all constitutional monarchies, and political authority 
involves titled personalities, titled associations and age grades in all four cases (Nzimiro 
1972).  In Abo, Oguta, and Onitsha the official title of the Chief of state is the Obi.  He is 
called the Atamanya in Osomari (Nzimiro 1972).  Because of the central roles that titles 
play in the designation of individuals to authority positions in these polities, Afigbo 
(1973) is of the view that the Obiship and Atamanyaship may have been the ultimate 
titles that can be taken by anyone in them. 60
The office of the chief of state resides in a specific lineage—Ebo (lineage) in 
Onitsha, Abo, and Osomari, Ogbe.  In Oguta where the towns that made up the polity are 
in their own turn made up of the Ogbe, the Obiship resides in a specific Ogbe (Nzimiro 
1972: 21).  Both the Ebo and the Ogbe are typical Igbo lineages (Nzimiro 1972).  
However the office of chief of state is still open to every worthy male from the royal line 
who proves himself so by his exemplary character and wealth.  Wealth and character are 
the two principal criteria that must be fulfilled by citizens who aspire join the title 
60 Asagba (Anglicized Asaba) is another Northern Igbo polity that evolved a centralized 
system of political organization.  In Asaba where the Chief of state is given either the Obi 
or Eze title studies reveal that both titles were phased out sometime in the nineteenth 
century.  Isichei (1969) revealed from her research that both titles were the highest that 
anyone could take in the Asagba society.  She even speculated that they may have gone 
into oblivion because no one could afford to take them in a long time.  Her findings 
underscore Afigbo’s assertion.
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societies in these polities (Nzimiro 1972).  Membership of title societies in these Igbo 
polities is open to only freeborn citizens.  Being a freeborn citizen is also a prerequisite 
qualification for election to the office of chief of state.  These deliberate provisions in the 
political system specifically exist to deter the evolution of autocracy in these 
communities.  
Society in these polities is “organized on a basis of age and sex into male and 
female age sets, the women have their own system of councils and a general assembly 
which parallels that of the men, and there are a number of voluntary associations 
membership in which is sought by the socially and politically ambitious” (Nzimiro 1972: 
21).  Furthermore, society in each of them is ranked in a manner that depicts asymmetry 
in the prevalent authority patterns and relations.  However, that ranking is not indicative 
of a system of stratification that favors some members of society at the expense of others.    
Take for instance the rank of Nwadiani or freeborn citizen.  It is a sociologically non-
discriminatory rank that includes the following categories of people in the society: titled 
and untitled individuals who are not of royal descent as well as titled and untitled 
individuals who are of royal descent.  By royal descent we are talking about the lineage 
that claims direct descent from the founder of the polity (Nzimiro 1972).   Any Nwadiani 
who is in good social standing in terms of character and integrity who achieved the withal 
to join the title associations would become an ogaranya or distinguished personality in 
society.  The status and prestige of ogaranya earned the one membership of the political 
elite in any of these polities.  The lowest rung of the status ladder in society is occupied 
by the Ohu (slaves and slave-born)61 who are not worthy of citizenship and all the rights 
61 The population of ndi ohu in is quite minor in most Igbo communities.
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that it confers on the Nwadiani.  Citizenship is therefore the exclusive right of Ndi 
Nwadiani or freeborn individuals.
There are three categories of Nwadiani (Nzimiro 1972).  The first category 
includes all freeborn people who are descended from the founders of a polity.  The 
second is composed of descendants of freeborn individuals from other political units who 
became members through fission from their original units.62  The freeborn status of their 
ancestors from their place of origin is actually the principal qualifying criterion that 
earned people in this category full membership of the ward that their ancestors attached 
themselves to (Nzimiro 1972: 23).  Like all members of their ward, “they observe its 
rules of exogamy and are associated with its cults and ritual activities” (Nzimiro 1972: 
23).  The third category of Nwadiani includes descendants of the original inhabitants of 
the land who welcomed and accepted the founders of the polity.  The office of Ezeani
(Priest of Ani or Ala, the Supreme Deity of the land) resides with members of this 
category.  As was mentioned a little earlier, the numerous rights and privileges that 
accrue through the institution of citizenship can only be enjoyed by the Nwadiani
(Nzimiro 1972).  Marriage can only be contracted between freeborn citizens.  As a matter 
of fact, “intermarriage has united the three categories together in a closely knit web of 
kinship which has given them a strong sense of corporate solidarity” (Nzimiro 1972: 24).  
But it is only the Nwadiani in the first and third categories that can hold political offices 
(Nzimiro 1972).  In some of the polities, Osomari for instance, only the Nwadiani in the 
first and third categories may assume the Okpalaship in any Ebo.  The reason being that 
in Igboland the position of Okpala is associated with both religious and political 
authority.  In Osomari, the belief is that sacrifice to ancestors can only be successful 
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when it is performed by “a true agnate” (Nzimiro 1972: 25).  “This dichotomy between 
citizenship (Nwadiani) and non-citizenship (Ohu and today, foreigner)63 underlies the 
whole social framework in these societies” (Nzimiro 1972: 25).  The categorization of 
society in these polities is devoid of sharp lines of stratification that segregate society into 
rulers and subjects.  These are realities of Igbo societies that are not conquest-based, and 
in which authority is not self-sustained and practiced through force and the domination of 
people. 
For instance, the normative restriction that bars freeborn individuals from other 
political units who voluntarily left their original wards and kindred to join another one in 
Osomari from assuming the Okparaship is strictly aimed at discouraging the incidence of 
conquest-based authority in the polity.  Similarly, the constitutional stipulation that 
restricts eligibility to the office of Ezeani to only the category of Nwadiani who first 
settled the land is aimed at preventing the evolution of a dynasty and autocratic 
leadership in these polities.64
Ndi ohu (cult slaves) are in a status of their own in Osomari.  They cannot 
intermarry with the Ndi nwadiani and are therefore denied the ties that the institution of 
citizenship bestows on Ndi nwadiani in society.  Ndi ohu cannot take titles, which 
consequently disqualifies them from becoming members of the political elite.  They can 
join age sets but cannot hold leadership offices in them.  Irrespective of their limited 
rights of participation in the direction of the polity’s affairs, the fact that they are 
62 They are called the onoru (the one that stayed put).
63 Ndi biara abia (Sojourners). 
64 The concept of constitution and constitutional is used to invoke the existence of an 
unwritten creed of laws, customs, traditions, and stipulations that guide governance.  This 
is based on the notion that constitutions can be written or unwritten.  A typical example 
of an unwritten constitution is that of England. 
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eligibility for the membership of the age sets implies that they are not totally barred from 
all its channels of Participation.  On closer examination therefore, one would discern that 
in these societies it is basically the lack of kinship ties that disqualifies ndi ohu from the 
channels of Participation.  In indigenous Igbo society an individual without kinship ties is 
an un-integrated and non-participant member of society in the polity.
Nzimiro (1972) categorized society in Abo, Oguta, Onitsha, and Osomari into 
two: the political elite class or functionaries of the state (the Obi, Atamanya, and Eze in 
and the occupants of the various palace and ritual offices), and commoners (everyone 
who can belong to the prestige associations).  The prestige associations constituted “an 
intermediate category as most titled offices are restricted to persons who are members of 
those associations” (Nzimiro 1972: 37).  In the E-G scheme these two categories are 
designated as superordinate actors or Super-actors and subordinate actors or sub-actors 
respectively (Eckstein and Gurr 1975).65   But in terms of what is described by the 
authors of the E-G scheme as the ‘asymmetric relations’ (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 8-20), 
in these three polities, the commoners submit to the authority of the political elite in such 
a manner that makes it impossible for authority to extend itself to the point of autocracy.  
There lies a remarkable difference between centralized and un-centralized political 
systems in Igboland.  In Northern and Northeastern Igbo communities, the centralization 
of some aspects of the practice of authority entailed a clearer delineation and definition of 
the authority patterns.   However, as a feature of the political system, centralization of 
some aspects of the practice of authority in these societies does not necessarily imply that 
65 Throughout Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry, their primer 
on the application of congruence theory in social research, Eckstein and Gurr (1975) 
referred to individuals in the two categories variously as “supers” or S and “subs” and s 
for short.
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they are sociologically stratified.   The existence of clearly defined lines of asymmetry in 
these Northern and Northeastern Igbo polities does not in any way lock commoners out 
of the channels of Participation in the authority patterns.  The channels of Participation
in these societies are open, and facilitated for all commoners.  There are several principal 
factors deeply rooted in the fabric of Igbo society that render the lines of asymmetry 
between commoners and the political elite in these societies quite thin and flexible.  
Status and social mobility in Igbo society are in the main not ascribed.  Hence in these 
societies, commoners are potential members of the political class.  This reality is 
achievable for everyone particularly for the reason that land, the major element of 
economic production, is owned by the lineage and inherited through kinship ties.  In pre-
colonial times resourceful individuals in these societies were able to accumulate the 
requisite wealth that enabled them to acquire titles that qualified them to join the coveted 
political elite category.  As in other parts of Igboland the path to leadership and authority 
in these four polities is normatively prescribed and recognized as well as open to all. 
The military, legislative and judicial affairs in each polity are the responsibility of 
the public officials.  The palace officials work hand-in-hand with the chiefs of state, 
while the ritual officials discharge the ritual affairs of the societies.  As it is in the rest of 
Igboland, “law, morality and religion provide sanctions for controlling human conduct 
which supplement one another and are combined in different ways” (Nzimiro 1972: 37).  
By the authority of the office that he occupies the chief of state in each of these 
polities combines the secular and ritual responsibilities of the state in his person and 
office (Nzimirio 1972).  This is in the sense that he officiates during ritual ceremonies 
while the Ezeani presides.  His office is analogous to the position of the Okpala at the 
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lineage level, which confers on its occupant the authority to discharge secular and ritual 
responsibilities and obligations on behalf of the members of his lineage.  All authority 
derives from the ancestors and is sanctioned by the Gods that the communities worship.
Normatively, an authority position does not entitle anyone to make economic 
claims on his fellow citizens.  No one pays or receives taxes or tributes from others.  This 
assertion raises the question of how the chiefs of states in these polities raised the 
“surplus” that supported their court.  The ability of an individual in terms of his wealth, to 
shoulder the huge material requirements of being a public figure was one of the 
qualifying criteria for these positions.  Individuals accumulated wealth through their 
personal industry, and wealthy individuals acquired membership of titled associations to 
become members of the political elite.  Every individual was therefore the master of his 
own economic destiny.  But members of the political elite—the chiefs of state, state 
functionaries, and other distinguished individuals in society were able to attract voluntary 
labor from well-wishers to supplement the labor of members of their immediate family 
for their agricultural work on the basis of their prestige.  
In sociological terms, the foregoing analysis encapsulates the socio-political 
situation as regards the practice of authority in pre-colonial Igboland.  Agriculture, the 
mainstay of Igbo economy, provided the basis for the development of extensive long 
distance trade between the Igbo and their neighbors who inhabit the southeast portion of 
the lower Niger basin (Ottenberg and Ottenberg 1962, Hodder and Ukwu 1969).66
Kinship ties that are developed principally through marriage within and between 
the various political units in pre-colonial Igboland were utilized extensively to evolve and 
66 As early as 1508 Pacheco Pereira, a Portuguese trader who ventured to the coastlines of 
the Niger basin had mentioned the active trading involving the inhabitants of those parts.
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sustain some of the ubiquitous non-governmental authority patterns that facilitated the 
harmonious existence of the Igbo in their thick rain forest environment (Dike 1956a).  In 
those situations when natural kinship ties could not evolve between different Igbo units 
traditional Igbo religion was handily employed to promote the necessary economic ties 
between different political units in Igboland.67  This was particularly true of the Aro Igbo.  
When faced with they were faced with the difficult challenge of not being able to develop 
kinship ties with other Igbo groups the Aro Igbo promptly cashed in on the Pan- Igbo 
influence of Ibiniukpabi, which enabled them to carve a dominant niche for themselves in 
the long distance trade that flourished between the Igbo and the other nationalities that 
inhabit southeast lower Niger basin.  This happened at a time when the need for 
agricultural labor by European settlers in the New World injected a demand for Africans 
who were bought and transported across the Atlantic as items of trade (Ottenberg 1958, 
Isichei 1973, Johnson 1904, Talbot 1926, Forde and Jones 1950).
Is it then unusual that the Aro Igbo were unable to exploit the Pan-Igbo influence 
of their oracle to seek political hegemony over Igboland or at least parts of it?  Although 
Ottenberg (1958) seemed to have been tempted to speculate that the oracle organizations 
may have led to the evolution of a large and centralized political organization in 
Igboland, I am compelled to argue in the context of our discussion that the inability of 
anyone or group to evolve or impose such a system of rule on the Igbo may have 
stemmed partly from the geography of the Igbo homeland.  It is inconceivable that a 
geographical environment that partly dictated the evolution of village-based democratic 
polities could have suddenly encouraged their transformation into one single political 
67 The Oka Igbo cashed in on the Pan-Igbo influence of Agbara, their own oracle to ply 
their skills as smiths, diviners and physicians all over Igboland in the long distance trade.
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organization by any one Igbo group.   It could have been unusual for the Aro Igbo to 
transcend their typical Igboic political system which lacked strong hierarchical 
characteristics and power centralization (Ottenberg 1958) to evolve a predatory system of 
rule that was capable of controlling and exploiting other Igbo groups.  Indeed, in spite of 
their acclaimed acumen to harness the Pan-Igbo influence of their Ibiniukpabi, to carve a 
central role for themselves in the economy of southeast lower Niger basin, the Aro Igbo 
or even any other Igbo group at that, lacked the capacity to transform themselves into 
over-lords in pre-colonial Igboland.  There is no evidence that they attempted to impose 
their choice of political authority, or transform political units into unitary polities or try to 
raise a standing army within or from outside Igboland through the influence of their 
oracle (Ottenberg 1958). 
The Yoruba
The Yoruba inhabit the deciduous rain forest ecological zone of the Niger basin as 
several groups that include the Oyo-Yoruba, the Ife-Yoruba, the Ijebu-Yoruba, the Egba-
Yoruba, the Ekiti-Yoruba, the Awori-Yoruba, etc.  Their homeland which is located in 
the southwest of the Niger basin occupies an area that stretches more than 200 miles 
(Forde 1951) as far as present Benin Republic and Togoland (westwards) and northwards 
towards Nupeland.  The fact that the nationality of Yoruba-speaking people consists of 
several groups gave Forde cause to claim that the Yoruba are more “united by language 
than by culture” (Forde 1951: 1).  Kenyo (1951), Johnson (1921), and Biobaku (1955) 
argued that the various Yoruba groups share some traditional and cultural traits as well as 
the same tradition of origin traceable to the town of Ile-Ife and the same mythical 
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ancestor, Oduduwa (Oguntomisin 1981: 223).   However, in spite of their claim of 
descent from one mythical ancestor, each of the various Yoruba groups—the Oyo, Ife, 
Ijebu, Egba, Ekiti, Awori, etc.—founded its own monarchical polity which differed 
slightly from each other in some ways (Atanda 1973, Oguntomisin 1981).             
Coleman took the contrary position on the issue of political heterogeneity in pre-
colonial Yorubaland when he argued that with the exception of the Ijebu-Yoruba, the 
other Yoruba sub-groups “were united into one kingdom ruled from Old Oyo” (Coleman 
1958: 25) for the greater part of the eighteenth century.  Although Coleman’s assertion is 
backed by the facts of Yoruba history, other scholars (Forde 1951, Law 1973) have 
pointed out that “the Yoruba have never effectively come under a single political 
authority” (Oguntomisin 1981: 223).  The truth from all these views is that the Old Oyo 
Empire which tied several Yoruba groups together in a single political organization at a 
point in their pre-colonial history started to decline around the middle of the eighteenth 
century and subsequently collapsed by around 1826 (Smith 1969a).
In spite of the acknowledged difference in political structures between the various 
Yoruba polities, the similarities that exist in their political structures are more than the 
differences (Oguntomisin 1981: 223).  In fact, in situations where differences exist 
between their political institutions, such differences are often minor (Lloyd 1954).  Here 
are some pointers: Access to the office of the chief of state in each one of them is by 
ascription.  Governmental authority is constitutionally stipulated and civilian-controlled 
in all of them (Oguntomisin 1981).  Furthermore, there are specific constitutional 
stipulations aimed at preventing governance from degenerating into despotic autocracy in 
each of them (Law 1971, Oguntomisin 1981).  The age-old tradition for all occupants of 
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notable apex positions of authority in Yorubaland to trace their descent to Oduduwa and 
Ile-Ife, is another similarity that exists between various Yoruba polities.  In addition to 
being a similarity, the claim made by every Yoruba to a common descent is equally an 
identity which puts them apart form the other inhabitants of the Niger basin (Gbadamosi 
1978).  
Contrary to what obtained in pre-colonial Igboland, state building in pre-colonial 
Yorubaland produced large polities that functioned with considerable degrees of 
centralization in the governance of society.  What then can we possibly attribute the 
incidence and feature of large polities and political centralization respectively to in pre-
colonial Yorubaland?  The answer to that question is subsumed in the history of the 
Yoruba, which shows that unlike the Igbo, they exploited warfare as an instrument of 
state building (Ajayi and Smith 1971).  However, these two features, i.e. large political 
organization and centralization in the structures of governance did not seem to have 
translated to unbridled autocracy in the practice of authority in pre-colonial Yoruba 
polities.   
When we look at the pre-colonial history of Yorubaland there is evidence that it 
did not lack ambitious actors who tried but were unsuccessful in the long run to transform 
themselves into the type of autocrats that Eckstein and Gurr (1975: 67) associate with 
“literally, self-sustained power” in the E-G scheme.  In all cases when such individuals 
who were always from the military succeeded in imposing themselves on their people as 
autocrats and despots what they could not achieve in each case which led to eventual 
collapse of their efforts was the imposition of durable institutionalized control over them 
(Atanda 1973: 10, Oguntomisin 1981: 231-2, Johnson 1921).   
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We can infer from what has already been established earlier in the discourse about 
the geography of the part of the Niger basin where the Yoruba homeland is located to 
assert that geography may have been one of the factors that made it impossible for those 
individuals in pre-colonial Yorubaland who tried to transform themselves into all-
powerful autocrats to succeed in the long run.  History indicates that rather than be ruled 
by controlling autocrats the Yoruba often fled into the forest and hills to found new 
polities—Ibadan and Abeokuta are good examples (Ajayi 1965, Akintoye 1966, Ajayi 
and Smith 1971, Awe 1973, Falola 1985, Oguntomisin 1981).  According to Ajayi and 
Smith, most towns in southern Yorubaland, “were deliberately situated within a belt of 
forest (the Igbo Ile) which was deliberately allowed to retain its undergrowth and was 
pierced only by narrow paths leading to the gates” (Ajayi and Smith 1971: 23).  The 
monarchical political system of the Yoruba was predicated on durable constitutional 
provisions with stipulations for power sharing, checks and balances that deterred the 
long-term success of attempts by anyone to foist autocratic rule on the Yoruba.  Even at 
this stage in our discourse it is not illogical for us to argue that the evident feature of 
centralization in the Yoruba system of governance must have affected the practice of 
authority in pre-colonial polities in Yoruba land.
 Authority and Its Practice Are Linked to Religion
Like it is amongst the Igbo, indigenous religion which is deeply rooted in the 
social structure and social organization of the Yoruba played a central role in all aspects 
of their pre-colonial political organization.  Much of the reason for this can be located in 
the fact that Yoruba religion is totally home-grown.  There are several pointers that can 
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be used to buttress this immediate assertion.  Inherent in the Yoruba worldview is the 
belief that “the factor of luck, which is associated with the head” ((Boscom 1951: 492) is 
essential in the life of every individual.  According to this belief, luck is a personal 
quality, that relates the “owner of the head (olori) ” (Boscom 1951: 492), i.e. an 
individual “to the multiple souls or spiritual guardians: the ‘creator’ (eleda)” (Boscom 
1951: 492).  Thus, “[a] lucky person (olori rere, e’eda rere) is one who has a good head 
or a good creator, while an unlucky person (olori buruku, e’eda buruku) has a bad head 
or creator” (Boscom 1951: 492).  In this religion, an individual’s “luck and … success in 
economic and other affairs is … a matter of destiny (ayanmope, ayanmo) or fate (iwa), 
which is also called ‘to kneel and choose’ (akunleyan)” (Boscom 1951: 492).  There’s 
room in the religion for an individual to consult diviners or priests (babalawo) “to find 
out what is in store for the future and what can be done to avert evil and insure favorable 
outcome” (Boscom 1951: 492).  Lucky individuals are those people who achieve some 
measures of economic success that translate to their achievement of the social status of a 
‘gentleman’ (gbajumo) or the ‘man of principle’ (enia pataki) (Boscom 1951: 493) in 
society.  The role of individuals who achieve either or both social statuses in the practice 
of authority in Yoruba society is worthy of mention.  A ‘gentleman’ is both popular and 
attracts a good measure of following in the community especially when he achieves the 
status of a ‘man of principle’ at the same time.  A ‘man of principle’ “has all the 
characteristics of a gentleman, with the added qualities of fearlessness, leadership and 
social responsibility” (Boscom 1951: 493).  It is interesting that while ‘the man of 
principle’ will criticize the king, when criticism is justified, the gentleman on the other 
hand waits until someone else speaks up and then joins in the chorus (Boscom 1951).  In 
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the context of the E-G scheme both personality traits encourage the participation of 
everyday people in the affairs of their society.  In turn, the participation of such 
individuals led to the responsiveness of leaders who preferred not to antagonize them and 
their loyal followers. 
Like their system of governance, indigenous Yoruba religion, which incorporates 
some degree of centralization, is neither rigid nor exclusionary in its logic and practices.  
Holders of authority positions at the infra and supra levels of society and priests 
constitute the centers of action around which revolve the participation of the people in 
their religious and social affairs (Lawson 1985: 54-6).  The creed of Yoruba religion does 
not only “provide a mine of information about their history and mythology, it reflects the 
philosophy of the race and reveals the concepts that they have formed about the world 
they live in” (McClelland 1982: 7).
The encapsulation of the aforementioned aspects of the flexible worldview of the 
Yoruba has enabled indigenous Yoruba religion to continue to function as one of the 
crucial agencies of socialization amongst the Yoruba.  Indigenous religion enabled the 
Yoruba to respond to changes to “secular modes of thought and action that propose new 
concepts of power and new relationships to place and role” (Lawson 1985: 98) in creative 
ways while retaining the originality of their authority structures and patterns.  Its creative 
response to Christianity gave birth to the Cherubim and Seraphim Church, a popular 
Christian denomination among the Yoruba, which parallels their indigenous religion in 
both creed and practice.  Thus, the Yoruba have tended to be syncretic in their religious 
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beliefs and practices, both of which accommodate their worldview, indigenous culture 
and authority patterns.68
The chief of state in pre-colonial Yorubaland can only execute ritual obligations 
as the priests who he lacks the authority to control have recommended them.  The priests 
on the other hand have the authority from both the Gods and Ancestors to use their good 
offices to ensure that the chief of state remains responsive to the citizens in the discharge 
of their leadership responsibilities.  For instance, in some Yoruba polities—the kingdom 
of Lagos is one—the Oba’s oracle is housed in the abode of the priest.  This was meant to 
ensure the independence of the priest in the discharge of his official religious functions.  
That way, only him consulted the Oba’s oracle when asked and relayed his findings to 
the latter.  Other religious and traditional stipulations made it possible for the Oba of 
Lagos to remain responsive to the people.  It was a traditional taboo for him to initiate the 
offer of sacrifices to his ancestors.  Whenever the priests ascertained that the Oba’s 
ancestors were unhappy with his conduct he equally issued the authorization for 
sacrifices to appease them (Cole 1975).  Priests were prevailed upon by the people to 
prescribe “taboos that the Oba was bound to obey” (Atanda 1973: 4).  In Yoruba tradition 
to be touched by a masquerade implied that the ancestors had vetoed an Oba’s legitimate 
authority to govern.  In fact, it was on behalf of subordinate members of the Yoruba 
society that priests established that it is a taboo for an Oba to be touched by a 
masquerade. There were instances when an Oba who became autocratic and despotic was 
68 Rather than say that colonialism and westernization have undermined the various 
segmental structures and units of Yoruba society (family, religion, etc.) that are 
responsible for ensuring the perpetuation of indigenous authority patterns of the Yoruba 
it’d be more appropriate to argue that the latter have been creatively transformed by all 
that came with the former without loosing their indigenous traits which enables them to 
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made to abdicate upon being touched by a masquerade, which was in turn instigated by 
the people (Atanda 1973).  Under these circumstances, thanks to indigenous religion, in 
spite of their extensive authority, Yoruba chiefs of state avoided responsiveness in their 
practice of authority at the risk of inciting the people against their authority.  
Warfare and Conquest in State Building and Transformation
There were cases when the age-old authority patterns of the monarchical political 
system of the Yoruba were eroded and transformed in some considerable degrees (Ajayi 
1965, Awe 1973).  The reason for that partly derived from warfare and conquest at the 
time when they became effective devices for state building and transformation pre-
colonial Yorubaland (Ajayi and Smith 1971).  In a period that spanned about seventy 
years (1813-1893) Yorubaland witnessed about fifty different wars (Johnson 1921, Smith 
1969, Ajayi and Smith 1971).  Atanda (1973), Oguntomisin (1981), Falola (1985) have 
established that there were changes in aspects of the authority patterns of the Yoruba that 
resulted from the wars and upheavals that led to the decline and eventual collapse of the 
Old Oyo Empire.  One such change was the rise of militarism and despotism in the 
conduct of the business of governance particularly in some new states that were founded 
in parts of post-Old Oyo Yorubaland (Ajayi 1965: 72-81, Awe 1973).
Ibadan is one of the new states that were founded in southern Yorubaland by the 
influx of population of displaced groups from the Old Oyo Empire and the surrounding 
states (Ajayi and Smith 1971: 11).  Founded in 1829 it grew in all respects as a result of 
the dependence of its leaders on militarism for state building and state transformation 
sustain their role as purveyors of all the dimensions of indigenous Yoruba authority 
patterns.
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(Ajayi and Smith 1971, Awe 1973).  Traditionally, the norm in Yorubaland was to 
mobilize for war and demobilize the army and let the soldiers and their commanders 
return to their farms immediately after (Johnson 1921: 75, 131, Ajayi and Smith 1964: 
10).  But Ibadan broke with that tradition by raising a standing military composed of 
professional soldiers who assumed extensive leadership roles in society. With the 
exception of two religious positions of authority, recruitment into all other positions in 
Ibadan was affected by the new norm, which made merit “the most important 
qualification for achieving chieftaincy titles” (Awe 1973: 66).  Ibadan became a Yoruba 
polity that extended a lot of recognition to soldiers and war commanders in the bid to 
retain their services (Awe 1973: 66, Falola 1985).  
Even then Ibadan did not completely reinvent all aspects of the Yoruba authority 
patterns.  Many crucial elements of indigenous Yoruba authority patterns still survived in 
Ibadan.  For instance, citizenship continued to be the most important qualification for 
recruitment into every leadership position in the polity.  In fact, there were strict 
definitions of who was a citizen as opposed to a stranger (Awe 1973 and Falola 1985).  
Thus, access to chieftaincy titles, which largely “constituted power in nineteenth-century 
Ibadan” (Falola 1985: 55) was restricted to citizens of Ibadan alone.
From the foregoing one can discern two facts of history about political 
development in pre-colonial Yorubaland.  The first is that the Yoruba were never wielded 
into one political entity under the control of one political authority (Atanda 1973: 1).  The 
second is that in spite of the validity of the first fact of history cited above, they evolved 
fairly large political organizations (Atanda 1973: 1).  The second fact of history 
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represents one of the major disparities in political development amongst the Igbo and the 
Yoruba.
Unlike in Igboland, some state formation and most state transformation 
undertakings in pre-colonial Yorubaland were conquest-based.  This evident disparity in 
state building and transformation between the two nationalities did not stem from a 
history of warless ness in Igboland or between Nd’Igbo and their neighbors.  A quick 
explanation is that circumstances made it untenable for the Igbo to exploit wars for state 
making.  Charles Tilly’s (1985, 1990) depiction, as shown in Figure 3.5 below, of the 
symbiotic relationship between war making and state making fits pre-colonial 
Yorubaland to a good measure.  There were various cases in which agents of states in 
pre-colonial Yoruba polities embarked on:
(i) War making: Eliminating or neutralizing their rivals outside 
the their rivals outside the territories in which they have clear
and continuous priority as wielders of force
(ii) State making: Eliminating or neutralizing their rivals inside
those territories
(iii) Protection: Eliminating or neutralizing their enemies for their
clients
(iv) Extraction: Acquiring the means of carrying out the first three





Figure 3.5: Symbiotic interaction between war making and state making.
Source: Charles Tilly. 1985. “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime” in 
Bringing the State Back In by P. D. Evans, D. Rueschemayer, and T. Skocpol, eds. 
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Thus, those parts of pre-colonial Yorubaland that achieved large political 
organization give credence to findings by historical sociologists (Downing 1992, Ertman 
1997, Kiser and Linton 2001) showing that wars determine the size and forms of state.  In 
Yorubaland wars aided the extraction of state and private wealth in various ways (Fadipe 
1970, Ajayi and Smith 1971, Awe 1973).69 But in spite of the impacts of wars on state 
building and transformation in Yorubaland, there is still ample evidence to show that war 
69 The Igbo do not have the tradition of using wars to source slaves.  J. S. Harris 
confirmed this much from his research when he said: “The Igbo of the Bende area have 
no recollection nor traditions of raids to obtain slaves, although these frequently have 
been reported from other regions, particularly along the coast during the slaving period.  
Although a few captives were sold, this was an incidental by-product of battles in this 
area, and, (sic) to my knowledge, never one of the prime motives for waging war (Harris 
1942: 40).  The vast majority of the handful in Igboland who were enslaved internally or 
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making did not upset the authority patterns of the Yoruba in fundamental ways (Lloyd 
1953: 78). 
Authority Patterns in Yorubaland
We’ve established earlier that the Yoruba settled their part of the Niger basin in 
kinship groups or lineages.   It was those groups that then evolved into kingdoms in each 
case (Atanda 1973).  Thus, while the Egba Yoruba founded the kingdom polity of Egba, 
the Oyo Yoruba founded the Oyo Ife, and the Ijebu Yoruba founded the kingdom polity 
of Ijebu Ode, etc.  We’ve further established earlier in the discourse, that a lot of socio-
political growth and transformation took place in most of the pre-colonial kingdom 
polities in Yorubaland before and especially during the period beginning from about the 
onset of the second decade in the nineteenth century.  Most of those resulted from 
conquest and the extension of political authority by towns into other surrounding towns 
(Akintoye 1971, Atanda 1973).
However, authority in the centralized political system of the Yoruba obtains in the 
following configuration, which is evident in Figure 3.6 below.  Every individual Yoruba 
“belonged to an ebi (lineage) and the male members of a lineage, their wives (if they are 
married) and children lived together in one agbo-ile (compound)” (A kintoye 1971: 13).70
The ebi is the basic or lowest level of authority in the Yoruba political system.  A 
combined group of several lineages constitutes the adugbo or ward, which is the next and 
second level of authority.  The apex level of authority in Yorubaland resides in the Ilu or 
Town.  Since Yoruba society is lineage-based, the Ilu is organized according to all the ebi
sold in the trans-Atlantic slave trade with the Europeans “were enslaved for infractions of 
societal customs” (Harris 1942: 40). 
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that founded and constitute it.  There is a rationale for starting the examination of this 
configuration of authority with the Ilu.  Our deliberate desire here is to emphasize the 
observation made earlier that centralization is a vital feature of the Yoruba political 
system.  It does not however imply that authority radiates from the Ilu down to the ebi in 
an undemocratic manner.
Ilu (Linage-based) Composition:
The Chief of state, Igbimo, and Representative
Priests Democracy
The Adugbo composed of the




Ebi composed of households
and presided by the Olori-Ebi
or Baálè
Figure 3.6: The configuration of authority in the Yoruba political system
70 The ebi is referred to as compound in some cases.
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The Ilu
The Yoruba are town-dwellers, who carved the town (Ilu) out as the apex of their 
centralized and monarchical political system (Atanda 1973: 3).  The settlement and 
inhabitation of each Ilu is according to lineages that are held together by “ strong kinship 
ties” (Atanda 1973: 3).  Political authority in an Ilu is neither established nor maintained 
in a haphazard pattern.  According to F. I. Fadipe, “[t]he relationships between the capital 
town of the state and other towns and villages embraced under it, whether offshoots of 
the original town or tributary, were closely similar from state to state …, so also was the 
division of the personnel of the state into civil and military chiefs.  The functions of the 
state council were practically the same from one state to another…  The procedure 
adopted in the conduct of affairs, whether in the judicial sphere or in the military or in the 
sphere of external relations was likewise, … the same from state to state” (Fadipe 1970: 
200) and from one group to the other.  Most if not all Yoruba states were made up of an 
original town which serves as the capital, other towns which were either founded by 
people from the original town or conquered and annexed as tribute-paying polities 
(Fadipe 1970).  In the Old Oyo Empire the title of the chief of state is Aláàfin.  In Ijebu 
Ode, and Ife, he is called the Awujale and the Ooni respectively.  In the Ekiti 
Confederation, he is called the Oba.  We shall see in due course that authority is practiced 
through an elaborate state bureaucracy.  
The premier lineage that settled an original Ilu is usually the one that produced the 
chief of state.  The political organization of subsidiary polities in each of the central 
Yoruba states was similar to the one that prevailed in the latter.  For instance, just as it 
was in the central states, different public officials were designated to conduct civil and 
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military affairs in the former and their subsidiary polities.  Except in the conduct of 
external relations, the implementation of capital punishment and the recruitment of the 
head chief, each subsidiary polity in a typical central Yoruba state (including tribute-
paying polities) enjoyed autonomy in the conduct of its political affairs.  The authority of 
the central states over their subsidiary polities was exercised mostly in raising manpower 
for military campaigns and revenue collection (Fadipe 1970: 201).  
All over Yorubaland the status of the chief of state “is similar in each kingdom 
and the paraphernalia and rituals of kingship are of a common pattern” (Lloyd 1966: 
487).  Although the recruitment of the chief of state is mostly guided by the norm of 
hereditary, there have been situations when mythical links to the royal line at Ile-Ife or 
victory in a power situation in an Ilu were used to catapult someone into the office 
(Atanda 1973).  
There was often room in the authority patterns to accommodate growth and 
expansion that resulted when lineage groups left their original Ilu and joined another one.  
The functional essence of that was to ensure that bone fide members of a lineage are not 
left out of the practice of authority in any given Yoruba polity on the grounds that their 
lineage was not one of the original founders of a town.  In the context of the E-G scheme 
this mechanism of accommodation underscored the norm which stipulated that the 
participation of the individual Yoruba person in the political affairs of his or her society 
is strictly derived from his or her membership of the ebi.  The practice in every Ilu was to 
create new titles from time to accommodate such new arrivals.  But in order to ensure 
that new arrivals do not upset the asymmetry that underlay the practice of authority in 
any polity, certain normative guidelines were strictly adhered to whenever there arose the 
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need to create those new titles (Atanda 1973: 3).  First, the number of new titles was 
pegged to the bare minimum. That mechanism prevented a new lineage from assuming 
predominance over the older ones through the presence of more its members in the 
various representative councils on the auspices of which the practice of authority in the 
polity is based.  Second, the status, prestige and political importance of new titles were 
deliberately designated below existing titles.  Again, such measures ensured that titled 
members from newly arrived lineages do not utilize the prestige and status of their titles 
to command undue political importance in their new polity.  There was hardly any 
confusion therefore about who could ascend the rungs of authority at any given time in 
any Ilu and by extension in any of the kingdoms in pre-colonial Yorubaland.  
From the perspective of the E-G scheme the processes of leadership recruitment 
were normatively clear and salient for every member of society in pre-colonial 
Yorubaland.  From the subsidiary towns all the way to the central kingdom polities, 
everyone in the larger society was normatively conversant with the leadership positions, 
their occupants and the extent of their authority.  
In terms of the E-G scheme, in a situation like that of the Yoruba where the norms 
that guide the recruitment of leaders are salient to everyone, when authority is exercised 
by properly recruited leaders, it was hardly perceived as illegitimate by members of the 
society at large. All proper recruitment into leadership positions must encompass the 
acknowledgement of seniority based on age (Schwab 1955, Lloyd 1960).  Akintoye 
points out that seniority based on age attracts actionable respect and status due to belief 
that elders are “the repositories of society’s traditions and wisdom” (Akintoye 1971: 17).  
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Hence, in the lineages, and state councils, the opinion of older men and even women is 
highly regarded (Fadipe 1970, Akintoye 1971).
In theoretical terms, the Oba, Aláàfin, Ooni, Awujale as the case may be, is the de 
facto chief of state or premier leader who directed the governments in central Yoruba 
kingdom polities.  The legitimacy of the authority reposed in the office of the chiefs of 
state in pre-colonial Yorubaland derived from the intricate relationship that exists 
between religion, the social structure, and social organization of the Yoruba.  For 
instance, their unwritten constitution stipulates that the chief of state is the companion of 
the Gods that are worshipped by the people (Atanda 1973).  He is popularly called “Oba 
aláse èkeji òrìsà—the king, the commander and wielder of authority next to the … 
supernatural object of worship” (Fadipe 1970: 205).  Thus, in theory “he was supposed to 
have power of life and death over his people” (Akintoye 1971: 16).  However, the 
‘absolutism’ implied above does not translate to either reality or practice.  This is 
particularly because, among the Yoruba, there are clear limitations on the power, which is 
associated with each level and position in the authority patterns.  Such generally accepted 
made it impossible for the Oba, Aláàfin, Ooni, or Awujale to exercise what is described in 
the E-G scheme as “self-sustained power” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 67).   According to 
Akintoye, “the Oba exercised little direct authority of his own.  The chiefs, the councils, 
and further down the ladder, the lineages and associations were the chief instruments of 
authority” (Akintoye 1971: 17).  Two questions on the authority of the Oba, Aláàfin, 
Ooni, and Awujale need to be posed and resolved at this point.  First, over what matters is 
the authority of the Oba, Aláàfin, Ooni, and Awujale exercised?  Second, what are the 
bases of the legitimacy of their authority, i.e. what justifies it?  
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As occupants of sacrosanct positions that symbolize the unity of the component 
lineages in the entire polity, the authority of these chiefs of state is exercised over matters 
and issues that relate to the safety and over all well being of the people on the one hand 
(Fadipe 1970).71   On the other hand, they exercised their authority over foreign affairs 
particularly the conduct of wars and issues that concern peace with other polities, and the 
“administration of justice” (Fadipe 1970: 206).  In each respective case they exercised 
authority over these realms as heads of the state council or the Igbimo.
The Igbimo is composed of representatives from designated lineages as well as 
interest groups and professional associations in the towns that constitute each polity, be it 
the kingdom or its subsidiaries (Fadipe 1970, Law 1971).  The Igbimo discharged 
legislative, judicial and executive functions “with the king either immediately at the head 
or in the background” (Fadipe 1970: 209).  In the Old Oyo Empire the Igbimo was called 
the “Oyo ti o mo esi—shortened as Oyo-Mesi, i.e. The Oyo who knows the appropriate 
answer [to problems]” (Atanda 1970: 228).  Among the Ijesha Yoruba the Igbimo is 
called the Iwarefa, the Ijebu Yoruba call it the Ilamuren (Atanda 1973), and it is called 
the Ogboni in other parts of Yorubaland.  
It was through the discharge of their legislative functions that the chiefs of state 
and the Igbimo exercised their authority to issue directives in the kingdoms.  Those 
directives were mainly “ad hoc orders, such as imposing prohibition on commercial 
intercourse between members of the state and those of some other community, or the 
issue of regulations which came under customary laws, such as a reaffirmation, at a time 
71 According to a popular Yoruba saying, a town cannot exist without an Oba (Lloyd 
1960a).                         
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of unusual activity on the part of burglars, of what penalties awaited those caught, and the 
fixing of time within which anyone might venture to go out at night” (Fadipe 1970: 208).  
The participation of the citizens in this process was through members of their 
lineage who served in the Igbimo, and was therefore indirect.  Whenever these ad hoc
directives were issued, they were disseminated to the rest of the polity through the palace 
town crier.  But compliance to them was exacted in the lineages.  The positive and 
negative sanctions that anchored political authority in Yoruba society were exacted 
through the lineages (Schwab 1955).  
The authority of the chiefs of state and the Igbimo extended to the performance of 
judicial functions.  Their authority in this realm straddled the dimension of Directiveness
and the exaction of compliance to judgements that they handed down in capital cases.  In 
this capacity they constituted the Supreme Court in the central polity with the sole 
authority to try capital cases and other “indictable offences such as murder, treason, 
burglary, arson, unlawful wounding, manslaughter, incest…” (Fadipe 1970: 209), as well 
as disputes between occupants of authority positions and appeals that emanated from 
lower judicial bodies in the constituent polities.  The authority to grant pardons of all 
types belonged to the chiefs of state in its entirety.  They and members of the Igbimo
handled regular cases in regular sessions of the Igbimo during the course of the week 
while special sessions were convened when the occasion called for them (Fadipe 1970).  
The facts that executions and jail terms were exacted in the capital by designated 
institutions of the state (Boscom 1955, Fadipe 1970, Akintoye 1971) indicated the 
presence of some measure of regulated regimentation in the Yoruba authority patterns.
164
As we’ve shown so far, because of its centralized features, the Yoruba political 
system granted the chiefs of state the authority to be quite ‘directive’.   However, it is 
quite evident that their influence depended on the participation of members of the Igbimo, 
which is composed of lineage and other interest group representatives.  The Igbimo was
so powerful that it compelled an autocratic chief of state to commit suicide in pre-
colonial Yorubaland.  Although the Igbimo constituted the influential and extensively 
directive leadership together with the chiefs of state, its members are true representatives 
of the people.  Their relevance derived from their authority to participate on behalf of the 
lineages and groups that they represented and to ensure that the chiefs of state remained 
responsive to the governed. 
In spite of the lack of direct participation of the individual Yoruba who “counts 
for little except as a member of the lineage” (Boscom 1955: 451) there are still some 
obvious democratic elements in the Yoruba political system at this level in their practice 
of authority.  The generality of the public was free to attend sessions of the Igbimo 
eventhough they kept their views to themselves until they were asked to express them on 
particularly the more important issues (Fadipe 1970: 212).  Furthermore, members of the 
Igbimo whose continued membership of the body is dependent on the approval of their 
respective lineages interacted regularly with the other members of their lineage.  They 
kept them informed on the goings-on in the palace through their respective baálè or 
compound heads (Lloyd 1960b).  Through the same channel, the people often expressed 
their wishes, when necessary, “to their Oba” (Atanda 1973: 4). In situations when a chief 
of state became autocratic the people leveraged on their representatives in the Igbimo to 
reject him.  
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In those pre- colonial Yoruba polities where the Igbimo lacked the constitutional 
authority to directly reject an autocratic chief of state through suicide; its members could 
initiate a popular revolt against him by refusing to make themselves available at the Afin
(Palace) each morning to pay him their obligatory homage.  That gesture of disapproval 
signaled the citizens to rise against that autocrat if he refused to heed the early warning 
from members of the Igbimo to either abdicate or take flight or commit suicide.  The 
authority of the Igbimo to engender responsiveness from the chief of state and 
participation from citizens is so immense in some of the pre-colonial kingdoms in 
Yorubaland that it “virtually became the boss of the Oba, who, therefore, had little or no 
chance of becoming a despot” (Atanda 1973:4).  All the same “there was scope for 
individual acts of oppression and tyranny" (Fadipe 1970: 212) in the large political 
organization of the Yoruba with its characteristic centralized features.  In that regard 
some institutional provisions exist in some of the kingdom polities for youths to rally 
behind the war chief who was prohibited from playing an active role in civil affairs 
whenever they felt aggrieved over specific issues in order to bring their misgiving to the 
attention of the leadership (Fadipe 1970). 
The Ebi
The ebi is both the first and the lowest level at which authority is practiced in the 
Yoruba political system.  The ebi “is not only the most important primary group in 
Yoruba society,…. it is also the smallest political unit” (Fadipe 1970: 106).  When 
viewed through the prism of the E-G scheme it’s a crucial segmental unit and the cradle 
of most of the socialization received by the individual during the early crucial years of 
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life.   In those contexts, its equivalence amongst the Igbo is the ezi.  In the patrilineal 
Yoruba society, “[a] man derives his position in the wider political community in which 
he lives only through his membership in his compound which is generally known by the 
name of its founder.  His rights and privileges accrue to him only through the head of the 
compound.  His duties also to the wide society are duties which devolve upon the 
compound collectively” (Fadipe 1970: 106). 
The ebi’s primacy in the authority patterns derived from the logic that evolution 
of the lineage as a social unit preceded that of both the ward and the town (Fadipe 1970).  
In spite of the position of the ebi on the echelon of authority, it is the anchor of “the 
custom of deferring to seniors” (Fadipe 1970: 210) which serves as the basic element 
from which the Yoruba political structure derives its stability.  The olori ebi or baálè (in 
some places) who is also the most senior male in the compound heads the ebi.  He retains 
the loyalty of its members on the basis of his seniority.  According to Fadipe, it was 
solely through the baálè that the loyalty of the ordinary individual Yoruba is expressed 
“to the head of state and the central government” (Fadipe 1970: 211).  This is particularly 
crucial in a political system where [t]here was not much abstract loyalty to country” 
(Fadipe 1970:211).  If in addition to his age an individual who achieved the dual social 
statuses of gbajumo (‘gentleman’) and enia pataki (man of principle) was elected baálè, 
members often stood behind him “however bad the cause he espoused” (Fadipe 1970: 
211).  
The authority of the baálè included both judicial and legal autonomy in almost all 
issues that concerned the ebi and its members.  Fadipe describes the baálè as “the chief 
law-giver and magistrate of the” lineage (Fadipe 1970: 106) who is called upon to 
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intervene and resolve ill-feelings between adult members that defied attempts by those 
involved to settle them.  Except on issues that are in the exclusive list of the central 
polity, the authority of the baálè is the replica of the central government in both extent 
and practice.  Such issues included “murder, witchcraft, incest violation, and the 
communication to women of the secrets of the secret society” (Fadipe 1970: 108). 
He exacted punishments on acts of theft, acts of sexual misconduct and 
‘disrespect’ to elders by young people with flogging.  In the case of persistent acts of 
theft and delinquency in young boys, he ordered severe flogging.  There were even 
situations when some baálè “even had dungeons of their own in which they imprisoned 
recalcitrant members of the compound” (Fadipe 1970: 109).  
The baálè collected assigned taxes from lineage members for onward 
transmission to the central authorities.  That gave him the opportunity to extract some 
surplus for himself.  But that surplus was so paltry that it could not in any way be 
interpreted as extortion.  It should best be seen for what it was—part of the privileges and 
perks that came with his office.72  Generally, taxes were never imposed as burdens 
particularly on independent polities.  They were “usually small and was intended 
principally to cover the cost of the annual propitiatory sacrifice to all the òrìsà
worshipped in the community for the purpose of ensuring a peaceful and prosperous 
year….  When the sum to be paid by the compound was known, the baálè fixed the 
amount to be paid per head….  But usually, the amount demanded plus the extra 
72 The other privileges he reaped from the prestige as opposed to the authority of his 
office included commanding “the services of the able-bodied young men of the 
compound for boon work on his farm” and receiving specific parts of of sacrificial 
animals from members of his ebi (Fadipe 1970: 111).
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percentage added was small enough to be paid easily by members of the compound” 
(Fadipe 1970: 111). 
Without him the central authorities were unable to assign and assess levies for 
military duties and public works, much less issue summons to individual lineage 
members who were required to appear before the Igbimo.  In situations when part of a 
directive from the central authorities was deemed unpopular by the people the baálè’s 
authority extended to redirecting members of the ebi to disregard its enforcement.  More 
often than not it was members of the Igbimo who brought word home to members of their 
lineage on why they must disregard any such directive.  On the other hand, in the event of 
popular directives, violators were reprimanded or in serious cases apprehended and 
handed over to the central authorities on the instructions of the baálè by their fellow 
members of the lineage.
In the parlance of the E-G scheme, the baálè’s influence is extensive and in deed 
‘directive’.  If we borrow further from the E-G scheme we can say that his “attempt to 
regulate by directives extends many levels beyond the mere issuing of directives to 
include the attempt to influence” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 53) members of the ebi.  This 
is in the sense that it was his duty to not only “warn members of the compound to avoid 
being engaged in acts which would involve the family in a disgrace such as theft, 
burglary, or a charge of adultery emanating from outside” (Fadipe 1970: 108), it was also 
his duty to exact normatively-prescribed punishment on anyone from his lineage who was 
found guilty of violating such acts.  In this same regard still “every baálè sees to it that all 
adult male members of his compound have some visible means of subsistence—the 
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assumption being that a man who cannot point to such employment is more likely than 
not to be a thief and burglar” (Fadipe 1970: 108).  
Considering the scope of Directiveness evident in the ebi the temptation therefore 
would be for one to interpret the practice of authority by the baálè as indicative of 
regimentation in the Yoruba authority patterns.  But when his authority is viewed in the 
light of the E-G scheme, at the most the one would discern the seeming evidence of 
regulated or moderated regimentation of the directives exacted in the lineage by the 
baálè.  The E-G scheme tells us that “Directiveness is at a maximum when everything 
done in a social unit is dealt with, in every detail, by rigidly enforced directives” 
(Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 54).  This was hardly the case in the ebi.  The directives did not 
necessarily derive personally from the baálè.  Custom and tradition normatively 
determine them.  Eventhough members of the lineage ‘are treated collectively as a unit 
for purposes of centralizing authority’ in Yoruba society, it does not imply in any way 
that the ‘legal responsibility and rights of the individual is fully recognized’ (Fadipe 
1970: 106).  The reflection of this observation by Fadipe is evident in how the four 
aspects of the general Directiveness dimension tend to apply in the ebi.  Because of the 
full recognition of the legal rights and responsibility of individuals the coverage and the 
latitude of directives are evidently restricted and general as opposed to being 
comprehensive and specific.73  The presence in the ebi of centralized authority that owes 
73 According to Fadipe, “The immediate reason why the average Yoruba throws his 
weight into the enforcement of traditional codes will be found to vary according to which 
particular norm in question.  In some cases the motive is one of the elementary morality 
or humility.  In others it is a more or less conscious desire to maintain the solidarity of the 
group.  Yet, in others, the motive may be religious or superstitious—that is the fear of 
witchcraft and sorcery, the evil eye, the efficacy of the curse and so on.  In some cases it 
is the unconscious acceptance of whatever is customary to be right. All the motives are 
not mutually exclusive, nor do they exhaust all possibilities.  But behind the enforcement 
170
the duty of responsiveness to the members is equally evident in the binary fashion that 
the other two aspects (supervision and sanction threshold) are applied.  This is in the 
sense that the supervision and sanction threshold of directives in the ebi could be either 
close or loose, and either severe or lenient respectively as the occasion demanded.   Much 
of baálè’s authority derived from the prestige of the office, and he owes his duties “to 
preserve peace and order within his compound … first … to the members of the 
compound, and only secondarily to the large community as represented by the village or 
town authorities” (Fadipe 1970: 106).  Fadipe puts it this way: “On the whole the baálè
brings a high degree of public spirit to bear upon the discharge of his duties.  The public 
opinion of the compound would not in any case allow of slovenly administration….  The 
desire to avoid censure, direct and indirect, often leads him to take a firm line against an 
unruly member of his compound or one whose general conduct is likely to lead to trouble 
in his compound” (Fadipe 1970: 110).  When he punished “such anti-social behaviour as 
theft, incest and adultery” (Fadipe 1970: 108) he is basically exacting compliance to 
directives that derive from age-old custom and tradition aimed at preserving the solidarity 
of the community through that of the lineage.  No lineage would want to be saddled with 
the notoriety producing individuals whose behavior was responsible for upsetting the 
solidarity of the community.  At the same time “if any member of the compound gets into 
trouble [baálè is obligated] to give him every assistance possible in the matter of 
attendance before the proper civil authorities” (Fadipe 1970: 110) in the society.  
of some specific social norm, they operate individually or collectively” (Fadipe 1970: 
313).  Fadipe’s insights expressed above encapsulates the ‘spirit of the law’, if you may 
in traditional Yoruba society.  Suffice it to say that any piece of directive that does not 
invoke that spirit in the average Yoruba person often did not elicit compliance in him.  
That may have been where directives in the supra-national state were found wanting by 
the average Yoruba.
171
Tradition demands that “every member of the compound owes undivided allegiance to 
him in matters concerning the corporate interest of the members of the compound as a 
whole” (Fadipe 1970: 112).
A Cradle of Persistence
The ebi is the segmental unit that ensures the persistence of Yoruba authority 
patterns over the course of time.  It is adequately equipped to play that functional role in 
society for the Yoruba.  The puzzle therefore is how does that happen?  We established 
earlier on that the Yoruba migrated according to the lineage groups.  Because all the 
rights—including the rights of participation in every sphere of society—that accrues to 
every citizen are derived through lineage membership, it was unbecoming for anyone to 
simply pack up and take leave of his lineage.  Anyone who did ran the huge risk of 
exposing himself to the vagaries of life without a lineage.  Unless circumstances were 
unusual no normal individual would want to expose himself to such a life.
There were situations when an existing lineage outgrew the accommodation that 
is available to its members in their adugbo or ward of origin.  Whenever such situations 
became necessary it often required the establishment of branches of a lineage in another 
ward chosen by those who were being compelled by a tight accommodation situation to 
relocate.  Always, it was the Oba’s duty to help a branch lineage to secure the permission 
of the Olori Itun in its prospective adugbo to accept and welcome the newcomers.  Upon 
arrival in their new ward the political allegiance of members of the branch lineage to the 
Olori Itun in their former ward ended forthwith and transferred to the one in charge of the 
new one.  
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But the newcomers must elect a baálè for themselves who in spite of assuming 
“full jurisdiction in all routine matters is nevertheless subordinate to the baálè of the 
parent compound who alone is the head of the extended” lineage (Fadipe 1970: 112).  
The pattern of influence attempts open to the baálè in the branch lineage is not as 
extensive as that of the baálè in the parent lineage, which underscores his subordinate 
status.  The following are points that add credence to that assertion.  A summons from the 
town tribunal to a member of a branch lineage is considered to be an ‘extra-routine’ affair 
beyond his authority.  Although protocol demanded that such summon must be directed 
to him he must transfer it to their parent baálè whose station it was to mobilize the 
corporate support of the lineage for the individual who was involved.  The branch lineage 
is not a recognized unit in the polity for tax assessment, and he may not fix the amount 
due from lineage members for the tax.
With the advent of Christianity and western education individuals could and have 
assumed certain new privileges that include relocating their accommodation whenever 
and wherever they desired in their towns.  The pre-colonial tradition that stipulated the 
designation of all unoccupied land as free and made it even unnecessary for the freeborn 
who was in need of land to look beyond the territory inhabited by his lineage had been 
superceded by commercial land sale.  The act of physical separation from the rest of the 
lineage that afforded anyone the opportunity to assume certain measures of authority over 
members of their household in most of their affairs became tenable for individuals as a 
result.  Should he choose, an individual who embraced that opportunity was even free to 
“turn his physical isolation into a social and psychological one” (Fadipe 1970: 114).  
However, “in practice no one, Muslim or Christian, lives entirely outside the intercourse 
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of members of his [lineage], no matter however different their religious affiliations; and, 
(sic) where arbitration for settling disputes which threaten the solidarity of the group is 
invoked, the educated Christian who insists upon autonomy within his own immediate 
family does so at the risk of finding himself isolated” (Fadipe 1970: 114).
Predominantly, the Yoruba were farmers who spent “several days at a time during 
the height of the farming activity [in their more distant farm huts], but … maintained a 
residence in the city and regard it as their real home” (Boscom 1955: 448).  From his 
research findings Boscom believes that urbanism is “a traditional Yoruba pattern and not 
the outgrowth of European acculturation” (Boscom 1955: 448).74  With their extensive 
history of urban dwelling therefore, the urban centers that came with colonialism and the 
‘Nigerian’ supra-national state did not have many new demands to make on the economic 
and political organization of the Yoruba.  In fact Lloyd (1953) and Coleman (1955) both 
suggested that Westernization may have even produced a closer attachment of the Yoruba 
to their indigenous authority patterns.75  In the realm of the economy for instance, 
Durkheim’s (1984) association of concentration of people with their peculiar tendency to 
differentiate and specialize in their realm, of economic endeavor held true in the case of 
the Yoruba and urban dwelling.  Division of labor and occupational specialization that 
74 Elsewhere, say in the US, “the bonds of kinship, of neighborliness, and the sentiments 
arising out of living together for generations under a common folk tradition are likely to 
be absent or, at best, relatively weak in an aggregate the members of which have such 
diverse origins and backgrounds.  Under such circumstances competition and formal 
control mechanisms furnish the substitutes for the bonds of solidarity that are relied upon 
to hold a folk society together” (Wirth 1938: 11), “but in the Yoruba cities the bonds of 
kinship and living together which units the lineage were strong, and the elements of 
competition and formal control mechanisms were not developed as substitutes for kinship 
control mechanisms but, rather, as mechanisms of control on a supra-kinship, secondary 
level, transcending the primary groups, such as lineages, which were very much alive and 
functional” (Boscom 1955: 452).
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released women and men from everyday drudgery of urban dwelling and supported a 
large market economy were pronouncedly well developed amongst the Yoruba (Fadipe 
1970) long before European colonialism.  Reports by various European travelers who 
visited their part of the Niger basin as early as the early sixteenth century (Boscom 1955) 
including Hugh Clapperton and Richard Lander—see Clapperton (1829), Lander (1830) 
and Lander (1832) whose trip took place much later in 1825 exist as proofs.  
In the political sphere Louis Wirth’s (1938) thesis on urbanism which associates 
urbanism with representative government holds true too for the Yoruba.  Political 
participation through their representatives may have been evolved to respond to their 
urban dwelling life style more than it was a creation of their centralized political system.  
The above could constitute good reasons to argue that in spite of colonialism the 
probability that the democratic norms of pre-colonial Yoruba society have persisted is 
amply high. 
The Adugbo
The adugbo or ward is the mid-level at which authority is practiced in the Yoruba 
political system.    The Olori Itun or Ijoye occupies the authority position in the adugbo
in some places (Atanda 1973).  The number of adugbo in a kingdom is determined by the 
size of the kingdom as well as how it was founded (Atanda 1973).  Civil cases in a 
kingdom are handled at this level, provided they involve only residents of the same 
adugbo.  When cases between members of the same ebi were not settled successfully by 
the baálè they were often referred to the adugbo.  Investigations in criminal cases were 
75 This is a tendency, which has been observed elsewhere in Africa as well by Vincent 
Harlow (1955) and Coleman (1955: 48) amongst the Ganda (in Uganda) of East Africa.
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carried out in the adugbo before they were transferred to the Afin for the chief of state 
and members of the Igbimo to adjudicate. 
When we assess the Yoruba authority patterns on the E-G scheme scale of 
measure, the outcome, which is slightly different from that of the Igbo, is reflected in the 
configuration in Figure 3.7 below.  The presence of some measure of autocratic traits and 
regimentation in the general Directiveness dimension distinguishes the authority patterns 
of the Yoruba from those of the Igbo eventhough both sets of patterns are generally 
democratic.  Those autocratic traits that are evident in the authority patterns of the 
Yoruba depict their sharp clarity, which derives from the centralized features of the 
Yoruba political system.  The dimension of Participation is accommodated in terms of 
‘High’ while Responsiveness is accommodated in terms ‘Very Low’.  The Compliance
disposition is ‘Low’ on submissiveness, ‘High’ on allegiance and ‘Low’ on 
submissiveness, indifference, opposition, and insubordination respectively. 

































Figure 3.7: The ranking matrix of the Yoruba authority patterns on the E-G scheme 
measure-scale
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Colonial conquest and the dawn of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state introduced 
some shifts into the authority patterns of the Yoruba that enhanced the tendency towards 
regimentation in the Directiveness dimension.  That was how some of the hereditary 
rulers became prominent and even ‘more powerful than they had ever been at any other 
time in Yoruba history’ (Atanda 1973: 12).
Islam Was Reconditioned by Yoruba Norms
As is the case with all other components of different cultures76 that exist 
everywhere else in the world, the Yoruba evolved their authority patterns to serve their 
peculiar political needs.  Their authority patterns are best seen as “the expression[s] of 
[their] efforts to evolve a way of life suitable to [their] environment” (Dike 1953: 177).  
The validity of this assertion can be found in the peculiar role played by Yoruba norms to 
re-shape the development of Islam when it was introduced in Yorubaland.  That far-
reaching role was so successful that it became impossible for adherents of the faith to 
even attempt to utilize their faith to institute an alternative political system in 
Yorubaland.
Islam was introduced in Yorubaland sometime before 1840 (Gbadamosi 1978) 
through trade and commercial contacts.  Although the exact date when the faith was 
introduced in Yorubaland is unknown, at the time the Fulani jihad had sufficiently 
established Fulani hegemony in the parts of the upper Niger to a degree that could have 
influenced the course of politics in Yorubaland at the same time.  Why the introduction of 
Islam, which impacted the course of politics in Hausaland for instance, left Yorubaland 
76 “A people’s culture is the expression of [their] efforts to evolve a way of life suitable to 
[their] environment” (Meek in Dike 1953: 177).
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intact may be attributed to the Yoruba socio-cultural environment.77 That environment 
was and remained toxic to the absolutism that rulers in Hausaland associated with the 
Islamic faith in their practice of authority.
Yoruba Muslims never looked up to the Fulani who introduced the faith to them 
for political guidance of any sort.  They acquainted themselves with the faith in the image 
of their Yoruba heritage (Lawson 1985).  Evidence of that accomplishment abounds and 
includes the following.  Rather than adopt age-old Islamic designations like Imam or 
request one from Sokoto the early Yoruba Muslims preferred to designate their leader as 
the Parakoyi (Gbadamosi 1972).  In some parts of the Old Oyo Empire like Ogbomosho, 
Oyo, Oshogbo through which Islam first came into Yorubaland, the occupant of the 
office of Parakoyi “is primarily concerned with trade organization of principal markets 
on market days, maintenance of order by traders, etc” (Gbadamosi 1972: 230).  In those 
earlier periods the Parakoyi functioned both as a prayer leader and as an advocate before 
the political authorities for those pioneer converts to Islam in Yorubaland (Gbadamosi 
1972).  Those early converts even took a cue from their indigenous norms of leadership 
recruitment and designated the Parakoyi as a hereditary office.  In later years when they 
finally created the religious office of Imam as the leading position in their community 
they preferred to retain the position of the Parakoyi.  It has continued to linger as a title in 
the Yoruba Muslim community even while it does not bestow a lot of responsibilities on 
its occupant (Gbadamosi 1972). Much later in some Yoruba towns the Muslim 
community even adopted other traditional titles such as Balogun, Otun, Osi, Eketa, 
Ekesin for their leaders (Gbadamosi 1972: 234).  
77 We shall see in due course in this chapter that the basis of absolutism existed in 
Hausaland prior to the dawn of Fulani rule.
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The influence of traditional Yoruba norms is so strong on the Yoruba Muslim 
community that in some parts of Yorubaland the office of Imam can only be filled by 
direct descendants or kinsmen of either the first Imam or the person “who ‘introduced’ 
the religion” (Gbadamosi 1972: 232).  Furthermore, age even became one of the 
qualifying criteria that a person must meet in order to be appointed an Imam in the 
Yoruba Muslim community.  It became a tradition to present new Imams to the 
traditional “political head of the town, (irrespective of his religious profession” 
(Gbadamosi 1972: 234) before he can settle on his religious duties.  The implication of 
this is obvious.  At no time did the Fulani jihad and its extensive impact on politics in 
parts of the upper Niger closest to northern Yorubaland translate to direct Fulani 
interference in the practice of the Islamic faith in the heart of Yorubaland. The only 
exception was in Ilorin in northern Yorubaland, which was captured and occupied by 
Fulani jihadists in 1874.  The reason for that exception partly derived from the exodus of 
the majority of the Yoruba from the town after the Fulani jihadists captured it.  But until 
this day, Fulani rule in northern Yorubaland remains acrimonious.
Whenever the Muslim community in some Yoruba towns felt impressed by the 
Koranic knowledge of an itinerant cleric from Sokoto, they prevailed on him “to stay and 
lead the community as Imam” (Gbadamosi 1972: 232).  Such individuals stayed and 
functioned strictly in their religious capacity within the community.  Yoruba Muslims 
were Yoruba first and Muslims after that.  Conversely, no such dichotomy existed 
between indigenous Yoruba religion and politics.  As we saw earlier on, indigenous 
religion is the embodiment of the socio-cultural life of the people and their existence.  It 
is enmeshed in their custom and tradition.  The indigenous Yoruba religion is actually the 
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crucible that retained all four dimensions of influence relations in Yoruba society.  The 
salience of its creed to every Yoruba person puts it apart from Islam, which had to be 
interpreted to its adherents by specially trained personnel.
The Hausa-Fulani
The Hausa or Habe and the Fulani or Fulbe78 were two distinct nationalities that 
assimilated one another to become a distinct block of people who are called the Hausa-
Fulani (Smith 1960).  That assimilation was the outcome of the Fulani conquest of the 
Hausa in their jihad, which was declared in 1804.  Today, they speak the same Hausa 
language, practice the same Islamic faith (Smith 1960), and claim the largest share of the 
population of all the nationalities that inhabit the upper Niger basin region.  There remain 
pockets of pure Hausa who still profess and worship their traditional religion in this part 
of the Niger basin (Greeenberg 1947).  
There is a considerable population of unassimilated Fulani who still speak the 
Fula language, in most of the northern parts of West Africa (Coleman 1958).  But it is 
only in the north of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state that the Hausa and the Fulani exist 
as homogenous mix of Hausa-Fulani.  Thus, it is correct when we say that Hausa-Fulani 
is one of the several nationalities that inhabit the savanna grassland ecological zone of the 
Niger basin.  Like the other nationalities in the region, their environment impacted the 
evolution of their social, economic, and political organization in some unique ways.
78 They are also called Filani, Fellata, or Fula.
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Authority Patterns in Pre-Jihad Hausaland
The history of centralized political organization in Hausaland is extensive and 
predates Fulani conquest.  Like almost all the other inhabitants of the Niger basin, the 
Hausa were able to evolve their own distinctive political system, which encompassed 
some commensurate measures of democratic trappings.  
During this period each Hausa village comprised of clans.  Each clan was 
composed of several compounds, which were all basic economic and political units.  A 
compound head administered each one of them.   Compounds communally owned their 
land, the main factor of economic production.  Understandably, the peculiar features of 
the Hausa political system were starkly different from what obtained amongst the Igbo 
and Yoruba.  In Hausa society the compound head was basically a paternalistic 
administrator in his position.  He was in charge of administering the labor of his 
compound members for the cultivation of their land.  The harvests were kept in his care 
and he ensured that the proceeds from the sale were utilized for paying “the bride price 
for wives for the compound head and other members of the patrilineal group” (Greenberg 
1947: 195).  
Beyond the head of the compound was the village head who was usually the most 
qualified male from the most senior patrilineage that first settled the village (Yeld 1960).  
The political organization of each clan was such that “every office is traditionally 
assigned to a particular clan.  Where a clan is dominant in a district, a majority of the 
offices—including the most important ones—were assigned to it” (Greenberg 1947: 196).  
The clan heads constituted the village elders who directed the affairs of their respective 
villages with the participation of the rest of the villagers.  The oldest son of the eldest 
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brother of a village elder usually succeeded him.  Since participation was open to all 
villagers the political system of each village was predicated on the principle of direct 
democracy.  The configuration of that is shown in Figure 3.8 below.
But that was during an era when society in Hausaland had not been transformed 
into large-scale political organization under centralized rule.  It was an era when the 
authority patterns had not been restructured in ways that marginalized subordinate 
members of society for the benefit of few leaders who arrogated the task of directing 
society unto themselves.
Compounds presided by Heads who 
exercise authority in administrative 
capacity
Clans presided by Clan Heads                                     Direct
                                                                                                               Democracy
Village presided by Elders and 
Village Heads
Figure 3.8: Configuration of authority in Hausaland before the Habe rulers
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Unlike the Igbo and the Yoruba who were protected by the natural barriers in their 
respective homeland, the geography of Hausaland exposed them to the misfortune of 
loosing political independence to ambitious political actors first from within and then 
from outside.  Long before the Fulani jihad, the Hausa witnessed the gradual evolution of 
centralized autocracy championed by fellow Hausa people obliterated that distinctively 
indigenous and democratic Hausa political system.  
The political developments that robbed the Hausa of their indigenous democratic 
political system were initiated sometime in thirteenth century when some Hausa groups 
began to evolve leaderships that acquired state building inclinations (Smith 1964).  With 
time the ambitious leaders of those groups were able to found and transform a total of 
seven city states in Hausaland.79  They even transformed themselves into all-powerful 
despotic rulers of their own people who they made subjects.  They assumed the title of 
Sarki or king.  Later still, those same ambitious leaders founded additional seven states 
and made them the vassals of their seven independent states (Lugard 1907/1997: 238).80
Hausa society under the Sarki rulers was highly stratified into rulers and their 
commoner subjects who were called the talakawa (Smith 1971).  Those Habe rulers 
routinely expropriated sufficient surplus values from their subjects with which they kept 
and maintained extensive courts in their respective capitals.  With the surplus resources 
that they realized from their subjects they were able to raise and maintain well-equipped 
standing armies with which they protected themselves, and their autocratic political 
system in Hausa society (Yeld 1960).  They utilized those armies to attend to the business 
of state building—extended the frontiers of their domains, and extracted more resources 
79 Those city states are Biram, Gobir, Kano, Rano, Zazzau or Zaria, and Katsina.
80 Those seven vassals were Daura, Zamfara, Kebbi, Nupe, Gwari, Yaure, and Kwararafa.
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with which they sustained themselves and their states, etc.  It is evident in Figure 3.9
below that there were “close linkages between the success of a chiefdom in war, its 
prosperity and degree of centralization, royal absolutism and tendency to oppression” 
(Smith 1964: 170) in pre-jihad Hausaland.  
Prosperity of Chiefdoms




Figure 3.9: The interaction of transformational factors during state building in pre-jihad
Hausaland
The transformation of society and politics in Hausaland by the Habe rulers 
encompassed four component elements of state building through war as suggested by 
Charles Tilly (1985, 1990) with regard to early modern Europe—see Figure 3.5 in the 
section on the Yoruba.  The ruling groups in pre-jihad Hausaland made wars, and used 
wars to neutralize their rivals and paved the way to extract much-needed resources with 
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which they augmented their capacity to execute the first three activities, i.e. war, making, 
state making and protection (Tilly 1985: 181).
Each kingdom was composed of districts, which were in turn made up of villages.  
A district was placed under the charge of a headman who possessed “considerable power 
in the regulation of the [subjects] in his district and was responsible for the collection of 
taxes” (Greenberg 1947: 196) which were forwarded to the Sarki in the capital.  There is 
need to present a brief but vivid picture of how Hausa society was carved into kingdoms 
by state builders who subsequently transformed themselves into autocratic rulers.   
Before this transformation, societies in Hausaland were simple and village-based 
with very limited degrees of social stratification, trade and economic development.  Also, 
there was the absence of any “market institution and little slavery, although some 
occupational specialization had emerged” (Smith 1964: 167). There was a rampant 
tendency for the ruling groups that were evolving to reduce their neighboring villages to 
tribute-paying fiefdoms.  At first they mobilized their supporters and dependents into 
standing military forces with which they waged constant wars against the villages that 
surrounded them.  They were quite effective in their utilization of horses, which thrived 
well in that tsetse fly-free savanna grassland zone (Smith 1964).81  The deployment of the 
horse in warfare went a long way to transform the leaders of these groups into efficient 
war makers who then extended the frontiers of their various domains that with relative 
ease.  Their conquest of additional territory translated to more extractable resources and 
enhanced their power in Hausaland. 
81 For interesting details on the difference that the deployment of the horse made in 
warfare in West Africa, see Law, Robin. 1976. “Horses, Firearms, and Political Power in 
Pre-Colonial West Africa.”
185
Islam and the Evolution of Autocratic Authority Patterns in Hausaland
Islam, which was introduced in Hausaland sometime in the fourteenth century, 
became a factor that added a new impetus to state building and transformation amongst 
the Hausa.  Islam’s supportive role in the evolution of autocratic political system can 
partly be attributed to its external origin.  Its lack of a base in the indigenous culture of 
the Hausa became the enabler that favored the ambitious state builders who benefited 
from the interpretation of its tenets by the Islamic scholars who they permitted to 
propagate the faith in their domains.  The rulers’ control of those Islamic scholars 
translated logically to their control over what they preached to the ignorant subject 
peoples who had already been reduced to rent-paying tenants by the rulers.  
The increased resources that the state builders realized from their growing 
domains became a source of status and clout that they cashed in on to seek and realize 
political alliance with well-established absolutist kings in the nearby Bornu Empire to 
whom they began to pay tribute (Smith 1964).  That alliance with Bornu produced 
another set of boost factors, which improved their capacity to make war and transform 
the scope and character of their rule further.  Upon request the rulers of Bornu began to 
furnish them with support and guidance as well as the latest weapons of war (Smith 
1964).  
At this time when there were several other predatory power seekers in Hausaland, 
only those territories that were controlled by these ruling groups and their leaders existed 
as oases of order.  They attracted people from their surroundings who sought security.  
With time these domains emerged as centers of trade and commerce, which attracted 
more people to them.  The growth in trade and population yielded additional wealth from 
taxation for the ruling groups and subsequently enhanced their state building efforts and 
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capacities.  According to Smith, all of the various factors and developments that 
enhanced and aided these ruling groups to achieve tremendous success in state building 
in Hausaland happened to have taken place at about the same period of time.  The leaders 
who were guiding their state building endeavor took advantage of that coincidence and 
transformed themselves into kings.  Not only that, their startling successes in conquest 
and domination of their neighbors even encouraged them to absolve themselves of all 
existing norms, that used to exact responsiveness on leaders in Hausaland in the conduct 
of public affairs (Smith 1964). 
The interpretation that Islam prescribed for the enslavement of non-believers 
created yet another avenue through which these state builders who had by now emerged 
as autocratic rulers raised more revenue from the enslavement and even sale of those that 
they captured in their wars.   They embarked on the practice of deploying some of their 
captives to plantation agriculture, which yielded additional revenue with which they 
equipped their forces and campaigned more efficiently.  
From the time when the Habe state builders embraced Islam and proceeded to 
adapt it to their state building activities, the role of Islam in the social, economic, and 
political history of Hausaland was no longer as simple as it may seem to some observers 
today.  Islam, which was introduced into Hausaland by Arab traders, promptly became 
the harbinger of commerce and trade that furnished the rulers with the skilled personnel 
whose expertise they tapped to develop and expand their state bureaucracies.  Without 
Islam and the skilled administrative manpower that was associated with its initial 
propagation in Hausaland, there is no doubt that those rulers could either have found it 
difficult or impossible to operate their predatory centralized rule.  It furnished them with 
187
an invaluable political and ideological infrastructure with which they were able to support 
the regimentation of Directiveness over their conquered subjects.  Without the 
subservience preached by the Islamic scholars whom they favored and allowed to operate 
in their domains there is no doubt that they could have found it extremely difficult to 
achieve considerable ‘submissiveness’ from the mass of subject people too.  It is true and 
evident therefore that Islam played a tremendous role in both the political and economic 
transformation of Hausaland.
However, Smith (1964) argues that it is also true that Islam aided in the process of 
rendering aspects of the non-governmental patterns in Hausa society incongruent with the 
governmental patterns of the centralized rule which the ruling groups and their rulers 
evolved in Hausaland.  This was because some of the same incentives that made the faith 
attractive to the rulers became the paradoxical rationale for its rejection by some subject 
peoples in some parts of Hausaland.  The rejection of the religion that furnished 
centralized autocratic rule with its invaluable ideological support had a way of opening 
the authority of the Habe rulers up for illegitimate perceptions in some parts of Hausaland 
(Kano is one).  We know from the E-G scheme that in situations when members of 
society perceive the authority of their leaders as illegitimate, the later can only rely on 
force to exact the compliance of the former to their directives.82   There is evidence that 
such a scenario unfolded in some parts of Hausaland (Katsina for instance) at the time 
when the masses of subject peoples drew inspiration and empowerment from Islam to 
Past and Present 1972: 112-132. Fisher, Humphrey J. 1972. “‘He Swalloweth the 
Ground with Fierceness and Rage’: The Horse in the Central Sudan I. Its Introduction.”  
The Journal of African History 13(3): 367-388, and Fisher, Humphrey J. 1973. “‘He 
Swalloweth the Ground with Fierceness and Rage’: The Horse in the Central Sudan II. Its 
Use.” The Journal of African History 14(3): 355-379.
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question the authority of their autocratic Habe Sarkis (Smith 1964).  In a society where 
the channels of Participation were closed (impeded) to most members, such inspiration 
engendered what is described in the E-G scheme as creative acts of participation from the 
subject population.  In presence of the well-equipped standing armies that were kept by 
their rulers, the subject peoples of Hausaland paid considerable costs for their creative 
acts of participation which were crushed by the rulers in the bid preserve their despotic 
and autocratic regimes. According to Smith (1964) Islam played a complex role in the 
politics of Hausaland.  That role which persists till today became the source of uneasiness 
in influence relations between rulers and their subjects.
Faced with a subject population that was untiring in their attempts to resort to 
creative acts of participation the Habe rulers themselves were relentless in their drive to 
extract and expend more resources to further centralize their rule and deepen the 
stratification of society in their domains.  Each of these steps further impeded whatever 
channels of Participation that still remained open for the masses the more and absolved 
the rulers of all responsiveness to such a degree that rendered their domains almost what 
the E-G scheme called a collective extension of them.  For instance, the Sarki of Kano 
regimented his directives highly and extended his over all capacity to exact compliance to 
them in his entire domain by placing eunuchs in charge of his state treasury, various state 
offices, his harem, etc. (Smith 1964).  The complete absence of Responsiveness in the 
prevalent influence relations emboldened the rulers to institute what became known as 
kame, i.e. the practice of willfully appropriating the property and the labor of subordinate 
members of their society.  Kame then became a norm for the practice of authority in 
82 In other words, ‘government legitimacy entails political stability’ in polities (Useem 
and Useem 1979).
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Hausaland (Smith 1964).  Rulers proceeded to secure themselves in their walled capitals 
where they caused all “the major external trade routes to be concentrated” (Smith 1964: 
168).  
Their successors sustained and increased all those measures that produced 
additional centralization of politics and authority relations as well as stratified their 
societies to the point where “an elaborate social etiquette developed” (Smith 1964: 169).  
Subsequently, “kame [was even] extended to include the seizure of women as well as 
property, corvee increased, and ceremonial self-abasement was imposed on all subjects” 
(Smith 1964: 169).  Subject peoples who could not adjust to the comprehensive coverage, 
specific latitude, close supervision and severe sanction threshold of Directiveness under 
Sarki rule left the walled domains.  Those who remained became disposed to the point of 
indifference in the Compliance dimension and adjusted their daily socio-economic 
activities to the realities of such a life, which is akin to learning to ‘staying in their place’ 
(Smith 1964: 169).
When most of their subjects had been disposed to subservience, rulers directed 
more of their attention and efforts against external threats from their rivals in nearby 
polities, their own relatives and non-slave officials in their domains (Smith 1964).  
But overall there was extensive harmony of interests between elements of the 
ruling groups within each state in their influence relations with their commoners (sub-
actors) who they ruled and exploited.  What emerged all over pre-jihad Hausaland were 
polities in which society was stratified and even segregated into two categories of 
members.  The first category comprised of rulers who monopolized the Directiveness
dimension and utilized their monopoly of the organs of coercion and control to shut down 
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all channels of Participation in society, shielded themselves from the Responsiveness
dimension, and enforced the one of Compliance on the rest of society.  The other 
category was composed of the subordinate subjects of these rulers who existed as serfs 
and peasants, who had been largely convinced through the supporting ideological and 
political superstructure of Islam to give up all acts of Participation and absolve those in 
authority of all Responsiveness (Smith 1964). The Habe rulers successfully reduced 
society in Hausaland to socio-political arrangements that can best be represented with a 
rudimentary algebraic formula: c + 2a = C, where c is centralization, 2a is autocracy and 
authoritarianism, and C is absolute control.  These were the processes through which 
Hausa society acquired what is often referred to as “its traditional shape” (Smith 1964: 
168).  
Hausaland was still tottering on this system of rule at the time when the Fulani 
jihad was provoked in 1804.  We still need to establish how the Fulani displaced the 
Habe rulers.  As we observed above, Islam played an extensive role in the processes that 
led to their displacement.  After the faith was introduced by Arab traders they were 
followed the next century by various Fulani Islamic clerics who plied their faith 
peacefully in some of the Hausa states, winning converts along the way (Yeld 1960, 
Bovill 1933, Anene 1970).  The capitals of some of the Hausa states were playing host to 
Fulani preachers and Islamic scholars a couple of centuries later, to the point where many 
Fulani clerics successfully convinced some of the Habe rulers to convert to Islam (Yeld 
1960: 113
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Those Fulani clerics who found favor in the courts of some of the Hausa rulers 
soon attracted members of other Fulani clans83 who found security for themselves and 
their herds of cattle within the secure walls of the capitals of those rulers.84  They became 
sources of military manpower and tax revenue for those rulers (Yeld 1960).
What actually developed between those Hausa rulers and the increasing 
population of Fulani Islamic clerics who they welcomed in their courts was a symbiotic 
relationship.  However, it so happened that while some of the Hausa rulers employed the 
services of Fulani Islamic clerics and scholars, they either remained adherents of their 
traditional ancestral ways of worship or became just nominal Muslims by syncretizing 
Islamic practices with their traditional ancestral system of worship (Yeld 1960: 113).  
That symbiotic relationship between the Habe kings and the Fulani Islamic clerics later 
led to a power situation in 1804.
When that power situation came to a head it produced the jihad which one of the 
Fulani clerics called Usman Dan Fodio declared and led against the Habe kings85 in 1804 
(Paden 1970) with the support of his fellow ‘Town Fulani’ and Hausa converts to the 
Faith (Yeld 1960).  That jihad gathered considerable momentum and ushered in Fulani 
rule in Hausaland. 
83 There’s an extensive history of peaceful Fulani co-existence in this part of the Niger 
basin, which predates the nineteenth century (Anene 1970).
84 Some of these were from the Fulani clans who are called ‘Cow Fulani’.  The ‘Cow 
Fulani’ were essentially pastoralists who did not concern themselves with religious and 
political alliances.
85 All, except three of the independent states in Hausaland—Abuja, Daura, and Kebbi—at 
the time were conquered by the Fulani in their jihad.  With British conquest of the upper 
region of the Niger basin in 1904 and the subsequent imposition of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-
national state all three became separate Emirates politically equal to the Fulani Emirates 
(Yeld 1960). 
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Authority Patterns in Post-Jihad Hausaland
The year 1810 marked the near complete conquest of Hausaland by the Fulani 
jihadists.  Ever since, much of Hausaland has remained under Fulani rule (Smith 1964).  
But for a cause championed by one who was inspired by the desire for political reform, 
the Fulani jihad was an event that produced a paradoxical outcome.  Rather than 
restructure the absolutism of the Habe kings and enthrone a new political system which 
would restore popular participation the Fulani preferred instead to effect a change of 
guard and left everything else intact (Smith 1964, Paden 1970).  
The jihad was used by the Fulani to basically assume political power in 
Hausaland and deepen the existing autocracy further.  Only salutary changes were 
effected in the system.  For instance, while Dan Fodio re-designated the Hausa states as 
Emirates and abolished the title of Sarki he declared his clan the royal clan or Sullubawa
(Paden 1970)86 and appointed its members Emirs to rule over them in his name as the 
Sultan.  Members of the Sullubawa became the hereditary beneficiaries of all positions of 
authority in all but one Hausa state (Smith 1960).  That exception was the state of Zazzau 
where there were no hereditary offices before the jihad.  The Sullabawa created a total 
monopoly over  “territorial appointments and central decision-making increased” (Paden 
1970: 163) all over Hausaland even to the neglect of other Fulani clans whose members 
took part in the jihad.  Their monopoly was so complete that they even found ways to 
tele- guide the appointment of personnel into authority positions in places where 
circumstances would not permit them to do so directly (Smith 1964).87  The other thing 
86 Dan Fodio is from the dark-skinned Torobe clan.
87 When the Sultan’s appointee as Emir lost out to a Hausa war lord in a power struggle 
in 1893, the Sultan seeing that he could not afford to loose a strategically important 
province like Kano quickly sent his Vizier to install the victor (Smith 1964).
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was that they utilized Islam more than the Habe kings to provide ideological support for 
their authority.
Early on Islam provided two out of three of the bases of legitimacy perceptions as 
stipulated in the E-G scheme for Fulani authority in Hausaland in an insidious fashion.  
Because Dan Fodio used Islam in his initial writings to sharply condemn the oppressive 
rule of the Habe kings he gained the admiration of the talakawa who bore the brunt of 
that rule, and attracted them to lend their support to the jihad and Fulani rule.  His 
condemnation was the most valid rationale that attracted most if not all the talakawa who 
embraced the faith (Smith 1960).  In order to retain their support he prescribed a mantra 
that enjoined the conquered Hausa to accept that it was a precondition for salvation in the 
faith to extend their unquestionable loyalty to the Sultan, the Emirs and their lieutenants 
through whom Allah’s will on earth is enforced.  By so doing he was able to use Islam to 
secure personal legitimacy in Hausa society for all personnel who were elevated to 
positions of authority in their Caliphate state and imbue substantive legitimacy for his 
own authority as Sultan especially among the deposed Hausa rulers.  
Thus, but for Islam, it could have been difficult if not impossible after the jihad
for the Fulani who are distinctly different from the Hausa in almost every way to retain 
the loyalty of a people who witnessed the demise of oppressive rulers who shut them out 
of participation in the governance of their own society.  
Apart from relying on their manipulation of the Islamic faith there were other 
ways through which Dan Fodio and members were able to secure and retain much needed 
legitimacy for their authority.  They opted for the path of pragmatic politics and co-opted 
some of the Habe rulers they ousted from power into authority positions in the Caliphate 
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society.  We mentioned earlier that the jihad did not liberate Hausaland from the 
autocracy of Habe rule.  Hence, because the existing impediments placed on the channels 
of popular participation by the Habe kings were all left in place, the Fulani were soon 
faced with the problem of securing ‘procedural legitimacy’ for their authority.   To 
counter that problem force became necessary and was used often by the Fulani to address 
all creative acts of participation that continued to come from individuals who refused to 
submit to the perpetuation of the regimentation of Directiveness in their society. 
One might be compelled at this point to pose and address a couple of queries.  
Why was the situation in Hausaland different from the one in Yorubaland?  Why were 
oppressed subjects of the Hausa rulers unable to liberate themselves from the autocracy 
of the Habe rulers long before the jihad?  
It is indeed true that warfare and conquest were employed in both areas for state 
building, but it is interesting that there are subtle differences in the outcomes of their 
employment by the Yoruba and the Hausa.  In Yorubaland it was extremely difficult for 
the self-interested individuals who tried to emerge as autocrats to establish implicit 
control over their people.  Political unitarism never became a permanent feature of 
governance in Yorubaland.  We mentioned somewhere earlier that on each of the times 
when they tried geographical factors were there to provide protection to the people who 
fled out of their reach.  The people had nowhere to run in the open savanna grassland of 
Hausaland.  The result was that they were gradually over-ran by members of their own 
society who turned themselves into state builders and autocrats.  Thus, in Yorubaland, 
although states were built and transformed because of war making, the transformation did 
not affect the indigenous authority patterns.  The instability that resulted from the 
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political violence that accompanied Yoruba wars was not profound and fundamental.  
Unlike in Hausaland conquered polities were not mercilessly taxed, and even retained 
much of their political autonomy (Fadipe 1970).  
In Hausaland, the rulers were able to consolidate their rule by instituting novel 
machinery of state that they continuously transformed and made more efficient.  Their 
capacity to make war against weaker villages and districts and one another was enhanced 
as they proceeded.  Whenever they reaped military success in wars against their rivals, it 
enhanced their capacity to repress and exploit their subjects even further.  If and when 
such re-intensified efforts at war making back-fired in defeats, “the resulting defeats … 
[were] followed by sharp increase in the demands made on subjects, falling prosperity, 
and a spiral of oppression” (Smith 1964: 170).  
The other part of the answer to the puzzles can be found in the involvement of the 
Fulani as a distinct block of people who went all out for specific political goals.  Their 
involvement produced heterogeneity in the mix of nationalities in Hausaland, and 
introduced the factor of clash in kinship patterns for instance.   The Yoruba did not have 
to deal with any of the aforementioned realities in their situation.  There were of course 
foreign elements—slaves, freeborn individuals, et al—in Yorubaland.  But not only were 
they quite few, such foreign elements were by tradition always attached to households in 
the lineages where “[t]hey enjoyed all the rights and benefits of full members of the 
compound, except that their families could not supply the compound with the baálè”
(Fadipe 1970: 117).  Being attached to the lineage ensured the interaction of everyone in 
the Yoruba society under the auspices of the same normative homogeneous age-old 
segmental units and institutions.  Thus, in pre-colonial Yorubaland, society was 
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ethnically homogeneous, constituted of “large, dense, permanent communities whose 
inhabitants were economically independent, socially stratified, … politically unified” 
(Boscom 1955: 453) and recognized their kinship units as important components of their 
society.  These were not the case in Hausaland where indigenous state builders reduced 
the basic indigenous segmental units to irrelevance in their entire fundamental essence 
even long before the involvement of the Fulani.  Fulani involvement then exacerbated the 
political strife that was associated with state building and transformation in Hausaland by 
the Habe rulers. 
The other related difference which puts Hausaland apart from Yorubaland on the 
issue of war making and state building is that while conquest in the latter left the patterns 
of authority virtually unaltered, in the former it was the harbinger of systematic 
disenfranchisement of members of the larger society.  Dan Fodio who predicated his 
jihad on liberation (Trimingham 1962 in Anene 1970: 244) turned out becoming a state 
builder with a vision of domination much grander than the one espoused by the Habe 
kings that he ousted.88
Even after the conquest of the last of the Hausa states in 1810 his ambition wasn’t 
contained.  Additional territories were conquered and combined to create an extensively 
centralized unitary empire that could only be governed in an autocratic manner.  
Dan Fodio proceeded to institute a centralized political system that functioned 
according to the codes of “divine” directives authored by him personally (Smith 1964: 
172).  He authored two such theocratic codes during his lifetime.  His brother Abdullahi, 
who he assigned one part of the empire to administer, wrote others, and Muhammed 
88 Anene (1970: 245) believes that his “appeal to his followers had political and racial as 
well as religious implications”.
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Bello, his son and successor wrote some as well (Smith 1964).  He established himself as 
the Amir-al-Mu’minin (Commander of the Faithful), a military position of authority 
prescribed by the Prophet Muhammed himself (Levy 1957).89  This office became the 
apex position in the authority patterns of the Caliphate State and the sole source of all 
Directiveness covering every range of activity in society in specific details.  Dan Fodio 
established himself in that office throughout his lifetime and utilized it to function as the 
conduit through which God issued the statutory codes that guided his appointees who 
administered the Caliphate State on his behalf.  Upon his death his son assumed the title 
of the Sultan of Sokoto, which in the Hausa language is called the Sarkin Muslimi or the 
king of all Muslims.  Like his father, Bello continued to function in the same capacity as 
God’s conduit for all Directiveness in the Caliphate State.
But in actual fact the codes that Fodio, his brother and son authored were 
instructional manuals90 that were meant to guide the Emirs who they appointed to 
administer the provinces on their behalf.  Those written directives were their 
administrative response to the big burden of communication, which arose from the 
centralization that they instituted.  They were purposely written in Arabic to effectively 
exclude the mass of illiterate subordinate subject people from participation in the 
direction of the affairs of their own society (Smith 1964).  By impeding their access to all 
information on the ‘practice of authority’ over them Dan Fodio and his successors were 
able to effectively impede political participation.91
89 “The Amir, as the head of the military organization, was nominally the chief officer in 
the province” (Levy 1957: 359).
90 In a path-dependent manner the incarnate of this instrument of administration was 
created and put into use almost a century later by Frederick Lugard.
91There’s evidence to show that Frederick Lugard did the same in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-
national state.
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Smith (1964) argues that Dan Fodio’s true intention was to abolish Habe authority 
patterns by pointing at his instructions to his lieutenants the Kitab and Bayan Wujub.  He 
believes that it was actually the evolution of Fulani Caliphate authority in its practical 
terms that dictated otherwise.  He even absolved his son Bello on the same count with the 
similar argument that he was compelled to retain Habe authority patterns by the dictates 
of realpolitik in the politically volatile social environment of Hausaland.  
Smith’s arguments above underscore the substance of the core argument in this 
study.  When we recall that the Fulani went all out and utilized the jihad to build a 
pluralistic polity we are inclined to draw from the E-G to posit that they couldn’t have 
avoided administering as the did.  There is even room in the core argument that underlay 
the study to understand why Dan Fodio entrusted only members of his clan with authority 
positions in both the central and provincial capitals of the Caliphate state.  Isn’t kinship a 
recurring component of the practice of authority amongst the Igbo and Yoruba too? 
The Fulani rulers created a polity made themselves extreme autocrats who fit the 
E-G scheme proposition of political actors who defined “their own problems and issues, 
keep their own counsel, issue whatever directives they please, implementing them as they 
see fit, and ignore or block off “feedback” except for information required to sanction 
non-compliance” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 67).  We learnt from the E-G scheme that it is 
one of the principal ways through which autocrats and their aides shield themselves from 
the obligation of Responsiveness.  
The coverage of every range of activities and issues in society in the written codes 
of directives handed down by Dan Fodio, his brother and son sharply transformed the 
existing high degree of asymmetry between rulers and subjects in Hausaland much 
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further.  There were clear definitions that divided society in Hausaland into definite 
racial, kinship, residential, and religious categories.  People of Fulani descent became 
superior to people of non-Fulani descent.  Specific Fulani lineages were defined as 
superior to other lineages and kin groups.  Muslims were defined as superior to non-
Muslims.  Muslim Hausa urban dwellers became defined as superior to nomadic Fulani 
on the basis of religion.  Members of ruling families were defined as superior to 
commoners.  Commoners were defined in the following categories in a ranking order: 
merchants and long distance traders, Koranic teachers, craftsmen, independent peasants, 
beggars and the physically disabled (Yeld 1960). 
The economy and all economic activities were all subject to state directives.  The 
ownership and control of land were transformed in their entirety in favor of the rulers.  
Commoners became disenfranchised serfs who worked the land according to strictly 
enforced stipulations of what they must surrender or keep.  Ranges of taxes, tributes, free 
labor, etc. were decreed into existence to create the surplus that sustained the rulers and 
funded their state bureaucracies.
Each Emir maintained a standing army with which he wielded his vast authority 
to exact compliance of the Sultan’s directives on the subject people in his Emirate.  A 
Council of Electors composed of hereditary members from ruling Fulani lineages was 
entrusted with the task of recruiting candidates into authority positions.  Specific 
directives stipulated the recruitment criteria that must be adhered to eventhough it was 
still the Sultan who approved, confirmed and installed their selections.  The Council of 
Electors was the institutionalized structure that blocked popular participation in the 
recruitment of leaders.  
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Each Emir had the authority to apportion his Emirate into fiefs and assign them to 
his slave supporters to over-see on his behalf.  These slaves who were not allowed to 
travel out of the provincial capitals without the Emirs’ authorization c onstituted the first 
link in the overall pattern of influence relations in the Caliphate society.  It was through 
them that taxes from the fiefs got to the Emir.  They also ensured that the Emir’s army 
never lacked personnel.  They derived their upkeep from part of the taxes that came in 
from their fiefs.  What actually obtained in the Caliphate Empire was similar to tax 
farming.  There was a stipulated amount that must go to the Emir as tax from each of his 
fiefs.  By discretion, fief-holders extracted in excess of the stipulated amount in taxes that 
they retained for their personal use since they were required to give only the stipulated 
sum to the Emirs.  But since they did not reside in their fiefs they appointed their own 
slave agents (jakadu) to represent them there.  The jakadu resided in the fief where he 
collected the taxes from the subject people through their village heads, ensured that 
manpower was raised for the Emir’s army, and over-saw the slaves who farmed the 
Emir’s lands.  Although the jakadu let the heads and elders of the villages in the fief have 
some semblance of authority, “[t]hey might threaten to report any insubordination to their 
master, who had the power to physically punish or banish offenders” (Yeld 1960: 120).  
The jakadu were quite powerful figures who took the liberty to extort from the 
commoners.  Each of those agents (fief-holders, jakadu) took the liberty to extort as much 
taxes as he liked from the talakawa.  It was an elaborate system of control and 
expropriation.
The overall pattern of influence attempts by superodinate actors in the Caliphate 
society is starkly different from what we saw in Igbo and Yoruba societies respectively. 
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Attempts to influence the behavior subjects radiated from the Sultan to the Emirs and 
flowed through their fief-holders, their jakadu to the village heads (Smith 1964)—Figure 
3.10.  The “evident risks in questioning the authority of these men or their agents 
constrained commoners to quiescence” (Smith 1964: 178).  Compliance to directives was 
high, due to close supervision and real possibilities of dire sanctions (costs) in the event 
of non-compliance.  The extremely close supervision component of the regimented
Directiveness increased the cost of non-compliance for the commoners.  Because 
channels of Participation were basically blocked for commoners, it was imperative for 
the non-passive amongst them to erupt into creative and disruptive acts of participation 
like revolts and uprisings.  Those acts were “frequent in southern Kano after 1850, in 
Katsina city under the Emirship of Abubakar, 1887-1905” (Smith 1964: 178).  But due to 
the unity of purpose that existed between Super-actors and their aides at the various 
levels of authority in the Emirates, the status quo was restored each time that those
revolts and uprisings occurred and disrupted asymmetry in influence relations in a part of 
the Caliphate state.  However, the evident autocracy of Fulani rule was hardly watertight, 
the reason being that it functioned with the assistance of agents of the ruling classes—
palace slaves, eunuchs, assimilated individuals, etc. who went out of their way to over-
extend their orders in their zeal to enforce compliance.92  Going by the E-G scheme, the 
pattern of influence attempts in the Caliphate authority patterns had extensive room for 
regimentation, comprehensive coverage, and specificity of latitude, close supervision and 
92 This assertion is underscored by the one made in the E-G scheme by its authors: The 
involvement of agents through whom autocrats influence the behavior of their subjects, 
entails that ‘instances of absolutism’ are ‘ephemeral occurrences’ as opposed to being the 
entrenched characteristic feature of polities.  In a more technical language the authors of 
the E-G scheme believe that absolutism characterizes those transient moments in a polity 
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severity of sanction threshold in the general Directiveness dimension because of the 
power of court officials and their agents to add to directives.  It opened the system to an 
enormous degree of patrimony and corruption.  On both counts, the ultimate victims are 
the subordinate members of society.
The evident asymmetry in the Caliphate society between the Fulani rulers and 
their subjects played a critical role in the political development of Hausaland after the 
jihad.  Having identified “themselves as Muslims, as rulers, and conquerors, and as 
Fulani” (Smith 1964: 180) they decreed that rebellion against their authority was 
equivalent to heathenism, which under Islam constituted the necessary and sufficient 
grounds for the social and economic exclusion of anyone from the membership of 
society.  They also decreed that under Islam an excluded person could justifiably be taxed 
at the most merciless rate.  Non-Fulani Muslims from whose ranks the clientage of low 
level court functionaries, Islamic teachers and mallams and craftsmen that surrounded 
officer holders were recruited were allowed limited participation through assimilation 
(Smith 1964: 181).  The implicit loyalty of assimilated individuals to the Fulani rulers 
was part of the social barrier that shielded the latter from exercising any form of 
responsiveness in the Caliphate society.  
when some of its leaders have been isolated from most if not all their lieutenants 
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Figure 3.10: Authority patterns in post-jihad Hausaland 
Points of Transmission for Authority Patterns in Caliphate Hausaland
Illustrations provided by the authors of the E-G scheme indicate that authority 
patterns are transmitted across generations and time through segmental units in society 
that are most proximate to government.  Our assessments show that in each case those 
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segmental units often function as agencies of socialization, which include the family unit, 
schools, etc.  In Caliphate Hausaland the family and the education system have always 
been deeply steeped in Islam.  
Islamic education in Caliphate Hausaland comprised three distinct phases.  The 
initial phase which is long (lasting anytime from ‘four to eleven years’) and crucial 
“began at an early age of about five when the young Muslim children were sent down to 
the piazza schools managed by mallams” (Gbadamosi 1967: 89).  Each mallam who 
conducted the schools in the piazza of his home or under the shade of a near by tree was 
placed in charge of as many as forty tender-aged and impressionable children.  Although 
both boys and girls start off together in this phase, less emphasis placed on formal 
education for females in Caliphate society resulted to the latter being withdrawn after a 
few years for marriage (Hitti 1967).  
The memorization of the Koran dominated the content of this first phase.  The 
mallams took their duty of imparting the entire Koran in the memory of their tender aged 
charges quite seriously.  They style “involved considerable discipline and invariably, the 
use of the lash … on the slow pupils” (Gbadamosi 1967: 90).  Directiveness in these 
extremely regimented schools was high.  It was from these mallams with whom the 
children spend a lot of time that acquire the knowledge and socialization that the need to 
fit into the Caliphate society.  By accompanying their teachers when they went out to 
preach, officiate in religious services the children became acquainted with “the basic 
tenets of their religion… how to pray and worship, [and] how to live and behave as 
Muslims” (Gbadamosi 1967: 90).  This was when they learnt that unquestioning loyalty 
to the authority espoused by their leaders and Allah’s earthly representatives is the 
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hallmark of being faithful Muslims.  The second and third phases reinforced what was 
accomplished in the first phase and taught advanced subjects.  The individuals who 
continue their education into the last two phases became judges, teachers and 
independent mallams.  According to Gbadamosi, “Islamic education was the pillar, the 
live-wire of the Caliphate….  It turned out the rulers, judges and scholars who maintained 
the legal system…. It also turned out the various clerics who played important roles in the 
administrations, as well as religious men who tried to maintain the tone of religious life” 
(Gbadamosi 1967: 92).  In the main Islam was used to sustain the status quo.
We conclude this section by making the following provisional summary.  While 
there may have been congruence among and consonance within the governmental and 
non-governmental authority patterns in the Caliphate society hardly were there all the 
three ‘bases of legitimacy’ perceptions in all the constituting areas.  The reasons for that 
paucity in the ‘bases of legitimacy’ perceptions hinged partly on the exclusive and 
unpopular manner of the recruitment of occupants of the leadership.  In the E-G scheme, 
recruitment is salient ‘for norms of legitimacy’ (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 213).  That 
salience is underscored by the fact that recruitment encompasses aspects of Weber’s 
legal-rational and traditional types of legitimacy.  Amongst the non-Town Fulani and the 
less ardent adherents of the brand of Islam professed in the Caliphate society, the 
processes through which individuals were elevated to positions of authority may not have 
corresponded to what were prescribed by their Fulani rulers.  To those two categories of 
people, individuals who occupy authority positions in the Caliphate society lacked 
‘personal legitimacy’ and their authority may have been perceived as illegitimate.  That 
was a possible cause of instability.
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It was more likely than not that the practice of not taking the views of subordinate 
members of the population into account in the formulation of the directives by the Fulani 
rulers robed their authority of ‘procedural legitimacy’.  Similarly, their practice of 
impeding all channels of Participation in the Caliphate society implied that their 
authority lacked ‘substantive legitimacy’ in the perception of those who were prevented 
from participating.93
We can draw from the E-G scheme then to infer that political performance of the 
Caliphate state was bound to be spotty.  Its political performance could have been high 
only in those parts where it enjoyed the pre-requisite ‘bases of legitimacy’ perceptions.  
Those included parts of the Caliphate society that were inhabited by the ‘Town Fulani’ 
who share kinship patterns with Dan Fodio’s lineage, and other adherents of the brand of 
Islamic faith that they professed.  The Emirs could have found it impossible to exercise 
their authority in their other parts of their Emirates without the standing armies they 
maintained in the capitals.  The Caliphate state’s level of political performance in those 
areas where it lacked durable ‘bases of legitimacy’ perceptions in Hausaland may have 
93 There is ample evidence to assert that Igbo, Yoruba, and Hausa-Fulani artforms reflect 
the influence relations that support the practice of authority in their respective society.  
Igbo and Yoruba musical artforms encompass the same egalitarian and participatory 
tenets associated with their influence relations.  This is true even amongst Igbo groups 
where some elements of centralization are evident in the authority patterns.  At state 
functions and ceremonies in Onitsha, Aboh, Ossomari, and Oguta, royal musicians do not 
perform exclusively for or to glorify the Obi, and Atmanya respectively.  Every freeborn 
citizen is free to fall in line behind these chiefs of state, titled and other distinguished 
citizens to dance to the royal drums. Members of society usually employ art and 
performance as repertoires of participation.  In Hausaland the ruling classes engage and 
retain the services of professional musicians, poets, and praise singers to cater for their 
exclusive glory.  The most famous art form in the Caliphate society is the exclusive 
dubar, which features the colorful display of and by mounted horsemen sent by Emirs 
and vassals to perform for the Sultan on a designated occasion each year.
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been adequate most of the time due to the threat and reality of sanctions, but was always 
at risk of falling to nil when subjects found opportunities to resist.
The ranking matrix of the Hausa-Fulani authority patterns on the E-G scheme 
measure-scale is presented below in Figure 3.11.  The configuration is almost the direct 
opposite of that of the Yoruba.  The pervasive nature of all aspects of Directiveness in the 
Caliphate state is evident.  In a polity where society is composed of subjects as opposed 
to citizens where leaders’ directives were not ‘wishful intentions’ but aimed at eliciting 
definite ‘behavioral consequences’ from the former, the configuration is an apt depiction 
of the assertion made in the E-G scheme as regards the explicit intention of autocratic 
leaders to use the four ‘distinct dimensions’ (coverage, latitude, supervision, and sanction 
threshold) of their extremely regimented directives to progressively narrow whatever 
choices that could be made by their subjects in every aspect of their lives.94  Such wide 
scope of Directiveness translates to ‘Very High’ non-participation (near absence of 
participation), no leadership responsiveness and compliance dispositions that are based 
on negative legitimacy perception of leadership by many members of the larger society.
94 The E-G scheme clearly states that “coverage narrows choice; latitude narrows it more, 
supervision still more, and sanction threshold and severity more again” (Eckstein and 
Gurr 1975: 54).
208









Participation 7. Participant (+)
8. Non-participant (0)






















Figure 3.11: The ranking matrix of the Hausa-Fulani authority patterns on the E-G 
scheme measure-scale
Chapter Summation
In respective terms, political, social, and economic development among the Igbo, 
Yoruba, and Hausa-Fulani during the pre-colonial period was peculiar, unique and 
different.  There is no historical evidence to support the view that before colonialism 
anyone or group attempted to bring the Igbo under a single centralized political system.  
Politics and governance in pre-colonial Igboland were effectively local, limited and 
democratic.  Apart from some of the Igbo groups that inhabit northern and northeastern 
Igboland, all Igbo groups evolved and retained a decentralized political system that share 
a range of similarities.  The few exceptions to this are found in the aforementioned 
groups in northern Igboland who may have borrowed their centralized monarchical 
political systems from their Bini, Yoruba and Igala neighbors.  
Politics in even those northern and northeastern Igbo groups do not deviate from 
the pattern of limited and democratic governance that characterize the politics of all Igbo 
groups.  Everywhere in Igboland authority patterns and the relations that support them 
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encapsulate profound democratic traits in the four dimensions of Directiveness, 
Participation, Responsiveness, and Compliance.  Economic autonomy and independence 
at the individual level and political autonomy and independence at the group level was 
prevalent.  Igbo society functioned through built-in sociological mechanisms that 
shielded the individual and groups from social, economic and political isolation.  It was 
through those mechanisms that the Igbo, a predominantly agricultural people, were able
to develop trade and commerce amongst themselves and with their various neighbors.  
The observation made by Isichei (1973, 1983) and Ottenberg (1958) about the relative 
political stability that prevailed in the many autonomous polities all over pre-colonial 
Igboland is indicative of the congruence among and consonance within the Igbo authority 
patterns. 
In Yorubaland political development assumed a dimension that was quite 
different from the one in Igboland.  The Yoruba system of political administration was 
monarchical and centralized.  They evolved quite large-scale political organizations 
through the employment of war as an instrument of state building and transformation.  
But their authority patterns, which radiated from the most local base from where they 
projected out to the Ilu were partly responsible for checking the evolution of durable 
absolutism in their body politic.  Authority relations in Yorubaland were not devoid of 
autocratic traits.  In Yorubaland, direct democracy and its inherent participatory features 
for individual members of the larger society were not as profound as they were in 
Igboland.  The disruptions that took place in the various Yoruba polities due to wars had 
no fundamental impacts on their authority patterns.
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In logic, context and content political development in Hausaland was unique and 
different from what prevailed in both Igboland and Yorubaland.  In Hausaland, what can 
be rightly described as an age-old non-large scale, non-centralized and democratic system 
of political organization was displaced by the personalized rule of groups who employed 
war making to establish several large polities under the charge of absolutist rulers.
These ruler-state builders were successful in building and transforming the 
respective states that they built in Hausaland in ways that left politics and governance in 
Hausaland rigidly centralized and society deeply stratified along the lines of rulers and 
the talakawa.  The extensive authority and power wielded by those absolute rulers were 
based on their ruthless capacity to extort wealth from their subjects and exact compliance 
of their directives on them.  Indeed, they laid the foundation of and fostered the 
‘traditional shape’ of Hausa society.  Their rule instigated and may have contributed to 
the success of the Fulani jihad under whose sword they were overthrown.
The most enduring legacy of those absolutist rulers in Hausaland are the 
autocratic authority patterns that evolved and utilized to sustain their regimes.  The Fulani 
who ousted them found their legacy quite useful.  But in the light of the size and diversity 
of the Caliphate Empire there can be little doubt that the Fulani couldn’t have done 
otherwise.  The size of the Caliphate State (constructed on the ruins of the Habe states) 
and the desire of the Fulani to concentrate authority in their specific lineages dictated the 
use that the Fulani found for the legacy of the regimes they replaced
We must quickly insert some much-needed assertions at this point in the 
discussion to clarify some of arguments made so far in the analysis.  Irrespective of the 
nomenclature of the arrangement in society, i.e. whether it is in social, economic or 
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political arrangements, if as shown in Figure 3.12 below, whenever there is a dynamic 
integration between centralization and large scale organization in any of the above named 
arrangements, the organizational outcome will hardly have room for the accommodation 
of popular participation.  
Let’s begin with the typical case of Hausaland.  When we recall the success of 
Habe Sarkis in integrating large-scale organization and centralization into the social, 
economic, and political arrangements of their various domains, we will better understand 
their success in eliminating popular participation in the three realms of society in 
Hausaland.  They were able to rid society of popular participation in the economy after 
they took control of all land, walled everyone of the commercial cities and centers of 
trade and assumed absolute control over all production, trade and exchange in them 
(Smith 1964).  Their integration of centralization and large-scale organization into the 
economic sphere or sector paved the way for them to impose their control over it.  Their 
success in those processes marginalized subordinate members of the society to participate 
in the economic organization of their society only on the terms stipulated by their ruling 
classes.  Thus, those who worked the land could do so only as serfs, while the hunters, 
the blacksmiths, weavers, dyers, traders, etc. all practiced their trade in guilds that made 
for the expropriation of their surplus production.  
This transformation of the economy through centralization and large-scale 
organization flowed directly into the centralization and large-scale organization fo the 
social arrangement of society.  That was because of the association between vocational 
guilds and social status in society in Hausa society (Yeld 1960).  Of course we have seen 
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how similar processes took participation in the political realm out of the reach of 
subordinate members of society in Hausaland.
The Yoruba who instituted centralization in their political arrangement were able 
to at the same time cage the monsters of autocracy and despotism and kept them out for 
good through their refusal to accommodate the dynamic integration of centralization and 
large-scale organization into their politics.  Popular participation in the organization of 
each of the three arrangements in Yoruba society became the counter force that checked 
attempts by self-interested actors to achieve those processes in any of the three.  The 
Aláàfin who attempted to accomplish those processes in the economy of Old Oyo Empire 
by taking advantage of the trans-Atlantic slave provoked a power situation with members 
of the Oyo-Mesi, who functioned as de facto voice of the people in the practice of 
authority in Oyo society.  We already mentioned that the crises that stemmed from that 
power situation were partly responsible for the demise of the Old Oyo Empire (Morton-
Williams 1970).  As opposed to the dynamic integration of centralization and large-scale 
organization, the Yoruba preferred simply to organize the arena (marketplace) aspect of 
their economic arrangement.  That gave rise to the office of the Parakoyi, which was 
assigned the authority to ensure that exchange and interaction activities in major 
marketplaces each market day were orderly, among other functions (Gbadamosi 1978).
As of the Igbo, we are already conversant with how they jealously guard against the 
dynamic integration of centralization and large-scale organization in their social, 
economic, and political arrangements in order to protect popular participation.  No one or 
group was able to integrate centralization in the extensively large economic arrangement 
that tied all sections of Igboland and their neighbors into a controlled organization.  It 
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wasn’t until the economy of Igboland was co-opted into the trans-Atlantic slave trade that 
the Aro Igbo assumed dominance over the supply side of the slavery portion of the Igbo 
economy.  Although sections of Igboland became known for one or another economic 
Social arrangement
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Figure 3.12: Impediments to popular participation in social, political, and economic 
arrangements in society
undertaking (black-smithing, medicine, divination, etc.) no one tried to or was able to 
centralize and control any aspect to the point where participation was rationalized as was 
the case in Hausaland.  Both superordinate and subordinate members of society 
inIgboland and Yorubaland retained the right to work the land, fish the water ways 
(except when it was religiously forbidden), practice trades, reap the fruits of their 
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endeavor.  Whenever they felt the need they took their products and produce to the 
marketplace to exchange for what they lacked without interference from anyone.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 will be tested in the last chapter with the evidence that we 
have marshaled so far in our discussion above.  The Igbo, Yoruba, and the Hausa-Fulani 
did achieve a tremendous degree of social, economic, and political development in their 
respective parts of the Niger basin.  There was no uniformity in their respective patterns 
of social, economic and political development.  Also, a remarkable degree of 
heterogeneity is encompassed in their respective authority patterns, relations of authority, 
social economic and political institutions and structures.  Thus all the relevant 
variables—differential patterns of political, social, and economic development, different 
authority patterns—which can lead to poor governmental performance particularly in 
multi-nation states are all present in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state, which they are 
compelled to constitute.
Persistence of the Authority Patterns in the Three Nationalities
Do the indigenous authority patterns evolved by each of the three nationalities 
still persistent?  This is a question that requires our attention at this point in the analysis.  
The question can be answered in the affirmative for the following reasons.  With the 
exception of the Hausa and the Fulani who intermingled with one another earlier on to 
produce one nationality every other nationality has remained homogenous and distinct.  
There is therefore an intuitive corollary between the maintenance of their distinctiveness 
and the persistence of the various segmental units through which their norms and 
values—including authority patterns are transmitted across time and generations. 
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British state building could not alter the homogeneity of each of the homelands in 
terms of the age-old patterns in which they are inhabited by the nationalities.  Even 
though the various cities and urban centers that came into existence in various parts of 
each homeland during and after colonialism have always attracted people from all 
nationalities, each homeland is still a homogenous crucible in the main.  This is 
particularly because of the reason that each one of them still contains the plurality of the 
members of the nationality.  People usually leave their homelands and go to those cities 
where they reside temporarily to seek economic betterment without severing any 
sociological affiliations with either their homelands or members of their kindred that they 
left behind.  Each urban resident identifies quite closely with his community and others 
who are from the same community through the various associations that they form in 
those urban areas for those purposes.  For example an Igbo resident of a city in any part 
of Igboland would belong to both his village and village-group associations each of 
which is organized as and functions like a segmental unit.  If the one is resident in a city 
in Yorubaland or Hausaland the associations that he will belong to will include the Igbo 
union.  The thrust of our argument therefore is that each nationality is disposed well 
enough to creatively adopt and adapt to western influences in ways that would not alter 
their peculiarities and distinctiveness.  The intuitive assumption then is that so long as the 
family, the kindred, the lineage and the other segmental units that distinguish the 
nationalities from one another are not transformed out of existence in their fundamental 
essence, they will continue to function as transmitters of values and norms.   
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CHAPTER IV:
AUTHORITY PATTERNS OF THE IMPOSED ‘NIGERIAN’ SUPRA-NATIONAL 
STATE
The British occupied the Niger basin gradually and in roughly six distinct stages 
that span across the nineteenth century (Anene 1966, Dusgate 1985, Tamuno 1966 and 
1972).  (i) The Yoruba kingdom of Lagos was bombarded, annexed and made a British 
colony in the period 1851-61.  (ii) The period 1861-90 witnessed the consolidation of 
British authority and the transformation of the Lagos Crown colony.  (iii) In the period 
1890-1914, the British embarked on a systematic alteration of the authority patterns that 
were established in the Crown colony.  (iv) Formal colonial rule was proclaimed in the 
rest of the Niger basin in the period 1896-1913.  (v) Lugardism evolved in the upper 
Niger in the period 1900-12, and (vi) the period 1914-60 marked the transformation of 
colonial authority patterns in the entire Niger basin on the aegis of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-
national state.  The organization of this chapter corresponds to the stages listed above.
Throughout the course of their intervention in the Niger basin, the British were 
confronted by a variety of issues.  The issues that they were compelled to contend with 
stemmed from a diversity of factors peculiar to that part of the West African sub-region.  
Foremost amongst the diversity of factors were the distinct socio-political arrangements 
that they found in each of the several nationalities that inhabit the Niger basin.  Indeed, 
when taken either singly or collectively, most of the choices made by the British in their 
quest to build the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state were dictated and even forced on them 
by the diversity of those extraneous factors peculiar to the Niger basin.95
95 I. M. Semakula Kiwanuka (1970: 296) reached a similar assessment About Africa in 
general long ago when he suggested that “the response of each colonial power was 
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In the initial stage, the British were only able to establish different administrative 
polities that incorporated only a part of Yorubaland, Igboland, and Fulani-ruled 
Hausaland respectively.  The ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state is the eventual outcome of 
their extensive efforts to bring the Niger basin and its inhabitants under a single political 
arrangement.  
Geography and historical factors that stemmed partly from the slave trade played 
their own crucial roles in Britain’s intervention in the Niger basin.  Specifically speaking, 
the existence of a natural seaport and Britain’s resolve to enforce the abolition of the 
slave trade on Africa’s west coasts are some of the factors that helped to expose the 
Yoruba kingdom of Eko96 to British annexation.  The natural seaport at the lagoon 
entrance attracted the Royal Navy to make Lagos a staging point in Britain’s anti-slavery 
endeavors on the West Coast of Africa.  In turn the presence and protection of the Royal 
Navy then attracted freed slaves and their descendants from Freetown, Sierra Leone—the 
Saro—and Brazil—the Amaro—to resettle themselves in Lagos and its environs.  The 
freed slaves and what they represented constituted the most important factor that favored 
the evolution of British authority in the Kingdom.97
The establishment of Crown colony rule in Lagos made it easy for the British to 
expand their authority into the rest of Yorubaland mostly “through a series of judicial 
agreements signed with a number of indigenous rulers”  
conditioned by the extent of the challenge or the degree of collabooration by …
Africans”—see “Colonial Policies and Administrations in Africa: The Myths of the 
Contrasts” by I. M. Semakula Kiwanuka, African Historical Studies, Vol. 3, #2, Pp. 295-
315. 
96 This is the original Yoruba name for Lagos.  The Portuguese called it Lagos.  For the 
sake of consistency we’ll call it Lagos throughout the study.
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(Adewoye 1971: 627).  Thus, as opposed to Igboland and Hausaland, in Yorubaland the 
slave trade and the subsidiary social, economic, and political factors that stemmed from it 
contributed a lot to the evolution and transformation of British authority.  However, the 
British still resorted to military coercion to exact its authority on the Yoruba who like the 
Igbo refused to perceive that authority as legitimate.  
But for the characteristic large-scale political organization and centralized 
political system of the Yoruba they could have equally been exposed to the same violent 
style used to pacify the Igbo whose political system and organization are village-based 
and decentralized.  In Yorubaland, the centralization of authority made it relatively easy 
for the British to identify and locate the right points of authority and their occupants with 
whom they parleyed.  Due primarily to their large political organization, the conclusion 
of each of the legal ‘agreements’ or ‘treaties’ brought extensive areas and large 
populations in Yorubaland under British authority simultaneously.  
On the other hand, Igboland’s decentralized village-based democracies posed 
challenges that dictated protracted engagements for both pacification and control.  
Hausaland’s centralized and autocratic political system, and large-scale political 
organization and autocratic patterns of authority made protracted military engagements 
beyond the initial campaigns virtually unnecessary.  Moreover in Hausaland, the British 
came in contact with a situation that they quickly exploited for the opportunities that it 
offered—easy identification of a ruling class, ready and willing to turn itself into an ally, 
and a population of subjects who have long been conditioned to autocracy.
97 The freed slaves and their descendants who returned from Freetown, Sierra Leone were 
known as the Saro while those who returned from Brazil were known as the Amaro.  We 
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The Period 1851-61: The Yoruba Kingdom of Lagos is Declared Crown Colony and 
Placed Under British Authority 
Lagos was the site of several events that aided the evolution and transformation of 
British authority in the Niger basin.  The first act of direct intervention by the British in 
Lagos was the deposition of Oba Kosoko and the imposition of Akitoye, his rival as Oba
by the Royal Navy in 1851.  The establishment of a permanent British consulate the same 
year in the kingdom was next (Smith 1979).  From start to finish it took the British about 
ten years to impose their authority in the Kingdom.  The abolition of the slave trade in 
1807 by the British Parliament marked a turning in Anglo-West African relations.  For 
one, the abolition was an historical event that led to the deployment of the Royal Navy 
off the West Coast of African where it was charged to execute anti-slavery patrol duties 
aimed at enforcing the Act of the British Parliament that declared the slave trade illegal.  
The enforcement of the Abolition Act provided the rationale for the British State and its 
managers to embark on a policy that challenged indigenous political authorities in the 
Niger basin.
In England at the time, advocates of “British intervention in Lagos used the 
presence of liberated Africans as support for their argument” (Ehrensaft 1972: 476).  At a 
time when other European states were still active in the slave trade such advocates 
believed and argued that if established in Lagos British authority would protect returning 
freed slaves against the possibility of re-enslavement (Kopytoff 1965, Ehrensaft 1972).  
Symbiotically, the freed slaves and their descendants furnished much-needed bases of 
legitimacy for British authority in Lagos after it was imposed. 
will consistently refer to them as Saro and Amaro respectively in the rest of the study.
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But it is interesting to note that there were shifts in British authority in the Crown 
colony at the time when the decision was made in London to impose classical colonial 
rule in Lagos and the rest of Yorubaland.  With those shifts which alienated the freed 
slaves, came quick changes in their perception of British authority from then onwards.
British authority was practiced in Lagos for much of the time when it was a 
Crown colony in a manner that hardly differed from how it was practiced in Britain’s 
colony in the Cape of Good Hope in southern Africa.   But unlike the Cape colony where 
5,000 British settlers (Campbell 1897, Marquard 1952) were encouraged by their 
government to relocate in 1820, society in Lagos was composed mostly of Africans, a 
handful of Europeans and a sprinkling of Lebanese.  Indigenous Lagosians made up the 
greater proportion of the African population while the freed slaves made up the 
remaining, much smaller proportion. 
Of course we are aware that unlike in the Lagos Crown colony, society in the 
Cape colony was racially stratified in favor of Europeans from the outset.  Hence, this 
comparison between them is not meant to illustrate similarities in racial relations in the 
two Crown colonies.  Rather, we make the comparison to illustrate some other points.  
The attention paid by British public to the politics and affairs of the Cape due to the 
presence of the 5,000 English settlers (Marquard 1952) can rightly be compared to the 
support of the section of English public that urged their government to protect the freed 
slaves who returned to Lagos against possible re-enslavement.  In both cases settlers and 
freed slaves—the latter’s’ African origin notwithstanding— and their supporters in 
England did not just believe that they were loyal subjects of the British Crown, they 
equally claimed the right of participation in the affairs of both colonies respectively.  The 
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claim for participation made by the settlers and the Saro and the Amaro98 derived from 
their conviction that they were loyal subjects of the British Crown.  Their claims and 
conviction were partly responsible for why the influence relations in the Cape and Lagos 
mimicked what probably obtained in the British society at the time.99 Also, the 
comparison is made to highlight some unique similarities and contrasts of society in the 
two colonies.  From the outset society in the Cape was racially segregated, and socio-
political participation for the settlers was hardly open, or facilitated.  The refusal of the 
Crown-appointed governor to allow the Cape settlers to establish their first newspaper 
and literary club (Campbell 1897) indicated un-facilitated participation. 
The situation in the Lagos Crown colony was somewhat different.  The racial 
segregation that favored the few Europeans merchants in Lagos was not directed at 
members of the Saro and Amaro community.  If at all, society in the Lagos Crown colony 
was segregated in favor of Europeans and the Saro and Amaro community against 
indigenous Lagosians (Mann 1985).  Unlike indigenous Lagosians, members of the Saro
and Amaro community were adequately accommodated in the scheme of things.  Their 
status as loyal subjects of the Crown in a socio-political environment where nascent 
British authority faced the threat of possible overthrow by the leaders and people of 
indigenous Lagos may have played a role in that.  They were not hindered from 
establishing such facilitated (open) channels of Participation as newspapers and civic 
98 European residents of Lagos as well as the Saro and the Amaro discriminated against 
indigenous Lagosians.  Integration within the African members of society in Lagos began 
when indigenous Lagosians took a cue from the returnees to embrace western education 
and culture.
99 Britain had begun to democratize for the upper and middle classes at that time.
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organizations.  They owned and ran successful businesses, and practiced the professions 
without being racially discriminated against.  
Viewed from the perspective of the E-G scheme the annexation of Lagos by 
Britain initiated and nurtured a different set of ‘governmental’ authority patterns in the 
kingdom.  Indigenous Yoruba society in Lagos was not necessarily transformed into a 
new one as a result of the annexation.  Instead, a new society emerged and quickly 
shunted indigenous Yoruba society along with its indigenous authority patterns aside.  
Power and authority in that new society were “concentrated ... in the hands of Europeans, 
and, to a lesser extent, their African collaborators” (Mann 1985: 15).
The new society and polity that emerged under the auspices of the Crown colony 
required and quickly furnished itself with new segmental units—legislative system, civil 
service bureaucracy, tax system, etc.  All four dimensions of influence relations, i.e. 
Directiveness, Participation, Responsiveness, and Compliance and the accompanying 
‘bases of legitimacy perceptions’ required for practice of authority in the new society and 
polity configured in ways that differed from the prevalent patterns in the indigenous 
society.  For instance, government in the kingdom was headed by the Oba and the Igbimo
or Council of State, who were recruited and removed from office according to age-old 
Yoruba custom and tradition.  The Oba’s office was ascriptive, and the authority of the 
government he headed was deeply rooted in norms that were prescribed by indigenous 
Yoruba customs and tradition.  The Oba conducted the business of the state with the 
Igbimo while the baálè and the Olori Itun held forth in the ebi and adugbo respectively.   
In contrast, the premier authority position in the colony was occupied by the governor 
who was recruited by the British Colonial Office in London without recourse to members 
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of society in the colony (Smith 1969, 1974, Nicolson 1969, Tamuno 1972).  There were 
appointed Executive and Legislative Councils too.
The first of those governors wasted no time in grafting the British system of laws 
and jurisprudence, i.e. tort, equity and common laws, the Supreme Court presided over by 
a Chief Justice and a bureaucracy that was associated with them onto the new society 
(Mann 1985: 15).  
The dimension of Directiveness in the Crown colony of Lagos society was 
anchored in the governor, the appointed Executive and Legislative Councils, and based in 
British legal system.  The courts were proximate segmental units in the Crown colony 
that were utilized for the exaction of compliance to directives and some measure of 
responsiveness on the governor who could only be removed by the Colonial Office.  
Participation in Crown colony society was not diffused.  For instance, Lagosians had no 
say in the recruitment of the individuals through whom the Colonial Office practiced 
authority in the Crown colony.   Most of the participation that took place in the polity 
favored the Saro and Amaro community in the main.  Most of that participation was by 
proxy through the courts of law, and the Press.  For instance, Lawyers who included 
members of the Saro and Amaro community who practiced law in Lagos utilized the 
courts to impact directives handed down by the Colonial Office and its appointees—the 
Crown colony governor, the Executive and Legislative Councils.  That happened in those 
instances when the courts interpreted existing statues or handed down judgments in cases 
that came before them.    In some situations the decisions that emanated from the courts 
encouraged permissiveness and responsiveness on the governor, the Executive and 
Legislative Councils.  In succinct sociological terms, the governmental authority patterns 
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that took effect in Lagos sequel to the annexation fall within the Weberian definition of 
legal-rational and bureaucratic.  Grafted from England, they were meant to function like 
impersonal instruments of administration.
One could be tempted to concur with Mann’s (1985) dismissive description of 
those African members of society in post-annexation Lagos who aided the evolution of 
governmental authority patterns in the Crown colony as “collaborators”.  But an objective 
assessment of both their identity and antecedents would show that they were not mere 
collaborators. 
Although the annexation of the kingdom was actually effected by gunboats 
deployed by the Royal Navy, the successful circumvention of indigenous society in 
Lagos could have been difficult in the absence of the Saro and Amaro.  Their presence 
helped to avert the sharp racial division of society that prevailed in the Cape between 
Europeans and Africans from the outset. Although their population was less than 10,000, 
they became “a very impressive and influential group” (Echeruo 1977: 30) whose 
members played prominent roles in the evolution of British governmental authority 
patterns in Lagos.  
They were not crass opportunistic collaborators who stumbled into the role of 
aiding the British and cashing in on the windfalls of colonialism.  Their circumstance as 
freed slaves and descendants of freed slaves placed them in the historical role they 
played.  They even believed that the advancement of Africa could only be accomplished 
through the projection of Christianity and British political power (Ayandele 1974).  Their 
enthusiastic support for British authority compelled a colonial administrator to refer to 
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them as “an important wheel in the social machinery we have created” (Temple 
1918/1969 in Duffield 1971: 258). 
Non-Governmental Authority Patterns in Victorian Lagos
Victorian Lagos (Echeruo 1977) was mostly composed of the Saro and Amaro
who resettled themselves in Lagos (Fyfe 1962, Kopytoff 1965, Gbadamosi 1978, Mann 
1985).  They were a heterogeneous lot that “included Muslims as well as Christians as 
well as illiterates, and merchants and traders as well as members of other occupations” 
(Mann 1985: 18).  The Saro for one were de facto British subjects (Duffield 1971).  
“English courts, legal procedure, safeguards and laws were as much part of their 
inheritance (and were highly valued as such) as they were the inheritance of citizens of 
London, Tolpuddle, or Christchurch, New Zealand” (Duffield 1971: 253).  The Amaro
themselves were not left out in this regard.  They were sufficiently acquainted with the 
culture of Latin Europe—language, the Catholic religion, etc. because of their sojourn in 
Brazil (Mann 1985: 17-18).  For people who lived, thought and acted English and 
European for a significant proportion of their lives, both the Saro and the Amaro were 
basically “Black” Englishmen and Europeans or “Afro-Europeans” (Burton 1863: 216).  
Unlike indigenous Lagosians their worldview was Victorian.  Their attitude and 
preferences on family, economy, and politics were Victorian to the core (Echeruo 1977).  
They ‘frequently sent’ their children to school in England, associated “themselves with 
the usual recreations of a sophisticated Europe, and so went to the Races, to Fancy Dress 
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Colonial Office
Colonial Governor The Chief Justice
The Legislative Council The Courts
The Press Churches Civic Organizations
Saro, Amaro, Europeans, and Indigenous Lagosians
who emulated the former and became westernized
Figure 4.1: Authority patterns in Lagos Crown colony.  The arrows indicate direct power 
and the lines indicate influence
balls, to the Gymkhana games, and to cricket.  In the evenings, they went for ‘brisk 
walks’ or for ‘short rides’” (Echeruo 1977: 30).  Their churches were governed from 
England, and they formed and ran musical groups and theaters and voluntary 
associations.  They answered European names.  The internal structures of all their 
endeavors were based on Victorian values and norms.  There was therefore no doubt that 
their acceptance of British authority in Lagos had a lot to do with resemblances between 
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the workings of their everyday life and the workings of the former.  They were apart from 
indigenous Lagosians (Echeruo 1977).  But the turn of political events later made them to 
recant much of their identification with England, including changing their names 
(Echeruo 1977).
The same demographic characteristics, i.e. possession of European cultural traits, 
norms, and values in the realms of ‘administration’, ‘commerce’, ‘religion’, ‘technology’, 
and ‘education’, (Ehrensaft 1972: 473) that placed them apart from indigenous Yoruba 
were also responsible for the roles they played in the propagation of British authority in 
Yorubaland.  Although they resettled in both Lagos and the Egba Yoruba polity of 
Abeokuta, their enabling role for British authority was only in Lagos. 
The Period of 1861-90: Transformation of Polity and Consolidation of British 
Authority in Lagos
The Saro and Amaro directly facilitated the transformation of the Crown polity, 
which led to the consolidation of British authority in Lagos.  Their involvement in the 
direction of the affairs of the Crown polity was normatively accommodated for a period 
that lasted almost a decade.  In the ensuing period the rank of the Saro and Amaro was 
expanded with indigenous Lagosians who emulated them to embrace western education, 
commerce, etc.  That fact translated to more people who perceived authority in the Crown 
polity in a positive light.
In the beginning of British rule, authority patterns in Crown colony Lagos society 
included the governor, who was an appointee of the Foreign Office, the Executive 
Council and the Legislative Council, whose members were also appointed and nominated 
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as official and unofficial members respectively.  The unofficial members of the 
Legislative Council represented the local population, i.e. merchants/businesses and 
ordinary residents of the colony who included Europeans and Africans.  The 
Directiveness dimension reposed with the British Foreign Office from whence it 
officially flowed to the governor, the Executive and Legislative Councils.
As we mentioned earlier, members of the Saro and Amaro communities were 
integrated into the scheme of things in the colony.  In 1881, about forty-five of them were 
employed in the civil bureaucracy as the Registrar of the Supreme Court, Acting Colonial 
Secretary, Acting Colonial Surveyor, Chief Clark and Treasurer, the Superintendent of 
Police, Postmaster, etc. (Mann 1985: 20).  To a large degree, their involvement must have 
ensured that issues that affected their community were not subjected to regimented 
directives.  They were conversant and even accepted the prevalent Victorian “belief… 
that the opinions of non-voters, expressed through petitions and other means, could 
influence governmental policy” (Tamuno 1966: 7).  They relied on their Press, the 
churches and vocal clergy to become (Echeruo 1977, Mann 1985, Ayandele 1974, Cole 
1975) central players in the social, economic, and political affairs of Crown colony 
Lagos.100
The situation was starkly different for indigenous Lagosians.  Attempts in 1863 
by Oba Dosumu to raise alarm that he did not “freely agree to cede Lagos to the British 
Crown” (Echeruo 1977: 76) as reports in the Lagos Press portrayed was disputed by the 
latter.  Hitherto unregulated aspects of their lives came under directives.  Pointers: A 
directive by the governor and the Executive Council was issued to regulate traditional 
100 The relations among these hierarchical categories of individuals that were involved in 
the direction of the Crown colony of Lagos were quite asymmetrical.  
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drumming by restricting it to day time on the grounds that it disturbed the peace of some 
residents (Echeruo 1977: 68-9).  A directive by Crown authority made it a crime to bury 
people anywhere but cemeteries.  English-type statutes redefined their rights to land 
(Hopkins 1980).
Unlike indigenous Lagosians the participation of the Saro and Amaro community 
through their Press, the Churches, and a range of civic associations was frequent as well 
as intense.  Their acts of participation covered the range of modes stipulated in the E-G 
scheme—‘group, direct, personal, indirect personal and impersonal actions’.  Their 
participation implied that British authority did not lack the vital condition for political 
performance, i.e. congruence between and consonance with ‘governmental and non-
governmental patterns’.  
The Egba Yoruba polity of Abeokuta where some Saro and Amaro resettled in 
was a different socio-political milieu.  The difference accounted for why it attracted 
mostly those Saro and Amaro who turned out as antagonists of British authority.101  The 
returnees who resettled in Abeokuta tried to squeeze themselves into the polity’s 
traditional authority patterns as “modernizers” (Pallinder-Law 1974, Phillips 1969, 
Kopytoff 1965).  Their bold attempt to modernize traditional authority patterns and create 
“a ‘Christian, civilized state’, independent of foreign leadership” (Pallinder-Law 1974: 
69) in Abeokuta was guided by “an anti-European bias” of ‘Africa for Africans’” 
(Phillips 1969: 127). They constituted the Egba United Board of Management, E. U. B. 
M. and made it the executive political authority.  In the E. U. B. M. they attempted to 
“combine the authority of the traditional elite with the skills and ideas of the westernized 
101 The first Yoruba language newspaper—the Iwe Irohin started publication in Abeokuta 
as early as 1859.
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Saro” (Pallinder-Law 1974: 69).  But their efforts fell short and collapsed in 1874 and 
“the Egba remained attached to their traditional forms of government” (Phillips 1969: 
130).
The poor political performance of the E. U. B. M. and its subsequent failure can 
be traced to the lack of resemblance between its social and political patterns and the 
authority patterns of traditional Egba Yoruba society.  In spite of the Board’s co-option of 
the traditional leaders in Abeokuta—the Bashorun (or head of the Council of State in 
traditional Yoruba political system) at the time was made the President-General—
indigenous Egba citizens refused to extend their allegiance to its authority.  They 
perceived the authority of “the man who wielded the real authority, its Secretary, George 
William Johnson, [a Saro] tailor… who had lived in England” (Phillips 1969: 127) as 
illegitimate.  In a society where in spite of centralization tradition dictated that authority 
must neither concentrate in the hands of one person or a group of people nor be exercised 
in a manner that excludes the citizens, the Board, did not command much public respect 
(Phillips 1969: 128).  The second attempt by the returnees to institute a ‘modern’ 
government in Abeokuta, this time with the active involvement of the government of 
Crown colony Lagos, equally failed for the same reasons. 
The political performance of the E. U. B. was so dismal that it is a surprise that it 
even survived for sixteen years.  For the entire duration of that period it depended on 
military assistance from Lagos to enforce compliance of members of indigenous society 
in Abeokuta to its directives (Pallinder-Law 1974).  Not withstanding such support it still 
experienced poor political performance.   The people of Abeokuta resorted to “protest 
and disturbances” (Pallinder-Law 1974: 81) every time when they sensed that the mostly 
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Saro and Amaro minders of the E. U. B. infringed on the authority of their traditional 
leaders.  After Frederick Lugard became the first governor-general of the ‘Nigerian’
supra-national state, sustained instability in the E. U. B. provided him with a much-
needed excuse to annex Abeokuta in 1914 and bring the Egba Yoruba under the control 
of British colonial authority (Pallinder-Law 1974, Gailey 1982).  However, that 
annexation and the imposition of Egba Native Administration could not even entail 
political performance in colonized Abeokuta.   
In Lagos, annexation created the requisite ‘social environment’ that Eckstein 
(1969: 278) rightly identified as an important element that affects political life in society 
quite closely.  Such environment was lacking in Abeokuta.  In social, political, and 
economic terms, in Lagos, that ‘social environment’ was conducive for the growth and 
success of the Saro and Amaro and show-cased so positively that they became role 
models for members of indigenous Lagos society.   
The absence of racial stratification, due perhaps to the limited presence of 
Europeans in Lagos (Mann 1985) implied that the Saro, Amaro and the indigenous 
Lagosians whom they inspired did not have to contend with racism in their pursuit of 
social and economic advancement.  Real estate and property rights that used to be 
uncharted territory in indigenous pre-colony Lagos society became a new economic 
realm for those who cared to embrace and utilize them to acquire wealth (Hopkins 1980).  
There were those who became entrepreneurs by going into the then new world of 
‘legitimate’ commerce, which was just opening up on the ruins of the outlawed trade in 
human beings.  This was about the time when European merchants elsewhere in the 
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Niger basin were averse to the idea of indigenous involvement in direct trade with 
Europe.  
With time indigenous Lagosians who emulated the Saro and Amaro and embraced 
“legitimate trade… began to establish a new set of allegiances to the representatives of 
the alternative…power structure: … the consul, [or as he was called,] the white Oba
(ruler), and to his commercial, spiritual, and military chiefs, the European and Sierra 
Leonean merchants, the missionaries, and the captains of the naval squadron” (Hopkins 
1980: 785).  Over the course of time, the success of the indigenous emulators in 
commerce led to the expansion of the ranks of people in Lagos who approved of British 
authority.
When we recall that the “[r]esemblances among social and political authority 
patterns clearly could also serve as a potential mediating and higher-order variable” 
(Eckstein 1969: 277) we will better appreciate how the unhindered pursuit of economic 
and social advancement by the returnees and those indigenous Lagosians that they 
inspired helped to create an influential segment of the Lagos population who were 
disposed to support British authority in the Lagos Crown colony.  Thus, the disparity that 
could develop between “social and political authority patterns” (Eckstein 1969: 277) in 
societies that are stratified along specific demographic, economic, or social lines was 
avoided in the Lagos Crown colony.  The proportion of the population of Crown colony 
of Lagos society that perceived British authority as legitimate was rather on the increase.  
That reality augured quite well for the performance of British political authority.  Racial 
relations in Lagos only began to take a downturn in about the beginning of the 1890s 
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(Ajayi 1965, Mann 1985), a period that also coincided with the imposition of classical 
colonial rule in the rest of the Niger basin.  
By itself, the fact that the Saro and Amaro were not barred from economic and 
social advancement in the Crown colony of Lagos may give credence to the argument 
that instead of racism “the evolution of the land market [is] a cause and consequence of 
the annexation of Lagos” (Hopkins 1980: 797).  Consul McCosky who spear-headed and 
over-saw the annexation of Lagos said as much when he wrote to his superiors in the 
Foreign Office “that the colony would give ‘a new impetus to the exertions of all classes 
of inhabitants as they will be secure in the possession of what they legally acquire’” (in 
Hopkins 1980: 789).  McCosky even consulted the Saro and Amaro as well as the 
European residents of Lagos on the annexation and reported that with only “a few 
exceptions … [he] found them favourable [to the idea]” (McCosky to Russel 1861 in 
Hopkins 1980: 789).  There is no doubt therefore that with the exception of the few 
European residents of Lagos the Saro and Amaro were the only other residents of Lagos 
who were sufficiently equipped and did appreciate that the annexation would be in their 
favor.   Hence, their support for the new social, political, and economic order that it 
ushered into their society.
While the presence of a handful of Europeans in Lagos at the time may have 
helped to forestall the emergence of racism in Lagos there is no evidence to support the 
view that racism could have inspired the annexation, or that prior to the dawn of classical 
colonial rule there were attempts of any sort to frustrate the economic and social 
advancement of its non-European residents.  Thus, an environment devoid of racial 
stratification as well as economic success based on the private property rights became a 
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big incentive for the returnees to desire political stability which they believed could only 
be realized through British political authority (Hopkins 1980) which partly explains the 
support that they extended to it.  
Their support for British political authority in the Crown colony remained a major 
base of legitimacy that was both cherished and utilized by all Crown colony officials.  In 
1863 when Oba Dosunmu publicly denied that he gave his kingdom and land over to the 
Queen of England, the alarmed Lt. Governor was quick to declare “a state of emergency 
in the town [and called] ‘on all loyal subjects of her majesty to assemble tomorrow 
morning, at 8a.m. at Government House, to be sworn in as Special Constables for the 
assertion of Her Majesty’s authority and the protection of life and property within her 
colony of Lagos’” (in Echeruo 1977: 18).  Letters to the editor and articles by some 
returnees which appeared in the Lagos Press on that incident as well as the annexation 
itself underscore the support of British political authority in Lagos by members of the 
returnee community (Echeruo 1977).
As a ‘vital component of Victorian Lagos’ the returnee community in Lagos gives 
credence to a core element of Eckstein’s theoretical framework on the crucial link 
between influence relations and political performance in social units.  Eckstein (1969: 
278) observed that people are effective in their efforts to play political roles in their 
society in situations where their socialization furnished them with the social tools that 
they need to play those roles.  He adds that the extent to which individuals can be 
effective when they make efforts to play political roles is a function of the degree of 
compatibility between “the norms and practices demanded by their concurrent social 
roles”  (Eckstein 1969: 278) and the political roles they are trying to play. 
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Unlike indigenous Lagosians who lacked the benefit of Western education and the 
knowledge of the workings of the European political system, the Saro and the Amaro
were sufficiently equipped to participate actively in the socio-political affairs of the 
Crown colony.  They played that role through the various newspapers and civic 
associations that they founded, and through the law courts and other channels of 
Participation.   Newspapers102 were such effective channels of Participation in Crown 
colony Lagos that between 1863 and 1913 about twelve of were either started or went out 
of publication (Echeruo 1977, Mann 1985).  
If the dimension of Participation can be used “to assess degrees of asymmetry 
between subs and supers” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 61) in a social unit, and if the degree 
of participation in a social unit “depends on the extent to which supers act in accordance 
with or contrary to subs’ explicit preferences—hence, in large part, their Participation” 
(Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 61), what prevailed in the Lagos Crown colony between Crown 
authorities and the returnees was indeed an asymmetric.
If we infer from available records (Echeruo 1977) we can say that most members 
of returnee community in the Crown colony seemed convinced that they were sufficiently 
accommodated in the democratic authority patterns that prevailed in the polity at the 
time.  They accepted and believed in the ‘forms and norms’ that underlay the practice of 
its authority whose institutions and structures they willingly subscribed to as a result.   
Court records and reports, articles and letters to the editor published in the various 
newspapers published in Lagos at the time show that they resorted to the courts and the 
102 The Anglo-African, 1863-1867, Lagos Times and Gold Coast Colony Advertiser, 
1880-1893, The Observer, 1882-1888, Eagle and Lagos Critic, 1883-1887, The Mirror, 
1887-1888, Lagos Weekly Times, 1890, Lagos Echo, 1891, Lagos Weekly Record, 1891-
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other normatively approved channels and processes of participation on those occasions 
when they found the cause.  
As long as Lagos remained a Crown colony most of them continued to furnish all 
three ‘bases of legitimacy’ perceptions of its authority.  Because many of them were there 
and witnessed and even celebrated the execution of the instrument of cessation between 
Oba Dosunmu and the British Consul on July 27, 1861 (Echeruo 1977), the ‘personal 
legitimacy’ of the Crown-appointed governor was not lost on them. They were convinced 
that the governor had the legitimate authority to direct the affairs of their society.  Their 
feeling of involvement through their Press, churches and civic organizations in the 
direction of the affairs of their society accounted for the ‘substantive legitimacy’ that they 
extended to the authority of government in Crown colony Lagos society. 
But for their role, it could have been quite difficult if not impossible for British 
authority to transform itself to the rest of Yorubaland the way that it did.
1890-1914: Influence Relations in Lagos Crown Colony Society Are Altered, 
The patterns of authority in the Lagos Crown colony were not typically colonial.  
 This is as far as the returnees were concerned.  Loyalty to the Crown and socialization in 
European culture seemed to be the two qualifying criteria for the accommodation of 
Lagosians in the new polity.  Those two criteria may have accounted for why indigenous 
Lagosians were marginalized by the Saro, the Amaro and the few European residents of 
Lagos at first.  Those indigenous Lagosians who emulated the Saro and the Amaro and 
acquired western education and became socialized in European culture were quickly 
1930, Lagos Standard, 1893-1920, ‘Nigerian’ Chronicle, 1908-1913, and The ‘Nigerian’
Times, 1910-13—see Ayandele (1974: 14), Echeruo (1977: 4), and Mann (1985: 184). 
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integrated in the new society too.  But the decision to impose classical colonial rule in the 
entire Niger basin altered all that.  The practice of colonial authority required a more 
congruent and consonant authority patterns.  The immediate casualty of the alteration was 
the positive perception Crown colony authority by the returnee community.
As from the early 1890s there emerged a shift in the “conditions permitting 
special roles” (Kopytoff 1965: vii) for the returnees and their descendants in Lagos.  The 
major instigation of that shift was the change in British government policy in favor of 
classical colonial rule in the Niger basin.  British “[p]olicy makers in London … now 
assumed that Great Britain would remain in the colony indefinitely and that in future 
whites would play a larger and educated Africans a smaller part in colonial development” 
(Mann 1985: 23).  Frederick Lugard, the most prominent architect of British colonial 
efforts and policy in East Africa and the Niger basin who was described by P. C. Lloyd 
(1960) as “an autocrat, a terrible autocrat, determined to run Nigeria as a one-man show” 
(in Afigbo 1972: 164) articulated this view in The Dual Mandate in British Tropical 
Africa (1922/1965), his primer on classical colonialism in tropical Africa.  This 
development marked an important milestone in the evolution of the authority patterns of 
the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state.  
Mr. William MacGregor who was appointed governor of the Colony and 
“Protectorate” of Lagos in 1899 enacted his Native Councils Ordinance of November 4, 
1901 (Afigbo 1971b) which became one of the several practical steps that marked that 
shift in policy.103  The ordinance which “set up a Central Native Council to advise the 
Governor on matters concerning the good government and the well-being of the native 
103 MacGregor was governor of the Colony and “Protectorate” of Lagos, which included 
the entire Yorubaland from 1899-1901.
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population” (Afigbo 1971b: 440) was roundly criticized by the African members of the 
Lagos Legislative Council “as an unjustified interference with the rights of internal self-
government of the Yoruba states as guaranteed in the various treaties of cession” (Afigbo 
1971b: 451).  In Lagos, under MacGregor and his predecessor institutions modeled on 
“British lines …were dismantled and replaced with chieftaincy institutions” 
(Nwabughuogu 1981: 66) in Lagos.  
William Macgregor’s tenure inaugurated an era in which the bureaucrats in the 
Colonial Office, London embarked on a conscious effort to reformulate authority patterns 
in Crown colony Lagos society.  That reformulation produced a number of quick shifts in 
the influence relations in Lagos.  The Saro, Amaro, and western educated Lagosians were 
quickly shut off from the various positions they held in the civil service and bureaucracy.  
Force and coercive became the main means through which society was made to comply 
to directives.  New policies were formulated to among other things, reinvent indigenous 
authority patterns and make them responsive to the dictates of colonial control.
We shall see in the next chapter, how one of them called the “indirect rule” policy 
was formulated and implemented and used to achieve British state building in the Niger 
basin.   The visible impact of the “indirect rule” policy can be found in Igboland and 
Yorubaland where it altered aspects of pre-colonial indigenous political systems that 
promoted responsiveness of leaders to society and the participation of ordinary members 
of society.   
The new policy makers in the British government at the time who favored 
classical colonial rule in the Niger basin and elsewhere in Africa against the 
encouragement of participation of indigenes in their affairs suddenly found use for all 
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forms of racist theories on African inferiority as justification (Ayandele 1974).  In Lagos, 
society was systematically transformed into a racially stratified social unit—different 
social facilities for Europeans and Africans, substandard social services for Africans, 
systematic restriction of Africans to only lower level positions with dismal pay in the 
civil service, etc.  (Tamuno 1972; Sptizer 1974, Ayandele 1974, and Mann 1985).  
William MacGregor himself was alarmed by the trend which prompted him to declare in 
two separate letters to the Colonial Secretary in London that: “Segregation would … be 
disastrous here” (in Mann 1985: 24).  
The story was similar in the realm of business and commerce.  According to 
Anthony Hopkins, “African merchants were able to flourish during the period 1850-1880 
because trading conditions at that time gave no overwhelming advantage to large firms” 
(Hopkins 1973: 203) which were all European concerns.  European firms must have been 
energized by the dawn of a racial situation that favored Europeans and discriminated 
against Africans, to embark on racially motivated “non-competitive practices in an effort 
to force African merchants out of business” (Mann 1985: 24).  The backlash from that did 
not augur well for the legitimacy of British authority in Lagos.   
The Saro and Amaro who “had agitated for more vigorous colonial expansion [in 
the Niger basin] during the 1880s and 1890s, expecting to be Britain’s partners in 
progress … had not anticipated the heightened racism that accompanied the change in 
policy” (Mann 1985: 23).  Their notion of themselves as partners in the practice of British 
authority entered a lapse at the time when the dawn of classical colonial rule and its 
supporting ideology, structures, and patterns of authority dictated a redefinition of Lagos 
society and its inhabitants according to racial lines.
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Suddenly, all Africans in Lagos became vocal opponents of British authority and 
a new consciousness among Lagosians with western education began to evolve.  Their 
relations with the representative of the British Crown soured and caused them to embark 
on different creative and disruptive acts of participation directed at displacing British 
authority for good.  This period coincided with the extension of classical colonial rule to 
the greater Niger basin, up north and down south under the aegis of the “Protectorate” 
governments of Southern and Northern “Nigeria”.  It was a period that brought the Igbo, 
Yoruba, Hausa-Fulani, and others closer to being tied into a single but artificial socio-
political arrangement for the first time in their respective political histories.  
The Period 1896-1906: Colonial Authority Patterns are Extended to the Rest of the 
Niger Basin
The extension of colonial authority patterns to the entire Niger basin is 
synonymous with the ‘second phase of the overthrow of indigenous authority’ in the 
nationalities that inhabit the areas (Anene 1966).  The various architects of classical 
colonial rule in the Niger basin were faced with the diverse socio-political circumstances 
that exist in its indigenous societies.  However, all of them held fast to a construct quite 
pervasive at the time amongst Europeans which posits that without proper European 
supervision and guidance, Africans “were incapable of ensuring good government for 
their peoples” (Afigbo 1972: 82).  That could have accounted for why they proceeded to 
institute the norm of excluding the inhabitants of the Niger basin from participating in 
their own governance.  But given their relentless energy one could say that their quest to 
bring the inhabitants of the Niger basin under a single political umbrella was driven by 
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their desire to exclude them in that process more then anything else.  The desire to 
exclude indigenes from the task of bringing them under one political umbrella became 
the underlying rationale, which informed all the efforts that went into the formulation of 
the authority patterns as well as influence relations that supported colonial rule in the 
Niger basin.
Given that underlying rationale, it must have been clear to the British from the 
outset that they needed to employ military force to impose colonial rule on the inhabitants 
of the Niger basin.  The outcome of the Berlin Conference of 1884-5 became the 
watershed event and turning point for all the other events that culminated in the extension 
of colonial authority patterns to Igboland, Hausaland, and the rest of Yorubaland.  The 
Conference provided a legal seal of approval to participating European states that 
empowered them to partition and self-allocate Africa.
Thus, sequel to the Berlin Conference the lower and upper portions of the Niger 
basin were carved into the “Protectorate” governments of Southern “Nigeria” and 
Northern “Nigeria” respectively.  Both polities served as the crucibles in which colonial 
authority patterns were extended to all inhabitants of the Niger basin.   The Igbo, Yoruba 
and the others that inhabit the lower Niger basin came under the political authority and 
control of the colonial “Protectorate” government of Southern “Nigeria”.  Hausaland and 
all of upper Niger basin were placed under the authority and control of the colonial 
“Protectorate” government of Northern “Nigeria”.  Each of these two new political 
entities was placed under the charge and control of a British “High Commissioner”.104
104 Frederick Lugard who personally led the military campaigns of conquest against the 
Fulani and the nationalities of the upper Niger was made the first “High Commissioner” 
of the “Protectorate” government of Northern “Nigeria” and Ralph Moor was appointed 
to control the “Protectorate” colonial government of Southern “Nigeria”.  
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The nature of military force employed in the conquest of and exercise of colonial 
authority over the Igbo, the Yoruba and the Hausa-Fulani varied in intensity and 
regularity reflecting each nationality’s political system and authority patterns.  
In Igboland where the political system was decentralized, and the authority 
patterns were deeply democratic, military coercion was regular, intense, and extremely 
punitive during conquest and throughout the course of colonial rule.  The refusal of 
Igboland’s countless independent political units to submit to alien conquest presented the 
British with a big problem.  In almost every case a community that was invaded was 
quick to reassert itself as soon as the invading forces left.  
The necessity for regular military patrols to coincide with the beginning of each 
dry season was therefore there from the outset and remained for quite some time 
(Tamuno 1972, Anene 1966).  Furthermore, because of their deeply democratic authority 
patterns most Igbo communities refused to submit to colonialism.  That refusal attracted 
intense and brutal use of military coercion against many communities in Igboland 
(Ekechi 1971, 1983).  Table 4.1which shows the various incidents in Igboland that 
involved the deployment of British-led forces in the period 1886-1957 provides concrete 
support for the argument made above.
Yorubaland’s characteristic centralized authority patterns and large political 
organizations were factors that made the use of military coercion quite perfunctory during 
the period of pacification.  The Anglo-Ijebu war of 1892 was about the only high 
intensity military engagement in Yorubaland during colonial conquest (Afigbo 1971b).  
Centralized authority patterns provided the British with identifiable occupants of 
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authority positions with whom they “treatied”.  That explains why “treaties” featured 
prominently in the extension of colonial authority in Yorubaland.  
Incidents that involved British Military Forces in Igboland During Pacification and Colonial Rule
Year Nationality Involved Target Type of Incident
1886-1899
Several nationalities in 
the 




Several acts of armed  
resistance numbering 
about fifty (50)
November 1901- March 
1902
Arochukwu and the 
Igbo heartland, lower 
Niger





Onisha, Ezi Asaba in 
western Igboland
British authority Several acts of armed 
revolt numbering about 
three (3)
June-August 1906
Owa and Agbo in 
western Igboland, lower 
Niger
British Authority Two (2) armed revolts 
November 1909-May 
1910
Ogwashi Ukwu and 
other parts of western 
Igboland, lower Niger





western Igboland, lower 
Niger
The ‘Nigerian’ supra-
national state and its 
authority




Onitisha, Udi, Okigwi, 
Afikpo, Bende, Aba in 
the Igbo heartland in 
the lower Niger, and 
parts of the neighboring 
Igalaland in the upper 
Niger
The ‘Nigerian’ supra-
national state and its 
authority
Seven (7) armed 
rebellions
1929
Igbo, and all the 
nationalities in the 
southeast, lower Niger
The ‘Nigerian’ supra-




1949 Enugu, and other 
townships in the lower 
Niger
The ‘Nigerian’ supra-
national state and its 
authority
þ Strikes (36) involving 
47,000 workers
1950 Townships in the lower 
Niger
The ‘Nigerian’ supra-
national state and its 
authority
þ Strikes (26) involving 
26,000 workers
1957
Townships in southeast 
lower Niger—Enugu, 
Onitsha, Port Harcourt




Table 4.1: Incidents that involved the use of armed forces in Igboland 1886-1957. 
ÞFigures include strikes that took place in townships in Yorubaland.
Sources: Annual Colonial Reports 1916, 1916, 1950, Haywood and Clarke (1969), and 
others.
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But like the Igbo, the democratic authority patterns of the Yoruba were factors that 
disposed them towards mounting resistance against colonial authority—see Table 4.2.  
Communities in Yorubaland were regular objects of punitive military treatments which 
were as unsettling as those that were meted out to the Igbo.
Incidents that involved British Military Forces in Yorubaland During Pacification and Colonial Rule 
Year Nationality Involved Targeted Author Type of Incident
1892
The Ijebu Yoruba 




January-February 1897  Ilorin (northern 
Yorubaland, lower 
Niger)
British Authority Armed resistance









Oyo Yoruba, in the 
lower Niger
The ‘Nigerian’ supra-
national state, its 
authority and the 
Alafin
Bloody armed revolt
1918 Egba Yoruba, lower 
Niger
The ‘Nigerian’ supra-
national state Extensive armed revolt
Table 4.2: Incidents that involved the use of armed forces in Yorubaland 1886-1957. Sources: 
Annual Colonial Reports 1916, 1916, 1950, Haywood and Clarke (1969), and others.
As for Hausaland, Frederick Lugard’s conquest of the Fulani Caliphate Empire in 
1904 and the military campaign in 1906 to suppress the Satiru uprising, were about the 
only high intensity military engagements embarked on by the British to impose their 
authority in that part of the upper Niger.  We can attribute that to the Caliphate Empire’s 
highly centralized and large-scale political organization, which was based on extremely 
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autocratic authority patterns.  All that Frederick Lugard did on the heels of his military 
defeat of the last of the Fulani armies was to summon and address the Fulani rulers on the 
plains outside the city of Sokoto to make it clear to them that he was their conqueror.  In 
contrast to the Igbo and the Yoruba, members of the Fulani ruling classes were quick to 
reconcile themselves to British conquest.  They even identified them as benefactors.  
Ahmadu Bello made all that clear in his autobiography when he said: “Whatever the 
rights and wrongs of the attack on Kano and Sokoto may be, the British were the 
instrument of destiny and were fulfilling the will of God.105  In their way they did it well.  
Even at the actual time there was no ill-will after the occupation.  We were used to 
conquerors and these were different: they were polite and obviously out to help us rather 
than themselves” (Bello 1962: 17).  What followed was the alliance which he initiated 
with them, which guaranteed political performance in that portion of the Niger basin 
during and ever since the end of colonial rule.  Most of the revolts and incidents that 
erupted thereafter in the upper Niger were in areas outside the core of the Caliphate 
society and directed at Frederick Lugard and his Fulani allies (Dorward 1969, Tamuno 
1972: 60, and Osuntokun 1979: 144-8)—see Table 4.3.  According to Tamuno, several 
parts of the upper Niger witnessed “instances of stiff and prolonged resistance.  The 
people of the Benue valley, particularly the Idoma and the Tiv, and others who inhabited 
the foothills of the Benue Platueau and the plains and mountains of southern Adamawa 
witnessed punitive expeditions and patrols of the classical type until the 1930s.  The Tiv 
105 Bello was referring to the legendary prophesy by a Fulani Islamic cleric who 
proclaimed in 1803 when the jihad began that “the Fulani Empire would last for one 
hundred years” (Bello 1962: 17).  According to Bello, “No one then was greatly surprised 
when its end came on the grazing ground outside Sokoto almost exactly one hundred 
years later” in 1904 (Bello 1962: 17).  This tendency to wrap themselves and their 
involvements in messianic motifs is an age-old practice by the Fulani.
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provided the best example of prolonged resistance and bloody reprisals in these areas” 
(Tamuno 1972: 60). 
Incidents that involved British Military Forces in the Upper Niger During Pacification and Colonial Rule 
Year Nationality Involved Targeted Author Type of Incident
1886-1899
Several nationalities in 
the 
in the upper and lower 
Niger
Britain’s Royal Niger
Company Several acts of armed  
resistance numbering 
about fifty (50)




British Authority One (1) armed 
resistance
August-September 1900 Yola in the upper Niger British Authority One (1) armed 
resistance
February-May 1900 Kaduna, Gurara, and 
Okwa in the upper 
Niger
British Authority Armed resistance (3)
December 1900 and 
January-February 1901
Bida/Kontagora in the 
upper Niger British Authority Armed resistance (2)
February-March 1906 Satiru, upper Niger 
The British and their 
allies, the Fulani 
ruling classes
Armed revolt (1)
April 1906 Hadeija in Hausaland, 
upper Niger
The British and their 
allies, the Fulani 
ruling classes
Armed revolt (1)
February-March 1906 Tivland, upper Niger The British and their 
allies, the Fulani 
ruling classes
Arevolt (1)
December 1908 Yonkwala and surround 
nationalities, upper 
Niger
The British Armed resistance (3)
November 1914 Kabba, Ilorin, Mada, 
Nasarawa—the “semi-
Islamized” parts of the 
upper Niger that were 
forced into the new 
Caliphate areas
The British and their 
Fulani allies
Armbed rebellion (4)
1915 Kontagora, upper Niger
The ‘Nigerian’ supra-
national state, its 
authority and the 
favored Fulani ruling 
classes
Armed revolt (1)
1915 Kano, Bornu in 
Hausaland, upper Niger
The ‘Nigerian’ supra-
national state, its 
authority and the 
favored Fulani ruling 
classes
Armed revolt (2)
1915 Kano, Bauchi, Bornu
The ‘Nigerian’ supra-
national state, its 
authority and the 
Armed revolt (3)
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favored Fulani ruling 
classes
May 1915-1916 Muri in the upper Niger
The ‘Nigerian’ supra-
national state, its 
authority and the 
favored Fulani ruling 
classes
Armed revolt (1)
1915 Montoil, in the upper 
Niger
The ‘Nigerian’ supra-
national state, its 
authority and the 





national state, its 
authority and the 
favored Fulani ruling 
classes
Armed revolt (1)








Table 4.3: Incidents that involved the use of armed forces in the entire upper Niger 1886-
1957.  Sources: Annual Colonial Reports 1916, 1916, 1950, Haywood and Clarke (1969), 
and others.
In the “Protectorate” of Southern “Nigeria” “the Royal Instructions of 1 January 
1900106 which the British considered the “legal” instrument that instituted their political 
authority and control over the nationalities that inhabit the lower Niger basin did not 
provide for executive and legislative councils [as was the case in the Crown colony of 
Lagos].  These Instructions vested all powers and jurisdiction acquired (sic) by the Crown 
in this protectorate in a High Commissioner” (Tamuno 1966: 4).  Governance in each 
“Protectorate” was essentially ‘a one man show’ (Egerton 1904 in Tamuno 1966: 4) 
under an autocratic “High Commissioner”.  
106 C. O. 380/152, Royal Instructions to Moor, 1 January 1900 (in Tamuno 1966).
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Ralph Moor, the “High Commissioner” in the South at the time was open about 
his resentment of the authority patterns in the colony of Lagos.  In 1901 he decried ‘the 
tendency at present in part of Nigeria (Lagos) [that] appears to lead to the position that 
the native element backed up perhaps by the local commercial community determine (sic) 
the legislative action that can be taken by the Administration” (in Tamuno 1966: 4).  He 
expressed his apprehension that ‘If this position advances a step further … the territories 
of Nigeria will be ruled piecemeal by and for the native…’ (in Tamuno 1966:4).  Moor’s 
preference, which he implemented during his tenure as “High Commissioner”, was 
‘absolute’ colonial rule (in Tamuno 1966: 4).  He considered himself the best-qualified 
interpreter of the interests of indigenes.  His discomfort may have been caused by the fear 
of “the influence educated Africans … exercised … at [the] time in the neighbouring 
Lagos” (Tamuno 1966: 5-6) colony. The colony was finally absorbed by the 
“Protectorate’ of Southern “Nigeria” in 1906.
1900-12: The Evolution of Lugardism in the Upper Niger Basin
We must conduct a closer assessment of the authority patterns that Frederick 
Lugard instituted during his tour as the first “High Commissioner” in the “Protectorate” 
government of Northern “Nigeria” (Nwabughuogu 1981: 90).  The necessity and logic 
for such a closer assessment derives from the rationale that Frederick Lugard wasted no 
time to extend the same patterns and system of rule to the rest of the Niger basin after the 
amalgamation of the two “Nigerias” in 1914.  Together, the amalgamation and Frederick 
Lugard’s tenure as governor-general epitomized the consolidation of the authority of a 
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unitary supra-national state over all the nationalities that inhabit the upper and lower 
Niger. 
Single-handedly, in the period from 1900-6, Frederick Lugard built a new state in 
the upper Niger (Afigbo 1965).  He formulated authority patterns and influence relations 
resembling those of the Fulani rulers of the Caliphate state, with which he projected 
British colonial authority in that region (Hubbard 2000, Perham 1968).  It is not 
surprising at all that Frederick Lugard recognized almost immediately that authority 
patterns and influence relations in Fulani-ruled Hausaland contained almost all the traits 
that he needed to build an imperial outpost in the Niger basin for Britain.  It is in that 
light that we can best understand his disregard for all nationalities in the upper Niger 
(with the exception of the Fulani) and his determination to use the “indirect rule” policy 
to extend Hausa-Fulani-type authority patterns over them.  
When he reasoned that he would bring them into civilization (Lugard 1904) 
through centralized autocratic control, he meant that their indigenous systems of 
governance lacked similar traits.   Furthermore, he meant that the materialization of his 
desire to establish colonial authority and control over them depended solely on the extent 
to which he accomplished the task of extending Hausa-Fulani-type authority patterns to 
their society (Nwabughuogu 1981).  
He spelt out the germ of his projected desire for the inhabitants of the upper Niger 
in a speech he gave on March 21, 1903 to a gathering of Fulani rulers comprising the new 
Sultan of Sokoto and Sarkin Muslimi, and his councilors.107
107 ‘… The old treaties are dead, you have killed them.  Now these are the words which I, 
the “High Commissioner”, have to say for the future.  The Fulani in old times under Dan 
Fodio conquered this country.  They took the right to rule over it, to levy taxes, to depose 
kings and to create kings.  They in turn have by defeat lost their rule which has come into 
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According to Kirk-Greene, “Many of the basic principles of indirect rule … in the 
emirates are to be found in it, and some of the features have survived the colonial period 
and persisted through independence (Kirk-Greene 1965: 6).
As “High Commissioner”, Frederick Lugard “centralize[d] power in his own 
hands” (Flint 1969: 252 in Afigbo 1972: 164) and situated himself as the supreme 
legislative and executive authority over the upper Niger basin which he equated to the 
the hands of the British.  All these things which I have said the Fulani by conquest took 
the right to do now pass to the British.  Every Sultan and Emir and the principal officers 
of state will be appointed by the “High Commissioner” throughout all this country.  The 
“High Commissioner” will be guided by the usual laws of succession and the wishes of 
the people and chiefs, but will set them aside if he desires for good cause to do so.  The 
Emirs and Chiefs who are appointed will rule over the people as of old time and take 
such taxes as are approved by the “High Commissioner”, but they will obey the laws of 
the Governor and will act in accordance with the advice of the Resident….  It is 
forbidden to import firearms (except flint-locks), and there are other minor matters which 
the Resident will explain.  The Alkalis and Emirs will hold the law courts as of old but 
bribes are forbidden, and mutilation and confinement of men in inhuman prisons are not 
lawful.  The powers for each Court will be contained in a warrant appointing it.  
Sentences of death will not be carried out without the consent of the Resident.  
The Government will, in future, hold the rights in land which the Fulani took by 
conquest from the people, and if Government requires land it will take it for any purpose.  
The Government holds the right of taxation, and will tell the Emirs and Chiefs what taxes 
they may levy, and what part of them must be paid to Government.  The Government will 
have the right to all minerals, but the people may dig for iron and work in it subject to the 
approval of the “High Commissioner”, and may take salt and other minerals subject to 
any excise imposed by law.  Traders will not be taxed by Chiefs but only Government.  
The coinage of the British will be accepted as legal tender, and a rate of exchange for 
cowries fixed, in consultation with Chiefs, and they will enforce it.
When an Emirate, or an office of state, becomes vacant, it will only be filled with 
the consent of the “High Commissioner”, and the person chosen by the council of Chiefs 
and approved by the “High Commissioner” will hold his place only on condition that he 
obeys the laws of the Protectorate and the conditions of his appointment.  Government 
will in no way interfere with the Mohammedan religion.  All men are free to worship 
God as they please.  Mosques and prayer places will be treated with respect by us.  Every 
person, including slaves, has the right to appeal to the Resident, who will, however, 
endeavour to uphold the power of the native courts to deal with native cases according to 
the law and custom of the country.  If slaves are ill-treated they will be set free as your 
Koran orders, otherwise Government does not desire to interfere with existing domestic 
relations.  But slaves set free must be willing to work and not remain idle or become 
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just conquered Fulani Sokoto Caliphate Empire.  He responded only to the Colonial 
Secretary in the Colonial Office, London.  He designated the Emirates in the now defunct 
Caliphate Empire as administrative “Provinces” and called them “Native Authorities”.  
Each Emir became the principal sole “Native Authority” atop a hierarchy of “five grades 
of chiefs” (Afigbo 1971b: 444) who became his sole “Native Authorities”108.  Each 
“Province” was entrusted to a British Resident who reported directly to the “High 
Commissioner”.  Although an Emir was meant to be the sole “Native Authority” in his 
Emirate, he was still subordinated to the Resident.  The “Provinces” were in turn 
apportioned into “Divisions” each of which was entrusted to a “Division Officer” or D. 
O.  However, in reality, the D. O. “actually ruled the Native Authorities [in his Division.  
He was the] undisputed prince, combining in his person legislative, executive, and 
judicial roles” (Ola 1968: 236).  All “Division Officers” in a “Province” were placed 
under the administrative supervision and control of the “Resident” to whom they reported 
directly.  However, all directives in the “Protectorate” emanated exclusively from 
Frederick Lugard himself.   
The coverage of Frederick Lugard’s highly regimented directives was 
comprehensive, and their latitude was specific.  Even Emirs were required to “observe 
rules” (Smith 1964: 185).  He relied on elaborate machinery to ensure close supervision 
thieves.  The Resident may give permits to trustworthy men to bear arms. … (Kirk-Green 
1965: 43-4).
108 Frederick Lugard formulated and administered an oath of office to these “Native 
Authorities” that ran as follows: “I, swear, in the name of Allah and Muhammad his 
prophet, to serve well and truly His Majesty King Edward VII and his representative, the 
“High Commissioner” of Northern Nigeria, to obey the laws of the Protectorate and the 
lawful commands of the “High Commissioner” and of the Resident, provided they are not 
contrary to my religion.  And if they are contrary, I will at once inform the Resident for 
the information of the “High Commissioner”.  I will cherish in my heart no treachery or 
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of his directives.  The sanction threshold attracted by the violation of each directive was 
quite severe.  He believed that indigenous peoples were incapable of participating in their 
own governance, and his ‘self-sustained’ power absolved him of every responsiveness to 
the people he administered, thanks to the “efficient army” (Bull 1963: 47) and police that 
he created and deployed often to exact submissiveness from the subject peoples.  In deed, 
he found “good” use for the Fulani system (Adeleye 1972: 209).  As Afigbo (1971b: 444) 
rightly observed, he tried to bring the inhabitants of the upper Niger under effective 
control by “collaborating with another imperially minded race”.  
As he stated in his Sokoto address, he strongly believed that conquest of the 
Fulani imbued the “rights” of control and oversight over them on him.  He exercised the 
last word of veto over all matters including appointments in every “Native Authority”.
His “Residents” were de facto autocrats who simply dictated to the Emirs and in most 
cases did not even care to consult them prior to embarking on policies (Ayandele 1966).  
In a 1907 dispatch to Frederick Lugard, “Resident” Burdon proudly asserted “an 
undoubted fact that the wishes of the Government, expressed through the residents, are 
carried out to the letter without any question by the various Emirs” (Burdon to Lugard 
1/11/1907 in Ayandele 1966: 516).  Involved were two sets of autocratic authority 
patterns—Fulani and colonial—that shared consonance within as well as congruence 
amongst one another to elicit satisfactory or good political performance within certain 
parts of the polity.  So much so that “many of the Residents” (Ayandele 1966: 516) 
proclaimed a ‘sentimental attachment for traditional culture’ of the Caliphate society 
(Ayandele 1966).
disloyalty, and I will rule my people with justice, and without partiality.  And as I carry 









Figure 4.2: Lugardian authority patterns in colonial Hausaland
The Sultan who presided over Fulani authority in pre-colonial Caliphate society 
was effectively displaced “by Lugard and his successors as the immediate suzerain of the 
Emirs” (Smith 1964: 186) and as we mentioned earlier, “each Emir [became] sole Native 
Authority for his chiefdom, and responsible for its good order and discipline through the 
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Provincial Resident” (Smith 1964: 186) and of course the “High Commissioner”,109 who 
was also the ultimate authority in the over all.  
Frederick Lugard derived the legitimacy for his authority “to levy taxes, to depose 
kings and to create kings” (Kirk-Greene 1965: 43) in Hausaland from a single source: 
“right of conquest, the very claim of the Fulani themselves a century before” (Kirk-
Greene 1965: 6).  Again, as governor-general of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state, 
Frederick Lugard and his successors invoked the same ‘right of conquest’ as the only 
‘basis of legitimacy’ for their extensive authority.  In the post-colonial period subsequent 
military actors who have exercised authority in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state have 
all invoked the same ‘right’ as the sole basis of legitimacy for their own rule.  
In spite of their subservient status under British colonial administrators, the Fulani 
rulers were hardly perturbed.  There were reasons for that.  One such reason is that their 
alliance with the British fostered the common objective of perpetuating the stifling of 
popular participation in the affairs of the Caliphate society.   In fact, “Relations between 
the Fulani and the British remained cordial, with little thought [between them] of 
increasing popular participation in local government” (Smith 1964: 186).  As it was in the 
pre-colonial era when Dan Fodio, his brother Abdullahi and his son Bello formulated and 
issued all “doctrine and orders” (Smith 1964: 173), through their lieutenants in Arabic, 
Frederick Lugard issued his directives as confidential Memoranda addressed to his staff 
(Smith 1964, Kirk-Greene 1965).  In both situations the conquered peoples were largely 
kept ignorant of their “conquerors’ written doctrine and instructions” (Smith 1964: 173) 
on how they must be controlled. 
109 See Government of Nigeria, Ordinance to Prescribe the Powers and Duties of Native 
Authorities, No. 40 (1933) and Ordinance for Administration of Justice and the 
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Frederick Lugard was particularly careful that “Very little information was passed 
on to the public about the aims, methods, rules and tasks of the various administrative 
agencies” (Smith 1964: 186).  That was purposeful and deliberate—“his rules regulating 
communications between British administrators and the subjects protected the native 
officials by minimizing opportunities for complaint” (Smith 1964: 186).  That was an 
effective way of shielding rulers from responsiveness in their influence relations with 
members of the larger society.  Because of the expectation that complaints from 
subordinates in society can elicit some form of feedback from the leadership in a social 
unit, in the E-G scheme complaint is articulated as a logical link between the 
Participation and Responsiveness dimensions (Eckstein and Gurr 1975).  Authority that 
stifles participation and complaints from subordinate members of society is bound to be 
unresponsive too.   Frederick Lugard’s deliberate efforts to impede members of the larger 
society from all access to information on his ‘practice of authority’ are akin to the 
erection of impediments to channels of Participation.  Irrespective of how trivial it may 
be, information on the ‘practice of authority’ in any society is the fuel that energizes the 
participation of people in the socio-political organization of their society.  These 
assertions put the Caliphate and the colonial authority patterns into the same autocratic 
and unresponsive slot.
Another reason that underlay the cordial relations between the British and the 
Fulani rulers was that the former “guaranteed the security and hereditary positions of” 
(Smith 1964: 185) the latter.  The Fulani rulers were a buffer that protected colonial rule 
and its practitioners from the ire of the masses of people in the Caliphate society.  That 
buffer bound the two authority patterns together.  Thus, during colonial rule practitioners 
Constitution of Native Courts, No. 44 (1933) in Smith 1964: 186).
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of authority in Hausaland were linked in a “mutually beneficial alliance” (Adeleye 1972: 
210) at the expense of the talakawa who remained “tied to their farms as serfs or 
peasants, and having limited interests or rights in their government” (Smith 1964: 170).  
The set-up produced a performance-enabling social climate for colonial rule in the 
Caliphate society.  Furthermore, it was “[b]ecause British personnel were spared the 
opprobrium that could arise from regular confrontation with members of the masses” 
(Adeleye 1972: 210), that the “Protectorate” colonial government was able to consolidate 
its authority from the outset and all the way throughout the period of colonial rule.  That 
can explain the apparent success of colonial rule in the “Northern Provinces” as opposed 
to the South.
Since the pre-jihad era, in addition to being an instrument for raising revenue for 
rulers and state, taxation affirmed the asymmetry between rulers and subjects in 
Hausaland.  Frederick Lugard alluded to that in his Sokoto address to the assembled 
Fulani rulers.  There have always been various types of taxation (Smith 1964) including 
the gaisuwa which is plainly a form of bribe that lubricated super-ordinate-subordinate 
influence relations in Hausa-Fulani society.  After their jihad the Fulani rulers retained 
the taxation system and practice that existed, initiated the practice of taxing their pagan 
subjects “according to the degree of their subjection” (Perham 1937: 52).  Frederick 
Lugard was therefore aware of the role that taxation played in authority relations between 
super-ordinate individuals and subordinates in Hausa-Fulani society.  By virtue of the 
taxation that he imposed he sent the clear message to the Fulani rulers and their subjects 
that they must submissively comply with his directives.  “Payment”, therefore, 
“implicitly recognized the British authority to levy tax” (Smith 1964: 184) and to rule.  
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He left the giasuwa in place and consolidated all other types of tax into two—“the haraji
due from sedentary folk and jagali, payable in cash, from the cattle nomads …. [which 
were] assessed as a lump sum due from each village head “ (Smith 1964: 184).  Frederick 
Lugard was therefore able to enhance all asymmetry in the governmental and non-
governmental patterns in Hausaland through the “indirect rule” system.
Frederick Lugard’s policy of “indirect rule” ensured smooth intercourse between 
the two authority patterns which preserved all aspects of government-subject linkage 
such as the taxation system, the patronage-clientage system, etc. in the Caliphate society.   
The perpetuation of the one system through which surplus value was expropriated from 
the talakawa for the upkeep of rulers, and another that enabled the rigid asymmetry that 
divides society into super-ordinates (rulers) and subordinates (subjects) during colonial 
rule underscored the congruence between Fulani rule and colonialism.  There was 
therefore no wonder why colonial rule instigated extensive revolts in Fulani-subjugated 
tutelage areas and Tivland for instance—see Table 4.3, but failed to do the same in core 
Caliphate areas of the “Protectorate” of Northern “Nigeria”.  
Furthermore, the British relied on the cordial relationship that evolved between 
them and the Fulani rulers to sow the seeds of new social patterns that germinated and 
quickly blossomed into formidable props for the practice of autocratic authority in 
Hausaland during and after colonialism.  Two good examples that come to mind in that 
regard are their (i) preservation and accommodation of Islam, and (ii) their micro-
management of education policy in the “Protectorate”. 
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The Period 1914-60: Lugardism and the Transformation of Colonial Authority 
Patterns in the Lower Niger Basin—Igboland and Yorubaland        
For several reasons that we will soon furnish in the discourse the scenario of 
events in the upper Niger was dramatically different from the one that unfolded among 
the Igbo and the Yoruba and in the rest of the lower Niger.  The differences that exist in 
the political system and political organization that prevailed in the two nationalities will 
be used to account for that divergence.  For one, decades of trading and several years of 
evangelist activities in the lower Niger provided British personnel with extensive data 
and experience on its inhabitants.  The crop of actors—lawyers, evangelists, traders, etc. 
and other facets of liberal England—who were attracted by Britain’s colonial 
involvement in the lower Niger started things quite differently (Nicolson 1969).  But the 
logic of colonial rule dictated that they overlook and suppress all democratic components 
of indigenous authority patterns they came in contact with.  Later day actors like 
Frederick Lugard and most of those that operated in upper Niger were conservative 
Victorian gentlemen who disdained liberalism and were attracted to colonial service by 
the peculiarities of Fulani authority in Hausaland that they embraced and incorporated 
into the colonial state they built (Nicolson 1969).  The conservative orientation of those 
Victorian gentlemen made them even more disdainful of nationalities in the lower Niger 
who they labeled primitive on account of the democratic traits in their indigenous 
authority patterns. 
The impeded channels of Participation inherent in colonialism’s governmental 
authority patterns quickly drove many in Igboland and Yorubaland into various modes of 
creative—and often disruptive—acts of participation from the very outset.  The modes of 
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those acts were both ‘varied’ and ‘strenuous’.  In Igboland particularly, those acts 
initially came in the form of armed resistance, but over the course of time, they waned 
and assumed the modes of ‘indifference’ and “passive resistance” (Afigbo 1971b: 451).  
In spite of Christianity’s great demands on a people who’s governmental and non-
governmental authority patterns are intricately intertwined with their own traditional 
religion, the adoption of Christianity was a group action by Igbo communities and 
individuals alike to protect themselves from the abusive excesses of colonial authority 
(Ekechi 1971).  The penchant of some European missionaries to stand up to abusive 
colonial autocrats became an incentive for defiant communities to embrace Christianity 
in Igboland.  The adoption of the Christian faith provided them with immunity against 
violent military patrols and expeditions, and spared them from wanton exactions of 
forced labor, floggings, and imprisonment under the Collective Punishment Ordinance 
(Ekechi 1971).  Over the course of time both the Igbo and the Yoruba took advantage of 
the western education that they acquired from Christian missionary agencies and 
embarked on the next phase of their creative acts of participation in defiance of colonial 
authority (Afigbo 1971b).
Among the Igbo and in Yorubaland—excluding the Crown colony of 
Lagos—British political authority continued its evolution under the aegis of the 
“Protectorate” government of Southern “Nigeria”, into which the parts of the Niger basin 
controlled by the Royal Niger Company and the Foreign Office respectively were 
consolidated in 1899.  Unlike the Yoruba whose indigenous political system was 
centralized, which the British erroneously felt was straightforward and quite amenable to 
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classical colonial rule and control, the intricately complex political systems and 
supporting structures of Nd’Igbo presented the British with a huge political
Colonial Office





Figure 4.3: Lugardian authority patterns in colonial Igboland and Yorubaland
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and administrative challenge.  Unfortunately, that challenge was perceived in quite a 
simplistic way, hence the manner in which British colonial administrators proceeded to 
address it.
Based on the mistaken conviction that political authority in the various Igbo 
villages resided in individual “headmen” or “chiefs” the “Protectorate” government of 
Southern “Nigeria” proceeded to “introduce the Warrant Chief System” (Afigbo 1966: 
540) of rule which sidetracked indigenous political “institutions and work[ed] at cross-
purposes to them” (Afigbo 1971b: 443).  Under this system, “warrants” were given to 
individuals in an arbitrary fashion.  The “warrant” chiefs were designated to take part in 
hearing cases in “Native Courts” (Afigbo 1966).  The “Warrant” became the power as 
well as authority for anyone who received it from the “Protectorate” colonial government 
(Afigbo 1967).  While the “British regarded the warrant as a recognition of an authority 
which its holder was supposed to enjoy by traditional right …[,] in popular usage a 
warrant chief meant a chief whose only source of authority was the warrant” (Afigbo 
1971b: 443).  Thus, in all Igbo communities, all “warrant” chiefs were regarded as 
illegitimate agents of an illegitimate alien authority, which exacted compliance to its 
directives on the people, by the use or the threat of force.  The “warrant” chiefs exercised 
their authority by force.  In most cases people refused to even submit but resolved to dig 
themselves firmly on the points of ‘indifference’ or ‘insubordination’.  In several parts of 
the Igbo hinterland the “Native Courts” in which the “warrant” chiefs functioned were 
established on the heels of punitive expeditions “to further keep the people under close 
government surveillance” (Ekechi 1974: 155).  In conception and practice the “warrant 
262
chief” system and the “Native Courts” were both affronts to the authority pattern of 
Nd’Igbo.   
Some of the individuals who were given the “warrants” “were the traditional 
ritual heads of their villages” (Afigbo 1966: 541).  The rest were either misfits who were 
otherwise unqualified to speak for their communities or “just ordinary young men of no 
special standing in indigenous society who had been pushed forward for the specific 
purpose of parleying with the white man” (Afigbo 1966: 541).  As we established 
elsewhere, being a ritual head in traditional Igbo society did not imbue sole executive 
authority on anyone.  In those instances where the “warrants” were given to traditional 
ritual heads of village groups or clans, their recipients consequently became and were 
seen as agents of illegitimate alien authority, which augured quite badly for the ‘personal 
legitimacy’ of such “warrant” chiefs.  The Igbo believed that the new political order 
violated their indigenous authority patterns by imposing sole executive power on 
“warrant chiefs” (Afigbo 1966: 541).  Moreover, lumping autonomous political units 
together under the “Native Courts” violated the legendary sovereignty of respective 
village units and compromised political performance in Igboland and within the supra-
national state itself.  
The only “native” aspect of the “Native Courts” was the “warrant chiefs” in the 
sense that they were indigenous men.  The real authority over each “Native Court” was 
the District Commissioner who was appointed the ex-officio president by the “High 
Commissioner”.  The laws that were administered in the “Native Courts” were handed 
down directly from the “High Commissioner”, and the “Court” proceedings were British 
and “guided by detailed regulations drawn by the law officers” (Afigbo 1966: 541) of the 
263
“Protectorate” government.  As appointees of the colonial authority the “warrant chiefs”, 
their Court Clerks and Court Messengers or Kotima saw themselves “as dispensing a 
‘new type of justice’” (Afigbo 1966: 542) that lacked the need for responsiveness on their 
part.  They operated as agents of an authority that existed above the people.  There were 
two grades of “Native Courts”.  The first or “Minor Courts” were just below the “Native 
Councils by virtue of the fact that the former was presided by a “warrant chief” while the 
latter was presided over by a British District Commissioner or District Officer (Afigbo 
1972).
In Yorubaland the centralized position of the chief of state became the basis for 
implementing the “indirect rule” policy in each Yoruba polity.  The chiefs of state 
became the presidents of the “Native Courts” in their polity, which gave them “more 
powers than they should exercise under traditional constitutions and so estranged them 
from their councils” (Afigbo 1971: 457) and community.   Their detachment from 
indigenous Yoruba authority patterns was leavened by their placement under British 
“Residents”.
Colonial authority patterns in the entire Niger basin were subsequently 
consolidated and centralized in the “Nigeria” supra-national state.  The amalgamation—
which will be analyzed later in the chapter on British state building policies—was 
utilized to consolidate and centralize colonial authority and merge the two colonial 
administrative polities in 1914. 
Amalgamation helped Frederick Lugard who became the Governor-general110 of 
amalgamated “Nigeria to preserve the authority patterns he built and nurtured in the 
110 Frederick Lugard created this “strongly authoritarian position” (Flint 1969 in Afigbo 
1972: 164) for himself in the amalgamation of the two “Nigerias”.  He convinced the 
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upper Niger and extend them to the lower Niger (Afigbo 1967, 1972, Perham 1937).  
Lagosians credit him with inaugurating and presiding over the “damn-nigger era” 
(Duffield 1971: 258-9) in Anglo-West African relations.  The construction of colonial 
authority patterns in the lower and upper Niger was a personalized accomplishment of the 
individual colonial actors, particularly Frederick Lugard, the principal state builder. 
Frederick Lugard was deeply improvisational in the formulation of the directives as he 
went along.  More than anything else, he seemed to have been guided by his personal 
tastes and prejudice.  As “High Commissioner” he explained his aversion for a single 
rational-legal system in the upper Niger with the two shifty excuses that it would alienate 
the Fulani rulers, and create ambiguity in the administration of justice in the Caliphate 
society (Afigbo 1971b: 445).  He allowed the Fulani rulers to retain their age-old Islamic 
Alkali courts, which functioned without over-sight by his political staff.  When he 
became governor-general he scraped the existing single-legal system in the lower Niger 
and replaced it with the dual contraption he developed in Hausaland for the different 
reason that a single legal system under the Supreme Court would introduce alien values 
into and destabilize “‘primitive’ communities” (Afigbo 1967: 693).  The precedence that 
Frederick Lugard and the rest set in personalizing the formulation of directives became 
an unfortunate legacy that survived into the post-colonial era.  There is hardly a post-
colonial political actor in the supra-national state who does not indulge in the art of 
creative formulation of directives to suit his definition of “legal”.
We will illuminate the authority patterns of the supra-national state a little further 
by conducting a more thorough assessment of the Political Memoranda, the compendium 
Colonial Office to let him remain in charge even during his extended annual leave.  Thus, 
an office was reserved for him in the Foreign Office building in London from where he 
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of directives that Frederick Lugard formulated during his time as “High Commissioner” 
and applied to all parts of the Niger basin when he became governor-general.  The aim 
here is to use the E-G scheme to assess the Memoranda comparative to the Igbo, Yoruba, 
and Hausa-Fulani.
When we extrapolate from the definition of Directiveness—“the extent to which 
supers attempt to influence the behavior of members of a social unit by means of 
directives” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 53)—the Memoranda epitomized attempts to 
comprehensively influence the behavior of the inhabitants of the Niger basin.  In the 
context of the E-G scheme the coverage of the Memoranda was comprehensive.  
Frederick Lugard’s Ordinances and Regulations touched every aspect of life in the supra-
national state.  Some of if not all of them still prevail in “Nigeria’s” statute books.111  As 
we mentioned somewhere earlier, Frederick Lugard was the sole legislative and executive 
authority.  He only delegated the enforcement of his directives to his staff.  The
Memoranda contained his personal explanations of and his views of each directive.  They 
contained his suggestions on how each one could best be applied.  The ‘sanction 
threshold’ of the Memoranda was quite ‘severe’ for everyone involved including his 
lieutenants.  He was specific that only he can amend, and that no one may depart from the 
stipulations of the Memoranda.  He also decreed that attempts made in that regard would 
attract severe sanctions.
The extreme asymmetry between the British colonial administrators and the 
colonized nationalities was evident in the non-involvement of indigenous peoples or their 
representatives in the formulation of the Memoranda.  His meticulous efforts to avoid 
continued to rule his “Nigeria” during his annual leave. 
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responsiveness by circulating them only to his staff has been discussed above.  Unlike in 
the Caliphate where a docile population cared less about how it was governed, Frederick 
Lugard’s style for subjecting every aspect of their lives to specific directives provoked 
considerable resentment in Igboland and Yorubaland where Participation and 
Responsiveness are age-old dimensions of authority patterns.  Colonial rule provoked 
extensive acts of political instability such as riots, armed insurrections, demonstrations, 
strikes, various acts of passive resistance, etc. in both nationalities for that reason.  Hence 
his reliance on force to achieve the task of enforcing his directives.  Ruth First described 
his “system … as a classic example of militarism in government” (First 1970: 34).  The 
‘Northern ‘Nigerian’ Proclamation’ of November 1, 1906 and the ‘Native Courts 
Ordinance’ of 1914 (Duffield 1971) epitomize his preference for order over law as an 
inherent aspect of authority relations in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state.  Like his other 
legacies, this preference for order over law has refused to wither.  Every post-colonial 
regime in the supra-national state wields it as a veritable instrument of political control of 
the nationalities.
The Igbo were particularly resentful of the imposition of individuals—foreign and 
indigenous—on them as all-powerful agents of alien authority (Afigbo 1971b).  The 
Yoruba were also irked and rankled by the sudden transformation of their constitutional 
monarchies into unresponsive institutions whose occupants were selected and remained 
in office at the pleasure of the British “High Commissioner” and his staff (Afigbo 
1971b)112.  
111See ‘Nigerian’ Land Law and Custom (1951/1962) and The ‘Nigerian’  Legal System
(1954/1963) by T. Olawale Elias. 
112 In 1900, 1901, and 1903 the Governor of the Colony and “Protectorate” of Lagos 
whose authority extended over all of Yorubaland took disciplinary actions against 
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The E-G scheme posits that perception and knowledge of leaders by subordinates 
are important criteria in the overall assessment of the authority of the former by the latter.  
Eckstein and Gurr (1975: 213) state that, “a personal characteristic … was the one factor 
other than position … frequently mentioned as a basis of authority”.  It was not only that 
the Igbo and Yoruba lacked knowledge of the various British men who were imposed on 
them as governor-general, “High Commissioner”, Residents, D. Cs. and D. Os, they 
equally lacked knowledge of their recruitment criteria and procedure.   The postulation 
made in the E-G scheme about recruitment being ‘salient for norms of legitimacy’ 
affirmed itself on the imposed colonial actors who were viewed as unworthy of trust and 
support by the Igbo and Yoruba. 
The young age of those men was an unsettling effrontery to both the Igbo and 
Yoruba who recruit their leaders based their age and wisdom among other criteria.  
Furthermore, they could not easily reconcile themselves with leaders who “were 
characteristically authoritarian and extraordinarily autocratic, peculiarly difficult to deal 
with, and extremely overbearing” (Ekechi 1983: 26).  Imposed leaders who took the 
liberty to beat up and publicly flog “African chiefs, elders, young men” (Ekechi 1983: 
34) did not in any way earn the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state and its authority any 
measure of legitimacy in Igboland, Yorubaland, and elsewhere.
Ever since, trust and support for authority in the supra-national state have been in 
short supply in both Igboland and Yorubaland.  The hatred and mistrust for agents or 
anyone perceived as an agent of the supra-national state persists in parts of Igboland 
indigenous leaders in Ibadan (Bashorun and Council), Ilawo (Oluwo) and some members 
of the Ogboni and the Awujale in Ijebu respectively (Afigbo 1971).
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(Ekechi 1974, 1983).113  The continued refusal of the Igbo and the Yoruba to trust and 
line up support for authority in the supra-national state manifest itself in specific 
instances and situations that indicate political instability or poor governmental 
performance in the supra-national state.
In so many ways the Memoranda contradicted traditional norms on what leaders 
can and should do.   Some examples here will suffice.  Specific directives that took away 
the inherent right of ownership and control of land from communities and invested it in 
the supra-national state raised a lot of opprobrium among the Igbo and Yoruba.  The 
directives that proclaimed flogging of adults and imprisonment into effect were instantly 
unpopular in Igboland.  So were directives that authorized government to exact forced 
labor from individuals and communities for road construction and other public works.  In 
Arrow of God, the third book in his historical trilogy on British colonial intervention in 
Igboland, Achebe (1988: 402-22)114 paints a vivid portrait of an episode in a fictional 
village-group about the administration of forced labor through the exaction of flogging of 
adults by an assistant D. O.  The episode clearly portrayed the extensive disaffection that 
113 In 1950, the presence of a British anthropologist and his wife who were on a fieldwork 
in Mbaise, one of the parts of Igboland where there is extensive hatred of colonial 
authority raised a lot of consternation including a strongly-worded complaint to the 
British D.O. in the area by an indigene (Ekechi 1983: 33).  Another researcher—an 
Igbo—was unable to elicit the cooperation of some people in Mbaise in 1973 because 
they “thought I was a government agent in spite of my protestations to the contrary” 
(Ekechi 1974: 148).  Two participants in a failed coup attempt in 1990 who were from 
Mbaise and the neighboring Obowo clan were given safe passage into exile abroad by 
their two communities after their escape from Lagos.  The story is that the agents of the 
State Security Service, SSS, who visited the two communities, were given a run-around 
which made it impossible for them to even trace the compounds that the two young 
soldiers come from.  In the end they got fed up and returned to Lagos.
114 This is the Picador collection of the three books.  The three books—Things Fall Apart, 
No Longer at Ease, and Arrow of God—that made the trilogy were published separately 
in 1958, 1960, and 1964 respectively.
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was generated amongst the villagers against British authority by directive and the 
‘abnormal’ behavior of the assistant D. O.  Other directives that took judicial arbitration 
away from communities and their recognized channels like the Ama-Ala in Igboland and 
transferred it to the “warrant” chiefs and “Native Courts”, introduced taxation, collective 
punishment, etc. had similar effects.  In terms of stipulations in the E-G scheme, the 
salience of these alien directives gave the affected nationalities instant cause to withhold 
‘substantive legitimacy’ from the supra-national state and its authority.   
In order for us to further substantiate the logic inherent in the refusal of the Igbo 
to withhold ‘substantive legitimacy’ from the supra-national state we will expatiate a 
little more on specific directives, i.e. the laws, actions, and policies initiated by individual 
British men who were appointed by the Colonial Office to practice authority in Igboland.  
Individual British men who wielded colonial authority in most parts of Igboland were 
perceived as brutal, cruel and insensitive because of their conduct (Ekechi 1974, 1983).  
The refusal of the Igbo to comply with directives on forced labor, etc. attracted 
unrestrained military aggression against them on countless occasions.  The validity of this 
statement can be underscored with a brief discussion of the efforts by the British to 
establish colonial authority among the Owere or Southern Igbo who inhabit an extensive 
chunk of the Igbo hinterland.
The raw face of British authority was perceived and felt in Igboland the first time 
“during the Arochukwu Expedition of 1901-02” (Ekechi 1983: 26).  Apart from being the 
first time when a foreign army traversed Igboland (Afigbo 1971a), that Expedition 
exposed almost all parts of Owere Igbo to first hand experiences from British colonial 
authority.  During that Expedition, “food and animals were commandeered by the 
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soldiers and able-bodied men were forced to carry military stores for the expeditionary 
force” (Ekechi 1983: 31) as it traversed Owere Igbo areas on its way to and from 
Arochukwu.  Leaders of Owere Igbo villages and towns were arrested and detained and 
even taken away by the force until they arranged for food and able-bodied men.  Once 
Arochukwu was sacked in that Expedition, British authority assumed the face of one H. 
M. Douglas, 26, who was appointed the D. C. of the newly designated Owere “Province” 
on the recommendation of Lt. Colonel Montanaro, the commander of the Aro Field 
Force.  Douglas quickly embarked on a “series of military aggression ... directed against 
the different communities in the Owere district for the purposes of establishing British 
rule in the area” (Ekechi 1983: 27).  According to Ekechi, it was official policy to destroy 
farms and compounds on villages that were attacked just to make an example and compel 
the people to acknowledge “Government’s prestige in the Owere District” (Ekechi 1983: 
30).  For administrative policy Douglas “adopted the standard colonial strategy of seizing 
… chiefs and elders of [insubordinate villages] as hostages so as, in Douglas’ words, “to 
see if the removal of the Chiefs would have any effect in inducing them to make their 
roads” (Ekechi 1983: 27).  The fear of having their elders held in colonial government 
prisons known for their inhumane conditions made many Owere Igbo communities to 
submit.  However, as the Acting District Commissioner in one part of Owere Igbo once 
confessed, “The practice of calling chiefs to meetings and seizing them [as hostages] has 
resulted in a general distrust of the government and its policy” (in Ekechi 1974: 150). 
The highly regimented directives that were decreed into effect included those that 
sanctioned flogging and collective punishments.  Communities were routinely subjected
to the ‘Collective Punishment Ordinance’, which aimed to facilitate the entrenchment of 
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colonial authority in the Southern “Protectorate”.  According to Egerton, its author, the 
directive was informed by the belief that “In primitive communities crimes, especially 
those of violence, are instigated by the community and carried out by individuals.  The 
punishment of the actual perpetrators is not sufficient, the community must be made to 
suffer” (in Ekechi 1974: 156).  The extensive suffering that was regularly inflicted on 
various Owere Igbo communities under the Collective Punishment Ordinance during the 
period played into their deep distrust and resentment of the British and the system of rule 
they imposed.  Unlike Hausaland where governance and authority involved the normative 
control of the subordinate members of the population in society, the physical control of 
adults was normatively prohibited in Igbo society.  There was routine violation of that 
norm by colonial authority among the Owere Igbo, which robbed it of ‘substantive 
legitimacy.  In indigenous Igbo society general Directiveness was not ‘regimented’, its 
‘coverage’ was not ‘comprehensive’, its ‘latitude’ is ‘specific’, and its ‘sanction 
threshold’ was hardly ‘severe’.  There was no wonder that the Igbo found British 
authority and its lack of responsiveness quite unsettling.  The Igbo were instantly revolted 
by autocratic ‘definition’ of problems and issues, the lack ‘deliberation’ before resolution 
were reached on issues.  Moreover, the ‘implementation’ and ‘sanctioning’ of directives 
by fiat and without ‘feedback’ were as unusual as they were unsettling.  
The punitive nature and character of the Directiveness of the colonial authority 
among the Owere Igbo “left an enduring residue of hatred and bitterness in the minds of 
the people towards Douglas and the colonial administration as a whole.  Especially 
galling to them was the wanton destruction of their homes and farms, the chief anchors of 
their social and economic existence” (Ekechi 1974: 30).
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In Yorubaland, Frederick Lugard’s attempts “to introduce direct taxation which 
he had … come to regard as the linchpin of [his] system … led to much resentment and 
riot” (Afigbo 1971b: 457) including the assassination of a chief who was identified as a 
collaborator.  While regimented directives succeeded in bringing the Igbo and Yoruba to 
submit, it “invariably created a hostile and distrustful attitude towards the administration” 
(Ekechi 1974: 150) amongst them and made them to withhold ‘substantive legitimacy’ 
from the supra-national state.
We have shown with the E-G scheme that the authority patterns of the ‘Nigerian’
supra-national state stand apart from that of the Igbo and the Yoruba in many ways.  
Frederick Lugard and other political actors were able to restructure some aspects of the 
institutional structures of politics in Igboland and Yorubaland in ways that imbued the 
“new” institutions with some traits that resemble their parallels in the supra-national 
state.  We can then argue that the British and indigenous political actors who succeeded 
them at the end of colonial rule are responsible for incorporating the capacity for 
regimentation to Directiveness in particularly Igboland but to some extent in Yorubaland.  
With that, popular participation in governance declined while the age-old obligation by 
the leadership to be responsive to the community began to be ignored in post-colonial 
Igbo and Yoruba societies.  All over Igboland and Yorubaland colonial rule instituted a 
new norm that guided leaders to enforce compliance with their directives through the 
threat or use of raw coercive force.  Conversely, society in Igboland and Yorubaland as 
well as the other nationalities of the Niger basin which now constitute the ‘Nigerian’
supra-national state have not been affected or transformed in a similar way.  Hausaland is 
still an exception in every particular scenario in this story. 
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Thus, instead of one homogeneous sociological entity comprising an integrated 
system of norms, values, and socio-political structures (Zolberg 1968) society in the 
‘Nigerian’ supra-national state is devoid of integration.  That lack of integration is not 
only typical of most states in Africa but is responsible for rendering African states mere 
crucibles that house both the ‘new’ or imposed socio-political structures, arrangements 
and patterns as well as their indigenous parallels which have simply refused to wither 
away (Zolberg 1968: 71).
In the case of Hausaland, it seems that consonance and congruence were 
established in the outset between the authority pattern of the Fulani rulers of the 
Caliphate society and that of the “Protectorate” government of Northern “Nigeria”.  Both 
authority patterns seemed to resemble each other in terms of their relations as well.  That 
may account for why during colonial rule, the Fulani rulers and the British colonial 
administrators developed and maintained a common front and utilized it to suppress the 
subject population in Hausaland and the other nationalities that inhabit the upper Niger 
basin whenever they attempted ‘insubordination’.  Invariably, the ‘Nigerian’ supra-
national state was able to institute “a particular type of un-integrated society which can be 
called ‘syncretic’ ” (Zolberg 1968: 71) amongst its constituting nationalities.  The same 
can be said about many other African states.  
Chapter Summation
British occupation of the Niger basin was in stages.  So was their imposition of 
the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state and its authority patterns.  The Niger basin’s 
geography and the pre-colonial history of its inhabitants impacted both processes.  The 
Yoruba kingdom of Lagos became the first portion of the area to be occupied, in 1861.  
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The annexation of Lagos is directly related to the slave trade, its abolition and events 
related to them.  The Royal Navy needed a staging port in the vicinity of the busy slave-
trafficking Bights of Benin and Biafra, to facilitate its enforcement of the abolition.  
Lagos offered a suitable setting for that, thanks to its natural seaport.
Following annexation, the presence of the Royal Navy in Lagos attracted freed 
slaves and their descendants to return from Sierra Leone (the Saro) and Brazil (the 
Amaro) to resettle in Lagos which was declared a Crown colony.  The presence of the 
Saro and the Amaro is a vital factor that aided the establishment and evolution of British 
authority in the Crown colony in the period 1861-90.  The Saro and Amaro, who were 
factored right into the governmental and non-governmental patterns and influence 
relations of British authority as soon as it was established, provided essential ‘bases of 
legitimacy’ for the practice of authority in Lagos Crown colony.  Their status as Afro-
Europeans and loyal subjects of the British Crown partly facilitated their integration in 
the influence relations which underlay the practice of authority in the colony.  
Between 1890 and 1914 there was a shift in the authority patterns and influence 
relations in the Crown colony.  That shift was necessitated by the resolve in Britain at the 
time to impose classical colonial rule in the Niger basin.  It produced disaffection among 
African members of society in the Crown colony, and subsequently changed their 
positive perception of British authority in that polity.
Colonial authority was extended to Igboland, other parts of Yorubaland, and 
Hausaland in the period 1896-1906.  In Yorubaland, the presence of the Saro and Amaro, 
the nature and system of political organization entailed limited use of military force by 
the British during this period of de facto occupation.  In Igboland and Hausaland, the use 
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of military force was pronounced and extensive.  However, the peculiar nature of Igbo 
political system and organization exposed the Igbo to extensive military activities by 
British-led forces.  But while military force was employed during the initial conquest in 
Hausaland, the ubiquitous and autocratic character of the political system established by 
the Fulani were factors that aided the processes of the conquest and occupation of 
Hausaland for the British.
Resistance to the imposition of colonial authority patterns in each of the three 
nationalities tended to reflect their respective indigenous authority patterns.  In Igboland 
and Yorubaland, where the practice of authority is democratic, it was sharp and sustained.  
In Hausaland, where the practice of authority has always been autocratic, it was not as 
sharp and sustained.
The last stage in the evolution of the authority patterns of the supra-national state 
was in the period 1914-1960.  That period witnessed the amalgamation of the two 
colonial polities that were carved out of the upper and lower Niger, and the imposition of 
a homogenous authority patterns on their inhabitants under the aegis of the supra-national 
state.  The authority patterns of the supra-national state resemble those of the Fulani.  The 
resemblance between the governmental and non-governmental authority patterns in 
Fulani-ruled Hausaland and those of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state is both 
considerable and extensive.  But the degree of disparity (absence of congruence and 
consonance) between and within the governmental and non-governmental authority 
patterns of the supra-national state and those of the Igbo and Yoruba is conversely 
considerable and extensive.  According to Eckstein’s (1969) congruence theory, such 
disparity is bound to lead to poor political performance in every social unit where it 
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exists.  We will see the extent to which that postulation is supported when we test the 
relevant hypotheses later in chapter six based on the analysis in this chapter.
Structure and Forms of Polity in the Supra-national State
At this point we cannot resist the temptation to raise and address issues that relate 
to the structure of the supra-national state in the post-colonial period.  The structure of the 
supra-national state has been expressed in multiple forms that included parliamentary, 
US-type, and several military-dictatorial dispensations.  The constant in each one of those 
forms is its’ lack of durability.  Each one of them amounted to a platform on which 
political actors simply operated the authority patterns bequeathed by colonialism.  Since 
the authority patterns of the supra-national state resembled those of the Hausa- Fulani 
ruling classes more that the indigenous authority patterns everywhere else in the Niger 
basin, the former (Hausa-Fulani ruling classes) have tended to be better placed to 
mobilize themselves and to engage in the practice of authority in the latter.  That much is 
evident in the zeal with which they hatched and implemented diverse socio-political 
programs and policies that enabled them to assume and consolidate control over principal 
segmental units—the army, civil service bureaucracy, etc.—in the supra-national state 
from the early pre-colonial period.115  Each time, in contrast to the other nationalities the 
Hausa-Fulani ruling classes seem to be the ones who possess a properly packaged agenda 
ready for implementation.  Why then have we paid less attention in the study to the 
various forms that polity in the supra-national state has gone through since the end of 
115 Robin Luckham documented the accomplished of this feat in the supra-national by 
Hausa-Fulani political actors through the ‘Nigerianization’ and ‘Northernization’ policies 
in The ‘Nigerian’ Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority & Revolt 1960-67. 
Cambridge University Press (1971b).
277
formal colonial rule?  It is for the particular reason that we have been taught by the E-G 
scheme that the roots of in/stability in societies are encased in their authority patterns and 
not in the forms of structures assumed by their polity at different points in time.  If it 
were otherwise, the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state could have realized extensive stability 
in its body politic for the simple reason that it has experienced several dispensations since 
the end of formal colonial rule.
CHAPTER V: 
BRITISH STATE BUILDING STRATEGIES IN THE NIGER BASIN
As was described in the previous chapter, the British followed their conquest of 
the inhabitants of the Niger basin with the quest to create a homogeneous set of authority 
patterns with which to administer them under the aegis of a supra-national state.  That 
quest represents shifts from the policy that had previously guided the administration of 
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Britain’s possessions on the West Coast of Africa (Martin 1927).  Those shifts were 
motivated by pressure groups composed of individuals who represented the conservative 
side of the two ideological divides in English society at the time (Nicolson 1969).   The 
Igbo, the Yoruba, and other nationalities resisted the establishment of a homogeneous set 
of authority patterns.116  As part of their strategy for building a supra-national state, the 
British gave parity to their alliance with the Fulani ruling classes.  Again, this further 
exacerbated the problems in the supra-national state with the other nationalities.
Apart from some specific policies, alliances were the other ingredients that British 
colonial officers utilized to build a supra-national state from the diverse inhabitants of the 
Niger basin.  We believe that it is significant that neither the differential policies nor the 
alliances, were formulated or implemented even-handedly manner amongst the 
nationalities by the British throughout the course of building the ‘Nigerian’ supra-
national state.  But the diversity of cultures and political terrain represented in the 
nationalities in the Niger basin would not let the British alter easily the political 
landscape in each nationality in their quest to impose a supra-national state on all of 
them.  Our aim in the current chapter is to establish the degree to which the specific state 
building initiatives helped to create legacies that aid and abet political instability in the 
supra-national state.  Evidence involving conflict will be presented in chapter six to 
explore the assertion that the state building policies are indeed legacies that produce 
political instability. 
We can identify some of those initiatives by the British to build a homogenous set 
of authority patterns to enable their imposition of a supra-national state over their 
116 There was a shift too in the style of resistance to the British by the nationalities.  They 
resisted Britain’s unprovoked invasion militarily, and shifted to other methods thereafter.
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inhabitants of the Niger basin.  These include (i) the indirect rule policy, (ii) the 
amalgamation policy of January 1, 1914, (iii) the policy that guided the recruitment of 
indigenous personnel into the military forces of the supra-national state, and (iv) colonial 
policy on education.  On the other hand, the alliances are the special relationships 
specifically developed with the Fulani aristocracy and some select few individuals from 
among the Igbo, Yoruba and other nationalities.  The British-Fulani alliance was a critical 
state building ingredient, which underscored the formulation and implementation of the 
aforementioned four policies.  Unlike any relationship struck with other inhabitants of the 
Niger basin, the British-Fulani alliance was unique and special, which is also why it 
survived the course of colonial rule.  We underscore the uniqueness of that alliance with 
the argument that if the rest of the state building variables were the construction 
hardware, the alliance with the Fulani aristocracy classes was certainly the mortar used to 
chalk all of them together.  Nothing like the alliance ever evolved between the British and 
any of the other nationalities (Nwabughuogu 1981).  Its near equivalents were the one-
one-on friendships that individual colonial officers in Igboland and Yorubaland 
developed at the personal level with select personalities who supported their efforts 
(Atanda 1973, Afigbo 1971). 
Our choice of the four state building policies above was guided by the magnitude 
of the impact that each of them made on Britain’s state building involvement in the Niger 
basin.  The degree to which each one of them continues to impact the cause of political 
performance in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state was the other factor that led to their 
selection for analysis.  We shall show that all four policies were inspired by and 
280
implemented to satisfy the preference that British colonial actors showed towards the 
‘forms, norms, and practice of authority’ in Fulani-ruled Caliphate society of Hausaland.  
The Indirect Rule Policy  
In spite of an extensive line of studies on Britain’s colonial policy of indirect rule 
in the Niger basin in particular, and in Africa in general (Perham 1937, Afigbo 1966, 
1967, 1971b, 1974, Atanda 1970, 1973, Ikime 1967, Igbafe 1967) there is still an absence 
of a generally accepted definition of the policy (Crowder and Ikime 1970).  Indirect rule 
is variously portrayed as governance of indigenous peoples through their own social, 
economic, and political authority patterns (Lugard 1965, Ormsby-Gore 1935, Perham 
1935, 1937, Crowder and Ikime 1970, Afigbo 1973, Atanda 1970).  But this portrayal of 
the indirect rule policy is hardly suitable.  This is because its formulation and 
implementation were aimed at the realization of imperial ambitions as opposed to the 
interest of African peoples.   
Apart from its preferential implementation in Hausaland to support the autocratic 
authority patterns of the Fulani ruling classes, in Igboland and Yorubaland (where 
authority patterns and influence relations are democratic) the indirect rule policy was 
perceived as an effrontery to traditional authority patterns and the practice of authority 
(Nwabughuogu 1981).  The continuing political instability in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-
national state can be traced in part to the implementation of the indirect rule policy in 
ways that favored the Fulani authority patterns and disregarded those of the Igbo and the 
Yoruba.
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In the period before colonial intervention and conquest, i.e. up until the end of the 
nineteenth century, British commercial and religious activities in the Niger basin 
depended on indigenous peoples first, and then on freed African slaves who had imbibed 
western culture, particularly education (Flint 1969).117  Even after the abolition of the 
slave trade and the shift that it triggered in Britain’s West Africa policy, in the period 
between 1897 and 1914 Britain’s agents in the lower Niger basin seemed comfortable to 
exert their authority in a direct fashion (Igbafe 1967, Flint 1969, Mair 1969). Sequel to 
outright intervention in the internal affairs of West Africans by the British, the 
willingness of the freed slaves to be involved in the direct propagation of British rule in 
the lower Niger was strongly predicated on two factors.  First, was their desire for British 
political control in the Niger basin to imitate the practice of authority that prevailed in 
England at the time.  
Secondly, was their desire to be normatively integrated as active participants in 
the authority patterns and influence relations on which the practice of British authority 
was based.  They were strongly convinced that Africa would be saved from itself through 
the dawn of British authority.  Exposure to western education and culture gave the freed 
slaves cause to proclaim their dissatisfaction for aspects of indigenous African cultures at 
the time in preference for the English culture and system of governance.  Years later the 
dawn of autocratic colonial rule dashed their expectations and desires, and made them 
recant (Tamuno 1966, Ayandele 1974, Mann 1985). 
Why the Shift? Pressure Groups in England
117 I am weary of using the concept of “educated” to refer to Africans who had acquired 
western education for the reason that the former tends to portray those who do not 
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Why this shift from a relatively successful pattern of rule to one that causes 
resistance?  One important reason was the emergence of conservative pressure groups in 
England that advocated changes in the policies of the British Colonial Office. There was 
a carefully orchestrated campaign by a lobby of private individuals in England in the 
1890s to undermine the evolution of British-type democratic authority patterns and 
influence relations in the Niger.  It was a campaign that established the requisite political 
grounds in Britain at the time which led to the formulation and implementation of the 
policy of indirect rule in the Niger basin.  While the campaign predated the policy of 
indirect rule, those who orchestrated it were motivated by the desire to realize the total 
subjugation of the inhabitants of the Niger basin to absolute colonial control, which they 
believed would pave the way for profitable commerce (Nwabughuogu 1981).  Members 
of the lobby were determined to sell British public opinion and policy makers on their 
conviction that British commercial interests in the Niger basin and the rest of West Africa 
would be better served if British traders assumed political authority over Africans 
through their indigenous political institutions.  This lobby was averse to the idea of 
involving Africans who were socialized in western culture or the projection of British 
authority “through institutions modeled on European lines, as the missionaries and the 
Colonial Office had been doing” (Nwabughuogu 1981: 70).  
Mary Kingsley (1897 and 1901), a vocal member of this lobby, based her 
opposition to the involvement of Africans who possessed western education in the 
exercise of British political authority in West Africa on two points of argument.  First, 
she claimed that desires on the part of Christian missionary agencies and some British 
politicians to take freed African slaves who acquired western education seriously were 
possess western education as uneducated.
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misguided.  She argued and believed that their association with indigenous African 
institutions lacked authenticity as well as legitimacy.  Secondly, she argued that the 
inherent inferiority of Africans when compared with Europeans entails that the best that 
freed slaves could possibly acquire from European culture were its undesirable and 
substandard elements.  She strongly condemned the efforts of the Christian missionary 
agencies to establish schools for the socialization of Africans in western culture as futile 
and misguided (Kingsley 1897).  Another prominent member of the lobby was Frederick 
Lugard himself.  As we have seen in the previous chapter, he was a man who was 
obsessed with the ambition to play a central role in the projection of Britain’s imperial 
authority in Africa (Perham 1968).118
The campaign by the lobby paid off in favor of the aims and desires of its 
members when the Niger Committee, an ad hoc instrument put together by the British 
government to study and recommend on how best to project British socio-economic 
authority in the Niger basin, recommended that “chiefs” as opposed to Africans with 
western education would be more suitable allies in the projection of Britain’s authority in 
the Niger basin.119  The Committee’s recommendation and its acceptance by the British 
118 The Niger basin was indeed his second posting in the service of the imperial desires of 
Britain. Earlier, he was in East Africa on behalf of the British East Africa Company 
where he played a prominent role to conquer and acquire the East African kingdom of 
Buganda and its neighboring nationalities for the British Empire.  Most of those 
indigenous East African kingdoms resembled Hausaland in their centralized, autocratic 
rule.
119 This is an age-old British practice for handling public policy, often utilized to deflect 
public scrutiny on national issues (Nwabughuogu 1981).  Beginning with the Select 
Committee that submitted its report in 1865, which was appointed by the British House 
of Commons on the State of British Settlements on the Western Coast of Africa (See 
British Parliamentary Papers, Correspondence Returns and Other Papers Concerning 
West Africa 1812-74, Colonies Africa 50), whose precursor was the Ord Commission 
that inquired into the Condition of the British Settlements on the West Coast of Africa, 
this policy tool played a crucial role in British involvement in Africa.  The Niger 
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government were grounded in social Darwinian tenets.  The tenets center on the 
conception that the history of all human societies is the history of evolutionary 
progression of sorts in which social, economic, and political progress is depicted by a 
requisite centralization of institutions of socio-political organization in society (Burrow 
1966, Lovejoy 1964, Jones 1980, Thompson 2000).  
For the social Darwinists, societies at the high end of the evolutionary ladder of 
social progress possess certain definite characteristics (Pearson 1893, Kidd 1894, Ritchie 
1889).  They argued that those definite characteristics include: Discernable institutions of 
governance (highly centralized structures), economic exchange (currency, markets and 
taxation system) as well as institutions for cultural interaction (formalized agencies and 
structures of socializing new and young members of the society).  It was a notion that 
considered the monarchy as the most advanced system of political organization and 
governance.  In the same context, of societies that practiced centralized systems of 
governance were seen as more developed on that progressive scale of history than those 
whose systems of governance were decentralized. Because of the extensive reach of this 
social Darwinist conception of history in British society at the time, it influenced most of 
the judgments that British officials made about the nationalities and their respective 
levels of political development. 
The push by members of the aforementioned lobby for what Taubman Goldie, 
another of its influential members called the “general policy of ruling on African 
Committee appointed by Joseph Chamberlain when he became the first industrialist to 
hold the position of Secretary for the Colonies (Nicolson 1966) submitted its report 
August 4, 1898.  The members of the Committee were Lord Selborne (Chair), Sir George 
Goldie, Sir Clement Hill, Sir Ralph Moor, Sir Reginald Antrobus, and Sir H. McCallum.  
Moor, Antrobus, and McCallum were later appointed to top positions in Britain’s colonial 
regime in the Niger basin.
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principle through native rulers” (Goldie 1898 in Nwabughuogu 1981: 71) and their 
utmost aversion for Africans who had been socialized in western education and culture is 
hardly value-free.  Nor were the Niger Committee’s recommendations and the British 
government’s subsequent acceptance of its recommendations.  All—members of the 
lobby, Committee, British government—were driven by the self-serving desire to identify 
strong (rigid) and autocratic authority patterns in the indigenous societies of the Niger 
basin and to co-opt it in ways that would effectively facilitate the colonization of the 
inhabitants.  They were convinced that the cause of imperial rule and economic 
exploitation in West Africa would best be served by strong (rigid) and autocratic 
indigenous authority patterns that are devoid of the democratic tenets of Participation
(for members of the larger society) and Responsiveness (for the super-ordinate members) 
in their influence relations.  McCallum’s recommendation “that the native Chiefs, 
subsidised as hereinafter suggested by him, should in all cases be organized as village 
and district councils” was adopted by the government.120
In essence, even in the formative stages, indirect rule policy was meant to be a 
biased state building initiative because it adopted just one specific indigenous system of 
authority in the Niger basin.   The centralized system of governance presided over in 
Hausaland by the Fulani was favored for adoption.  Irrespective of its centralized 
features, the indigenous system of the Yoruba for instance was considered unsuitable for 
the implementation of the policy.  Neither was the decentralized system that was 
prevalent in pre-colonial Igbo society.  For members of the lobby, the craving by freed 
African slaves and their descendants for British-type socio-political institutions and 
120 The Committee’s report was published as C. O. 879/52, no. 550.  The version used 
here is contained in C. W. Newbury’s British Policy Towards West Africa: Selected 
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authority patterns was a function of their socialization in European culture and education 
both of which rendered them unfit allies of their preferred version of colonial rule.  
Members of the lobby believed that the argument by freed Africans slaves that their 
socialization in western education and culture sufficiently qualified them to participate in 
the governance of the Niger basin was yet another rationale to shunt them aside in favor 
of the “native chiefs”.  The other major reason for a shift in British policies was the 
alliance that Frederick Lugard entered into with the Fulani ruling classes in Hausaland for 
the sake of their autocratic authority patterns.
Preferential implementation of the indirect rule policy accomplished the task of 
helping the Fulani to realize a goal that they were unable to attain through the jihad—
bringing all nationalities in the upper Niger under their authority and sway.   Thus, while 
the indirect rule policy was a state building tool that helped the British to exert political 
authority and control in the Niger basin, it was also used to aid and abet the process of 
extending Fulani-type influence relations to all the inhabitants of the Niger basin under 
the aegis of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state.  Taken together, while all the 
aforementioned did serve the cause of Britain’s imperial adventure in the Niger basin, 
their impact on political performance in the supra-national state has been negative 
(Nwabughuogu 1981).121  The physical control of people (evident in the walled cities and 
Documents, 1875-1914, pp.309-11. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
121 In socio-political terms, post-jihad society in Hausaland seemed to have a lot of 
similarity with the English society under the Hanoverian state that successfully midwived 
and nurtured the Industrial Revolution.  Authority in the Hanovarian state was highly 
authoritarian and held by the aristocratic classes, which retained and control much of the 
property and juridical rights over it.  On those rested the success of the transition to an 
industrial economy.  As it were, the Hanoverian state was quick and handy to ensure that 
the significant proportion of the population which constituted the labor force existed: 
‘within an ‘authoritarian’ framework of law which severely curtailed their rights to work 
or not to work, to select occupation, to withdraw their labour to search for alternative 
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penal system), the elaborate system of taxation, and rulers’ control over land were all 
strong indicators of the extensive controlling capacity of the centralized Fulani political 
system.  
Frederick Lugard was influenced by the aforementioned factors to implement the 
indirect rule in a manner that favored the Fulani aristocracy.  His Political Memoranda 
institutionalized his strong support for and approval of Fulani authority patterns as a 
durable tool for the control of inhabitants of the Niger basin.  His ambition to oversee the 
projection of Britain’s imperial authority and control beyond the upper Niger was 
immense.  His unsuccessful attempts in 1905 to convince the Colonial Office to integrate 
the two colonial polities that the upper and lower Niger were carved into, did not compel 
him to give up on his ambition (Lugard 1905).
The indirect rule policy was implemented in the upper Niger to protect the 
Caliphate society from “the agents of social and economic change—the Christian 
missionaries, the European traders, and the coastal traders” (Nwabughuogu 1981: 77). 
Fredrick Lugard often pronounced that it would violate his promise to the Fulani 
aristocracy to expose the Caliphate society to the agents of change (Nwabughuogu 1981).  
He cited the propensity of western educated African members of the society in Lagos to 
avail themselves of the courts and the rule of law to litigate against colonial authority as 
employment to engage with impunity in ‘insubordinate’ behaviour towards their bosses.  
Englishmen may have been freeborn but traditional statutes of the realm dealing with 
masters and their servants, apprenticeship, poor relief for the able bodied, vagrancy and 
delinquency gave employers political and judicial authority over their workers which left 
the labour market in a state of suspension between feudal servitude and the free 
contractual system of nineteenth-century political economy…. The compliant behaviour 
of the majority of the populace coupled with the acceptance of aristocratic government 
ensured that a potentially unfavourable coincidence of rapid population growth and 
urbanization, on the one hand, and serious challenges to established authority, on the 
other, did not occur (O’Brien 1993: 130, 132).
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his reason for opposing their unfettered access to parts of the upper Niger (Lugard 1901).  
He derided their propensity for trade and commerce, (which we must recall helped to 
expand the population that anchored the bases of legitimacy for the Crown authority in 
Crown colony Lagos society) as unsightly love for the dollar (Perham 1960).  He 
implemented a conscious stratification of society in the urban centers, which separated 
members of nationalities from the lower Niger from nationalities of the upper Niger.  The 
result was the sabon garis or strangers’ quarters that sprang up in urban centers in the 
upper Niger (Lugard 1919).  Thus, during colonial rule society in the upper Niger was 
separated into the European quarters where Africans were not allowed to reside, the 
sabon garis which were located outside the city limits exclusively for ‘strangers’ from 
the lower Niger, while indigenes lived in other areas.122
The indirect rule policy produced profound, extensive, and enduring impacts on 
indigenous societies in the upper Niger.  The reasons for that derived partly from how it 
was implemented.  Shielding societies from all agents of social change sustained the 
social, economic and political status quo  in those societies.  In the Caliphate society for 
instance the norms that guide the practice of authority remained unchallenged, and the 
patterns of authority and influence relations remained conservatively intact.  The absence 
of the agents of change entailed that there was no one to facilitate or point the ordinary 
people towards emerging opportunities.  As a result, they were unable to improve their 
economic, social, and political situations.  At the same time the capacity of the leadership 
in the Caliphate society for non-responsiveness in the practice of authority was enhanced 
and bolstered.  
122 See Political Memoranda (1919).
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Colonial state building in the upper Niger impacted negatively on the economic 
development of indigenous societies in both the short and long terms.  At a time when the 
lower Niger was experiencing noticeable economic transformation, the upper Niger was 
in economic stagnation.  The disparity in the economic transformation of the two  
“Protectorates” was evident in the inability of Frederick Lugard to balance his operating 
budgets without financial subventions from both the Colonial Office and the colonial 
government of the “Protectorate” of Southern “Nigeria”.  In 1905 alone, he received as 
much as 405,500 pounds sterling and 75,000 pounds sterling respectively from both 
sources (Lugard 1905-1906, 1905).
In the context of congruence theory the evident disparity in economic 
transformation between the upper and the lower Niger even at that early colonial period 
can be linked to the disparity between the authority patterns of the indigenous 
nationalities that inhabit them.  The age-old norm of participation without hindrance for 
all and sundry in indigenous Igbo and Yoruba societies may have played a role in the 
immediate economic prosperity of the “Protectorate” of Southern “Nigeria” at a time 
when the “Protectorate” of Northern “Nigeria” was relying on subsidies for its 
operations.  Contemporary social science literature is riddled with studies that support the 
linkages between successful economic transformation and socio-political democracy 
(Lipset 1959, Putnam 1995a, 1995b, Helliwell 1994, Burkhart and Beck 1994, Leblang 
1997, Feng 1997, Quinn and Woolley 2001, Rotberg 2001).123  The speed with which the 
Igbo, Yoruba and the other nationalities in the lower Niger embraced trade in cash crops 
and western education, two principal agents of social, economic and political change in 
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British West Africa (Kimble 1963, Coleman 1958), was facilitated by their democratic 
authority patterns.124  In a situation where land, the primary factor of economic 
production was not under the political control of ruling classes in Igboland and 
Yorubaland, everyone freely engaged in cash crop agriculture.125  The absence of systems 
that exist in Hausaland for appropriating surplus value from ordinary people by the 
leadership implied that every hard-working member of society in Igboland and 
Yorubaland had the opportunity to benefit from the new economy.  In Igboland and 
Yorubaland “money earned from trade or agriculture” (Post 1970: 36) enabled 
individuals and even communities to fund tuition in government, private and missionary 
schools and for further education in England and the US.  The same cannot be said about 
Hausaland.
Apart from the resultant autocratization of aspects of the authority patterns and 
influence relations on which indigenous Igbo and Yoruba systems of governance were 
based, the implementation of the indirect rule policy did not alter their ‘norms, forms, and 
practice of authority’ in fundamental ways (Afigbo 1971a).  Members of the larger 
society in both nationalities did not have to, for instance, contend with officially 
sanctioned efforts to prevent or restrict them from acquiring western education, or 
participating in the new economy and reaping the attendant benefits (Ekejiuba 1967, 
Martin 1988, Falola 1995, Ekechi 1995).  Indirect rule’s negative impacts on the practice 
123 There are studies (Przeworski and Limongi 1993, Sirowy and Inkeles 1990) that found 
otherwise.  But Leblang (1997: 1) argues that such out layers “may be a function of the 
research design and empirical specification chosen by investigators”. 
124 This includes the women—sees Felicia Ekejiuba (1967).  “Omu Okwei, the Merchant 
Queen of Ossomari: A Biographical Sketch” Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 
Vol. II, (4), pp. 633-646 for biographical sketch of one who became a successful 
merchant as early as 1887.
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of authority’, i.e. its diminishment of Responsiveness and impediment of the channels of 
Participation in Igbo and Yoruba societies did not elicit the loss of the normative 
inclination and capacity of the people for participation.  The zeal shown by Igbo and 
Yoruba nationals who acquired western education to resist colonial authority projected 
through reconditioned indigenous political structures devoid of Responsiveness to society 
can be attributed to their normative preferences for Participation.  
Legacies of Indirect Rule
Preferential implementation of indirect rule produced specific legacies in 
Hausaland, as well as Igboland and Yorubaland.  One of the immediate legacies was the 
lack of uniformity in the development of anti-colonial tendencies and movements in the 
three nationalities.  Another was the evident disparity in the political performance of the 
supra-national state in the three nationalities.  Conscious efforts were made to preserve 
and encourage only the Fulani and their authority patterns for the specific reason that they 
safeguarded the durability of Britain’s imperial designs in the Niger basin.  Subsequent 
events are proof that British did not miscalculate in that regard.  
We’ll furnish a pointer to substantiate that, by taking a look at the incidence of the 
two phases of anti-colonial resistance in the Niger basin.  From available evidence it is 
clear that almost every nationality in the Niger basin participated actively in the initial 
phase of anti-colonial resistance which involved taking up arms to resist Britain’s 
unprovoked punitive expeditions.  On the other hand the participation of members of 
each nationality in the second phase of anti-colonial resistance was literally a function of 
125 Study by David A. Leblang indicates that there is a positive “relationship between 
property rights, democracy, and economic growth” (Leblang 1996: 5).
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certain sociological factors that stemmed from their authority patterns.  To begin with, 
the second phase of anti-colonial resistance evolved almost exclusively in the colonial 
urban centers and cities in the lower Niger where the bulk of the people who acquired 
western education converged.  The rate and degree of exposure to and the acquisition of 
western education as well as the degree of participation in the post-slavery economy by 
members of a nationality are all factors that predict the degree to which members 
engaged in anti-colonial efforts and activities during the second phase.  The absence of an 
extensive history of facilitated channels of Participation for members of the larger 
society led to their inability to participate in the second phase of anti-colonial resistance.  
But for the sabon garis into which colonialism’s social segregation/stratification urban 
policies consigned individuals from nationalities in the lower Niger who traveled to the 
upper Niger to trade and work, cities and urban centers in the upper Niger all remained 
tranquil during the second phase.  Attempts by politicians from the lower Niger who 
embarked on a tour of cities in the upper Niger in 1953 to sell their demand on Britain to 
terminate colonial rule in 1956 provoked riots that targeted the sabon gari in Kano, a 
Hasua-Fulani city (Luckham 1971a: 210).  Hausa-Fulani political leaders who believed 
that the end of colonial would jeopardize their authority incited those riots (Luckham 
1971a). 
The Amalgamation of January 1, 1914
Whatever doubts that existed about the underlying motives of indirect rule as a 
preferential state building policy evaporated at the time when Frederick Lugard and his 
supporters in England embarked on another spirited campaign to bring about the 
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amalgamation of the two separate colonial policies.  In 1911 when the Colonial Office 
made an initial contemplation to amalgamate the two polities, the supporting rationale 
was pragmatic: to stem the then continuing drain that Frederick Lugard’s Northern 
“Nigeria” posed to the tax-paying British public (Lugard 1920/1968).  Most if not all 
colonial officials who worked in the upper Niger believed that the patterns of authority 
and influence relations among the Igbo and Yoruba posed immediate and potential threats 
to Fulani and British interests in the supra-national state.  They believed that they would 
be able to extend Fulani authority patterns, undermine the Igbo and Yoruba and 
neutralize the threats posed by their democratic authority patterns in the supra-national 
state with the amalgamation.
Another ad hoc lobby was organized, which successfully swayed the Colonial 
Office on the need to extend the Lugardian methodology for projecting Britain’s colonial 
design to the rest of the Niger basin (Nwabughuogu 1981).  The composition of that 
lobby included Frederick Lugard himself, his wife Flora (1903-4, 1905,126 1906), and a 
handful of his supporters and admirers particularly Edmund D. Morel (1911/1968, 
1902/1968).127
The campaign was extensively fuelled by Frederick Lugard himself beginning in 
1905.  In various meticulously written Annual Reports, articles in journals and through 
the revised edition of the Political Memoranda he announced his sole-discovery of an 
efficient formula for wielding colonial authority over African peoples (Lugard 1905, 
Nicolson 1969, Nwabughuogu 1981).  In synoptic terms, his formula was ‘order, before 
126 Also filed in Colonial Office Confidential 879/88, #789, pp.29-32 (Nwabughuogu 
1981).
127 Both books were originally published in 1902 and 1911 respectively.  Kenneth N. 
Dike reissued them in 1968 with new introductions.
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development’ (Nwabughuogu 1981).  That mantra is epitomized by his preferential 
implementation of the indirect rule policy in the upper Niger. 
Speaking in terms derived from the E-G scheme, the ‘norms, forms, and practices 
of authority’ that Frederick Lugard instituted on the back of the existing authority 
patterns of Fulani rule, and through which he sought to realize Britain’s imperial 
ambitions and design in the entire Niger basin stood on three legal tripods: The Native 
Courts Ordinance, the Native Authority Ordinance, and the Native Revenue Ordinance.  
These were the three directives that anchored implementation of the indirect rule policy 
in the upper Niger.  What he proceeded to accomplish under the amalgamation policy 
was to extend the reach of all three to the entire Niger basin.  
The wordings of the Native Courts Ordinance are revealing enough.  They show 
that it was aimed at alienating members of the larger society in each nationality from 
participating in the judicial affairs of their society.  Under that Ordinance, the authority to 
administer directives and exact sanctions reposed exclusively in the so-called native 
chiefs who it simultaneously absolved of responsiveness associated with the exercise of 
authority in indigenous Igbo and Yoruba society.  The Native Courts became highly 
impeded channels of Participation that operated outside established judicial procedures 
and due process.  For instance, they excluded legal representation of any kind for 
individuals brought before them.
In 1914 when the amalgamation made it possible for the Native Courts Ordinance 
to be enforced in Igboland, Yorubaland and the rest of the inhabitants of the lower Niger, 
its provisions quickly closed down the Supreme Court as a judicial channel for the 
administration of Directiveness.  Prior to then, colonialism’s authority patterns and 
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influence relations accommodated the existence of the Supreme Court as a normative 
channel for the administration of Directiveness.  It is true that members of the lower 
Niger nationalities may not have used it voluminously, frequently, and intensely 
particularly for the reason that it operated according to alien principles (English statutes, 
rules and procedures) which only the lawyers (who were few in number at the time) were 
conversant with.  But the fact that it operated on the rule of law implied that it was—
paraphrasing from the E-G scheme—a formally provided, normatively tolerated, 
unsanctioned, feasible, and facilitated channel of Participation all the same (Eckstein and 
Gurr 1975).  It brought some check on the exaction of compliance to colonial directives 
through appeals on cases from “Native Courts” with legal representation.  With the 
amalgamation, the reach of the Supreme Court was restricted just to the urban areas, 
which also promoted the isolation of rural dwellers from the urban dwellers. 
Provisions of the Native Authority Ordinance stipulated for the appointment of 
‘sole native authorities’ in both Igboland and Yorubaland.  It elevated some of the 
“warrant chiefs” to ‘sole native authorities’ and empowered them to “exercise executive 
powers independent of the Native Courts” (Afigbo 1972: 142).  The Aláàfin of Oyo for 
instance was elevated and made a paramount executive whose authority encroached on 
the authority of the leaders of indigenous polities in the new “Native Authority” area of 
Oyo “Province”.  And the Baálè or head of the Yoruba polity of Ibadan became “a 
subordinate Native Authority under the Alafin” (sic) (Perham 1937: 191) and was made 
to pay tax tribute to the Aláàfin.  On the grounds that they were not a tribute-paying 
polity to the Aláàfin the people of Ibadan resisted that and it required the presence of 
troops to compel them to comply (Perham 1937).  Under that centralization policy “the 
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Bale of Ibadan was in the position of a northern District Head in relation to the Aláàfin, 
and … the towns hitherto administered by Ibadan [were expected to] be ruled directly 
from Oyo” (Perham 1937: 191).  Such violations were solely aimed at bringing 
“uniformity” to all sections of the supra-national state without regard to the distinctive 
peculiarities of the respective nationalities that are involved.  The acrimony that stemmed 
from this policy of centralization of authority persists till today in both Igboland and 
Yorubaland as well as elsewhere.
The recruitment of the sole native authorities and the source of their authority 
both ran contrary to indigenous norms in their communities.  On both counts, i.e. 
recruitment and source of authority, the sole native authorities lacked every modicum of 
legitimacy in their communities.  Hence, their reliance on colonial military forces to 
exact compliance on their communities to the directives from the supra-national state.  
The Native Revenue Ordinance was designed to serve as the statutory directive 
that enabled colonial appointees to extract the revenue through direct taxation from their 
ever-hostile communities.  But particularly in Igbo society, which lacked a distinct 
taxation system the idea of direct taxation provoked a lot of acrimony and acts of 
resistance.  Yorubaland reacted violently to colonial taxation too.  The elaborate taxation 
system that yielded the resources needed to run state affairs in pre-colonial Yoruba 
society was a concomitant component of the Yoruba authority patterns.  Be it the Owò 
Òde (public money) or the non-recurrent tax raised in towns to finance a military 
campaign or to buy off an invasion, taxation in pre-colonial Yorubaland was levied by 
the ebi with the full knowledge and participation of the people through their elders 
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(Fadipe 1970).128   There were extensive tax riots in the period 1914-1932 in parts of 
Igboland (Afigbo 1966) and Yorubaland (Osuntokun 1971, Ausman 1971) and elsewhere 
(Ikime 1965) in the lower Niger particularly where communities resisted attempts to levy 
direct taxation on them.  
The indirect rule policy and the amalgamation policy were associated with one 
another in logic and purpose in Britain’s colonial involvement in Africa.  The association 
of both policies in Britain’s colonial involvement in Africa survived Frederick Lugard’s 
departure in 1918 (see Perham 1960).    Two of his books, Political Memoranda (revised 
and published in 1919) and The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (1922/1965) 
became exulted primers on external intervention in state building in Africa.  His 
successors and others in other parts of Africa relied on both primers to build supra-
national states in “Tanganyika” in 1925, “Northern Rhodesia” in 1927, the “Gambia” in 
1933, “Sierra Leone” in 1937, and “Gold Coast” in 1947 that thrive on autocracy and 
disregard for popular participation (Nwabughuogu 1981, Brown 1960, Jones 1958, 
Hailey 1951).129
128 In view of the fact that an indigenous taxation system has been an age-old segmental 
unit of authority patterns in Yorubaland, it will not be wrong for us to assert that the anti-
taxation riots that erupted in Yorubaland during those early years of colonial rule were 
meant to express dissent against unresponsive alien rule.
129 Hailey’s (1951) claim that the incidence of societies whose indigenous system of 
governance is decentralized determined why indirect rule was not applied to Kenya 
dubious at best when we recall that the Igbo and most of the neighbors who inhabit the 
southeast of the Niger basin all evolved decentralized political systems too.  It may have 
been the presence of a considerable number of Europeans and their determination to 
carve Kenya into a settler colony that actually prevented the extension of the policy to 
Kenya at the time, i.e. 1920s-1930s.  All of Britain’s settler colonies in southern Africa as 
well as Australasia were accorded the status of self-governing territories.  Even if Kenya 
wasn’t a candidate for settler colony, the fact that none of its large nationalities had a 
centralized political organization based on despotic and autocratic authority patterns and 
influence relations could be yet another reason that rendered it “unfit” for the indirect rule 
policy. 
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The legacies of the amalgamation are several.  It enabled Britain to combine the 
Niger basin into a single political organization without the consent of its inhabitants.  The 
amalgamation elevated the “strength and stability of ‘native chiefs’ and their loyalty to 
Britain” (Nwabughuogu 1981: 86) to the status of a ‘norm’ that supports the practice of 
authority in the supra-national state.  But the nature of indigenous political systems in the 
Niger basin made it impossible for the ‘norm’ to resonate elsewhere beyond Hausaland.  
Except the Hausa-Fulani, other nationalities perceive this ‘norm’ as another 
illegitimate component of the white man’s authority fit to be treated with indifference, 
opposition and insubordination except in those instances when he wheels out his 
instruments of violence.  Among the Igbo and Yoruba, the impact of the ‘norm’ on 
perceptions of authority in supra-national state was immediate and negative.  The same 
was true about the ‘norm’ among most members of the returnee community in 
Yorubaland.  It undermined the bases of legitimacy that existed in the returnee 
community for British authority and power in Lagos society.  
However, in Igboland and Yorubaland the aforementioned ‘norm’ was positively 
perceived by its beneficiaries—the “warrant chiefs”, court clerks, kotima130, the Aláàfin, 
Oba, Ooni, et al.at the expense of the rest of the society.  In Yorubaland for instance, it 
was due to the ‘norm’ that a particularly close relationship developed between the 
Aláàfin, of Oyo and Captain Ross, the Resident in the “Oyo Province”.  Both individuals 
exploited their close personal relationship to revise Yoruba history to justify their 
extension of the authority of the Aláàfin, to independent parts of Yorubaland (Atanda 
130 Derived from Court Messenger, this name was often used to ridicule and deride those 
who worked for the British in that capacity.  In most Igbo communities a court messenger 
was often called, ‘nwa kotima otile ntu’ (the court messenger whose buttocks are ashy) 
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1973).  In Igboland the “warrant chiefs” equally took advantage of it for the same 
purpose.  Some of them utilized it first to strike their own personal friendship with 
colonial officials before proceeding to alter the age-“old network of independent” 
(Ottenberg 1958) political units by which various Igbo communities organized their pre-
colonial polities and governance respectively (Afigbo 1966, 1973). 
The encouragement and support that came from the “warrant chiefs” to the 
colonial officials made a critical difference in the latter’s successful construction of 
several centralized artificial polities out of the various independent political units in 
various parts of Igboland.  Since colonialism, the projection of the authority and power of 
the supra-national state (though ephemeral) in Igboland has depended on those artificial 
creations, which symbolize colonialism’s deliberate centralization and autocratization of 
political authority and governance in Igboland.  
Indigenous Igbo and Yoruba societies were immensely fractured by the two 
policies.  But while it is true that some of leaders in both nationalities succumbed to the 
enticements that accompanied both policies the generality of the Igbo and Yoruba 
remained perceived the supra-national state and its authority as illegitimate.  Both 
policies provoked riots in particularly the Igbo heartland (Afigbo 1966 and 1973) and 
Yorubaland (Perham 1937, Atanda 1973). 
Colonial Education Policy in the Niger Basin
Like the other European states that participated in the colonization of African 
peoples, aspects of Britain’s state building efforts and activities in the Niger basin are 
because of the ash-colored khaki short pant uniforms they wore.  Youngsters even 
composed a syncopated tune out it.
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subsumed within the education policy that its colonial officials implemented in the area.    
Irrespective of the colonial power that was involved, in every specific case colonial 
policy on education was not only a reflection of the official colonial mindset, it was also 
the blueprint for reshaping the social and cultural life of colonized peoples (Barnes 1997: 
198).  The rule of the thumb in every colonial context in Africa was that the content and 
scope and even the spread of western education were dictated by policies formulated by 
colonial powers (Barnes 1997).  Although there were attempts by Christian missionary 
agencies and the trading firms to alter or influence colonial education policies in different 
parts of Africa and elsewhere in the colonized world, there was no exception to this rule 
of thumb (Barnes 1997).
As it was with most other state building initiatives undertaken in the Niger basin 
by the British, their colonial education policy was dichotomous.  The one formulated for 
the upper Niger was meant to favor the Hausa-Fulani aristocracy and their autocratic 
authority patterns, preserve the socio-political status quo in Hausaland and extend it to 
the rest of the upper Niger now carved into the colonial “Protectorate” of Northern 
“Nigeria”.  The idea of nurturing “a modern and aristocratic Anglo-Muslim civilization” 
(Barnes 1997: 198) in the upper Niger was paramount in the minds of British colonial 
officials.  The idea was encapsulated in the conscious colonial policy to utilize western 
education to cultivate a pro-Caliphate and pro-British worldview in subsequent 
generations of the Hausa-Fulani ruling classes.     
Colonial administrators in the lower Niger wanted a western education that aimed 
at making indigenous peoples suitable for playing roles that facilitated the exploitation of 
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raw agricultural produce for export.131  Their counterparts in the various Christian 
missionary agencies desired to use western education to win converts for their respective 
denominations (Ekechi 1972).  But from the outset nationalities in the lower Niger 
embraced western education on the conviction that it would equip them with the skills 
necessary to reclaim the participation they lost in the direction of the affairs of their 
society when the British introduced a new socio-political order.  Many a community and 
individuals in Igboland were motivated to tax and task themselves to fund the education 
of their sons in by the desire to have them acquire written and spoken skills in English 
language that symbolized power and authority in the new order.
The desire of all colonial actors who worked in the upper Niger was to establish 
and nurture a system of education similar to the English public school system to benefit 
the future members of the Fulani aristocracy which furnished loyal manpower for “Native 
Administration”.  Deliberate policy initiatives were taken to ensure that the Christian 
missionary agencies were excluded from playing a role in the realization of that desire.  
Colonial officials who were not pleased with the anti-colonial inclinations of 
beneficiaries of western education peddled by Christian missionary agencies in the lower 
Niger took deliberate steps to keep the latter out of the upper Niger.  They were 
concerned that Christian missionary agencies would repeat the same role of ‘producing’ 
opponents of colonial rule if they were allowed to operate in the upper Niger.  
The proselytization activities of the Christian missionary agencies as well as their 
propagation of western education helped to bring about social changes in both Igbo and 
131 Chinua Achebe himself a product of colonial education who often criticizes it told The 
Guardian (Manchester) that “Colonial education was saying there was nothing worth 
much in my society”. Maya Jaggi “Story of the Savannah” The Guardian, Saturday, 
November 18, 2000.
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Yoruba societies.  Because Christian missionary agencies through their proselytization 
were also able to weaken indigenous cultures which tended to blunt anti-colonial 
resistance there was an initial convergence of interests between them and colonial 
administrators in the Niger basin.  In Igboland for instance, the establishment of Native 
Courts and Christian mission stations (Ekechi 1971, 1983) always accompanied the 
conquest of each community.  But the emergence of divergence of opinion between the 
Christian missionary agencies and colonial administrators on what the role of western 
education should be in the Niger basin produced a divergence in their interests as well.  
For the Christian missionary agencies, western education was strictly a tool for 
evangelization and social change while colonial administrators wanted it to remain “an 
important factor in colonial control” (Fajana 1972: 323).  However, both views ran foul 
of the expectations of nationalities particularly in the lower Niger where the recipients of 
western education strongly believed that it is the ticket for “full participation in all phases 
of government and ultimate self-government” (Fajana 1972: 323).  Their conviction 
became a source of concern for colonial officials.  
That was not all.  There are other explanations for why Christian missionary 
agencies were kept at bay in the upper Niger.  In Igboland where initial military activities 
did not pacify the people to any significant degree for colonial rule, most communities 
and individuals that found it difficult to submit to colonial rule became targets of 
repressive and high-handed treatment from colonial administrators.  So much so that 
functionaries of the Christian missionary agencies took it upon themselves and wrote 
letters and petitions in which they condemned the cruel treatment of the people (Ekechi 
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1971, Nwabara 1977).  Such activist engagements became additional grounds for colonial 
actors who operated in the upper Niger to keep the Christian missionary agencies at bay.
Unlike in the lower Niger, in the upper Niger colonial education policy was 
formulated implemented with the aims of protecting Islam from contamination by 
western culture and preserving the socio-political status quo in the Caliphate society 
(Luckham 1971a: 208).
Frederick Lugard was averse to the existing practice in the lower Niger and other 
parts of Africa where the propagation of western education was under the charge of 
western missionary agencies.  He strongly believed that the propagation of western 
education should be integrated with the exercise of colonial power and authority, while 
colonial administrators must exclusively determine its contents, scope, and spread.  He 
favored a system of western education, which accommodated Islam, its institutions, and 
scholars, and for the benefit of sons of the Fulani ruling classes as a matter of preference. 
The success of the preferential formulation and implementation of colonial education 
policy through meticulous micro-management and interventions by British colonial 
administrators in the upper Niger was startling—see Tables 5.1-4.  All over the upper 
Niger, particularly in Hausaland, the acquisition of western education was heavily 
skewed in favor of primarily the sons of various categories of the Fulani ruling classes, 
i.e. emirs, district heads, and secondarily, the sons of their loyalists, who were employed 
in the “Native Administration” establishment.  In 1952 for instance, all but 24% of the 
members of the Northern Region House of Chiefs were beneficiaries of preferential 
education policy (Tibenderana 1983).  In 1954, when the nationalities of the upper Niger 
(which were assigned 54.5% of the total population in the controversial census of 1952) 
304
graduated a mere 85 boys in the competitive School Certificate Examination, the 
equivalence of the university matriculation test, 1,334 of their counterparts from the 
lower Niger passed the same examination (Miners 1971: 36).  In the period 1958-65 
while a mere total of 7,037 and 3,557 boys respectively took and passed the school 
certificate examination in the upper Niger, a total of 50,343 boys and girls from the lower 
Niger took the same examination, out of which 30,906 passed (Miners 1971: 117). 
Britain’s colonial education policy produced assorted varieties of durable political 
legacies that produce political instability in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state.  In 
Igboland and Yorubaland where western education was quickly associated with skills that 
enabled its recipients to become effective participants in the economic, social, and 
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Table 5.1: Early disparity in school attendance in the upper and lower Niger
Source: Annual Colonial Report Nigeria, #950
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political systems that dawned with colonial intervention, individuals and even 
communities wasted no time to invest their hard-earned resources to support and fund it.  
Western education quickly became a factor, which enhanced the age-old 
democratic practice of authority in Igbo and Yoruba societies.  Rather than harm the 
egalitarian components of the social, economic and political patterns in Igboland and 
Yorubaland, western education produced the opposite effect.  Rather than condone
colonialism’s systematic reconfiguration of indigenous patterns of authority, Igbo and 
Yoruba recipients of western education were at odds with all attempts by the British to 
impede their access to channels of Participation in their authority patterns.  They were 
quick to assert claims over their legitimate right to take precedence over the so-called 
native chiefs in the leadership of their societies.  They argued that their exposure to 
western education and culture qualified them more than the “native chiefs” for 
participation in the direction of the affairs of their society.
The contrary was the case in Hausaland where western education became a tool 
that was used to enhance and sustain the socio-political status quo.  It wasn’t until 1947 
for instance, that the inauguration of the Regional House of Assembly in the upper Niger 
opened up a channel of Participation for commoners for the first time in post-jihad
Hausaland.  



































Table 5.2: Beneficiaries of preferential education policy in the upper Niger 
Source: Hubbard 2000: 267
























Table 5.3: Links of secondary school entrants to the Native Administration (NA), 1921-
42 in the upper Niger. Source: Hubbard 2000: 267
Evidence-Based Proof on the Outcomes of Colonial Education Policy
In contrast to the lower Niger, there was a desire by colonial actors who operated 
in the upper Niger to build “a modern and aristocratic Anglo-Muslim civilization” 
(Barnes 1997: 198).  That contrast was a unique concept in British state building in the 
Niger basin.  When the desire was applied to the formulation and implementation of 


































































Table 5.4: Secondary school entrants in Caliphate Hausaland in the period 1921-42 by 
their father’s occupation.  Source: Hubbard 2000: 267.
colonial education policy in the upper Niger, it led to the cultivation of a worldview 
compatible with Hausa-Fulani authority patterns by the products of western education in 
particularly Caliphate Hausaland and the upper Niger in general.  As we mentioned 
somewhere above, it was conscious colonial policy, to ensure that products of western 
education in the upper Niger evolved a worldview compatible with Fulani authority 
patterns.  Our view therefore, is that colonial education policy was responsible for 
bringing about a situation in the supra-national state in which two different worldviews 
were cultivated in recipients of western education from the upper and lower Niger 
respectively.   Given the discernable differences between both worldviews, they have 
tended to contend with and against each other in politics and other realms of life in such a 
308
manner that has not augured well for political performance in the supra-national state 
during and after colonial rule.  
There is no harm to mention at this point that the issue of dichotomy in the 
worldview held by individual political actors in society is central in our E-G scheme-
guided discourse.  The need to substantiate our assertions that it was a conscious colonial 
policy to ensure that products of western education in the upper Niger cultivated a 
worldview that was compatible with Hausa-Fulani authority patterns with specific 
evidence led us to the autobiography and biography of Ahmadu Bello, one of the 
prominent pioneer products of western education in the upper Niger.  Ahmadu Bello 
claimed decent from Dan Fodio, received the hierarchy title of Sardauna in the Sokoto 
Caliphate, and became the first premier of the Northern Region.  He was a targeted 
victim of the January 15, 1966 military coup d’etat.
Colonialism neither attempted to nor disrupted the Islamic system of education 
and socialization in the Caliphate society.  Instead, British colonial actors who operated 
in the upper Niger implemented a conscious policy that established a tradition that 
continuously nurtured a healthy collaboration between Islamic and westerns systems of 
education in the Caliphate society.  Islamic education remained the primary agency that 
functioned to inculcate tarbiyya132 or discipline and moral values in the young and the 
growing.  It prepared individuals to occupy their assigned stations in the Caliphate 
society (Lemu 1983 in Paden 1986).  In this regard, one hears the echoes of Herbert 
132 According to Paden, in the Hausa language, “The term tarbiyya is the broad generic 
term for training and discipline, and may include aspects of coporal punishment, but 
really refers to the learning of acceptable behavior in society.  It is related to the idea of 
obedience (biyayya), and its opposite, disobedience (rashin biyayya).  The commonly 
used contemporary term for “indiscipline” (rashin da’a) … derives from the Arabic term 
da’a” (Paden 1986: 81).
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Hyman’s research findings on the importance of socialization and learning to an 
individual in the acquisition “of social patterns corresponding to his societal positions 
mediated through various agencies of society” (Hyman 1959: 18).
Autobiographical and biographical data on Ahmadu Bello indicate that in Sokoto, 
the age-old tradition of sending children between the ages of three and five off to the 
makarantar allo (Koranic schools) where they were placed under the tutelage of strict 
mallams continued.  From that early age children were made to learn their religious 
obligations and values—the compulsory practice of prayers, memorization of the Koran, 
knowledge of Islamic law and jurisprudence, knowledge of the ‘biographies and 
qualities’ of the twenty-five prophets recognized by Islam (Paden 1986).  Each of the 
prophets is associated with specific qualities—obedience, perseverance, piety, honesty, 
leadership, wisdom, patience, etc.—held up to the children for their emulation.133  The 
process emphasized peer learning and deference to seniors and authority.134
At Katsina College, the exclusive school established solely for the sons of the 
Muslim ruling classes extra care was taken to ensure that Bello and his peers received “a 
classic form of British education (not a watered-down variety for colonial export)” 
(Paden 1986: 85).  Katsina College which became “the fountainhead from which most 
western education would spring in the” upper Niger (Paden 1986: 85) was truly an 
English public school transplanted to Hausaland.  The principal ‘was a taskmaster’ who 
placed a sign that that says “Character Maketh Man” over his desk.  ‘All of the teachers 
133 We believe that Hyman’s finding “that the totality of experiences in … childhood 
status [make remarkable impression] and is responsible in part for adult patterns” 
(Hyman 1959: 21) holds credence here.
134 Dale F. Eickelman (1978) points out that peer learning is a crucial component in 
Islamic education, which has been over-looked by scholars.  However, peer learning is 
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(except the Arabic/Islamic teachers) are British, in the public school mold’ and ‘seventy-
five percent of the students’ final grade was determined by “character assessment”, rather 
than academic performance’ (Paden 1986: 88, 95, and 85).135  The boys were made to 
visit the “Sultan’s house every Friday afternoon … to get a sense of the dignity and 
significance of the office of Sultan, and the social context in which it operated” (Paden 
1986: 94).  They evolved an age-grade system of seniority based on their enrolment 
number.  Products of Katsina transformed themselves into the “Barewa Old Boys”, a 
monolithic power block often called the Kaduna Mafia because of the influence of the 
members in commanding realms of life in supra-national state.136
As John Paden puts it, at the end, colonial education policy molded Bello into a 
personality whom Islam, as ‘the bedrock of values in his life’ gave ‘meaning to the other 
spheres’ of his life.  He functioned ‘well within the range of cultural norms for someone 
… trained for leadership, although he sometimes carried [those] values to extreme form’.  
He imbibed the ‘quality of rigid discipline, which is valued in the culture’.  He learned 
‘how to dress and act to instill fear and respect in people’.  ‘Partly because of his early 
sense of ancestors and partly because of his exposure at Katsina College, he develops a 
strong regard for large-scale systems’ and ‘profound respect’ for and admiration for ‘the 
British for their ability to create large-scale systems, and maintain an historical continuity 
to such systems’ (Paden 1986: 101-2).
not peculiar to Islamic education.  It’s a feature of indigenous African systems of 
socialization—see Fafunwa (1974) and Raum (1940).
135 Ruper Wilkinson (1964) presents a Comprehensive study of the impact of British 
public school education. In Gentlemanly Power: British Leadership and the Public 
School Tradition-A Comparative Study in the Making of Rulers. London and New York: 
Oxford University Press.
136 See The Kaduna Mafia (1987) by B. J. Takaya and S. A. Tyoden (eds.). Jos: Jos 
University Press. 
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Bello, indeed, all products of western education in Hausaland cultivated a 
worldview which is the integration of “three different worlds of value and meaning into 
[a single] whole” (Paden 1986: 7).  That worldview is a synthesis of African values, 
Islamic civilization, and European civilization.137  Paden presents it as a sevenfold 
typology in Figure 5. 1.  We extrapolated from Paden’s typology to construct the 
threefold typology shown in Figure 5.2 as the representation of the worldview cultivated 
in products of western education in the lower Niger.  On the issue of differences in the 
worldview cultivated in the recipients of western education in the Caliphate society and 
the lower Niger, we must profer some necessary explanations.  Although we designated 
the one cultivated in the peoples of the lower Niger as Euro-African, we must make haste 
to mention that the Christian missionary agencies through whom much of colonial 
education policy was implemented in the lower Niger were not comfortable with the 
indigenous cultures.  They associated them with paganism, which was targeted for 
eradication for reasons that it was considered backward and antithetic to Christianity 
(Isichei 1969).138  Hence, rather than encourage and sustain continuity in the socialization 
137 Bello was particularly unapologetic about being a purveyor of that worldview  
According to Paden, sometime in the 1960s when Nnamdi Azikiwe (an Igbo) “met with 
Ahmadu Bello and said,  “Let us forget our differences …” … Bello replied, “No, let us 
understand our differences.  I am a Muslim and a northerner.  You are a Christian and a 
easterner.  By understanding our differences, we can build unity in our country” (Paden 
1986: 3).
138 “The missionary enterprise”, argued Ischei, “often seemed like an attack on the very 
structure of Ibo society.  There are many examples, amusing or pathetic, of the cultural 
alienation imposed on early converts.  The first Ibo Catholic priest, Paul Emecete 
(Emechete), in an interesting fragment of autobiography, remembered that when he and 
other boys were undergoing involuntary training as catechists, they had to speak English 
always.  Since their only reading matter was the Bible, they were reduced to such 




1. A = African
2. B = Islamic
3. C = European
4. AB = Islamic-African
5. AC = Euro-African
6. BC = Euro-Islam
7. ABC= Euro-Islamic-African
Figure 5.1: Overlap of civilizations culminating in the worldview cultivated in the 









1. A = African
2. B = European
3. AB = Euro-African
Figure 5.2: Overlap of civilizations culminating in the worldview cultivated in products 
of western education in the lower Niger.  Source: Adapted from Paden (1986)
of children through the kind of healthy collaboration that was nurtured in the Caliphate 
society between Islamic and western systems of education, an unhealthy disconnection 
was established between western and indigenous systems of socialization in Igboland, 
Yorubaland, and everywhere else.  Socialization in political participation and other socio-
political values which have been determined in several studies to start from early years 
in children (Barnes 1900, Chambers 1903, Goddard 1906, Hall 1914, Hill 1930, and 





Igbo and Yoruba children earlier in their lives in their various family settings, must have 
been affected adversely by colonial education as a result.  Unlike in the Caliphate society, 
agencies of socialization such as the family and schools did not seem to have operated 
collaboratively in the socialization of children in lower Niger.  Our belief therefore, is 
that while the family continued to function as the foremost agent of socialization into 
politics in each nationality, beyond the Caliphate society, it did so with stress and strains 
from colonial education policy.  That could have led to a situation in which products of 
western education in the lower Niger were equipped at best to operate as marginal 
political actors in the supra-national state where the authority patterns have more 
resemblance with the prevalent patterns in the Caliphate society.  
Recruitment Into Military Forces
What exists today as the armed forces of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state 
originated in the various military forces that British state builders in the Niger basin 
raised and deployed to aid and abet their state building ambitions.  Any assumption to the 
recruitment into those forces was guided by considerations that synchronize with 
Britain’s imperial design and ambitions in the Niger basin.  Those forces were not just 
utilized to build and impose the supra-national state, given the situation in which most 
nationalities perceive the authority of the supra-national state as illegitimate; the military 
establishment has been a dominant element that sustains its continued existence.  The 
critical role of the army in the pursuit and realization of Britain’s imperial ambitions in 
the Niger basin were seriously appreciated by Britain’s colonial and state actors 
(Luckham 1971a: 231).  That appreciation was so real that up until 1958 all decisions on 
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the army of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state were the exclusive preserve of the British 
War Office in London (Miners 1971).  No one can therefore argue that the British 
government was not actively involved in all aspects of the various efforts made by its 
appointees in the Niger basin to establish the army.
Effective control of people is possible only when the loyalty of the individual 
agents of control is not in question.139  It is in that light that our discussion in this section 
must take place.  Implicit loyalty to the imperial cause was one major factor that 
determined who was recruited into those military forces.  That was the underlying 
rationale why the initial forces used for colonial conquests in the Niger basin were raised 
from the ranks of disaffected individuals in society.140  Lt. John Glover of the Royal 
Navy who later became the lieutenant-governor of crown colony Lagos raised the militia 
force that was used to enforce Compliance to crown authority in the Yoruba kingdom of 
Lagos from runaway Hausa slaves (Kirk-Greene 1964, Miners 1971).  The bulk of the 
forces that Frederick Lugard deployed in Hausaland to defeat the Fulani in 1903 was 
raised from runaway Hausa slaves as well as other disaffected individuals in the 
Caliphate society (Miners 1971).  In the context of the E-G scheme the slaves and 
disaffected individuals who enlisted in Frederick Lugard’s forces and took arms against 
139 See Julia Adams’ “Principals and Agents, Colonialists and Company Men: The Decay 
of Colonial Control in the Dutch East Indies” American Sociological Review, 1996, Vol. 
61, pp.12-28, for explicit presentation of what could happen in situations when loyalty of 
colonial agents falter. 
140 A similar factor played a role in the propagation of Christianity in Igboland.  Most of 
the pre-1900 Christian converts in Igboland were individuals who were alienated from 
mainstream Igbo society—Ndi osu (outcastes), ndi ohu (chattel slaves) and victims of 
natural misfortunes (Ekechi 1971).
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the Fulani ruling classes qualify as subordinate actors who were disposed to act creatively 
by impeded channels of Participation in the Caliphate society.
The army’s role as the paramount defender of the supra-national state has been 
critical and functional since colonial rule.  It cannot be otherwise when the supra-national 
state does not derive the legitimacy of its authority from the consent of its constituting 
nationalities.  Thus, imperial considerations or loyalty to Britain’s imperial ambitions and 
design became the determining criteria for recruitment into colonial military forces 
(Gutteridge 1970).  The predominance of norms that support the democratic practice of 
authority in Igbo and Yoruba societies implied that their authority patterns were 
incompatible with Britain’s ‘imperial considerations’ (Gutteridge 1970) which gave 
British state builders cause to disqualify Igboland and Yorubaland as suitable sources of 
recruits.  That can account for why the Yoruba and Igbo are not considered as ‘martial 
tribes’ with ‘martial traits’, which where the other two qualifying criteria for recruitment 
into colonial military forces.  
Put simply, the definitions of ‘martial tribes’ and martial traits’ are derived from 
the notion which states that soldiers who are recruited from nationalities that inhabit 
remote parts of colonized territories are likely to be more detached, more brutal and more 
hostile, and as a result more effective in the suppression of anti-colonial uprisings in 
urban centers far from their homeland (Gutteridge 1970).  Frederick Lugard and the rest 
of the colonial actors who played central roles in the establishment of the military forces 
of the supra-national state associated the urban centers with individuals from lower Niger 
nationalities who had western education and expressed their aversion for colonial 
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authority.141  The army was meant to be the counter force that could be used to neutralize 
threats to the supra-national state from the urban residents.  That rationale justified the 
exclusive recruitment of the Tiv (Munshi), the Numan, the Tangele, the Dakakori, et al., 
i.e. nationalities that inhabit the remote parts of the upper Niger later known as the 
‘Middle Belt’ as infantrymen in the military forces of the supra-national state during the 
colonial era (Miners 1971, Gutteridge 1970).  Troops raised from these nationalities were 
deployed to suppress the 1929-30 anti-tax protests mounted by women in Igboland and 
the neighboring Ibibiland (Miners 1971, Afigbo 1966, Haywood and Clark 1964).142
Like the designation of the so-called ‘martial tribes’, the definition of loyalty to 
Britain’s imperial ambitions was more subjective than objective.  If it were otherwise, 
instead of members of the aforementioned nationalities who are not even adherents of the 
Islamic faith, from the outset members of the Fulani aristocracy could have been the 
prime candidates for recruitment.   Conquest of the Fulani-ruled Caliphate state by the 
British with the same forces made its Fulani rulers to develop an initial aversion for the 
army.  But their upset and aversion did not last long.  The preferential alliance that 
evolved between them and the British a little after the conquest of their empire by the 
latter helped to bridge the initial differences that developed between them because of that 
conquest.
141 Exposure to Christianity was particularly considered to be a factor that rendered the 
nationalities of the lower Niger unfit as sources of recruitment.  A recruiting mission to 
West Africa in November 1916 sanctioned by the War Office to remedy the manpower 
shortage which was affecting the prosecution of WWI made recommendations that 
favored the so-called “pagan areas” (Haywood and Clark 1964: 254) in the upper Niger, 
which “produced a useful and steady expanding volume of material” (Haywood and 
Clark 1964: 254) for manpower needs in the colonial military forces.
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Islam’s resistance to western education and its associated provision of the bases of 
legitimacy for Fulani authority in Hausaland was another criterion that favored its 
adherents as opposed to adherents of indigenous African religions or even converts to 
Christianity for recruitment into the colonial military forces.  That explains the 
determination of the British to Islamize the rest of the nationalities that inhabited the 
upper Niger through colonial education.  This assertion raises the question of why the 
Yoruba Muslims failed to meet the bill for recruitment into colonial military forces.  By 
no means are we saying that adherence to or association with Islam was all that it took for 
members of a nationality in the Niger basin to qualify for recruitment into the military 
forces of the supra-national state during colonialism.  There are some socio-political 
factors that account for why Yoruba Muslims were deemed unsuitable for the military 
forces at the time.  The version of Islam that the British deemed unthreatening to their 
imperial design in the Niger basin was noticeably conservative in content and approach, 
which was why it provided the bases of legitimacy for Fulani authority in the Caliphate 
society.  Islam’s conservative traits produced the situation in which “the cult of the 
Muslim led to support for men and institutions that were despotic and corrupt” 
(Gutteridge 1970: 304).  There were still versions of the faith that posed threats to both 
Fulani authority and colonial rule in Hausaland (Adeleye 1972).  As soon as it was 
introduced in Yorubaland Islam was quickly reconditioned by the indigenous ‘norms’, 
‘forms’ and ‘practice’ of authority.  Yoruba Muslims never looked to the Fulani for 
guidance in the practice of their faith. A people who adhere strongly to norms that 
support Participation and Responsiveness in the practice of authority could not be found 
142In the official lexicon of the army, that operation in which a lot of women lost their 
lives is known in Hausa as yakin mata, i.e. ‘Women’s War’.
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suitable for recruitment into military forces meant for enforcing Compliance to 
regimented Directiveness  that emanate from an autocratic system of governance.
Loyalty to Britain’s imperial design and ambitions was not the only qualifying 
criterion for recruitment into the military forces of the supra-national state during colonial 
rule.143  The extent to which a nationality’s indigenous authority patterns and influence 
relations are democratic or autocratic, and the degree, i.e. the extent to which members of 
a nationality identify with the norms that guide the practice of authority played some 
roles too.144   The trenchant disloyalty that the British associated with the Igbo and the 
Yoruba is a function of their democratic authority patterns and influence relations and 
their consistent and passionate attachment to both.  They were unlike the Tiv of the upper 
Niger whose initial willingness to accommodate attempts to restructure their un-
centralized and democratic political organization (Bohannan 1958, Magid 1968: 300) 
gave the British cause to believe that they would abandon their democratic system of 
indigenous governance (Dent 1966).  Eventual attempts by the British to mold a 
monolithic political entity in the upper Niger by integrating every nationality into the 
Fulani Caliphate society was a huge success in Tivland (at least in the short run and in
terms of the normative changes in their institutional structures).  
Similar attempts in communities in northern Igboland that share boundaries with 
parts of the upper Niger drew fierce resistance (Jones 1961).  The same is true of attempts 
to introduce direct taxation which was seen as tribute payment to alien rulers by the Igbo 
and most of their neighbors (Afigbo 1966) in parts of the Igbo heartland in the 1920s.  
143 Loyalty to Britain was never in short supply among the Fulani ruling classes.  In his 
1913 Annual Reports E. J. Arnett, the “Resident” in charge of Sokoto “Province disclosed 
that: “The Sarkin Musulimi aided by the Waziri and Majidadi has continued to give every 
satisfaction in carrying out loyally the policy of the government” (in Paden 1986: 85).
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Direct taxation was so provocative in some communities that even the “warrant chiefs” 
joined the rest of their communities to proclaim to a D. O. that they were not conquered 
like the Hausa and would not submit themselves to direct taxation (Afigbo 1966: 552).  
The assumption made by Britain’s colonial administrators in the upper Niger that 
they had succeeded in molding the nationalities that inhabit it into the monolithic polity 
that they called the “Protectorate” of Northern “Nigeria” was yet another rationale that 
gave them the confidence to recruit its’ peoples into the military forces.145  That 
explained the emphasis that was placed on the recruitment of Hausa-speakers.146  But 
from the rational point of view there is an inherent paradox in a recruitment policy that 
favored speakers of a language and a culture that discouraged literacy in western 
technology and education (Gutteridge 1970, 1975).  For one, it led to the evolution of a 
vacuum in western education and technology in the armed forces of the supra-national 
state, which produced far-reaching negative consequences on its political performance in 
the post-colonial period.  In the army, the social cleavage that resulted was further 
compounded by the outbreak of World War II.  But it wasn’t until the end of de facto
colonial rule that it exploded into coups and coup attempts.  In the absence of Europeans 
to meet the need for tradesmen and skilled personnel (drivers, mechanics, clerks, etc.) in 
the army, recruiters were forced to look in the nationalities of the lower Niger particularly 
the Igbo (Gutteridge 1970, Miners 1971). 
The imminent end of de facto colonial rule forced another realistic shift on the 
recruitment policy into the military forces beginning from the 1950s.  The need to replace 
144 Degree here can be measured in terms of high or low.
145 The consequences of that assumption have been unusually dire for political stability in 
the supra-national state.
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the all-British officer corps did entail the recruitment of members of lower Niger 
nationalities who possess the requisite western education qualification to take the place of 
departing British officers.  
Each nationality’s reaction and response to that need was typical of (i) the texture 
of the asymmetrical relationship between its leadership and subordinate members, and (ii) 
the reflection of its authority patterns and influence relations.  In the upper Niger 
prominent Hausa-Fulani political actors including the Sardauna of Sokoto who was also 
the premier of the Northern Region embarked on a targeted campaign to convince and 
lure secondary school boys to enlist in the officer corps.  In his speeches the Sardauna
harped on “the former martial glories of the jihads” (Lukaham 1971a: 244) and called on 
students to ‘show that they were not women’ (Lukham 1971a: 244).  They initiated 
policies (quota system, lowering of entry qualifications, and reducing failure rates in 
selection tests into the ‘Nigerian’ Military Training College) that benefited nationalities 
in the upper Niger (Luckham 1971a).  In the nationalities that inhabit the lower Niger, 
enlistment into the military remained a career choice that individuals made on their own.  
In the light of the socio-political disparities between society in Hausaland, Igbo and 
Yoruba, while enlistees from the upper Niger who responded to their leadership and 
joined the army constituted a cohort of beneficiaries in a patronage-clientage system, 
their counterparts from elsewhere saw themselves as citizens in the army.  In both 
composition and ideology, the army was hardly a homogenous establishment in the 
supra-national state.  Some of the seeds that later germinated as crises in the army were 
planted under this circumstance.
146 Hausa has been the official lingua franca of the ‘Nigerian’ Army (NA) (Miners 1971, 
Luckham 1971b).
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Ahead in western education, and being a nationality in which the individual is free 
to embark on pursuits for personal advancement without securing the approval of the 
ruling classes, the Igbo quickly took advantage of the window of opportunity which 
opened in the officer corps and enlisted in record numbers.  In 1956 and in 1960 when 
colonial rule ended 68% of the officer corps was composed of Igbo (Gutteridge 1970).  
That figure was in contrast to only 14% who hailed from nationalities in the upper Niger 
(Miners 1971).  The Yoruba, whose members didn’t seem to show much desire at first for 
the military constituted about 17% of the corps in 1960 (Miners 1971, Gutteridge 1970, 
Luckham 1971b).147  But it was only the composition of the officer corps that changed as 
a result.  The rank and file remained predominantly Hausa speaking (about 75-80%).  It is 
intriguing that it was this skewed composition of the officer corps and not the one of the 
rank and file became the nagging cause of worry for Hausa-Fulani political actors.
The effects of the preferential recruitment policies that favored the Hausa-Fulani 
began to manifest themselves in the army in the years following the end of WWII.  
Artillery units and infantry battalions (about 70-80%) of the army were composed of 
illiterate, Hausa-speakers drawn from nationalities in the upper Niger.  On the other hand, 
the nominal skilled-trades-based component of the force was composed of members of 
lower Niger nationalities who possessed some measure of western education.  The socio-
political cleavage in this configuration of the military forces of the supra-national state is 
one that served Britain’s imperial interests in the Niger basin.  A mutiny over poor living 
conditions by some 100 clerks (from lower Niger nationalities) who were attached to the 
Command Ordnance Depot in the Yoruba town of Yaba in 1952 was quickly suppressed 
147 In 1966, seven years after the end of colonial when the population of the army was 
exactly 10,500 there were just 700 Yoruba in the army (Miners 1971: 27).
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by a detachment of Military Police and infantry riflemen (from upper Niger nationalities) 
before they could do more than wound a couple of their European officers and torch 
some army property (Miners 1971).   Over the course of the post-colonial period the 
symbolism of this and similar episodes traceable to that cleavage have not augured well 
at all for political performance in the supra-national state.
By the late 1950s the preferential state building policies of the British had 
entrusted control of the supra-national state into the hands of Hausa-Fulani political 
actors, who now sought to use the authority of the supra-national state to “redress” what 
they perceived as an imbalance in the composition of the officer corps.  Through their 
monopoly of such crucial positions of authority in the supra-national state as the prime 
ministership, defense portfolio, etc. the Hausa-Fulani were able to initiate a quota system 
that began to guide recruitment in the officer corps.  That quota system reinforced the 
Igbo and Yoruba perception that the Hausa-Fulani were not playing according to the 
norms of democracy in a plural state.  While the resultant composition of the army 
continued to serve Britain’s “imperial purpose” (Gutteridge 1970: 305) in the Niger basin 
to the hilt, it also it opened the super-national state to perpetual political instability and 
poor political performance.
The establishment of the police force presented the British with a different kettle 
of fish in its state building undertaking in the Niger basin.  In the initial stage of colonial 
rule there was hardly a distinction between the army and the police (Gutteridge 1970).  
But over the course of time there one major factor influenced policy on recruitment into 
the police.  Unlike the army the police was mostly quartered and deployed in the cities 
where the bulk of those who received western education reside.  Because the prerequisite 
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for enlistment into the police included some measure of western education it wasn’t 
possible for recruiting decisions to favor Hausa speakers or Muslims from remote parts of 
the upper Niger.148  That seemed to have helped to leave the door into the police more 
open for the Igbo and Yoruba, irrespective of the fact that the force was placed under the 
authority of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, a Hausa (Miners 1971).
Chapter Summation
Britain’s state building undertakings in the Niger basin did not conclude with the 
military conquest of its inhabiting nationalities.  Indeed, the unprovoked invasion and 
conquest of the area was the first phase of those efforts.  The next phase was devoted to 
formulating a homogenous set of authority patterns that facilitated the practice of colonial 
authority in the area under the aegis of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state.
The direct rule and the amalgamation policies, colonial education policy, and the 
policy that guided recruitment into the military forces of the supra-national state during 
the colonial era constitute the four principal tools with which that task was accomplished.  
The implementation of all four policies was mediated by the close alliance that evolved 
between the British and the Fulani ruling classes in Hausaland.  It was an alliance that 
was predicated on Frederick Lugard’s liking for the autocratic dimensions and 
dispositions of the Fulani authority patterns, which contrasts with his disdain for those of 
the Igbo and Yoruba which are democratic.
Thus, in the upper Niger, the indirect rule policy was implemented to preserve 
and extend the autocratic Fulani authority patterns to all nationalities that inhabit the area.  
148 As at 1960 the composition of the police force was in favor of lower Niger 
nationalities particularly Igbo (Miners 1971: 143).
325
In contrast, in the lower Niger, it was used to undermine the democratic authority patterns 
of the Igbo, Yoruba, and the rest.  In the upper Niger colonial education policy was a 
direct extension of colonial rule.  The efforts of Christian missionary agencies on the 
propagation of western education in the lower Niger were blamed for the anti-colonial 
agitations of its recipients.  The amalgamation itself became a device that was used to 
extend the autocratic authority patterns of the supra-national state with all their 
resemblances to those of the Fulani, to the rest of the Niger basin.  Recruitment into 
colonial military forces was guided by a policy which ensured only the enlistment of 
members of nationalities that were considered loyal to Britain’s imperial interests.
While the Hausa-Fulani, who cherished the preferential treatment that they were 
accorded, saw themselves as rulers, the Igbo, the Yoruba and the others became more 
distrustful of the supra-national state and its authority.  
CHAPTER VI:
THE CRITIQUE OF EXISTING DISCOURSE AND THEORIES:
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THE QUEST FOR THEORETICAL RECONSTRUCTION
Section One
Bringing In the Nationalities and Their History
Amongst the several propositional statements that we made earlier in the study is 
the suggestion that the discourse on political instability in ‘new states’ is both varied and 
extensive.  In a period that spans more than four decades the shortage of political stability 
and its negative impacts on all aspects of the lives of the populations of the ‘new states’ 
have been the subjects of immense interest to scholars who work from every theoretical 
perspective in the social sciences and allied disciplines in the humanities.  However, we 
equally suggested that those studies encompass extensive theoretical inadequacies.  One 
of the more glaring inadequacies evident in most accounts of political instability in ‘new 
states’ is that most of them are largely a-historical and overtly fixated on the post-colonial 
state as the only and central unit of analysis.  Very little regard, if at all is paid in them to 
the diverse and distinct social units that were made to constitute the ‘new states’.
Suggestions and findings in studies by scholars such as Jalali and Lipset (1992-
1993), Olzak and Tsutsui (1998), Gurr (1993), Anderson (1991), Hechter (1987), Smith 
(1981 and 1986), Tilly (1975 and 1993)149 all suggest that group identity issues have 
defied all predictions that they are disappearing anachronisms.  Not only that they haven’t 
disappeared into oblivion they have been responsible for most of the movements, claims, 
and violence that occur in UN-member states.  Such suggestions are sufficient grounds 
for a study like ours and the suggestions and findings that emanate from it.  The need for 
including the indigenous nationalities that constitute post-colonial ‘states’ as units of 
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analysis in the discourse on the political instability that plagues their body politic is made 
more necessary in the light of other research suggestions too.  Esman (1995) argues in a 
related vein that the increasing incidents of political instability associated with 
nationalities constitute obstacles to global peace while Susan Olzak and Kiyoteru 
Tsustsui (1998: 695) suggested “that characteristics of states in the world system generate 
distinct patterns of ethnic violence, nonviolent protest, and rebellion”.150
In most of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East where European colonialism created 
new political arrangements that assumed charge over the affairs of indigenous peoples 
there is ample evidence to suggest that neither colonial conquest nor de facto colonial 
rule and their legacies succeeded erasing indigenous societies and cultures.  We pointed 
out in Chapter Two of our narrative for instance that because of the persistence of 
indigenous societies, cultural norms, values, and structures alongside the society, cultural 
norms, values, and structures that emerged with the ‘states’ that resulted from colonialism 
in contemporary Africa that Zolberg (1968) described contemporary society in Africa as 
‘syncretic’.  Willaim Easterly and Ross Levin (1997) acknowledged this persistence 
albeit as a liability in their “ethnic theory of African stagnation” (Englebert 2000: 27).  In 
the realm of the economy Pierre Englebert (2000) highlights the negative role that great 
incongruence between post-colonial and pre-colonial institutions play in economic 
growth in contemporary African polities.
149 Our interpretation of these authors’ preference to designate the distinct social units as 
ethnic groups instead of nationalities is that it is the reflection of the entrenched mindset 
that nationalities deserve to be over-looked that we critique in the study.
150 Their suggestion derives from the conclusion that “peripheral countries with more ties 
to international governmental organizations have significantly lower levels of ethnic 
violence than peripheral countries without those ties” (Olzak and Tsutsui 1998: 691).
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For us therefore, if indigenous peoples, their societies and institutions did not and 
have not disappeared in the parts of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East where Europeans 
created ‘new states’ at about the end of the nineteenth century, we believe that their 
persistence must have been impacting the course of politics in the ‘new states’.  To 
accommodate them as units of analysis in studies of political development in the ‘new 
states’ like this one is tantamount to enriching the discipline of political sociology.  
Furthermore, going back into the pre-colonial history of the indigenous peoples of 
the Niger basin became a necessary avenue to establish that each of them had always 
directed their affairs and their society not in random and haphazard manner, but 
according to normatively determined and peculiar patterns deeply embedded within the 
fabrics of their age-old socio-cultural institutions.  We were able to establish that there 
had been situations in the pre-colonial history of some them when warfare was employed 
in state building, and that the outcomes were similar to the one that resulted from 
colonialism, i.e. the forceful incorporation of distinct peoples into a unitary political 
arrangement in the past produced negative consequences. 
In and by itself the resort to pre-colonial history became a methodological device
in the study.  It is evident in Figure 6. 1 that in contrast to previous studies in which the 
nationalities were deliberately excluded as unites of analysis, in the present study we 
have invented an expanded design that responds to one of the methodological concerns
inherent in comparative and historical research that involves small or even fewer cases 
(Lieberson 1992).   The social research practice—that derives “from [John Stuart] Mill’s
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Discourse excludes nationalities in 
the unit of analysis
Zone of convergence
Discourse includes 
nationalities as units in the analysis
Figure 6.1: Diagrammatic representation of theory reconstruction in the discourse on 
political instability in the ‘new states’ to include the nationalities as units of analysis
 [1872] method of agreement and … difference” (Lierberson 1992: 105)—of using few 
cases in comparative and historical social research to draw causal inference as “the forces 
that drive a societal outcome such as political development or organizational 
characteristics” (Lierberson 1992: 105) has been common place in political sociology for 
a long time now.  Barrington Moore (1967), Skocpol (1979), Orloff and Skocpol (1984), 
Katznelson (1985), and Stepan (1985) have all used it to good effect.





X2(b), X2(c), … Supra-national
state as unit of
analysis X1
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But by expanding the unit of analysis beyond the post-colonial ‘state’ as we have 
done, we were able to execute the narrative in terms of comparing the differences and 
similarities in authority patterns (an independent variable) between the nationalities on 
the one hand, and between them and the post-colonial ‘state’ on the other, to discern the 
causal relationship between their authority patterns and the rest of the other independent 
variables and the dependent variable (political instability).  Thus, as can be further 
discerned from Figure 6.1, instead of a design that involved the state (X) as the sole unit 
of analysis, we utilized the one that includes the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national (X1), and the 
nationalities (X2a, X2b, (X2c…) as units of analysis.151
Accommodating the Concept of Supra-national State Within the Statist Paradigm
The conception of the state in the discourse on political instability in ‘new states’ 
is as extensive and wide-ranging as the discourse itself.  It has ranged from the pluralism-
structural functionalism, and Marxism paradigms, which critics charge with treating “the 
state as a dependent variable; [whose] actions are explained by the interplay of interest 
groups or of social classes” (Lehman 1988: 859), to the age-old statist paradigm 
pioneered by Max Weber ([1924] 1968) and Otto Hintze (1975), and embraced by Nettle 
(1968), Stepan (1978), Skocpol (1979), Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol (1985), and 
others.
Without dismissing the relevance of the contributions made in social research by 
studies that situate their theoretical perspectives within the first two paradigms mentioned 
above, we believe that the state-centered paradigm serves our narrative in the present 
151 This design is exceedingly robust, and can, depending on the available “time-energy 
cost” be expanded infinitely to accommodate an extensive number of cases.
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study best, for the following amongst several other reasons.  (i) The statist paradigm 
emphasizes institutions and their constraints on the behavior of individuals in society.  It 
is evident in the narrative that we stressed that the role played by the patterns of authority 
inherent in the segmental institutions and units in the societies that we studied is 
important for the practice of authority in each one of them.  (ii) We subscribed to the 
crucial position in the statist paradigm that political phenomena in society are better 
understood when they are viewed “in a longitudinal and historical perspective” (Almond 
1988: 871).  This is evident in the way that we viewed and analyzed the phenomenon of 
interest, i.e. political instability, in the study.  (iii) The emphasis placed by the statist 
paradigm on the position that politics amounts more to “rule and control than of 
allocation” (Almond 1988: 870) knocks at the heart of the observations and findings that 
we made in the narrative about the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state in the Niger basin.152
In terms of the logic of its founding, characteristics, and inability to transform, in fact its 
entire history, the supra-national state is best suited for control and rule as opposed to 
allocation.  Its involvement in acts that qualify as allocation has been mostly accidental 
consequences of its abrasive interactions with most of the nationalities in the Niger basin. 
The concept of supra-national state, which features quite prominently in the 
narrative is a conscious conception used to elucidate some of the peculiar differences 
between the states as they exist in Africa in contrast to their European counterparts.  It 
denotes the other contribution made by this study to political sociology.  Although 
“broad-ranging” (Ertman 1997: 10), the theories of state building developed by Hintze 
152 Callaghy (1984) subscribes to the same position too.  But in spite of his argument 
made from that position that states in contemporary Africa straddles and struggles against 
society for legitimacy, his suggestions fell short of identifying the basis of the lack of 
legitimacy experienced by African states.
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(1975), Michael Mann (1986), Tilly (1985 and 1990), Perry Anderson (1974) and Brian 
Downing (1992) respectively all focus exclusively on medieval and early modern Europe 
(Ertman 1997).  Notwithstanding their “competing explanations for variations in political 
regime and the character of their administrative and financial infrastructures” (Ertman 
1997: 1011) that these scholars argue to have evolved in European states, the single 
factor common to all their theories is the one about war making as a central factor that 
drives state building.  In as much as the extension of the European state system in the late 
nineteenth century by some of “Europe’s leading states … by colonization, conquest, and 
penetration of non-European states” (Tilly 1990: 181) in Africa, some parts of Asia and 
the Middle East alludes to the centrality of warfare in state building, it is unrealistic for 
anyone to suggest that European efforts finalized the issue of state building in the non-
European world.  In the Niger basin, it was due largely to colonialism’s inability to 
obliterate indigenous nationalities that it proved itself only capable of establishing an 
administrative that finds it difficult and impossible to penetrate and transform indigenous 
nationalities effectively.  We established in the narrative that persistent political 
instability in the Niger basin since colonial conquest is proof that the indigenous 
inhabitants of the area have refused to find the requisite sense of identity in colonialism’s 
administrative legacies.  Their restiveness is an indication that they may be waiting for 
the opportunity to reassert their political autonomy if not break away completely from 
colonialism’s legacies.  It’s therefore improper to perceive Africa’s contemporary polities 
as anything else if not supra-national states that may remain perpetually unviable political 
arrangements.
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We provided ample evidence in the narrative as proof to suggest that warfare in 
state building was not peculiar to medieval and early modern Europe.153  Warfare was 
employed for the same purpose in some parts of the Niger basin in the pre-colonial 
period.  However, in each of the cases—in Yorubaland and Hausaland and its environs—
the resilient authority patterns of the nationalities dictated the confined success and 
durability of the resultant states.  The peculiarity of the indigenous nationalities of the 
Niger basin did not and may not accommodate the same state building trajectory that 
prevailed in parts of Europe in the medieval and early modern periods.154  Furthermore, 
some of our findings suggest that arguments made by the likes of Herbst (1990) that 
political instability in contemporary African polities derive from the continent’s non-
conformity to Europe’s state building trajectory or to the state system that resulted from it 
are not supported by concrete facts of history.
By employing the concept of supra-national state in the narrative we are able to 
highlight the problems and contradictions evident in the state system that European 
colonialism bequeathed to the inhabitants of the Niger basin vis-à- vis their authority 
patterns.  The concept was employed to expose the origin of the various factors that 
dispose the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state its weaknesses and illegitimacy.   Attempts by 
the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state to acquire ‘hardness’ through intensified efforts to 
penetrate indigenous societies to for instance improve its ability to extract more resources 
may further diminish its fortunes and even hasten its demise. Existing studies on political 
development in the Niger basin and indeed most of Africa have wrongly equated the 
153 Edgar Kiser and Yong Cai (2003) have shown that warfare featured prominent in state 
building in Chinese history too.
154 Continuing political stirrings in parts of Western Europe such as Spain, United 
Kingdom indicate that Europe did not resolve its state building issues in the two periods.
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‘Nigerian’ supra-national state as the parallel equivalent of states in Europe.  That 
comparison, which does not take the its performance during colonial rule into account, is 
then used to justify the suggestion that European states are both strong and hard while 
their African ‘counterparts’ are in contrast are soft and weak.  The application of the 
concept of supra-national state underscores the fact that we did not over-look the colonial 
history and persistent poor performance of the ‘‘Nigerian’ state’ vis-à-vis the 
nationalities.  It is a formulation that accommodates the diachronic existence as one of 
the bases for assessing its over all performance.
Why We Extended the Narrative beyond the Three Selected Nationalities
The nature and dynamics of the narrative made it necessary for us to extend the 
discourse beyond the three nationalities in the case study.  But for that we could have 
been unable to establish the supra-national nature and character of the Fulani Caliphate 
state for instance.  By accounting for the distinct nationalities that the Fulani rulers 
incorporated into their Caliphate empire we were able to test elements of some of our 
hypotheses at another level beyond the involvement of an external power in state 
building.  That is, that the proposition that social, economic, and political heterogeneity 
amongst diverse social units that are compelled to constitute a supra-national political 
arrangement often constitutes the recipe for political instability.
We have not been shy to admit that time and other resource constraints are largely 
responsible for forcing the tripartite sample of the Igbo, the Yoruba, and the Hausa-
Fulani on us as representative cases in the study.  Historical evidence indicates that 
political development in the Niger basin was not been exclusively determined by the 
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demographic factor of population size.  The location of each nationality’s homeland is 
another crucial factor that impacts their respective roles in political development in the 
area.  For instance, it is the eco-geographic peculiarities of the Niger delta that assigned 
continuing prominent roles to its numerically less nationalities—that are often excluded 
in study samples—in the politics of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state.  Again, the 
proximity of the nationalities that inhabit the parts of the upper Niger basin that became 
known as the Middle Belt to Hausaland rendered them important factors in the conquest-
driven political formations in those parts before, during, and after colonial rule.  The 
point in all these is that our preference is to posit the exigency-driven tripartite sample of 
representative cases in the study not as an end in itself, but as a fluid and impervious 
device that permitted the inclusion of other nationalities in the complex narrative about 
political performance in the supra-national state that they were forced to constitute.
Coding Colonial Policies as State Building Measures 
Britain’s colonial policies and their implementation in the Niger basin were 
hardly the autonomous actions of the British state.  In part, they were the products of the 
social, political, economic, and even geographical circumstances that Britain’s ‘men on 
the spot’ in the Niger basin were faced with in the course of their imperial service.155  In 
155 Anthony Kirk-Green identifies a category of these men in generic terms, as being 
composed of the District Officers (DOs) or District Commissioners (DCs).  A DO 
according to Kirk-Green is “the field representative of the colonial government, the 
proverbial man-on-the-imperial-spot, … the symbol and the executive agent of Britain’s
imperial administrations” (Kirk-Green 2000: 1).  In the Niger basin and elsewhere in 
Africa they were thin gods who made and enforced ‘laws’ on their personal whims and 
caprices.  There’s no wonder therefore why the Igbo called him ‘nwa deeshii’ meaning 
the petulant DC. 
336
the other part, the ideological convictions of those men equally played decisive roles in 
the formulation and implementation of those policies.
Britain’s colonial policies in the Niger basin have been the subject of focus in 
many studies most of which were conducted in the period beginning from the middle of 
the 1950s up until the early and the middle of the 1970s by African and European 
scholars.  Some of those studies singled them out and examined them in and by 
themselves while others examined them together with the colonial policies of the other 
European states that owned and operated colonies on the continent.  M. Semakula 
Kiwanuka’s (1970: 295) study is an example of the latter, and he simply preferred to 
reappraise European colonial policies for the purposes of assessing their “presumed 
virtues”.  There are also studies of Britain’s colonial policies that fit the first category 
mentioned above.  Adiele Afigbo’s (1972) study of the indirect rule policy concentrated 
on how British colonial administrators who operated in southeast Niger basin inhabited 
by the Igbo, Ogoja, Ibibi, and the Ijaw relied on it to evolve the administrative practice of 
appointing ‘Warrant Chiefs’ to exert colonial authority over these distinct nationalities.  
Michael Crowder’s (1964) was about the stylistic differences between the application of 
the policy by the British and the French in their respective colonial administrations on the 
continent.
The indirect rule policy was prominently featured in Isichei’s (1973), Jeremy 
White’s (1981) studies too.  The same is true about the Amalgamation policy, which 
featured prominently in the works of Nicolson (1969), and Tamuno (1972).  Colonial 
education policy and the policy that guided the recruitment of indigenous men into the 
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colonial military forces were discussed by Coleman (1971), Hubbard (2000), and 
Gutteridge 91970), Miners (1971), Luckham (1971b), and First (1970) respectively.
Coding Britain’s colonial policies in the Niger basin as state building measures is 
an innovative contribution to the study of political development and political sociology.  
The underlying logic of that coding is that but for them colonialism’s most visible legacy 
(the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state) in the Niger basin could not have been realized.  
Furthermore, coding them as state building measures is based on the logic and premise 
that the administrative and political character, institutional structures and even authority 
patterns of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national states were all molded and put into place in large 
part through those policies.
Applying the E-G Scheme to an African Case Study
A theory-driven longitudinal case study like this one often strives to analyze and 
interpret a chosen case in light of existing theories, or ‘generalizations’.  Always, the aim 
is to scrutinize the case more carefully in the bid to validate, modify, or replace existing 
theories with new and more valid ones (Eckstein 1966: 177).  The subject of political 
instability in polities that emerged from circumstances similar to the ones that led to the 
founding of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state has been studied in the past and in the 
light of different theoretical perspectives.  Following a careful search we concluded that 
Eckstein’s congruence theory and the E-G scheme have never been applied to the 
examination of political performance in Africa or any of the ‘new states’ elsewhere.  The 
application of congruence theory here is another theoretical contribution to political 
sociology. 
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Congruence theory hinges on “the nature of, and the relations among, the different 
authority patterns in a society” (Eckstein 1992: 187).  Initiated by Harry Eckstein, the 
theory has been elaborated on by him and others (Eckstein 1961a, 1966, 1969, 1971, 
1979, 1980, Eckstein and Gurr 1975, Gurr and McCllelland 1971).
Although Weber’s state-centered conception on the bases of legitimacy was the 
point of departure for authors of the E-G scheme (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 202)156 and 
they associate three of their dimensions of authority patterns with aspects of Weber’s 
typologies of legitimacy (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 201-229) the perspective on the 
problem of power and authority presented in the study is quite different from the 
Weberian view, which classifies power and authority structures as either traditional or 
patrimonial charismatic or legal-rational.  Weber’s concerns centered more on the gradual 
emergence of constraints on the power of kings and the role of legal-rational bureaucracy 
in that process with particular regard to Europe and the New World which can be 
regarded as the extension of Europe in almost every sense.  But he neither posed nor 
addressed the question of power and authority in a supra-national state artificially 
created, despite his teaching in Vienna, the capital of the Austria-Hungarian Empire, 
which was the best European analogue to the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state for instance.  
Beyond that oversight, issues of political instability were never posed by him.  At the 
same time, we exploited two themes from Weber in our comparative analysis of the Igbo, 
Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani (see Figure 6.2): centralization and the presence of written 
records or bureaucracy.  Beyond those, the analysis of differences in the three of the 
156 Even though Eckstein and Gurr concede that Weber’s typology might be considered 
as good, they still accept the merits of some of the criticisms leveled at it.  Hence they 
regard it “as only a beginning” from which they proceeded to furnish a “more 
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several constituent parts of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national have been informed partly by 
works by scholars such as Charles Tilly’s (1975, 1985, 1990) and Ertman (1997) on state 
formation and transformation in Europe and their components (i.e. taxes/capital, 
armies/coercion, bureaucracy, etc) in the early modern period. 
Eckstein’s congruence theory and the framework that derives from it start from a 
very different and broader perspective, namely the problem of political performance and 
especially the issue of political instability, our main concern in the study.  Although there 
is a long tradition of interest in this problem within political sociological including 
studies of riots, strikes and contentions (Tilly 1986, and 1995, Tilly and Tilly 1975, 
Tarrow 1967, 1989a, 1989b and 1998, McAdam et al 1996) revolutions (Skcopol 1979, 
1994, Walt 1996) and other forms of instability, sociologists have not used his framework 
in their analyses.  Yet, it would appear that this framework offers considerable capacity 
as can be seen in Figure 6.2 that can be utilized to address the subject of political 
instability in social units.
For sociologists, a particular feature of this framework is the analysis of authority 
patterns in kinship structures and its linkages to the nature and dynamics of political 
authority as an essential way of defining congruence.  In African societies, where kinship 
is an extremely critical component for understanding nationalities and their political 
organization and system, this social foundation of power reflects an important and 
necessary sociological perspective.
Therefore, congruence theory involves several valuable components.  Some of 
those components include the theory’s inherent premises that authority is universal, exists 
comprehensive and more discriminating” conception (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 201 and 
204).
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in patterns, and that it is practiced in every society in terms of those patterns.  
Furthermore, we are attracted by yet another premise of the theory which stipulates that 
authority patterns and practices of authority are subsumed within the socio-cultural and 
political organizations found in every society (Eckstein 1966a: 5).  In the case of the 
nationalities of the Niger basin, one of the possibly several suggestions encompassed in 
the aforementioned premises—particularly the last one —is that the diversity and 
distinctiveness of their socio-cultural and political organizations  are major factors that 
impacted the course of their respective pre-colonial history.  The same is also true of the 
political history of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state, which they were constituted into 
following colonial conquest.  Another suggestion is that their socio-cultural and political 
distinctiveness are evident in their respective governmental and non-governmental 
authority patterns, and in the forms and scopes of their respective sociopolitical 
organization.  The last, which is not the least by any means, is the suggestion that 
Britain’s state building endeavor in the Niger basin was largely influenced by the socio-
cultural and political distinctiveness and diversity of the nationalities.  
Implications of the E-G Scheme for Theory and Sociological Research
Many orthodox theoretical arguments made about political instability in the 
various supra-national “states” that resulted from Europe’s colonial intervention in Africa 
have been exposed to serious scrutiny by the application of the E-G scheme in the present 
study.  In Africa: Angola, Uganda, Rwanda, the Congo, etc. —indeed elsewhere in 
former European colonies Pakistan, Iraq, Indonesia—the likes of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-
national state have lacked stability in their central government since the end of formal 
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colonial rule.157  However, there is no doubt that aspects of orthodox arguments about 
their political instability are off-mark.  First, orthodox arguments tend to assume that 
products of Europe’s colonial intervention are givens, i.e. that they are age-old polities 
that emerged on the consent of the diverse nationalities that were made to constitute 
them.  Second, such orthodox arguments tend to stress that the determinants of political 
stability or the lack of that in the former colonial polities are what Eckstein calls the 
“traits of governmental structures”, the “social environment of governments” or a 
combination of both (Eckstein 1969: 277).  The emphasis placed on what Eckstein calls 
the “non-political aspects of [the] social environment” (Eckstein 1969: 277) in orthodox 
arguments as the determinants of political stability is insufficient to provide more valid 
explanations.  By emphasizing the “internal authority relations” (Eckstein 1969: 277) 
between governmental and non-governmental institutions as the determinants of political 
stability or its absence in polities and social units the E-G scheme enables anyone who is 
interested in embarking on the kind of sociological inquiry that we just conducted on the 
‘Nigerian’ supra-national state and its constituent nationalities to do so in a manner that 
the independent variables of interest include “both government and society 
simultaneously, [and] not each separately” (Eckstein 1969: 277).
It makes a lot of sociological sense to do so.  This is particularly for the reason 
that by so-doing, recognition is accorded to the diverse nationalities that were compelled 
by force to constitute the product of external intervention in state building.  The 
individuals who reside in the various supra-national states created by Europeans in Africa 
tend to belong primarily to their respective indigenous society and only peripherally to 
157 Counter examples are few in Africa—Tanzania and Botswana are the two that quickly 
come to mind.
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the former.  They are products of the socialization processes provided by their respective 
indigenous society.  It is indeed the socialization that they receive in their formative years 
that prepares them for the various roles that they play in the course of their life.  That fact 
is too important to be ignored in the quest to explain the roots and causes of political 
instability in society.  Eckstein makes it evident that the framework from which the E-G 
scheme was derived is purposely steeped in psychological and sociological tenets absent 
in the theoretical perspectives that inform orthodox arguments about political instability.  
The social-psychological crux of his argument that: “men are able effectively to perform 
political roles if their previously learned norms and behavior substantially prepare them 
for such roles, and if the norms and practices demanded by their concurrent social roles 
do not create strains or painful ambivalences and contradictions with their political ones” 
(Eckstein 1969: 278).
Given that indigenous society in each of the nationalities that constitute the 
‘Nigerian’ supra-national state has not disappeared.  Further more, given that the norms 
and behavior that make crucial difference in any political roles played by individuals are 
still those that they learn in the early years of life (Goddard 1906, Hall 1914, Hill 1930, 
and Adorno, et al 1950 in Hyman 1959: 17-36), the E-G scheme-derived arguments made 
in the study to the effect that the combination of the diverse nationalities with their own 
respective authority patterns in the supra-national state produced latent internal conflicts 
that continue to manifest and exacerbate themselves is sociologically and logically valid.  
We have applied a combination of frameworks—Eckstein and Gurr’s, Weberian, 
and mine to understand and present the analysis of why there is political instability in the 
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“‘Nigerian’ supra-national state.  What we carried out here is an interdisciplinary 
undertaking that straddles political sociology and political science.
Section Two
Hypotheses, Independent Variables, and Findings
The Four Hypotheses
The above assertions are captured diagrammatically in their succinct essence in 
Figure 1.2 (in Chapter One) which is repeated below as Figure 6.2.  The left and right 
sides of that diagram encapsulate elements of three principal factors that relate to the 
independent and dependent variables respectively—see Chapter One.  Furthermore, 
aspects of the same three factors are contained in the four study hypotheses, below.  The 
‘Nigerian’ supra-national state is a multi-national entity.  A critical variable for multi-
national polities is the degree of heterogeneity among its constituent nationalities.   
Hypothesis # 1: Given a high degree of social, economic and political 
heterogeneity among diverse societies in the Niger basin that were then compelled to 
constitute the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state by the British, the chances that political 
instability will prevail in the supra-national state during and after colonial rule is 
exceedingly high.
Hypothesis # 2: (i) Given the high heterogeneity in the governmental authority 
patterns of the constituent nationalities in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state the 
possibility that political instability will ensue in the latter during and after colonial rule 
will be quite high. (ii) The greater the heterogeneity in the non-governmental authority 
patterns of the constituent nationalities in the supra-national state the greater the 
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political instability that will ensue in the supra-national state during and after colonial 
rule.
The Degree of Differences in
Selected Characteristics 
Evolved in the Component Polities
+
Heterogeneity in                                                          +             Political Instability
Kinship and Authority                                                in the Supra-national            
Patterns of the Component State
Polities                                                                        +
Lack of Congruence and 
Consonance Between and amongst
The Authority Patterns of the
Supra-national State and those of 
The Different Nationalities due to
Preferential State Building
Policies 
Figure 6.2 Factors that contribute to political instability in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national 
state. The direction of arrows and plus symbols indicate causation and positive 
relationship respectively
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Hypothesis # 3: The greater the disparity between the authority patterns in the 
supra-national state and the authority patterns in its various constituent parts 
(nationalities), the greater the political instability that will prevail in some of the 
constituent nationalities during and after colonial rule.
Hypothesis # 4: The more an intervening power imposes a supra-national state 
via preferential policies and alliances towards one of several existing nationalities that 
are socially and politically diverse, vis-à-vis the others, the greater the political 
instability that will prevail in the resultant supra-national state during and after colonial 
rule.
Hypothesis 1 is essentially the application of some of the Weberian insights as 
updated by the works of Charles Tilly on the role of conquest in the formation and 
transformation of states in the West.  As can be observed, the insight about the role of 
conquest in state building can be applied to African nationalities as well but with 
differential success.
In contrast, Hypotheses 2 and 3 are derived from Eckstein’s framework for 
describing the authority patterns in kinship structures as well as various political units 
that make major decisions affecting the nationality.  Hypothesis 2 focuses on the 
differences between three major constituent parts whereas Hypothesis 3 focuses on the 
congruence with the authority patterns of the supra- national state and is item one in box 
three because it represents a British state building policy.
Finally, Hypothesis 4 represents a unique formulation by me to indicate the 
unintended consequences of state building by an external power in an environment 
inhabited by diverse and distinct nationalities.  Support for mass education on the one 
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hand and yet a preference for the language, culture and religion of the Hausa-Fulani on 
the other created an inevitable social schism within the supra-national state and partly 
explains the incidence of large number of coups d’etat for instance after independence.  
But again, education, recruitment patterns into the army, stratification as reflected in 
supports of elites, and cultural preferences are standard sociological concepts that appear 
to be missing from the Weberian and Eckstein frameworks relative to power, that is 
power hierarchies and the congruence framework.  My framework represents a way of 
coding colonial nation-building policies in a succinct way and provides a method for 
understanding internal contradictions.  In particular, given the widespread belief in 
sociology dating from Lipset (1959, 1960, and 1981)158 that education is one of the four 
indices159 that help to establish economic development as the basis for democracy and by 
implication political stability, the consequences of mass education policies in the 
‘Nigerian’ supra-national state take on added significance.  Education can also create a 
basis for political instability especially in situations that approximate the circumstances 
that obtained in the Niger basin where there were conscious initiatives by a colonial 
power to micromanage education policies.
The Importance of the Independent Variables
Figure 6.3 shown below summarizes the evidence for the four dimensions of 
influence relations and the ranking of each of the three nationalities that form the core of 
158 Political Man: The Basis of Politics by Seymour Martin Lipset was first published in 
1959 and 1960 by Doubleday & Co.  In 1981 the expanded and updated edition was 
published by Johns Hopkins University Press.  The one used here is the expanded and 
updated edition.
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our analysis on each one of them.  We established the basis of each nationality’s ranking 
on the various aspects of the dimensions of influence relations in Chapter Three.  In the 
first box, one can observe the great differences in the other social and political variables 
amongst them.  Their size of polity in each of them varies in terms of small for the Igbo 
and large for the Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani respectively.  There are variations between 
them on the presence or absence of standing armies, written records, socio-political 
centralization, system of socialization, and kinship patterns.  The Igbo whose political 
formations were not conquest-based had no need for standing armies.  Interestingly, the 
Yoruba who exploited warfare for state building found no need for standing armies.  The 
Hausa-Fulani is the out-layer case on this variable.  The standing army was a consistent 
feature of the socio-political order amongst them.  Centralization, which features in the 
political arrangement of the Yoruba, transcends the social, economic, and political fabrics 
of society in Hausaland beginning from the era when the Habe Sarkis asserted themselves 
as authorities over society.  The systems of socialization, i.e. religion and education 
amongst the Igbo and Yoruba evolved as indigenous and functional components of 
society but in Hausaland they canalized into bureaucratic tools for the control of society 
by rulers.  Unlike in Igboland and Yorubaland, religion provided the basis for a 
‘disciplinary revolution’ in Hausaland which aided rulers in state building and 
transformation.   In Hausaland Dan Fodio’s Fulani clan was able to engender the 
equivalent of a social situation that approximates what Philip Gorski (1993: 271) 
described as a ‘social revolution’, i.e. a situation in which “a ‘rising’ carrier group uses 
disciplinary institutions to cement its status and domination” and produces “rapid and 
fundamental social transformation” by so doing.160
160 Calvinism according to Philip S. Gorski played a similar role in Europe by instilling 
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The variations in kinship patterns in the three nationalities are evidently clear.  
The same is true about the ranking of each of the three on the different colonial policies 
that we rightly designated as state building measures.  We have already discussed each 
one of them detail in Chapter Five.  Political performance in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national 
is greatly impacted by this array of independent variables.
Findings about Political Instability: Testing the Hypotheses
What then are the roots of political instability and their locations in the ‘Nigerian’
supra-national state?  The answers to this puzzle are evident in the analysis in the 
preceding chapters.  Hypotheses 1 and 2 suggest that when different societies that (a) 
achieved discernable development in their social, economic, and political organizations, 
and (b) exhibit great heterogeneity in their governmental and non-governmental authority 
patterns are forced into a supra-national state particularly, by an external power, chances 
of political instability in the latter are bound to be high.   Furthermore, they suggest that 
the processes through which societies evolve and transform their polities are as important 
as the type of social, economic, and political system and organization that they evolve.  
Both hypotheses are strongly supported by the findings in the analysis in chapter three.  
The analysis indicates that the Igbo, the Yoruba, and the Hausa-Fulani evolved their 
distinct socio-political system and organization differentially.  The Igbo, who evolved 
democratic, village-based socio-political system and organization eschewed warfare and 
conquest as state building devices.  On the other hand, the Yoruba who utilized warfare
“an ethic of self-discipline within individual believers [who] invented a variety of 
institutional strategies for maintaining collective discipline within the church’ [and by so 
ding, they] promoted social reforms aimed at increasing popular discipline” (Gorski 
1993: 266).
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and conquest in their state building and transformation activities (Ajayi and Smith 1971, 
Akintoye 1970, Akintoye 1966, Smith 1969, Johnson 1921) were able to evolve 
centralized and large political organizations, with built-in functional, constitutional and 
broad democratic structural stipulations.  In the absence of any evidence that shows that 
there was any form of intermingling of peoples in both the Igbo and Yoruba homelands, 
one can posit that each of the two nationalities evolved a society of kins.
The exceptions were the Hausa-Fulani who evolved extensive centralized and 
large-scale political systems and organization through warfare and conquest.  Their 
highly centralized political system was exceptionally autocratic and controlling of society 
and its members.  For the reason that it was heterogeneous in every sense of the word, the 
Caliphate Empire is best described as “a society of racial communities” (Huntington 
1982: 8) built through warfare and military conquest.161  The Fulani Caliphate Empire 
was a supra-national state in its own right.  Evidence abounds as proof that it experienced 
its share of political instability.  From available evidence we can infer that political 
instability in the Caliphate state derived mostly from its diverse composition, and the fact 
that the Fulani relied primarily on military force and coercion to build, transform, and 
administer the diversity of peoples that composed it (Last 1967: 228-231, Smith 1960: 
100-2).162  Particularly noteworthy is the fact that political stability in the Caliphate 
Empire was mostly experienced in areas where there were similarities in kinship patterns 
developed through marriage within and between ruling Fulani clans and their Hausa 
161 Several distinct nationalities and racial groups, i.e. the Fulani and Negroid groups 
were incorporated into the Fulani Caliphate state.
162 The ‘Fulani system of government’ was faced with a considerable measure of 
‘political competition’ that often degenerated to serious instability over attempts by 
Fulani political actors to appropriate political authority by force (Smith 1960: 100).
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allies.  Last documents countless revolts and rebellions in the Caliphate after the death of 
Fodio during the period 1817-59, which he dubs the era of consolidation and the one that 
followed, 1859-1903, which he called the ‘period of security and settlement’ (Last 1967: 
63-141).  
The analysis in Chapter Three further shows that warfare and military conquest 
have a double-edged capacity to aid state building and transformation on the one hand, 
and to promote the potentials for political instability in a polity on the other.  That 
double-edged capacity was evident even amongst the Yoruba who share a common 
language and other cultural traits including the myth of a common forbearer, etc.  The 
political instability that led to the demise of the Old Oyo Empire in the late 1800s can be 
traced to warfare and conquest.
Evident in the analysis too is the finding that political stability in pre-colonial 
polities in the Niger basin derived mostly from shared kinship patterns and was anchored 
in the authority patterns that existed in each respective nationality.  That evidence is 
profound amongst the Igbo, Yoruba and in Hausaland before the Fulani jihad.  Political 
stability did not stem from the conquest and domination that prevailed in Fulani-ruled 
Hausaland.  Instead, both phenomena enabled the Fulani to merely replace the Habe 
kings as autocrats and overlords in post-jihad Hausaland.  Simply put, we found that the 
absence of consonance and congruence in the authority patterns163 that prevail in and 
between component units that constitutes a polity would usually breed separatist crises of 
all types in a polity’s body politic.  
163 Included here are the sorts of social authority patterns that evolve between distinct 
peoples through marriage and are epitomized by kinship networks.
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Based on the aforementioned findings we can rightly argue that there is a 
similarity between age-old quests by conquered polities in the Old Oyo and Caliphate 
Empires to reassert their political independence and the ones later mounted by 
nationalities for self-determination in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state.  The quest by 
nationalities in the supra-national state to reassert their political autonomy is evident in 
the incidents of political instability that are regular features of politics in the latter.  In the 
colonial period members of most of the nationalities embarked on various forms of 
creative acts of political participation that ranged from armed resistance, revolts, riots, to 
rebellions and attempts to secede.  The story is similar during most of the post-colonial 
period.  There have been coups d’etat, attempted coups, coup plots, assassinations, 
regional rebellions, and a secessionist civil war.  Since British intervention and the 
imposition of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state, the incidence of creative acts of 
participation in each nationality has been a function of its members’ perception of the 
authority that they associate with either the British or the supra-national state.  The Igbo 
and Yoruba in particular, and also the peoples of the Niger delta, that have a negative 
perception of authority in the supra-national state have tended to engage in creative acts 
of participation more often than the Hausa-Fulani whose perception of that authority is 
positive.  In a related vein, we found that while there was resistance against colonial 
conquest in each nationality, there was an inverse relationship between political 
centralization and scope of political organization and degree of resistance in any given 
nationality.  
Resistance against colonial conquest was stiffer in Igboland and non-Caliphate 
parts of the upper Niger than in Yorubaland and Caliphate Hausaland.  Hence, there were 
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more incidents that involved British military forces in Igboland than there were in 
Yorubaland and Caliphate Hausaland.  Those incidents were all armed resistance against 
British conquest and occupation.  These findings are supported by the results from a 
census of incidents of political instability that occurred in the supra-national state in 
period 1861-1904 as presented in Table 6.1.  Table 6.2 clearly shows that in the lower 
Niger and parts of the upper the Igbo and other nationalities sustained their armed 
resistance against colonial occupation.  In Hausaland non-Fulani peoples of Satiru and 
Hedeija embarked on an extensive armed revolt in 1906 which the British and the Fulani 
ruling classes suppressed together (Adeleye 1972).  In the period 1914-1959 which 
witnessed the consolidation of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state during colonial rule 
Table 6.3 shows that the incidents of political instability had expanded in context and 
sophistication to include riots, demonstrations, armed revolts and rebellions, strikes in all 
nationalities except the Hausa-Fulani.  In the period 1960-present, which coincides with 
the era of post-colonialism, Table 6.4 shows that the incidents became even more 
sophisticated to include assassinations, coups and coup attempts, states of emergency, 
population contentions of all sorts, secession attempts and threats, etc.  Figure 6.1, which 
presents a matrix of the incidents and the periods that they occurred, elucidates the point 
further.
Aspects of the analysis in Chapter Three fore-shadow Hypothesis 3, which 
suggests that great disparity between the authority patterns of a supra-national state and 
those of its constituent nationalities is a recipe for political instability in the former.  The 
findings in that analysis indicate that the governmental and non-governmental authority 
patterns of the Igbo and the Yoruba are soundly democratic.  Evidence of that can be 
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Table 6.1: Output from a census of incidents of political instability in the supra-national state in 
the periods 1861-1903. Summary: § Igbo, ‡ Yoruba, † Core Caliphate parts of Hausaland, µ 
Other parts of Hausaland and the upper Niger.  Sources: Multiple; see Chapter Four.
Year
Nationality  
Involved Target Type of Incident
1886-1899
§‡†µ Nationalities in 
the 






Several acts of armed 
resistance numbering 
about fifty (50)
1894 The Itsekiri in the  
lower Niger
British Authority Several acts of armed 
resistance numbering 
about thirty (30)
1897 The Bini in the lower 
Niger
British Authority Several acts of armed 
resistance numbering 
April-May 1899
The Bini, in the 
lower Niger
British Authority
Several acts of armed 
resistance numbering
January-February 1897 µ Bida (Upper 




British Authority Armed resistance
February-March 1900 µ Tiv in the upper 
Niger




µ Yola in the upper 
Niger
British Authority Several acts of armed 
resistance
February-May 1900 µ Kaduna, µ Gurara, 
and 
µ Okwa in the upper 
Niger
British Authority Several acts of armed 
resistance numbering 
about three (3)
December 1900 and 
January-February 1901
µ Bida/Kontagora in 
the upper Niger British Authority Act of armed 
resistance numbering 
about two (2)
March-May 1901 Ishan/Ulia, lower 
Niger
British Authority Several acts of armed 
resistance
November 1901- March 
1902
§ Arochukwu and the 
Igbo heartland, lower 
Niger




§ Ogwashi Ukwu, 
§ Onitsha, § Ezi 
Asaba in western 
Igboland




found in the fact that all four dimensions of the influence relations, i.e. Directiveness, 
Participation, Responsiveness, and Compliance, in their respective authority patterns 
configure in a manner that ensures that the forms and practice of authority in their society 
is democratic. 
On the other hand findings in the same analysis show that authority patterns in 
Hausaland have been autocratic ever since the thirteenth/fourteenth centuries when the
Table 6.2: Output from a census of incidents of political instability in the supra-
national state in the periods 1904-1913.  Summary: § Igbo, ‡ Yoruba, † Core 
Caliphate parts of Hausaland, µ other parts of Hausaland and the upper Niger.  
Sources: Multiple; see Chapter Four.
February-March 1906 † Satiru, upper Niger 
The British and 




April 1906 † Hadeija in 
Hausaland, upper 
Niger
The British and 




February-March 1906 Tivland, upper Niger British Authority Several acts of armed 
resistance 
June-August 1906
§ Owa and § Agbo in 
western Igboland, 
lower Niger





µ Chibuk, upper 
Niger
British Authority Armed resistance
December 1908
µ Yonkwala and 
surrounding 
nationalities, lower 
and parts of upper 
Niger
British Authority Armed resistance (3)
November 1909-May 
1910
§Ogwashi Ukwu and 
other parts of western 
Igboland, lower 
Niger
British Authority Three (3) guerrilla 
insurrections
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Table 6.3: Output from a census of incidents of political instability in the supra-
national state in the periods 1914-1959.  Summary:  § Igbo, ‡ Yoruba, † Core 
Caliphate parts of Hausaland, µ other parts of Hausaland and the upper Niger.  
Sources: multiple; see Chapter Four.























§Bende, §Aba in 
the Igbo heartland 
in the lower Niger, 
and parts of the 
neighboring 




state and its 
authority
Seven (7) armed 
rebellions
November 1914




parts of the upper 
Niger that were 
forced into the new 





authority and the 
favored Fulani 
ruling classes
Three (3) armed 
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1914 † Hausa-Fulani 
ruling classes
The British Anti-amalgamation 
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1939 µ The Tiv, upper 
The ‘Nigerian’
supra-national Extensive armed 
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Niger state, its 
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Table 6.4: Output from a census of incidents of political instability in the supra-
national state in the periods 1960-1990.  Summary: § Igbo, ‡ Yoruba, † Core 
Caliphate parts of Hausaland, µ other parts of Hausaland and the upper Niger. 
Sources: multiple; see Chapter Four.















party and its 
leaders
State of emergency
1963 µThe Tiv, upper The Extensive armed 
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1963, 1964 §‡† µ All The Northern 
Peoples Congress 









state and the 
NPC
Secession threats













state and its 
authority
Secession attempt 
in the name of the 
Delta Peoples 
Republic
1967 † Hausa-Fulani The ‘Nigerian’
supra-national 
state and its 









state and its 
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Secession, in the 
name of the 
Republic of Biafra, 
civil war








1976 µ Nationalities 
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Hausa-Fulani, the 








control of the oil 
wealth mined in 
their homeland
1990 §‡ Officers from 








ruling groups and their leaders founded and transformed the old city states, which were 
later conquered by the Fulani during the jihad at the turn of the nineteenth century.  With 
influence relations that were devoid of the dimensions of Participation and 
Responsiveness, the practice of authority in Hausaland is characterized by regimented 
Directiveness and coerced Compliance both under the Sarkis and under the Fulani.
The analysis and findings in chapter four equally support Hypothesis 3.  They were used 
to establish that the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state was imposed through warfare and 
conquest and that its authority patterns are remarkably congruent and consonant with the 
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Strikes 62 Organized labor 
in townships
73,000 workers Organized 
disruptions of the 
economy aimed at 
bringing pressure 
to bear on the 
political and 
economic authority 




Few Specific groups Leaders Threats by leaders 
of specific groups 



























One Wide-spread in 
Yorubaland
Entire nationality Formal declaration 
of emergency in 
response to real 





Few Wide-spread in 
the nationality 
concerned
Entire nationality Rapidly developing 
situation that 
threatened to bring 

































Strikes Several Organized labor Millions Organized 
disruptions of the 
economy aimed at 
bringing pressure 
to bear on the 
political and 
economic authority 




Two Specific group Leaders (self-
appointed)
Unsuccessful 





Few Specific groups Leaders Threats by leaders 
of specific groups 




Several Directed at 
individuals
Identifiable plotters Politically 
motivated murder 
of a political figure 
by a group
Pogrom Several Directed at 





The systematic and 
organized killing of 
members of a 
nationality through 
mob actions








violent in response 




Six Directed at the 
regime of the 
day
Identifiable plotters Sudden and illegal 
displacement of 
regime by a 
relatively small, 






Two Directed at the 
regime of the 
day
Identifiable plotters Sudden and illegal 
attempt to displace 
regime by a 
relatively small, 




Coup plot Few Directed at the 
regime of the 
day
Identifiable plotters Plot to displace 
regime by a 
relatively small and 
elite group in the 
armed forces
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Civil war One A nationality Entire nationality.  
Lasted for 36 
months and cost 




attempted to form a 
new polity based 














activities aimed at 
realizing the 
restructure of the 
supra-national state 
in a SNC
∗These numbers were derived from several sources which did not reflect all incidents of 
political instability that have taken place in the supra-national state.
autocratic authority patterns of the Fulani-ruled Caliphate Empire.  Our findings further 
show that due to the autocratic traits in the authority patterns of the supra-national state, 
conflicts and issues that develop therein are seldom resolved peacefully within what 
Tsurutani (1968: 930) in an heuristic note on how to conduct comparative political 
analysis about stability and instability in polities called “the existing institutional 
framework for decision-making”.  In situations where such a scenario obtain, the state 
according to Tsurutani (1968: 911) hardly “enjoys genuine support” beyond limited parts 
of the polity.  In the case of the Niger basin “genuine support” for the ‘Nigerian’ supra-
national state beyond the core of the Caliphate society is sparse.
Eckstein’s congruence-consonance framework from which Hypothesis 3 was 
derived suggests in part that “a government will tend to be stable if its authority patterns 
are congruent with the other authority patterns of the society of which it is a part” 
(Eckstein 1992: 188).  That suggestion is underscored by the finding that a high degree of 
smoothness ensued in the practice of colonial authority in Hausaland sequel to the 
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alliance that developed between the Fulani ruling classes and the British a little after 
colonial conquest of the former.
For reasons implicit in Hypothesis 3 and in the analyses in chapters three and 
four, we found that from its inception the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state “did not enjoy 
the confidence of a large section of the community, especially in the South, but the case 
of the North was a different matter” (Osuntokun 1971: 172).  It is explicit from Tables 
6.1 and 2 that political instability preceded the consolidation of the supra-national state in 
1914.  They demonstrate that after the consolidation of the supra-national state the armed 
resistance provoked earlier in Yorubaland, Igboland, and Hausaland and elsewhere in the 
Niger basin by attacks against indigenous peoples by British-led forces quickly turned 
into more serious incidents of political instability.  Information contained in Table 6.1 
clearly shows an escalation from localized resistance to more serious and widespread 
incidents of political instability such as armed revolts, rebellions, demonstrations, riots, 
etc.  In Igboland and Yorubaland those revolts “were mainly directed against illegitimate 
rulers or illegitimate powers granted them by the colonial government” (Osutokun 1971: 
173).  But in Hausaland, they “were less serious and were caused by the resentments 
harbored against the British by princes who had failed to secure thrones because of their 
hostility to alien Nasara rule” (Osuntokun 1971: 173).
The suggestion in Hypothesis 3 that the disconnection between non-identical 
governmental authority patterns in a supra- national state and its constituent nationalities 
translate to durable source of friction that breeds political instability is evident in the 
information in Table 6.1.  The post-colonial period in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state 
is characterized by increased rate of different incidents of political instability.  Political 
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instability is no longer manifest in local revolts, demonstrations, strikes, and the like.  It 
acquired more serious dimensions as indicated by secession attempts, coup plots, coups 
d’etat, assassinations, civil war, pogroms, etc.  
The scenario of instability in the supra-national state is captured in Figure 6.5
below.  The direction of the arrows indicates causation and association.  The analysis in 
chapter five supports Hypothesis 4, which suggests that political instability is inevitable 
in a supra-national state that was imposed on socially and politically diverse nationalities 
by an external power through state building policies that favored one or more of them.  
The analysis suggests that when state building is accomplished in that manner it is bound 
to breed resentment of the ally or allies of the external power by the nationalities that felt 
shut out during and after the course of state building.  When colonial rule ends, it further 
suggests that the resentment will intensify especially if the favored nationality or 
nationalities institute a repressive hegemony over the rest.
Aspects of the findings in the analysis in Chapter Five show that indirect rule was 
implemented to favor and sustain the autocratic authority patterns of the Fulani rulers 
particularly because of their resemblance with those of the supra-national state, which 
were autocratic in both character and logic.  They further show that the motive to 
preserve the autocratic authority patterns in the Caliphate society inspired the 
amalgamation, which aided and abetted the extension of those same patterns to Igboland, 
Yorubaland, and the rest of the Niger basin.  We established in the analysis that the end 
of colonial rule was a virtual transition to Hausa-Fulani rule in the Niger basin.164  By 
164 Today any individual who is employed in the federal civil service or state-controlled 
corporation is mandated to furnish a letter of attestation and good conduct from the 
traditional ruler in his community before he or she can commence his/her employment.
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manipulating the outcome of the 1952-3 ‘national’ census165 the British were able to 
relinquish political power to the NPC on their conviction “that a ‘Nigerian’ government 
controlled by conservative Northern politicians would be more ‘stable’ and favourable to 
its interests” (Luckham 1971b: 208).  Amongst other things, we have established that 
with the amalgamation, the norms that supported and guided the practice of autocratic
authority in Hausaland were extended under the aegis of the supra-national state to all 
nationalities.  Preferential implementation of indirect rule and the amalgamation buoyed 
the Fulani rulers and encouraged them to develop a strong sense of identification with the 
British and the cause of colonial rule.  So strong and deep was their identification that 
they strongly opposed the quest by the Igbo and the Yoruba to achieve a quick 
termination of colonial rule.  Their reluctance and the eagerness of the others to terminate 
colonial rule produced enduring animosities that augured badly for political stability in 
the supra-national state.  For instance attempts by politicians from lower Niger 
nationalities to sell their demand for immediate termination of colonial rule to inhabitants 
of Hausaland during a tour of cities in the upper Niger provoked riots that targeted 
residents from the lower Niger.  This was in 1953, and Hausa-Fulani political leaders 
who believed that anti-colonial campaign jeopardized their authority incited those riots 
(Luckham 1971a).
165 That census exercise generated the crisis and acrimony that affected the conduct and 
outcome of 1963 census.  The supra-national state did not recover from the inter-group 
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Historical Factors Continuing Factors
Still Present: Still Present:
Distinct, unshared Loyalties
+
Primordial Social         + Social discon-
Structures       + nections
Intra-nationality
Cohesive Attitudes
                               +     
No Sense of + Heterogeneous
Nationhood Authority Patterns
                                                                  +                              +   
   Unstable Polity
Figure 6.5: A legacy of instability from diverse factors
Source: Eckstein (1992: 182), with some modifications
We found in Chapter Five that preferential implementation of colonial policy on 
education continues to breed political instability in various ways in the supra- national 
state.  It is due partly to differences in the implementation of colonial education policy in 
the upper and lower Niger, that the authority of the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state is 
perceived differently by the Igbo and Yoruba on the one hand, and the Hausa-Fulani on 
the other.  The different forms of socialization and preparation that individuals from the 
animosity created by the outcome of both census exercises.  
369
three nationalities who played major roles in government during the immediate post-
colonial period received through western education influenced their worldviews and 
expectations of each other.166  Those disparities tended to influence their attitudes 
towards one another and their perceptions of the authority of the supra-national state 
when they assumed positions of power and authority in the supra-national state (Nicolson 
1969).167  The contents and nature of socialization in western education received by all 
political actors from Hausaland hardly prepared them sufficiently for the political roles 
that most of their counterparts and members of the larger society in both Igboland and 
Yorubaland expected of them.168  Although it is not proven here, it is likely that their 
166 Recall the dialogue that we reproduced in Chapter Five that took place between 
Nnamdi Azikiwe and Ahmadu Bello as reported by John Paden (1986: 3) in which the 
latter responded to the suggestion by the former that they forget their differences with the 
reminder that it is only by recognizing that they are Christians/Easterners and 
Muslims/Northerners respectively that they can forge a viable polity together.
167 Nicolson argues that Frederick Lugard and the personalities whom he attracted and 
surrounded himself with to further his state building in the Niger basin were mainly 
products of the immediate epoch in English life.  They came from “the ruling and officer 
classes, the gentry, and those who sought identification with the gentry” (Nicolson 1969: 
125).  Not only were they conservative, they were also highly disdainful of the modern 
industrial age and everyone—lawyers, traders, missionaries, etc.--who were associated 
with it.  There was indeed an ongoing schism in English life at the time involving those 
conservative elements and those who were associated with the modern era which was 
closing in fast on the immediate era.  That schism became projected to state building in 
the Niger basin.  Because of the Fulani ruling classes and their feudalist and autocratic 
authority patterns, the upper Niger attracted “the attention of the consciously ‘superior’ 
classes, the officers and gentlemen—and that helped to repel and antagonize the rest, the 
traders and missionaries busy and influential” (Nicolson 1969: 126) in the lower Niger.  
“It was in [the upper Niger] far removed from civil influences of traders, lawyers, 
missionaries, and an established civil service tradition, that the military class gained the 
upper hand, and superimposed itself on the existing form of rule by the Fulani Emirs, 
themselves a military ruling class” (Nicolson 1969: 127).  They were bent on instituting 
policies that would “convert ‘education’ into a means of autocratic discipline, …replace 
‘unreliable’ and ‘half-educated’ Southerners in the railways and in the civil service [with] 
West Indians in large numbers, and … muzzle the Lagos press” (Nicolson 1969: 214).
168 The truth of this assertion is underscored by the fact that the majority of political 
actors from Hausaland and the rest of the upper Niger are still members of the Fulani 
ruling classes and those who identify with what they represent.
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chronic failure to meet the expectation of the Igbo and Yoruba can partly be attributed to 
their previous socialization in those ‘norms and behavior’ that are only suitable for the 
practice of autocratic authority.
The fact that the practice of authority in Hausa-Fulani Caliphate society are 
steeped deeply in a ‘patronage-clientage system’169 (Tibenderana 1989: 72), and were all 
accommodated in the supra-national state, produced the situation in which Hausa-Fulani 
political actors often initiated policies to enhance the proportion of upper Niger personnel 
in the army and civil services.  It is probably because “the use of public office or 
authority for private gain” (Smith 1964: 164) is condoned and accepted as an inherent 
component of governance in Hausaland that more often than not, in the other nationalities 
amongst whom such norms do not guide “relations of political solidarity and rivalry, and 
relations between rulers and ruled,” (Smith 1964: 164) the perception is that Hausa-
Fulani political actors exercise authority in undemocratic, corrupt and intolerant ways in 
the supra-national state.  This line of argument may rightly require us to furnish evidence 
why the same assertion should not be made about political actors from nationalities in the 
lower Niger.  In the absence of concrete evidence, it is still logical to point out that client-
patronage connections are not a common part of authority patterns amongst the Igbo and 
Yoruba.
 The January 15, 1966 military coup, and subsequent events which epitomized 
poor political performance in the supra-national state, can be used to further the response 
169 The patron-client system “is an exclusive relation of mutual benefit which holds 
between two persons defined as a socially and politically unequal, and which stresses 
their solidarity” (Smith 1960: 8).  It disposes all classes of people in Hausaland to the 
control and direction of influential individuals (Watt 1983).  The claim that British 
colonial rule sent the system into decline (Tibernderana 1989) is discredited by Yeld 
(1960) and Smith (1960, 1964).
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made above.  The junior officers of Igbo and Yoruba origin who planned and executed 
that event were mainly provoked by their perception that the conservative leaders of the 
Northern Peoples Congress (NPC)—the Hausa-Fulani party that controlled power in the 
supra-national state, exercised their authority in a corrupt manner (Luckham 1971b: 391).  
A year before that coup, it was the same perception that fueled a wide-spread rumor 
among senior officers in the army who were mostly Igbo that the Fulani defense minister 
would introduce compulsory retirement to pave the way for junior officers from upper 
Niger nationalities to take their places (Luckham 1971b).  The bid by the Igbo in 1967 to 
secede from the supra-national state and found a brand new state that they called the 
Republic of Biafra can be traced to the failure of Hausa-Fulani political actors who 
controlled authority in the supra-national state to meet their expectations of egalitarian 
leadership devoid of corruption (Luckham 1971a: 401).
Eckstein’s assertion (1969: 278) on the importance of previously learned norms
and behavior in preparing political actors for future political roles, and the importance of 
their ‘concurrent social roles’ not confronting them with demands of ‘norms and 
practices’ that ‘create sharp strains or painful ambivalences and contradictions with their 
political roles’, can be applied to the Hausa-Fulani.  The involvement of the Igbo, Yoruba 
and the other nationalities whose authority patterns are democratic and who were not 
recipients of conservative socialization prompted them to Responsiveness demands on 
Hausa-Fulani political actors.  Another assertion made by Eckstein, that the nature of 
socialization received by political actors could lead to a situation in which “the norms and 
practices demanded by their concurrent social roles, [could] create sharp strains or 
political ambivalences and contradictions with their political ones” (Eckstein 1969: 278), 
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could logically be applied to Hausa-Fulani political actors in their practice of authority in 
the supra-national state.  Preferential formulation and implementation of colonial 
education policy have not augured well at all for political performance in the supra-
national state.
We found that Britain’s colonial education policy in the Niger basin constituted 
an integral aspect of its state building undertaking (Gutteridge 1970) which produced a 
durable and self-perpetuating imbalance in western education between the nationalities of 
the upper Niger and those in the lower Niger.  Aspects of our findings in chapter five 
show that from the outset nationalities in the upper Niger have lagged far behind their 
counterparts in the lower Niger in western education.  In the 1958-65 period for instance, 
only 3,557 out of the 7,037 boys from the upper Niger who sat the final secondary school 
certificate examinations passed.  In contrast, 30,906 out of the 50,343 boys from the 
lower Niger who sat the same examination in the same period passed (Miners 1971: 117).  
It cannot be over-emphasized that some of the crises that bedevil inter-nationality 
relations since the end of de facto colonial rule in the Niger basin can be traced to 
Britain’s colonial policy on education in the area.  No aspect of the structures of the 
supra-national state has escaped the crises that stem from this state building policy.  But it 
is particularly notable that the ones that take place in the army have each time quickly 
blossomed into coups, coup plots and attempted coups that wrack the supra-national state 
from time to time.  It’s not just in the military that the imbalance in the possession of 
western education between the nationalities has contributed to crises that impact 
negatively on political performance in the supra-national state.  The Igbo, the Yoruba and 
others often complain that by virtue of the worldview held by Hausa-Fulani political 
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actors, the grip on political power in the polity translates to a hegemony that retards the 
collective progress of other nationalities.  Hence, their relentless campaign for a 
Sovereign National Conference (SNC) to restructure the polity and devolve political 
power back to nationalities who would then co-exist in a confederate polity.  Since the 
late 1980s that agitation has grown increasingly militant and more contentious.170
More than any of the other three state building policies analyzed in chapter five, 
we found that the policy of preferential recruitment into the military forces of the supra-
national state is the one that transformed a principal state institution into a tool that is 
adopted every now and then by members of nationalities who resort to creative acts of 
participation when they could no longer tolerate the normatively impeded channels of 
Participation in the polity.  In Chapter Five we alluded to the aspect of the E-G scheme 
which highlights the destabilizing potentials of creative acts of participation in a social 
unit by members who lack access to normatively provided channels of Participation and 
used it to give credence to our assertion about the reaction of nationalities who are averse 
to how authority in the supra-national state is practiced.  We can cite instances with some 
of the military coups that have wracked political performance in the supra-national state 
to underscore the validity of the Eckstein-Gurr scheme on the destabilizing and 
subversive potentials of creative acts of participation in societies with impeded channels.  
The January 15, 1966 coup took place at a time when most nationalities, 
particularly in the lower Niger believed that it was impossible to remove the NPC, the 
conservative Hausa-Fulani party from power through normatively approved means, i.e. a 
170 Since the 1980s most of the nationalities in the lower Niger have established 
respective apex movements or organizations through which they champion the struggle 
for restructuring.
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free and fair democratic election.  We will resort to a projection that is neither 
demonstrated nor demonstrable to make argument here.  Members of other nationalities 
believed that it was only by creative and extra-ordinary means that the corrupt, nepotistic, 
and tribalistic regime of the Hausa-Fulani politicians whose leader we learnt was 
socialized to dress and act to intimidate people (Paden 1986) must be terminated.  Hence 
the vocal calls in the media at the time for the army to intervene (Luckham 1971a and 
1971b).  Who else harkened to those calls, if not Igbo and Yoruba officers in the army!  
They did, but not on “tribalistic lines” (Luckham 1971b: 391).  According to Luckham, 
“Many army officers, like other groups of southern intellectuals, tended to attribute all 
the political shortcomings of the regime to the Northern People’s Congress’s control of 
the political life of the Federation” (Luckham 1971b: 41).  Perhaps their attachment to the 
‘norms’ that guide the practice of authority in their indigenous society may have 
motivated them to take creative measures to terminate the monopoly of power by the 
NPC, which they saw as an obstacle to national unity (Luckham 1971b).  Twenty-four 
years later, in 1990 a similar factor may have motivated other middle ranking officers 
from the lower Niger who acted creatively to oust the dictator General Ibrahim 
Babangida from power.  Their first order of business was to eviscerate core Caliphate 
parts of the upper Niger from the supra-national state pending the acceptance of an 
unconditional undertaking by their Hausa-Fulani ruling classes that they were willing to 
denounce hegemony and accept to co-exist democratically and harmoniously with other 
nationalities. 
Issues concerning the motives of the makers of the January 15, 1966 and 
subsequent coups need be raised and addressed here.  Conventionally, the cycle of coups 
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in the supra-national state is attributed to competition for the control of state power and 
the resources that it makes available to senior officers and their civilian allies.  It is true 
that aspects of the aforementioned conventional explanation have indeed motivated coups 
and coup plots in the supra-national state.  However, an analysis that factors in relevant 
social science findings on the organization of the military and civil-military relations in 
society in the examination of the military establishment in the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national 
state, i.e. its origin/role in colonial conquest, the policies that guide the recruitment of 
personnel into it and its composition, suggests that conventional explanation of the 
motives of military coup-makers is rather insufficient.171
My informed assessment is that conventional explanation is mostly derived from 
the position that universally and institutionally the military establishment is uniquely the 
same, rigidly conservative and undemocratic.  Going by all that we have already 
established about the plurality of society on the one hand, and the plurality of authority 
patterns and the norms and values that guide the practice of authority in each of the 
diverse nationalities that constitute the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national, it is rather self-limiting 
to box its military establishment into one analytic civil-military relations framework.  Our 
preference is for an analysis that properly situates the possible sociological of norms and 
values possessed by the indigenous men who enlisted in the officer corps when it was 
opened up to them on the subjective and objective imperatives of a military institution 
that was established and commanded exclusively by Englishmen.
171 Findings from the analysis conducted by B. J. Takaya and S. A. Tyoden (1987) on two 
failed coups that took place in 1976 and 1986 respectively are quite revealing.  The list of 
those executed for their participation or involvement in those two events indicated that all 
of them were members of non-Fulani nationalities in the upper Niger:  all were Christians 
from southern Zaria and the Middle Belt.   
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It is on the strength of the above that we are inclined to argue further as follows.  
In civil-military relations studies, it is true that generally, the army is a segmental unit of 
society with a reputation of not functioning by democratic norms and practices.  It is 
equally true that because of “the importance of order, hierarchy, and division of 
functions” (Boene 1990: 14) in the discharge of its assigned role in the polity, the army 
functions by authority patterns that are, in general, the antithesis of democratic authority 
patterns.  However, apart from Samuel P. Huntington (1957)172 who argued otherwise, 
there are several other scholars who study military organization who believe that military 
organization and officership is not static, that they change in response to changing social 
conditions (Janowitz 1960, Lason 1974, Boene 1990).  These other scholars have argued 
in their own studies that notwithstanding the rigid and stratified a symmetry as well as 
authoritarianism that characterize the military organization, it is not just “military 
authority and career experiences [that] condition the perspectives of its leaders” 
(Janowitz 1960: 15).  These scholars believe that the perspectives of both officers and 
enlisted men are shaped by their social background.  Janowitz (1960), one of the foremost 
authorities in the study of civil-military relations, believes that “the objective, normative 
and subjective aspects of military service” (Boene 1990: 17) are not cast in stone, i.e. 
they are prone to changes.173  Bernard Boene (1990: 19) who lined up support for 
172 See Huntington, Samuel P. (1957). The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics 
of Civil-Military Relations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  Boene (1990: 
23) described the book as the embodiment of “somewhat outlandish conservative, 
promilitary stance” by Huntington.
173 See Janowitz, Morris (1960). The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political 
Portrait. New York: The Free Press.  Boene (1990: 23) praised the book for its 
“penetrating analysis … effective combination of thorough empirical research, Weberian 
concepts and theory, functional analysis, pragmatic realism and democratic concerns” 
and for being consistent with existing facts about military organization and exposing new 
ones.
377
Janowitz with his own published findings argued that in the period 1870-1950 in Europe 
“social origin” and “self-selection of authoritarian personalities” are partly responsible 
for the very “substantive conservative ideology” of the military in that part of the world 
that Huntington in his own work used as the basis of his argument that everywhere, at all 
times, the military—its officer corps particularly—is inherently authoritarian and 
conservative.  Thus, the officer corps is composed of two Weberian ideal type 
components: those who are basically concerned about practicing their profession, the 
advancement of their careers, etc.; and those who are in contrast more idealistic, and 
driven by social concerns.  The corps can be seen as coalescing into the elite “highest 
ranking officers” (Janowitz 1960: 6), and the “lower-ranking officers” (Janowitz 1960: 6) 
who wield a lot of power, and “influence the outcome of military decisions” (Janowitz 
1960: 7) mostly because their senior colleagues rely on their advice and special skills 
(Janowitz 1960).   According to Janowitz, it is “the elite concept”, which derives from 
“the formal structure of the military establishment … [that also] makes it possible to 
distinguish those members [of the officers corps] who use their skills to achieve social 
and political ends from those who are content to practice their profession for personal and 
immediate rewards” (Janowitz 1960: 6-7).  Janowitz’s argument that shifts in “the social 
base of officer recruitment” (Boene 1990: 21) and the diversification of the membership 
of the officer corps amongst other factors tend to affect the content of the conservatism 
that characterize military organizations seemed to hold true in the case of the army in the 
supra-national state.  There is no doubt that “[t]he colonial government in Nigeria created 
a military organization … which was modeled on the British army in organizational 
format and professional training” (Luckham 1971b: 1).  But the opening of the officer 
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corps to indigenous men was one of the events that we can equate with the kind of shifts 
that Janowitz talked about.  In the case of the supra-national state the shift in “the social 
base of officer recruitment” was largely responsible for remodeling an army that was 
basically established for conquest and colonization.  Luckham (1971b: 1) sees that 
remodeling as the violation of “the Sandhurst formula of political neutrality of the 
military”, but rightly attributes it to “pressure from the primordialisms of tribe and 
region”.  To assume that indigenous men who were socialized from childhood to respect 
and cherish different social norms and values and behaviors that can be associated with 
them would be transformed for good into the British officers they replaced because of the 
socialization they received in the army is not plausible.  
The officers who planned the coup of January 15, 1966 fall into the category of 
officers “who use their skills to achieve social and political ends”.174  They fit Janowitz’s 
description of “lower-ranking officers [who] wield considerable power” and were 
prepared to exercise it for a desired purpose different from advancing their personal 
careers (Janowitz 1960: 7).  If one removes the Fulani leaders who controlled authority in 
the supra-national state at the time and replaced them with the British, leaving every 
other thing untouched, my assessment is that the coup could still have taken place.  
Officers and men from the upper Niger in the army, who were not immune to the 
circumstances that prevailed in their own social background either, simply perceived the 
174 The deployment of the army under the command of at least three of the leaders of the 
1966 coup in Tivland in the period 194-65 marked the very first time when a military 
deployment in that area was not characterized by pillage.  The fact that the only seats 
won by any of the parties that opposed the NPC in the upper Niger in the 1964 federal 
elections was in Tivland adds credence that those officers who commanded the 
deployment actually used “their skills to achieve social and political ends” (Janowitz 
1960: 6-7).  Miners (1971: 178) allege that their “distaste … in the employment of the 
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January 1966 coup as an unconscionable conspiracy against their leadership.  We can 
attribute their perception of that event partly to their strong attachment to the ‘norms’ that 
guide the practice of authority in the Caliphate society.  As far as they were concerned 
what the peoples of the lower Niger considered as corrupt, nepotistic and tribalistic 
misuse of power was basically the patronage-clientage system, one of the components of 
their authority patterns at work.  Without it most of them could not have been in the army 
to begin with.  Their counter coup that took place in July 1966 was not an act of 
participation at all.  It was a quintessence reaction by soldiers from upper Niger who 
acted to avenge the death of their benefactors who lost their lives in the previous coup.  
Luckham (1971b: 1) sees their reaction as a conflict with “the undertone of populistic 
(sic) revolt of junior officers and NCOs [from the upper Niger] against the high command 
[mostly Igbo]”, that broke out in the army “which aligned officers of different regions 
and ethnic groups against each other”.  Their initial resolve to “secede en masse from” 
(Luckham 1971b: 391) the supra-national state was on the grounds that it had fallen into 
the control of members of nationalities—particularly the Igbo—that do not share their 
worldview on power and authority.175
Army on such tasks may well have been one of the reasons which led them to take part in 
the conspiracy”.
175 The coup which entailed the systematic annihilation of the Igbo in the army and the 
subsequent pogrom of Igbo residents of cities in the upper Niger immersed the supra-
national state in a 37-month long war of succession with the breakaway Igbo dominated 
Republic of Biafra.  The war which was prosecuted like a jihad by a War Council based 
in the Hausa-Fulani city of Kaduna (Ochoche 1987) helped the Fulani aristocracy classes 
to assume effective control over the army—the main factor that makes a critical 
difference in the power-authority equation in the supra-national state.  Ever since, it has 
been a Gramscian situation:  ‘The “normal” exercise of hegemony …characterized by the 
combination of force and consent’.  Whenever they find it too risky to utilize force they 
utilize ‘corruption-fraud’ instead, to ‘enervate and paralyze any antagonistic nationality in 
the supra-national state’ (Antonio Gramsci, Quaderni del Carcere, in Perry Anderson, 
“Editorial”, NLR, 17, Sept.-Oct. 2002: 8).
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We can also raise and address a hypothetical question which could help us to 
further examine the motives of coup-makers in the supra-national state: Did the leaders of 
the 1966 coup for instance, make plausible claims that they were motivated by a desire to 
restore democracy?  In the address that he made on the radio at midday on January 15, 
Major Nzeogwu was specific.  “Our enemies” he said “are the political profiteers, 
swindlers, the men in the high and low places that seek bribes and demand ten percent, 
those that seek to keep the country divided permanently so that they can remain in office 
as ministers and VIPs of waste, the tribalists, the nepotists, …those that have corrupted 
our society and put the ‘Nigerian’ political calendar back by their words and deeds” (in 
Kirk-Green 1971: 126).
Another issue that touches on the motivation of particularly the January 15, 1966 
coup makers who were mostly Igbo is the one that says that their intention was to impose 
a hegemony that favored the Igbo.  Hard facts tend to show otherwise.  In 1966 the 
composition of the category of the officer corps where the coup-makers came from 
favored the Igbo and Yoruba against upper Niger nationalities.  That was because of the 
principal reason that beginning from 1944 when the British War Office opened up the 
corps to indigenous men up until the eve of independence in 1959, few men from the 
upper Niger had the requisite qualifications in western education to merit acceptance into 
the corps.  We established in chapter five that colonial education policy was responsible 
for the education gap that exist between the nationalities in the upper and lower Niger.  
Data furnished by Miners (1971) and Luckham (1971b) in their study of the army in the 
‘Nigerian’ supra-national state show that before independence, out of the 57 indigenous 
men in the corps, a mere 14% (8) were from the upper Niger, while 86% (49) were from 
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the lower Niger.176  More than sixty-five percent of those 57 indigenous men were Igbo.  
In January 1966, 86% (46) of the senior members of the corps were Igbo (32) and Yoruba 
(14) respectively.  The 1958 and 1959 cohorts from amongst which came the leaders of 
the 1966 coup number a total of 36—twenty-seven (27) were from the lower Niger and 
only nine (9) were from the upper Niger.  Hence, Ruth First in her study of the January 
15, 1966 coup argues that it “was not an Ibo coup with motives of tribal domination.  It 
was a coup inspired by widespread political grievances” (First 1970: 300).  She believes 
that “the coup grew out of the angry … political purposes of young officers, who shared 
the disgust of their generation at the iniquity of the politicians, not least their use of the 
army to further their purposes” (First 1970: 300).  A planned deployment of the army by 
the Hausa-Fulani-controlled NPC central government to quell political riots and uprisings 
in Yorubaland over the outcome of the 1964-5 elections—which it rigged in favor of its 
allies in Tivland and Yorubaland—was partly responsible for inciting the coup plotters to 
strike at that time (Miners 1971).  As Major Nzeogwu, one of the planners of the coup 
disclosed in a newspaper interview, “The public is still largely unaware of the fact that a 
gigantic military operation over the Western Region was to swoop down on that territory 
on January 17.  The incident that was associated with January 15 today was to take place 
sometime later, that is the following month.  When therefore the significance of the state 
of emergency due to be proclaimed on January 17 was made known to us, it became 
inevitable that the operation of January 15 must necessarily take place before the dawn of 
January 17” (Nzeogwu, ‘Nigerian’ Tribune, July 2, 1967 in Luckham 1971b: 41).
176 All but one (Hassan Usman Katsina) of these individuals hailed from non-core 
Caliphate areas of the upper Niger.  The others were Kanuri (4), and the Middle Belt
(3)—See Miners (1971: 39 and 51).
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Similar arguments cannot be made about the July 1966 coup makers.  The 
principal actors in this coup were all members of the cohort that benefited from the extra-
ordinary efforts made by Hausa-Fulani leaders to reshape the officer corps in their favor.  
The ring leader of that event—Murtala Muhammed—was the nephew of the defense 
minister, who was a Hausa-Fulani (Luckham 1971a and 1971b).
Policy Implications 
We posed a range of theoretical questions in Chapter One to guide us in the study.  
Each of those questions raised issues that we tried to explore in the course of our 
discourse.  One of the issues raised by some of the theoretical questions concerns the 
persistence of indigenous authority patterns into the present in the various nationalities 
that constitute the ‘Nigerian’ supra-national state.  We argued in the study that it is 
plausible or “intuitive” but not proven that they persist.  The search for evidence that they 
persist could be an important topic for future research.  But the issues raised by those 
questions have policy implications as far as state building in the Niger basin is concerned. 
The findings in the study support the assertion that state building in the Niger 
basin is incomplete.  For state building to be successful it must reflect the realities and 
aspirations of the inhabitants of any given geographical space.  In an environment like the 
Niger basin where the age-old configuration of societies is in terms of the distinctiveness 
of the inhabiting nationalities, attempts to organize them under new socio -political 
arrangements must acknowledge and accommodate their respective social and political 
distinctiveness.  To do that is the only way through which the specific political elements 
or the “internal authority relations” (Eckstein 1969: 277) of their ‘non-governmental 
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institutions’ which serve as the basis for ‘governmental stability’ in societies can be 
accommodated.
Like racial and ethnic groups or ‘communities’ nationalities ‘have moral rights 
and claims (Van Dyke 1971 and 1974) and obligations that must be recognized in 
societies (Huntington 1982).  The Jeffersonian model of organizing the affairs of 
inhabitants of the state in Western Europe and North America is unsuitable for the Niger 
basin.  The distinct political systems and socio-political organization of the inhabitants of 
the Niger basin are indeed part of their ‘moral rights and claims’ that the British were 
unwilling to accommodate across the board and without bias.  To say this does not imply 
that one is oblivious of the aims and motives of European colonial intervention in Africa.  
Europe’s state building endeavors in Africa were meant to establish the institutional 
structures that could promote and perpetuate the control and exploitation of Africans.  As 
we established earlier, in our discourse on the practice of authority in Hausaland during 
the time of the Habe kings and in the post-jihad period under the Fulani rulers, control 
and exploitation of society by rulers can only take place in undemocratic polities.
What prevailed in the Niger basin is typical of the British in the rest of the 
continent where they intervened in state building.  The French, who went about their 
colonial intervention in Africa in a slightly different style, were still able to arrive at the 
similar end products (Mair 1969, Crowder 1964).  Speaking in comparative terms of 
European colonial intervention in Africa, after the British the French are the next set of 
Europeans whose involvement and activities produced legacies that reshaped the socio-
political lives of a big proportion of distinct African peoples.  Like the British, the 
heterogeneity of Africa’s socio-political landscape compelled the French to formulate a 
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policy of indirect rule as an integral component of their state building repertoires in the 
parts of the continent that they acquired and converted into their colonial possession.  But 
unlike the British who harnessed the authority patterns in nationalities where the practice 
of authority is authoritarian, the French preferred to dismantle all indigenous authority 
patterns to pave the way for the vast supra-national polity into which they molded all 
their West African possessions.  
The policies that the French formulated to facilitate the imposition of that huge 
monolithic colonial polity which functioned as an appendage of the French Republic 
included those that divided indigenous nationalities into artificial cantons in the bid to 
suppress their traditional authority patterns and influence relations.  The social Darwinian 
mindset “that French civilization is necessarily the best and need only be presented to the 
intelligent African for him to adopt it” (Crowder 1964: 203) guided their colonial policy 
of molding Africans into Frenchmen.  They succeeded in instituting and transforming the 
commensurate patterns of authority and influence relations, which enabled them to 
practice authoritarian authority through assimilated Africans during colonial rule.  
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APPENDIX 1
Appendix 1: The configuration of socio-political and economic systems and organization 
amongst the Igbo, Yoruba and Hausa-Fulani.
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